VZCZCXRO1624
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #2339/01 2250736
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 130736Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0798
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 002339 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV AF
 
SUBJECT:  Faryab Province Assessment 
 
REFTEL:  Kabul 1735 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (U) This is a bi-annual report from the State PRT representative 
in Mazar-e-Sharif on political, economic and security developments 
in Faryab Province. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Security in Faryab province, which forms the western flank 
of Regional Command North, has deteriorated over the past year and 
does not show signs of improving anytime soon.  Insurgent 
infiltration continues from Ghormach district up along the western 
border areas with Turkmenistan and the eastern borders areas with 
Jowzjan and Sar-e-pul provinces.  Apprehension about the insurgency 
among residents is running high, though some have demonstrated a 
willingness to stand up to the Taliban.  Norway, which heads the 
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Faryab, has signaled its 
intent to be more proactive at disrupting insurgent activities. 
Ghormach district, deemed a critical district by the U.N., is a 
crucible for UNAMA's Integrated Approach, but intra-Pashtun tribal 
disputes and strong Taliban influence impede efforts to improve 
local governance, security, and development there.  Construction of 
the ring road through Ghormach district remains two years behind 
schedule, owing to security concerns by Chinese construction 
contractors. 
 
SECURITY 
-------- 
 
 
Focus on Ghormach 
----------------- 
¶3.  (SBU) Insecurity in Faryab province mostly stems from unruly 
Ghormach district - officially still part of Badghis province in 
Regional Command West.  Access to Ghormach proved too difficult for 
Badghis provincial authorities and Spanish and Italian coalition 
forces, thus precipitating the presidential decree last fall that 
placed Ghormach under administrative control of Faryab province for 
an unspecified period.  Much of the overwhelmingly ethnic Pashtun 
district remains under the control of Taliban, who are co-mingled 
with residents, including security forces and district officials, 
making it difficult to separate insurgents from the rest of the 
population.  (See REFTEL for an explanation of the rise of the 
Taliban in Ghormach.)  Taliban have capitalized on the divisions 
among three Pashtun tribes in Ghormach - Achakzai, Zamand, and 
Torqui - and have entrenched themselves there.  Hardly a day passes 
without reports of an insurgent attack on a police checkpost or 
sightings of insurgent gangs on motorbikes.  The Norwegian PRT 
commander has signaled his intent to initiate joint offensive 
operations with the Afghan police and military to disrupt insurgent 
pockets rather than to conduct patrols. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Ghormach is one of two districts nationwide in which UNAMA 
has rolled out its pilot Integrated Approach (IA) - a comprehensive, 
intensified focus across the three lines of security, governance and 
development to help the district's population tip in support of the 
Afghan government.  Progress is slow, due to continuing weak 
governance and poor security in the district, which has kept many 
NGOs from wanting to work there.  UNAMA has been prodding Faryab 
Governor Shafaq to be more proactive at developing the Provincial IA 
Working Group into a meaningful body.  Shafaq believes the IA is 
working in Ghormach, albeit exceedingly slowly. 
 
Collapse of FDD in Ghormach 
--------------------------- 
¶5.  (SBU) Improving security along the ring road, which runs south 
and west through Faryab province before passing through Ghormach, 
was a driving factor behind the launch of Focused District 
Development (FDD) training of the Ghormach district police (ANP) 
last winter.  Since completion of FDD training in January, the 
Ghormach FDD-trained ANP force has collapsed.  Of 46 FDD-trained 
ANP, only 4 remain on the force; the rest have either left of their 
own accord due to disputes over pay, or have been transferred, or 
have defected to the Taliban.  Even the FDD-trained ANP district 
chief walked off the job.  The FDD-trained ANP believe that they 
should continue to be paid 2,000 afghanis (USD 40) more than their 
actual pay - a situation that had persisted for several months until 
U.S. Police Mentoring Team (PMT) members began looking into one 
policeman's involvement in skimming money from police salaries. 
When the overpayments stopped, the FDD-trained ANP's disgruntlement 
seems to have begun. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)On July 11, eight FDD-trained-and-equipped Ghormach ANP 
abandoned a checkpost they had been manning and took significant 
amounts of ammunition, a police vehicle, and other gear with 
themselves.  Since then, only two have returned, and they remain in 
 
KABUL 00002339  002 OF 005 
 
 
police custody.  It is unclear whether the other six have defected 
to the Taliban or are holding out for more pay.  These developments 
have undermined the mentoring efforts of the U.S. PMT that has been 
working closely with the ANP there.  Despite the PMT's best efforts, 
Ghormach FDD has largely failed due to the gaps caused by weak 
district governance and poor provincial police leadership. 
 
