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Viewing cable 09KABUL2478, AFGHAN ELECTIONS: PRELIMINARY OBSERVER GROUP

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL2478 2009-08-23 14:16 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO9133
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #2478/01 2351416
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231416Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1026
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 002478 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: AFGHAN ELECTIONS: PRELIMINARY OBSERVER GROUP 
READOUTS 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Numerous observer groups released 
preliminary reports on the transparency and fairness of the 
Afghan elections.  There were universal concerns among the 
groups about the accuracy of the voter registry; the 
intimidation of voters, candidates, campaign workers, and 
election officials, especially females; the lack of security 
which severely affected the voter turn out in the south and 
southeast of the country; the quality of the candidate 
vetting process; the late establishment of the Electoral 
Complaints Commission (ECC); the misuse of government 
resources; and the bias of media coverage which favored a 
powerful handful of candidates. 
 
2. (SBU) However, on the positive end, all observer groups 
praised the fact that these elections were carried off at all 
given the current security environment; that there was 
excellent coordination among Afghan Security Forces that 
prevented some attacks and curtailed others; the emergence of 
widely-covered national presidential debates on issues; that 
voting operations and the distribution of election materials 
were so highly successful; and that the legal framework for 
elections in Afghanistan and the protection of women's rights 
is already in place.  End Summary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
FEFA - Domestic Observers 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
3. (SBU) The Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan 
(FEFA), the country's home-grown observer coalition, sent 
7,368 observers to all provinces in Afghanistan, but not to 
all districts.  The number of observers it was able to send 
to insecure areas was significantly lower than the numbers in 
relatively secure areas.  Security also impacted the number 
of female observers sent out.  For example, there were no 
female observers in Paktia, arguably the most conservative 
province and the most prone to female voter registration card 
fraud.  In Zabul,  there were only five female observers. 
 
4. (SBU) FEFA held a press conference on August 22 to report 
that security was a problem, echoing the message of other 
observer organizations.  FEFA noted that some of its female 
observers were attacked in Kunduz, Logar, and Kabul.  FEFA 
calculated that 650 female polling stations throughout the 
country could not open, although they did not elaborate on 
the reasons for this situation; it was likely either lack of 
female staff or lack of security in the area or both.  FEFA 
also reported that 1500 polling centers opened late, although 
they did not expand on the reasons for the delays, whether 
there were any geographic or security distribution patterns, 
or what the impact was on voting.  There was at least one 
report of a FEFA observer in Kandahar actually witnessing the 
Taliban cutting off voters' fingers. 
 
5. (SBU) FEFA claimed that it had witnessed incidences of 
fraud including: support of candidates by IEC staff, closure 
of polling stations before 1600, illegal campaigning of some 
candidates on election day, stuffing of ballot boxes by the 
representatives of some powerful candidates, underage voting, 
and multiple voting.  In some cases, FEFA reported, its 
representatives saw people with boxes of voter registration 
cards; they claimed that this was seen nationwide, not just 
in the South, where it had been expected.  In a meeting with 
Ambassador Holbrooke, the Chair of FEFA specified that his 
organization,s allegations of ballot stuffing were specific 
to parts of Balkh, Kandahar, Laghman, and Takhar.  On a more 
hopeful note for future elections, FEFA's Chair told 
Ambassador Holbrooke that he believed the lower voter 
turn-out in the South was due to voter intimidation, not 
apathy.  The full text of FEFA,s report is available at 
http://fefa.org.af. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Asian Network for Free Elections 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
6. (SBU) The Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) 
deployed 55 observers to 13 provinces.  On August 23 it 
released a list of recommended changes to be made for future 
Afghan elections, an analysis of the existing legal framework 
for elections and women's enfranchisement in Afghanistan, and 
a press statement with statements at both ends of the 
spectrum.  While stating that "there is no denying the fact 
that the elections were by and large acceptable", they also 
said that "in some areas, peoples' participation was 
restricted to a great extent by the prevailing security 
situation."  It also describe in much stronger language than 
any other team the problems with ink that we have heard 
anecdotal reports about.  ANFREL said that "in many polling 
stations, the quality of indelible ink that was used was of 
extremely poor quality....Many voters demonstrated how the 
 
