VZCZCXRO3605 
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL 
DE RUEHBUL #2378/01 2280820 
ZNR UUUUU ZZH 
R 160820Z AUG 09 
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL 
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0848 
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002378 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: STRENGTHENING THE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL 
COMPLAINTS COMMISSION 
 
REF: A. Kabul 2295 
¶B. Kabul 2019 
 
¶1. (U) SUMMARY: Fraud remains a serious threat to the election 
process as actual or perceived fraud may seriously undermine 
acceptance of election results (ref A). The Independent Election 
Commission (IEC) and Independent Electoral Complaints Commission 
(ECC) are the main bodies involved in preventing, detecting and 
resolving electoral fraud. IEC fraud prevention and mitigation 
mechanisms are good but will be strained by conditions on the ground 
(ref B). As a result, a strong and effective ECC is critical for 
ensuring a credible election. After a slow start, the ECC is rapidly 
increasing capability and taking steps to improve its public 
perception of using USG and other support. End Summary. 
 
Fraud remains a threat to credible elections 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) A trend of electoral fraud, established the 2004 and 2005 
elections, is likely to continue. In 2005, the JEMB and ECC 
excluded more than 700 polling stations from the count due to fraud. 
An equal or greater risk during this election exists because 
security conditions have deteriorated, limiting the ability of 
candidate/party agents and observers, who serve as an important 
fraud deterrent, to reach fraud-prone areas. In addition, with a 
highly-contested presidential race, the potential impact of fraud on 
electoral outcomes is high. Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the international community push to increase 
enfranchisement by opening polling sites in areas inaccessible to 
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and observers further 
increases the risk of fraud, although the very recent IEC decision 
to insist that ANSF security is the sine qua non to establishing a 
polling center mitigates the risk. 
 
 
Roles of IEC and ECC in fraud prevention 
and resolution 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) The IEC is responsible for overall quality control of the 
election process and implementation of a systematic approach to 
fraud prevention and detection. In addition to existing controls, 
the IEC will use internal audits of results to detect fraud and 
conduct investigations when necessary. If the IEC finds evidence of 
fraud, it may quarantine boxes or stations as more investigation is 
done or decide to exclude or include boxes and stations from 
preliminary results (ref B). 
 
¶4. (U) The ECC will be primarily complaint driven and will not take 
up fraud cases unless it receives information that irregularity has 
occurred. However, the ECC will conduct analysis to determine areas 
that are fraud-prone, and may prioritize resolution of complaints 
from these areas. To reach decisions, the ECC will conduct 
investigations that will include interviews with key witnesses and 
inspection of election materials. If it identifies fraud it can 
decide to exclude or include boxes - or entire polling stations - 
from the count and sanction offenders for fraud violations or other 
polling and counting offences. 
 
¶5. (U) In addition to complaints made on Election Day, the ECC 
likely will receive complaints as the IEC announces preliminary 
results in the days and weeks after the election. The ECC will 
adjudicate these complaints and may make additional exclusion or 
inclusion decisions and sanction offenders for violations. The IEC 
only can certify and announce final election results once the ECC 
has made a decision on all complaints that have been filed within 
the allowed time frame. Complaints must be made within 72 hours of 
the offense. 
 
 
Recent ECC sanctions 
-------------------- 
 
¶6. (U) The ECC has announced several recent high-profile sanctions 
of candidates that have helped to strengthen the public perception 
of its capabilities. This increased credibility will be important 
when it faces the anticipated large number of complaints about fraud 
and other offenses after Election Day. 
 
¶7. (U) On August 10, the ECC announced that it had fined VP Karim 
Khalili, the second running mate of Hamed Karzai. Khalili allegedly 
used three MOD helicopters for campaign purposes without following 
the policy established by the IEC for the use of government 
helicopters by candidates. The ECC cited "use of government 
facilities on an unequal basis among candidates," and "failure to 
follow IEC notification policy on use of MOD assets," observing that 
Khalili directly ordered MOD to provide three helicopters for him to 
fly in from Kabul to Baghlan on 10 July for campaign activities. 
Khalili did not deny to the ECC that he had done so, contending he 
had the authority to use choppers for this purpose. The ECC said he 
paid the fine of 75,000 afghanis (1,500 dollars) on August 13. 
 
¶8. (U) In addition, the ECC announced on August 11 that it fined Dr. 
Abdullah Abdullah 5,000 afghanis for his campaigns pasting his 
photos on the publicity billboards of the Ministry of Public Health 
in Khost Province. The ECC also has fined eight presidential 
candidates for tardiness in their submission of campaign finance 
reports. 
 