¶7. (SBU)The 01 Standby Police Force (01 SPF), a special reserve 
police unit of the Ministry of Interior, that deployed to Ghormach 
to provide security while the regular ANP underwent FDD training has 
vexed the district governor, FDD-trained ANP, and U.S. PMT and 
Norwegian police mentors alike.  (NOTE: For reasons that remain 
unclear, the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) did not 
backfill for the ANP in Ghormach during the FDD training, as it has 
done in other FDD districts.  END NOTE.)  The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd 
Companies of the 01 SPF have since departed the district, but the 
4th Company - led by local strongman Sayed Gul - remains and is 
regarded by many, including current district governor Qari Dawlat, 
as being partial to former Ghormach district governor Abdullah Jan. 
Provincial police chief General Khalilullah Andarabi backs Sayed 
Gul's policing role in Ghormach, and has sent him to flush out 
Taliban pockets - a dubious move given Gul's own alleged Taliban 
ties and rumored involvement in kidnappings. 
 
The "Ring Road 500" 
------------------- 
¶8.  (SBU) Adding another layer of complexity to the policing puzzle 
in Ghormach is the hiring in June of 500 un-vetted and hastily 
trained policemen - none of whom are from Ghormach and nearly all of 
whom are of Uzbek and Tajik descent - to man checkpoints along the 
ring road and otherwise provide security for ring road construction 
in the area.  The Asian Development Bank, which is financing 
construction of the ring road in the north, has agreed to pay the 
salaries of the 500 new ANP for a one-year period.  The specter of 
Uzbeks and Tajiks policing a Pashtun district had sparked worries by 
UNAMA and the PRT that ethnic tensions would be stoked, but there 
have been no such reported incidents.  Najibullah, a Pashtun, is 
both the commander of the 500 man force and the top police official 
in Ghormach since the departure of the FDD-trained ANP chief.  He 
gets good marks from his U.S. PMT mentors, who view him as an 
action-oriented commander whose style has come as something of a 
culture shock to some of the FDD-trained ANP who were not accustomed 
to doing much policing outside their headquarters.  However, a 
controversy over police salaries requires urgent attention by the 
MoI.  Najibullah's men are unhappy that they are being paid only 
6,000 afghanis per month and not the 9,000 afghanis per month that 
their contracts specify.  According to a U.S. Police Mentor, the MoI 
has yet to approve the additional pay. 
 
GiROA officials propose alternative to ISAF operation 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
¶9. (SBU) Operation Tofan ("sandstorm"), a clear-to-hold joint 
ISAF/ANA operation launched last May to maintain security along the 
ring road to allow construction to resume, continues in Ghormach 
(See REFTEL).  As part of ramped-up military efforts in Ghormach, 
the Norwegian PRT is establishing a permanent forward operating base 
there.  The ongoing operation has resulted in only about 15 
insurgent deaths but has raised the hackles of Provincial Governor 
Shafaq, who was not informed of the operation until after it had 
begun, and of Provincial Council Chairman Farukh Jenab, who believes 
that the massive resources being spent on the operation will not 
solve the security problem in the troubled district.  Rather, those 
resources should be poured into reconstruction projects, he 
believes. 
 
¶10. (SBU)In mid-July, both men pitched their proposal to establish 
local defense forces in insecure villages to Minister of Interior 
Atmar and Independent Directorate of Local Governance (ILDG) 
Director Popal, who reportedly promised to study it more carefully 
before looking for funding.  With a $2 million annual price tag, it 
may prove difficult to find a willing donor.  Provincial ANP chief 
General Andarabi supports their plan and also thinks mounting a 
further iteration of Operation Tofan will not yield significant 
results.  However, a U.S. Police Mentor said that one effect of the 
operation is that Amruddin, a High Value Target Taliban commander, 
has been pushed out of Ghormach to Murghab district of Badghis.  A 
Norwegian intelligence analyst at the PRT holds out cautious 
optimism for the operation's outcome, based on indications that 
people in the Qala-i-Wali valley in Ghormach - a notoriously 
dangerous area for government and coalition forces - are willing to 
stand up to the Taliban. 
 
Spillover of insurgency to border areas 
--------------------------------------- 
¶11. (SBU) Insurgent and criminal activity have spilled over from 
Ghormach to other districts in Faryab, particularly along the 
western border with Turkmenistan (Almar, Shirin Tagab, and 
 
KABUL 00002339  003 OF 005 
 
 
Dawlatabad districts) and the eastern border with Sar-e-pul and 
Jowzjan provinces (Gurziwan and Belcheragh districts).  Elements of 
the radical Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, led by Uzbek national 
Tahir Yoldash, are also operating in the area, but their numbers and 
the extent of their cooperation with Pashtun Taliban remain unclear. 
 Some of these men are believed to be responsible for the ambush 
murder of the Dawlatabad police chief in June.  Faryab's Belcheragh 
district forms the base of a triangle of instability that includes 
Sar-e-pul's Sayyad district and Jowzjan's Darzab and Qush Teppeh 
districts.  Criminal and insurgent gangs, led by Mullah Nadir, who 
has ties to the Taliban, have thus far managed to both elude and 
frustrate ANSF units, who have not been able to coordinate 
cross-border operations effectively.  The Norwegian PRT admits to 
not having good situational awareness in the southernmost district 
of Kohistan, which abuts Sar-e-pul's remote Kohistinat district. 
His forces stretched thin, Provincial ANP chief Andarabi has refused 
the MoI's request to send 100 ANP soldiers to Kabul. 
 