KABUL 00002478  002 OF 004 
 
 
ink could be wiped off within a few minutes after the polling 
process."  Embassy Kabul will wait for further reports to 
come in before we assess whether or not we agree with this 
characterization.  The full text of ANFREL,s report is 
available at www.anfrel.org. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
European Union Election Observation Mission 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
7. (SBU) The European Union Election Observation Mission 
(EUEOM) put a generally positive spin on the elections at its 
press conference on August 22.  General Phillipe Morillon 
called the election "mostly good and fair" based on their 
observations in 17 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces, and 342 
polling centers out of 6,192.  (Comment: Morillon stipulated 
that this would allow for a statistically strong sample of 
Afghanistan's polling centers, but given the diversity of 
polling day experiences being reported by others it seems 
impossible to get an accurate aggregate picture without a 
complete view of the whole.  End Comment.)  The EUEOM did not 
present any data on turn-out and nor any analytical reports 
of fraud or fraud patterns. 
 
8. (SBU) Despite the relative optimism of the EUEOM press 
conference, its written report reflects the same concerns and 
trends noted by other international observers.  Highlights of 
the EUEOM report that were not noted in other observer 
reports were alleged incidents of the IEC Commission exerting 
pressure on its staff "in a manner which raised questions 
about its impartiality."  The EUEOM also directly cited the 
Electoral Media Commission for failing to ensure fair and 
balanced coverage of the election campaign by not preventing 
the skew of the media toward only four presidential 
candidates and most especially the incumbent.  The full text 
of EUEOM,s report is available at www.eueom-afghanistan.org. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
9. (SBU) The OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) fielded an experts mission rather 
than an observation mission.  Their plan has been to release 
an after-action report with a set of recommendations for 
future elections several weeks after these elections are 
concluded.  On August 22 they reported in Washington to a 
small group on their initial observations.  They drew their 
conclusions from official statements of the government, 
specific information from GIRoA officials, and their own 
small observation team's visits to 40 polling sites in Kabul 
City on election day.  Their current conclusions track with 
all of the general conclusions of the observer groups 
discussed here.  The text of OSCE/ODIHR,s report is not yet 
available online. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
International Republican Institute 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
10. (SBU) The International Republican Institute (IRI) 
released a preliminary report on August 22, calling the day 
of the elections "credible" but clarifying that this was not 
a comment on the on-going counting and complaint adjudication 
process.  With regard to Election Day itself, IRI said that 
it saw generally well-run, well-organized polling sites, 
based on 69 observers who visited 250 polling stations.  It 
is unclear how representative their observations are, and 
their report does not describe the locations of the polling 
stations they observed.  IRI noted that the main issues were 
low turnout, abuse of state resources, and fraud but their 
report was among the least detailed. The full text of IRI,s 
report is available at www.iri.org. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
Democracy International 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
11. (SBU) Democracy International (DI) chose to release a 
written statement on August 23 rather than hold a press 
conference.  They visited 13 of the 34 provinces in 
Afghanistan.  The title of the statement is: "Too early to 
judge if Afghanistan election is credible."  DI took a middle 
of the road approach giving positive and negative elements of 
election day equal time.  Their comments tracked with the 
general comments of all other observers but they differed by 
making the most unequivocal statement yet released about how 
the fairness of the elections cannot yet be assessed. 
 
12. (SBU) DI made a very pointed statement on the inability 
of any group to assess the percentage of Afghans who voted 
 
KABUL 00002478  003 OF 004 
 
 
since there is no accurate list of registered voters and no 
census of Afghans in general.  DI made clear that all groups 
will only be able to report on the total number of people who 
voted and called this "the only meaningful measure of 
turnout." 
 
