O 191225Z AUG 09 
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL 
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0916 
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC 0875 
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE 
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE 
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC 
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002425 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/RA, AND SCA/A 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID AF
SUBJECT: Election Preparations in RC-North: A Message to Governor 
Atta 
 
REF: KABUL 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Ambassador Eikenberry warned Balkh Governor 
Mohammad Atta Noor that any violence over election outcomes would 
shape the international community's view on its presence in 
Afghanistan. The Ambassador called on the governor to use his 
prestige and position to serve as a ?voice of reason? during what 
may be a very emotional post-election period. Atta was 
non-committal, replying that the region's people will accept the 
results if the elections are perceived to be fair and transparent. 
ISAF and ANSF officials at the RC-North regional elections 
Operations Coordination Center confirmed ANSF forces are deploying 
to open 1,810 election centers. They predicted that 54 ?high 
threat? election centers in Kunduz, Ghormach and Baghlan which serve 
2.6% of the northern region's 4 million registered voters will 
probably not open. End Summary 
 
¶2. (SBU) During an August 15 visit to Balkh provincial capital 
Mazar-e-Sharif, Ambassador Eikenberry discussed election 
preparations with the local PRT and RC-North commanders, with 
regional Operations Coordination Center Afghan National Army (ANA), 
Afghan National Police (ANP) and National Directorate of Security 
(NDS) officials, and with Governor Atta. Septel will detail 
Ambassador's visits to USAID-funded agricultural development 
projects and Governor Atta's request for a U.S. commitment to fund 
substantial additional infrastructure development projects in Balkh 
province. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In an unclassified briefing with media present, RC-North 
Commander General Vollmer called the pre-election security situation 
in Kunduz province and the newly incorporated Gormach district of 
Faryab province ?challenging? in light of a recent upsurge in 
insurgent activity and advised that an increase in ANP forces 
throughout the northern region would support ISAF stabilization 
efforts. On election preparation, Vollmer said that, of 1,865 
designated polling stations in the RC-North area, 1,805 are on track 
to be opened in time for elections. The remaining 60 stations, 
located in Taliban controlled regions of Kunduz, Baghlan and 
Ghormach, serve only 2.6% of RC-North's roughly 4 million registered 
voters. Vollmer confirmed that, if they choose, these voters will 
be able to access neighboring polling stations in secure areas. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Regional Operations Coordination Center 
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¶4. (SBU) In a briefing at Mazar's Regional Operations Coordination 
Center (OCCR), ANA 209th Corps Commander General Murad Ali Murad and 
303rd Pamir Zone Commander Major General Mujtaba Patang briefed 
Ambassador on security preparations for the August 20 elections, 
highlighting close ANA, ANP and NDS coordination with ISAF on 
information and intelligence sharing, analysis, and dissemination 
over the past two months. ANSF forces, he said, are now beginning 
coordinated deployment from provincial centers to districts to open 
1,810 of the originally planned 1,864 election stations throughout 
the region. (Note: This contrasts with General Vollmer's projection 
that 1,805 election stations will be opened.) The remaining 54 
election centers (22 in Kunduz, 18 in Gormach and 14 in Baghlan) are 
considered high threat and will likely not be opened. 
 
¶5. (SBU) NDS northern region chief Faizullah anticipated that 
Taliban insurgents will attempt to disrupt elections at a number of 
election locations via intimidation and by RPG and suicide bombing 
attacks. Acting on intelligence that the TB had placed cells in 
Baghlan and Ghormach, the OCCR has been able to ?collapse their 
plans.? He hoped that OCCR coordinated countermeasures, including 
establishing five ANA checkpoints in Baghlan, can reduce the number 
of high threat election posts from 55 to 40. He also noted the 
possibility of demonstrations in Jowzjan, Sar-e-pol and Faryab 
provinces by followers of General Dostum and predicted that such 
demonstrations could turn violent if the general does not return 
before elections are held. (Note: Dostum returned to Afghanistan on 
August 16. End note) 
 
¶6. (U) In a follow-on press conference, the ANA and ANP generals 
repeated their assurances of closely coordinated ANSF and ISAF 
efforts to ensure that elections in the north go smoothly and 
General Vollemer praised the performance and teamwork of ANSF 
forces. Ambassador said he was impressed with significantly 
enhanced ANA and ANP capabilities and the improving capacity of the 
Afghan Border Police (ABP). He called the purpose of his visit to 
Mazar to consult with Americans serving in civilian and military 
positions here, to see firsthand how Afghan election preparations 
are proceeding in the northern provinces, and to show our confidence 
in both the ISAF mission and the will of the Afghan people to 
conduct open and fair elections. He concluded that, while elections 
will likely not be perfect in light of the enormous logistical 
challenges involved, if a majority of registered voters exercise 
their franchise, it will represent an important defeat for the 
insurgency. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Governor Atta on Possible Post Election Demonstrations 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) In a meeting with Governor Atta and his senior provincial 
staff, the Ambassador stressed that elections will be a challenging 
exercise given Afghanistan's legacy of 30 years of internal 
conflict, low literacy and challenging logistics. He said that the 
U.S. and international governments back the IEC-GIRoA decision that 
no polling station will be opened unless it can be fully secured by 
ANSF forces and candidates who have mobilized local support are 
satisfied they will have the opportunity to place monitors at polls. 
The Ambassador stressed that the U.S. has neither a favored 
candidate nor a preference for a one- or two-round process. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The Ambassador expressed concern that uncertainty over 
election outcomes could lead to violent demonstrations. He noted 
that all major candidates have publicly condemned any resort or 
incitement to violence by their followers and that any such violence 
would shape international community's views about their presence in 
Afghanistan. ?I know I can count on you as a voice of reason during 
a very emotional period,? the Ambassador concluded. ?People will 
accept the results if the elections are perceived to be fair and 
transparent.? Atta replied. ?If not, people will protest.? 
 
¶9. (SBU) Provincial Council Chairman and Atta protege Farhad Azimi 
noted in a later aside to PRToff that he does not foresee trouble, 
and noted that Karzai spoke positively about Atta during a recent 
campaign rally in Kandahar, at which he said he would ask Atta to 
stay on as Balkh governor should he win re-election. In response to 
a private question from the Ambassador about his post-election plans 
should Karzai win, Atta said he might accept Karzai's outreached 
hand and stay on, albeit begrudgingly. 
 
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Comment 
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¶10. (SBU) With five-years tenure as governor, Atta is one of the 
longest-serving of President Karzai's provincial appointees. His 
own endorsement of opposition presidential candidate Abdullah as 
well as his recent outright rejection of Ministry of Interior 
instructions to replace provincial police officials has strained 
Atta's relation with the Karzai administration. And Atta's oft 
voiced view that the more secure northern provinces deserve a bigger 
share of donors' development spending that has been ?unfairly? 
concentrated in the insecure South and East (Septel) has sustained 
frictions with local PRT and RC commanders. Though his response was 
non-committal, Atta took on board the Ambassador's request that he 
use his personal prestige and influence to temper any post-election 
tendencies to violent demonstration. 
 
 
EIKENBERY