GOVERNANCE 
---------- 
 
Governor tiring fast of Ghormach woes 
------------------------------------- 
¶12.  (SBU) Governor Shafaq is a well regarded, thoughtful 
administrator who, as an ethnic Hazara, has navigated his way deftly 
among the largely Uzbek and Pashtun populations that make up Faryab. 
 He had his hands full dealing with mounting insecurity in the 
province even before Ghormach was placed under his administration. 
Frustrated by the problems of governance in Ghormach district, he is 
not happy that he has had to accept Qari Dawlat (Achakzai tribe) as 
the presidentially-appointed district governor because of the 
intra-Pashtun tensions that Dawlat's appointment has exacerbated. 
Shafaq has not embraced Ghormach as part of Faryab, and did not seem 
bothered by the fact that Dawlat and other Ghormach civil servants 
had not been receiving their salaries for several months.  The 
Norwegian PRT and UNAMA believe Governor Shafaq should do more to 
support Dawlat, who has also said he wants to resign because of the 
lack of support he feels he is getting from provincial authorities. 
Shafaq has tired of the job and would like to step down as governor 
but told State PRT officer recently that the IDLG has refused to 
accept his resignation.  Shafaq's naming of former Ghormach district 
governor Abdullah Jan (Zamand tribe) as head of the district shura 
last January provoked outcries by Pashtun factions opposed to Jan. 
In late July, a new shura - also led by a Zamand Pashtun - was 
formed, due to the fact that Jan had not convened any shura meetings 
in several months.  The IDLG and the Badghis Provincial Council have 
reportedly approved the move. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Governor Shafaq has led from the front in reaching out to 
communities in insecure areas.  He frequently invites elders for 
consultations and is cognizant of the fact that making residents 
feel that the government cares about them is an important part of 
his job.  When residents of a village in Gurziwan district 
complained that food assistance to their village had not reached 
intended beneficiaries, Shafaq investigated the matter, which 
resulted in the arrests of six people - including one from his 
office. 
 
Strong Council chairman seeks greater role for itself 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
¶14.  (SBU) The Provincial Council (PC), led by Farukh Jenab, enjoys 
a good working relationship with Governor Shafaq.  All but one of 
the 9 candidates is seeking reelection to the council.  Jenab is an 
activist PC chairman who has expressed frustration that the ANSF and 
ISAF do not make more use of the PC in their outreach to 
communities.  He has personally intervened in security matters 
affecting his home district of Qaysar, where Uzbeks form the 
majority.  In early July, when Taliban kidnapped twelve people, 
including Jenab's brother and nephew, from Singetak village on the 
border with Ghormach, Jenab rallied residents to take up arms and 
prepare for an attack on Ghormach border villages.  The threat of 
imminent attack reverberated among Pashtun villages in Ghormach, who 
sent a delegation of elders to meet Singetak elders.  The threat 
worked: all twelve people were released unharmed without any ransoms 
paid.  Jenab continues to provide food for 30 armed residents of 
Singetak - which he calls the frontline of the Taliban advance - to 
maintain their defensive positions, but accepts that he will not be 
able to continue doing this for much longer. 
 
Still falling short of poppy-free status 
---------------------------------------- 
¶15. (SBU) Poppy eradication is a contentious issue for Governor 
Shafaq, who insists his province is poppy-free.  Previous findings 
by the U.N. Office of Drug Control (UNODC) indicate that Faryab is 
not poppy free, and its 2009 assessment is no different.  Shafaq 
accepts that Ghormach is not poppy-free, but believes that it is an 
outlier that should not be counted as part of his province's overall 
 
KABUL 00002339  004 OF 005 
 
 
poppy eradication efforts.  In May, Shafaq led a campaign that 
eradicated 261 hectares under Governor-Led Eradication (GLE), thus 
qualifying them to receive $35,235 for their GLE award. 
 
DIAG progress made 
----------------- 
¶16. (SBU) The Disbandment of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG) process 
has been completed in Andkhoy, Gurziwan, Qaramqul, Dawlatabad and 
Shirin Tagab districts.  Khan Char Bagh district is currently 
undergoing the DIAG process but is not yet DIAG compliant.  The 
remaining five districts of Faryab (not including Ghormach) have not 
yet been targeted for DIAG. 
 