13. (SBU) DI was also the only observer group to comment on 
the IEC's decision to withhold the vote count until August 
25, calling it "unfortunate" on the grounds that it 
destabilizes the already uncertain political atmosphere.  DI 
would have preferred that the IEC release partial results 
with a clear explanation that they were partial.  (Comment: 
This could actually destabilize a tenuous security 
environment since most Afghans will take any IEC declaration 
as definitive, regardless of how it is caveated.  End 
Comment.)  The full text of DI,s report is available at 
http://democracyinternational.com/afghanistan . 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
National Democratic Institute 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
14. (SBU) The report by the National Democratic Institute 
(NDI) is measured and detailed.  NDI highlighted the fact 
that their observers saw different elections based on the 
region of the country from where they were reporting.  The 
elections proceeded relatively normally in the north, west, 
and central regions but there were reports of violence and 
disenfranchisement in the south and southeast.  NDI was 
straightforward in admitting that they could not assess the 
truth of the majority of these allegations as they did not 
have a strong presence in the south or southeast due to 
security concerns. 
 
15. (SBU) NDI reported definitively on the fact that there 
was violence and threats of violence against voters and 
election workers by the Taliban and other armed groups. 
According to NDI this did not appear to be systemic, but it 
was heaviest in the south and southeast.  NDI reported also 
that in many provinces polling centers were closed early, or 
did not open at all due to threats of violence and, that 
while local election officials seemed generally knowledgeable 
about counting procedures, female staffers seemed slightly 
less well-trained in some provinces than in others.  Many 
female polling centers postponed the counting procedure until 
the following day to prevent their staffs from being out late 
at night.  This was a culturally acceptable alternative to 
having female poll workers turn over counting 
responsibilities to their male counterparts. 
 
16. (SBU) Turnout was lower than expected in Kabul Province 
and nationwide, according to NDI's report.  NDI acknowledged 
that this was the case despite the IEC's afternoon issuance 
of an order to keep polls open an extra hour in some areas to 
encourage additional turn-out.  NDI's report admitted that 
they did not know whether this was due to the message not 
getting out or due to apathy or fear of violence. 
 
17. (SBU) Regardless of why that message did not affect its 
intended recipients, the IEC messages to poll workers seemed, 
to NDI, to be absorbed efficiently.  When hole-punches didn't 
work, the IEC told its local structures that workers could 
cut the corners off cards instead.  U.S. Embassy observers 
witnessed this adjustment first-hand as far away as Herat. 
NDI also reported positively on ink usage and the fact that 
there were fewer incidences of proxy voting and multiple 
voting cards than expected, calling the latter "isolated 
cases." 
 
18. (SBU) The NDI report concentrated more on women's 
obstacles to candidacy, voter turnout, and poll station work 
than any other we have seen.  NDI's report noted that female 
voter turnout was noticeably low, except in Bamyan and the 
north.  Especially in the south and southeast, where it was 
very hard to recruit female poll workers, the presence of men 
in female centers may have posed a big deterrent for the 
participation of women voters.  (Comment: Poloff observing in 
Herat Province noted that all women wearing burkas pushed 
them up and were completely uncovered in front once they 
entered the polling stations.  They would not be able to do 
this in male-staffed polling stations and trying to deal with 
the hard-to-decipher ballots through a burka would make 
voting significantly more difficult, especially if a female 
voter is illiterate.  Female polling station workers are an 
extremely important issue for all future elections.  End 
comment.)  NDI presented an assessment of the pluses and 
minuses of the election along with a long list of lessons 
learned and recommendations in today's report.  At their 
press conference, NDI was again the most measured, saying 
that they are reserving judgment for now on whether or not 
the elections were free and fair until the entire electoral 
 
KABUL 00002478  004 OF 004 
 
 
process is over.  The full text of NDI,s report is available 
at www.ndi.org. 
EIKENBERRY