VZCZCXRO4385 
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL 
DE RUEHBUL #2403/01 2291411 
ZNR UUUUU ZZH 
R 171411Z AUG 09 
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL 
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0887 
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002403 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: Civ-Mil Efforts Lift Election Prospects in the South 
 
¶1. (SBU) Begin Summary: Voter turnout almost certainly will be 
more modest than in the elections of 2004 and 2005, in part because 
of Taliban intimidation tactics. But thanks to military clearance 
operations, GIRoA actions and assistance from civilians in RC-South, 
ISAF and Afghan officials estimate eighty-five percent of the 
population in southern Afghanistan should have an opportunity to 
cast a vote on August 20. This projection represents an improvement 
compared to two months ago. Although without a formal role in the 
election process, PRTs have helped to overcome a variety of 
election-related problems ranging from mediating conflicts in Zabul 
to arranging for logistical support to take election materials and 
personnel into outlying districts in Helmand, Zabul and Uruzgan. 
While polling may not proceed smoothly in the Pashtun heartland, 
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and ISAF have coordinated 
closely on security measures. Election officials acknowledge that a 
number of polling centers, especially in Helmand and Kandahar, will 
not open because of insecure conditions. PRT Zabul predicts a 30 to 
40 percent voter turnout in its province. End Summary. 
 
Voter Turn-Out in the Pashtun South will Be Key for Karzai 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2. (SBU) Taliban disruption efforts are likely to dampen voter 
turnout. PRTs in the region report hearing of many such threats. 
Afghan security officials told PRT Kandahar officers that they 
receive daily reports of night letters and direct intimidation of 
potential voters in Kandahar City and surrounding areas. PRT Zabul 
observed that even if polling centers are secure many villagers in 
Taliban-controlled areas will have qualms about returning to their 
villages with an ink stained finger. As a result, some observers 
expect the regional voter turnout to be considerably less than in 
the elections of 2004 and 2005. The PRT is predicting a 30 to 40 
percent turnout province-wide, with higher results in the more urban 
areas. 
 
¶3. (SBU) A low turnout no doubt would be disappointing news for 
President Karzai, the heavy favorite throughout this Pashtun region. 
President Karzai's supporters have been active in trying to drive 
up the vote. Last week, for example, Maywand District Governor 
Obaidullah Bawari hosted a shura for 300 people at which he urged 
tribal leaders to put aside tribal differences and secure a peaceful 
election. According to PRT Kandahar, Karzai posters were on display 
at the meeting and a Provincial Council candidate called on shura 
members to vote for President Karzai. Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, 
perhaps sensing opportunity, has also taken his campaign to 
Kandahar, most recently on August 12 to conduct shuras and seek out 
more endorsements. He appears to have made some inroads. The 
Barakzai tribe in Arghandab district is currently divided between 
prominent Karzai supporter Gul Agha Sherzai and Abdullah supporter 
Noorulhaz Olumi and is not likely to support Karzai as strongly as 
in 2004, according to PRT Kandahar's local staff. In a sign of the 
increasing tension in Kandahar, the brother of Ashraf Ghani's 
campaign manager was gunned down August 17 in Kandahar City by three 
men on a motorcycle. Although there is some speculation the men may 
have been from the Karzai camp, no one knows who the perpetrators 
are, and it may just as likely have been insurgents. 
 
¶4. (SBU) There are signs that President Karzai's political fortunes 
may be at risk in other provinces as well. In Helmand, PRT sources 
note that voter apathy among Pashtuns is high. In a clear sign of 
concern about the turnout, the Karzai campaign sent Sher Muhammad 
Akhundzada (SMA), the influential former governor who was removed 
from office two years ago, to Lashkar Gah on August 10 to line up 
support from key local leaders 
and engage the public on Karzai's behalf. SMA held a large 
campaign shura at Karzai stadium in Lahkar Gah. He also prepared a 
campaign visit for Karzai (which was ultimately cancelled because of 
a suicide bombing the day before) and has spent considerable time 
with provincial officials and tribal elders to enlist their support 
for the Karzai campaign. PRT sources believe SMA will continue to 
employ his political skills in Lashkar Gah through the election 
period to try to ensure a favorable outcome for President Karzai. 
 