¶9. (U) In an interview with Tolo TV on August 11, Commissioner Fahim 
Hakim said if violations continue or recur, the ECC may increase 
penalties to a level that could disqualify a candidate. Fahim 
Hakim added that complaints have been filed against the local 
coordinators of the IEC in some provinces. He also said that six 
complaints against presidential and provincial council candidates 
have been sent to the General Prosecution Office because they 
contained allegations of candidate involvement in criminal activity. 
As of August 14, the ECC reported that it has received 376 
complaints, with the majority at the provincial level, and 
adjudicated 105, most of them dismissed. 
 
Current ECC operational status 
------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (U) The ECC was delayed in building its operational 
capabilities, which has undermined public confidence in its ability 
to regulate the election process, but it has recently gained 
momentum (ref A). The ECC will need to be fully functional before 
Election Day so that it is able to manage the anticipated flood of 
complaints resulting from the presidential and provincial elections. 
The ECC estimates it will receive about 4,000 total complaints 
mostly pertaining to provincial council elections. 
 
¶11. (U) On Aug 11, the ECC shared with donors its operational plan 
for adjudicating polling and counting complaints. The ECC will 
receive complaints arising directly from polling stations as well as 
complaints against preliminary results. 
 
¶12. (U) Key elements of the operational plan are the following: 
 
(1) A centralized intake process at the ECC Complaints Processing 
Center in Kabul. 
(2) An initial assessment process ("triage") by ECC HQ to 
determine the priority of each complaint. 
(3) Investigation strategies driven by ECC HQ, executed as 
required at the National Tally Center, in the provincial capitals or 
at the district level. 
(4) Close consultation with IEC regarding IEC audit and 
investigation findings. 
(5) Public notification of decisions through various means. 
 
¶13. (U) The ECC is represented in each provinces by a Provincial 
Electoral Complaints Commissions (PECC) made up of three 
Commissioners and one support officer. Eight of the offices will 
have additional legal and investigative capacity. ECC commissioners 
make all final decisions based on recommendations and initial 
decisions presented by investigative teams and PECCs. As of August 
12, the ECC had 30 of 34 PECC offices fully established and staffed 
and plans to complete the hiring of staff for the remaining four 
provinces this week. 
 
¶14. (U) The ECC has made recent progress in preparing its staff for 
the challenge ahead. In the past two weeks a total of 100 staff 
members from headquarters as well as provinces received a three day 
seminar on investigative techniques at separate training sessions 
for Dari and Pashtu-speaking staff at the Serena Hotel. The 
training sessions also served to raise the public profile of the 
ECC. At the sessions, ECC Commissioner Grant Kippen and other ECC 
officials outlined the overarching purpose of the ECC and its 
current activities to staff and the Afghan press. 
 
International and USG support to the ECC 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (U) The USG is supporting the ECC primarily through the UNDP 
Elect programs as well as through a USAID contract with the 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). Support 
includes core operational and staffing, as well as international 
technical advisors for legal affairs, logistics, public outreach and 
investigations. 
 
¶16. (SBU) In addition, the US Interagency Election Support Team is 
providing direct support, working with ECC to help identify 
procedural weaknesses, structure its operations, and analyze 
registration, polling center and fraud data to identify and map 
fraud-prone areas. While providing this assistance, the Team is 
ensuring that the support is being provided in a low-profile manner 
to limit false perceptions of USG over involvement. 
 
¶17. (SBU) The Team also is coordinating USG logistical support to 
the ECC and IEC by making flight arrangements on USAID Air and 
facilitating PRT access in insecure and fraud-prone provinces. With 
USG support, the ECC Commissioners are traveling to regional centers 
to ECC offices to ensure offices are well-functioning ahead of 
Election Day. Also with USG support, the IEC Chief Election Officer 
and other top-level election officials are traveling to fraud-prone 
and insecure areas to audit the current preparations and emphasize 
fraud prevention measures. Current plans call for top ECC and IEC 
officials to visit about 20 provincial centers in the days before 
the election. 
 
¶18. (SBU) In the days and weeks after Election Day, the ECC may 
require additional direct staffing, research, analysis and 
investigation support. Also after Election Day, USG transportation 
and logistical support may be even more important as investigation 
teams may need assistance accessing insecure areas so complaints can 
be resolved in a thorough and timely manner. The Election Support 
Team will continue its involvement with ECC and stands ready to 
provide additional technical support as needed. 
 
EIKENBERRY