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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM903, NCP UNHELPFUL ON ABYEI, SPLM RELUCTANT ON ELECTIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM903 2009-08-05 09:22 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO5032
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0903/01 2170922
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 050922Z AUG 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4196
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000903 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/E, DRL 
NSC FOR MGAVIN 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM EPET SOCI SU
SUBJECT:  NCP UNHELPFUL ON ABYEI, SPLM RELUCTANT ON ELECTIONS 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  In separate meetings with visiting Deputy Chief 
of Mission Mark Asquino, USAID Mission Director William Hammink, and 
Washington-based staff; senior Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) 
and Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) officials expressed 
frustration with the National Congress Party's (NCP) response to the 
Abyei ruling and expressed pessimism about the prospects of 
elections taking place.  GOSS officials expressed wariness of the 
NCP's offer of an electoral alliance, which lacks political appeal, 
but may be essential to securing Khartoum's cooperation on key 
issues, including the referendum.  END SUMMARY. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
GOSS: ABYEI DECISION ACCEPTABLE, NCP REACTION UNHELPFUL 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2. (SBU) Senior SPLM and GOSS officials expressed satisfaction with 
the Abyei Arbitration Tribunal's resolution of the Abyei area's 
borders, but noted deep disappointment and concern over the NCP's 
response to the ruling.  GOSS President Salva Kiir Mayardit, 
speaking before a July 30 Martyrs' Day audience of ministers, 
soldiers, donors, and Juba citizens, reaffirmed his acceptance of 
the Abyei ruling and clarified that it protects Misseriya grazing 
rights and does not, in itself, effect Abyei's secession.  He 
announced that he had invited Ngok and Misseriya leaders to Juba to 
discuss their misgivings about the ruling. 
 
3. (SBU) Kiir noted, however, that "some people are trying to cause 
unnecessary problems."  In a private meeting, Minister of 
Presidential Affairs Luka Biong Deng, described President Bashir's 
response to the ruling as pandering to the Misseriya and seeking a 
larger voting role for the tribe in the Abyei referendum than the 
Abyei Protocol prescribes.  Biong Deng argued that Bashir's response 
had deeply damaged the prospects of the parties' cooperation on 
other issues, including in the trilateral talks with the U.S. 
Special Envoy. 
 
4. (SBU) GOSS officials projected confidence in public and private 
that the North-South Boundary Commission will conclude that oil-rich 
Heglig and other disputed areas belong in the South.  Biong Deng 
urged the U.S. to participate actively in the border-resolution 
process; however, and noted that he expects that some of the 
contested areas may require additional arbitration in The Hague. 
 
5. (SBU) On the issue of Abyei-derived oil revenues, GOSS Ministry 
of Finance sources told ConGen Juba that they, their Government of 
National Unity (GNU) counterparts and Norwegian oil experts, are 
making estimates of how the South's share of future and previously 
remitted oil revenues will change in response to the Abyei ruling. 
This process of netting the parties' obligations to each other will 
be complex, and it is difficult to tell which side will be owed 
money when the analysis is complete.  Minister of Regional 
Cooperation, Oyai Deng Ajak, doubted that the GNU's finances would 
allow it to pay any arrears owed to the South, should the balance be 
in GOSS's favor.  (It would presumably be the same if the South owes 
arrears to the North.) 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
ELECTIONS LESS LIKELY, UNLESS ON NCP TERMS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
6. (SBU) GOSS officials agreed that the NCP badly wants the boost of 
a national electoral victory, and they argued that this is driving 
its calculations on other key aspects of CPA implementation.  Biong 
Deng argued that if the NCP were to have an election on terms that 
would protect its position, "everything else would be fine."  He 
stated that the NCP's intransigence in negotiations on the 
referendum law is a tactic to secure SPLM's electoral cooperation, 
although SPLM Deputy Secretary General Anne Itto argued that the NCP 
was most interested in the negotiation of post-referendum 
arrangements. 
 
7. (SBU) Biong Deng and Deng Ajak reported that the NCP has offered 
an electoral alliance to the SPLM.  Deng Ajak argued that there was 
no political gain to be had from such a pact, which he said would do 
grave damage to the SPLM's image.  Biong Deng argued that SPLM 
members who "would have been happy to help Bashir" may have changed 
their mind after the NCP's response to the Abyei ruling, which he 
said is pushing SPLM toward other parties. 
 
8. (SBU) The national elections in particular pose problems for the 
SPLM.  Deng Ajak stated that Kiir is not keen on standing for the 
national presidency, but that it was unclear how the party could 
nominate someone other than the party chairman for the highest 
office in Sudan.  The minister stated that he expected Kiir to 
convene the SPLM's Political Bureau and National Liberation Council 
 
KHARTOUM 00000903  002 OF 002 
 
 
to deliberate on the party's approach to elections, possibly as 
early as this month. 
 
9. (SBU) Southern officials were openly ambivalent about the 
likelihood and desirability of elections, at least at the national 
level.  In his Arabic remarks at Martyrs' Day, Kiir reportedly 
reassured the audience that the referendum would take place even if 
the elections do not.  Itto noted that voters polled by SPLM were 
excited about the prospect of elections, but she and Deng Ajak each 
declared in private that the elections may not happen.  All of the 
officials agreed that the critical obstacles to the elections are 
political, not logistical.  Itto expressed doubt that restrictive 
laws would be sufficiently reformed to produce a free and fair 
election, and she and Biong Deng insisted that political agreement 
on how to use the census results would be a prerequisite for 
elections. 
 
10. (SBU) The officials were uncertain what might be the impact of 
not holding elections, other than insisting that the referendum must 
not be affected.  Deng Ajak argued that the parties would still be 
able to agree on many issues in the absence of elections.  He 
conceded, though, that implementing some CPA provisions - including 
popular consultations with elected governments in Blue Nile and 
Southern Kordofan - would be difficult.  He noted that the party is 
discussing proposals for a more modest approach to elections, 
including holding elections only at the GOSS and southern state 
level. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
TRILATERAL TALKS AND OTHER FORUMS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
11. (SBU) Deng Ajak reported that discussions between GNU Second 
Vice President, Ali Osman Taha, and GOSS Vice President, Riek Machar 
Teny, concerning post-referendum issues have been under way for some 
time.  Deng Ajak expressed some impatience at not having received a 
report of what had been agreed between Taha and Machar, and he 
recommended that the process be coordinated with the 
U.S.-facilitated trilateral talks[U1].  Biong Deng reported that a 
recent two-day conference for SPLM leaders hosted by Chatham House 
on post-referendum issues had also been helpful.  He called for 
active U.S. involvement in these issues as well. 
 
12.  COMMENT.  The SPLM leadership is flirting with decisions that 
could have longer-term negative impact upon timely CPA 
implementation.  Both sides have agreed to respect the January 1, 
1956 border line outside of Abyei, and it is unlikely that the NCP 
will be flexible on Heglig or other disputed areas if they lie north 
of this line.  Arbitration would be time consuming to the point of 
threatening the implementation process, which has only 17 months to 
go.  In a similar vein, SPLM "cherry picking" of CPA milestones that 
it wants - the referendum - while pulling back from those it does 
not favor - elections - is not likely to sit well with the NCP.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
WHITEHEAD 
[U1]Mark, I didn't have this in my notes verbatim but recalled Oyai 
indicating it. I wanted to cross-check with your recall.