Access to Voting Centers Improved With Coalition Efforts 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The election outlook in terms of access to voting centers 
in the south has improved in recent weeks, the region's PRTs and 
ISAF governance contacts suggest. Military operations, especially 
in Helmand, have been a major factor, with election workers and 
voter registration teams able to enter newly cleared areas of 
Babaji, Spin Masjid, Chah e Anjir, and Khanashin. Security 
preparations also have progressed, with ISAF units coordinating and 
rehearsing with Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National 
Police (ANP) deployed in the provinces. The number of polling 
centers expected to open on election day has grown steadily. The 
most recent list compiled by the regional IEC indicated plans to 
open 44 of 47 polling centers in Nimruz; 101 of 222 polling centers 
in Helmand; 41 or 44 polling centers in Zabul; 229 of 271 polling 
centers in Kandahar; and 49 of 49 polling centers in Uruzgan. The 
benefits may be misleading - ten polling centers were added in 
Zabul, for example, by regrouping centers closer together for 
security reasons, a decision that may also limit the participation 
of some voters, PRT Zabul has said. But, since polling centers will 
be open disproportionately in more densely populated areas, they 
should make voting feasible for 85 percent of the population, 
according to regional ISAF and IEC analyses. In Helmand, the PRT 
estimates that upwards of 70 percent of the electorate now should 
have reasonable access to a ballot box. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Outwardly, PRTs and ISAF officers in the south have taken 
care not to intrude unduly in election planning and execution to 
ensure the process remains legitimately an "Afghan led" approach. 
Moreover, PRTs have reported that Afghan leadership generally in 
their respective provinces has come to the fore, providing guidance, 
instructions, and plans for a credible election. Behind the scenes, 
PRTs have taken a strong interest in the election planning process 
and, at times, have lent important assistance. All PRTs have 
participated in regular election coordination meetings, primarily as 
observers but occasionally as advisers and advocates to resolve 
contentious problems. PRT Zabul leaders, for example, have reported 
speaking on a daily basis with the governor and deputy governor and 
meeting at least once a week with the Provincial Election Officer 
(PEO). The PRT leaders, drawn into spats between the PEO and 
provincial officials, often served as informal mediators. 
Similarily, in response to requests of the governor and provincial 
ANSF chiefs, PRT Uruzgan and ISAF representatives have held a number 
of meetings with Afghan decision makers to review election plans, 
offer recommendations, and monitor exercises. 
 
Civ-Mil Coordination Key to Improved Election Support 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Given the difficult security environment, PRT Helmand, in 
particular, has been involved in providing election support 
virtually on a daily basis for the last two months. PRT officers 
have held meetings regularly with IEC officials to identify areas 
requiring support. PRT initiatives have included coordination with 
IEC and ISAF personnel to develop a helicopter lift program for 
getting the IEC officials into districts to identify polling 
centers. Because roads in Helmand are unsafe, all travel has had to 
be by helicopter, making it an enormous logistics challenge. 
Immediately after military operations, the PRT worked out the 
logistics for getting district field coordinators (DFCs) and voter 
registration teams into newly cleared areas to set the stage for 
elections. The PRT was also instrumental in persuading the 
provincial governor and provincial election officials to send the 
DFCs and voter registration teams into these areas. The PRT also 
worked closely with UK and U.S. military forces to develop an 
overall logistics plan for moving election material, ballots, and 
personnel before and after election day. At times, this has 
necessitated PRT officers serving as porters, lugging boxes of 
election material to and from helicopters late at night. 
 
¶8. (SBU) PRT Kandahar is addressing IEC concerns about the 
distribution of election equipment and materials and the 
transportation of election officials, particularly females, to 
polling centers. ISAF has indicated that it will consider providing 
air assets, if necessary. In Uruzgan, the IEC chief approached the 
PRT with a request to move election material out to districts where 
security conditions do not permit safe road transport. Utilizing 
helicopter support from the Dutch and Task Force Wolfpack, the 
material will be ferried to U.S. Special Force fire bases, then 
collected by IEC support staff and distributed to remote locations 
throughout several districts. In those locations where PRT 
logistical support is limited due to security constraints, the PRT 
is working with Afghan security forces and district chiefs to 
develop "work-arounds," with the goal of enfranchising as many 
voters as possible. 
 
¶9. (SBU) PRT support will not end on election day. The Dutch, for 
example, have established a joint operations center in Urzugan where 
all political and security players can monitor election day events 
and respond to crises as they arise. From mass-casualty planning to 
preparing back-up force support for the ANA and ANP, the various 
elements within the PRT have developed joint plans to help mitigate 
hazards as they present themselves on election day. If Afghan 
capacity is reached, the PRT is well prepared to augment Afghan 
security elements, if requested. 
 
¶10. (SBU) PRTs report key administrative and security preparations 
for the elections are still ongoing. ANSF and ISAF have coordinated 
extensively on security issues. One unresolved issue is the extent 
of the use of civilians with personal arms -sometimes referred to as 
"community based security" - to provide security in some areas. PRT 
Zabul also noted this week that provincial election authorities 
still needed to hire 500 to 600 staff to work at polling places. 
 
Comment 
----- 
 
¶11. (SBU) In the South, securing the electorate and permitting easy 
access to polling centers has long been considered a key challenge. 
The coalition activities of the past weeks in Helmand - particularly 
in the newly cleared areas of Babaji, Spin Masjid, Chah e Anjir, 
Khanashin, and Now Zad - in tandem with a coordinated voter 
registration efforts supported by the civilians working closely with 
the UK and U.S. forces there has increased the potential for locals 
to access voting centers on August 20. Still, in addition to 
continuing security concerns and Taliban intimidation tactics, voter 
apathy and simple disenchantment with GIRoA leadership in Kabul may 
be equally important factors on August 20. 
 
EIKENBERRY