VZCZCXRO9687
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHLO #1851 2231436
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 111436Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3129
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T LONDON 001851 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UK IR
SUBJECT: IRAN:  FCO SHARES LESSONS LEARNED ON DETAINEES 
 
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Greg Berry, rea sons 1.4 (b) and (d).  

¶1.  (S) SUMMARY:  In a meeting with Iran Watcher (poloff) August 11, Will Gelling, Tom Burn and Rachel Martinek of the FCO's Iran office shared lessons learned from the detention of British sailors by Iran in 2007 and more recently the arrest of nine local staff members from the British Embassy in Tehran.  They also provided an update on the status of their senior locally engaged political analyst, XXXXXXXXXXXX, currently one of dozens of subjects of a show trial underway in Tehran.  A legal analysis provided to the UK Embassy in Tehran by XXXXXXXXXXXX (strictly protect) has been sent via classified e-mail to NEA/IR.  END SUMMARY.  

UK SAILORS AND EMBASSY STAFF; DIFFERENT STAKES, DIFFERENT APPROACHES  

¶2.  (S) Although none of the three FCO officers were involved directly in securing the release of the UK sailors detained in 2007, they were able to share a few points on the approach of HMG to the crisis.  Tom Burn, fresh back from Tehran after being expelled by the IRIG last month (Note: He was the political officer expelled as part of the tit for tat expulsion of two UK diplomats from Tehran and two Iranian officials from London.  End note.), said lobbying by "unexpected actors" had paid dividends in the case of the UK sailors.  The sailors were captured by the IRGC navy about a week before an OIC ministerial meeting, and HMG lobbied Gulf states vigorously in advance of the ministerial to raise the issue with Iranian FM Mottaki.  Mottaki is known to have delivered the message back to Tehran that the IRIG had run afoul not only of the UK, but of regional governments as well.  Ali Larijani, who at the time was Supreme National Security Council Secretary and represented a more pragmatic counterpoint to the IRGC, also was an important conduit to the regime.  The UK also came out quickly and forcefully in public with its version of events (i.e., that the soldiers were unlawfully captured in international waters), but refused to respond to taunts from the IRIG.  

¶3.  (S) The cases of the UK Embassy local staff detained by the IRIG required a different approach.  Unlike in the case of the sailors, Gulf states, while sympathetic, declined to intervene with the IRIG on behalf of the embassy staffers for fear of being accused of "interfering in internal Iranian politics."  Turkey, however, had proved extremely helpful in delivering strongly-worded messages to the IRIG on behalf of HMG.  But it appears that EU unity proved one of the most crucial elements in securing the release of the embassy staff.  HMG was able to tell the IRIG that if the staff were not released by date "x," the EU would take unified action against Iran.  

UK LOCAL STAFFER INCLUDED IN SHOW TRIAL  

¶4.  (S) HMG remains very concerned about the fate of its senior local political analyst, XXXXXXXXXXXX, who is one of dozens of defendants in the ongoing show trial in Tehran. FCO provided poloff with an analyis of the "trial" by XXXXXXXXXXXX (strictly protect). (Note:  The analysis was sent by classified e-mail to NEA/IR.  End note.)  It is difficult to know how long the trial will last, as it is clear the proceedings are a political process aimed at intimidating the opposition, not a legal one. Meanwhile, HMG continues to demand the charges against XXXXXXXXXXXX be dropped and all embassy staff be permitted to return to work.  Visit London's Classified Website: XXXXXXXXXXXX 
LeBaron