DEVELOPMENT 
----------- 
 
PDP almost complete; NSP in all but two districts 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
¶17.  (SBU) In mid-July, Faryab's provincial development committee 
(PDC) finalized its current-year provincial development plan (PDP), 
and expects to finalize its five-year PDP in early August.  However, 
like most PDP's, Faryab's remain long wish lists.  National 
Solidarity Program (NSP) projects have been carried out successfully 
in all districts except Kohistan and Ghormach, where they have yet 
to be introduced due to difficulties in forming community 
development councils there to propose projects.  Germany has pledged 
$10 million euros for National Solidarity Program programs for those 
two districts. 
 
USAID's efforts in Faryab 
------------------------- 
¶18.  (SBU) Governor Shafaq has expressed impatience with USAID over 
the delay in starting construction of a teachers training center and 
a Faculty of Education building.  USAID's new agriculture program - 
IDEA NEW - is still in the rollout stage in Faryab.  It will involve 
training farmers in melon fly management, initiating five 
micro-hydro power projects in the southern part of the province, 
organizing a provincial agriculture retailers' association, and 
planning for a milk collection center in Meymaneh. 
 
Norwegian development assistance to Afghanistan 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
¶19.  (SBU) Norway provides approximately USD 115 million in 
development and humanitarian assistance annually to Afghanistan. 
Two-thirds (about USD 77 million) of that is used to support 
development activities and is managed by the Norwegian embassy in 
Kabul.  Eighty percent of its development money is funneled to 
national level projects, while twenty percent flows to projects in 
Faryab.  In 2008, Norway spent approximately USD 20 million in 
Faryab alone.  Norway believes that it is important to pay attention 
to stable areas when making decisions about development assistance. 
Its PRT generally does not fund  projects, believing that all 
humanitarian and development activities should be carried out by 
civilian actors.  In Ghormach, Norway is funding latrine, well, 
water catchment, and shelter projects through ACTED and CHA 
(Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance) - the only two NGOs 
working in that district. 
 
Water projects launched 
----------------------- 
¶20.  (SBU) There has been some good news regarding badly needed 
water projects in Faryab.  In June, President Karzai inaugurated a 
USD 11 million, 90-kilometer-long pipe scheme that will carry 
potable water from deep wells in Khamiab district, Jowzan province, 
to the arid districts of Andkhoy, Khan Char Bagh, Dawlatabad, and 
Qaramqul.  According to the Faryab Director of Rural Rehabilitation 
and Development, a large scale potable water project that will 
benefit residents of provincial center Meymaneh is in the early 
stages of implementation.  Because of the scarcity of water in much 
of the province, the Norwegian PRT's development advisor sees a 
great need to promote water conservation schemes and 
drought-resistant crops like pistachios and almonds. 
 
Road projects - one old, one new 
-------------------------------- 
¶21.  (SBU)Construction of the ring road - already two years behind 
schedule - continues to proceed slowly.  The China Railways 
construction firm, which is under contract to pave the road from 
Qaysar to the border of Ghormach and Murghab district, Badghis, 
cites poor security for the delays.  The Provincial Governor and 
Asian Development Bank representatives have complained to the 
Chinese firm about the low quality of its work and the need for it 
to accelerate the pace by adding more workers.  The longer it takes 
to complete the project, the longer it will take for the government 
to reap a security dividend, when residents and merchants are 
finally able to realize its benefits.  In a promising development 
that will facilitate cross-border commerce, a road construction 
 
KABUL 00002339  005 OF 005 
 
 
project to asphalt the corridor connecting Andkhoy district center 
with Aqina village on the border with Turkmenistan was inaugurated 
in June. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶22.  (SBU) If Faryab falls, so will the rest of the north, contend 
both the Faryab and Jowzjan Provincial Council chairmen, who recall 
the Taliban's successful advance on the north through Ghormach in 
¶1998.  Although the parallels to today's security situation are not 
the same, the same cannot be said about the level of apprehension 
among many residents of Faryab regarding the insurgency bubbling up 
from Ghormach.  Provincial Police Chief Andarabi feels like the 
security situation in his province is spinning out of control, and 
he is likely to feel that way until the policing puzzle in Ghormach 
can be solved.  The ANA will have to succeed at pushing up 
northwards from Murghab to Ghormach, while expanding their area of 
control within both districts.  COIN efforts will have to be stepped 
up in Ghormach - completion of the ring road is critical in this 
regard - but they will not be successful without a rebuilt ANP 
force.  FDD in Ghormach has been a painful learning experience that 
we must not rush to recreate without ensuring that there is in place 
first a nucleus of experienced ANP officers, not from Ghormach, 
around whom to build a multi-ethnic force.  Some members of that 
force may be drawn from the Ring Road 500, subject to their 
performance. 
 
¶23. (SBU) FDD is slated to begin in Qaysar district later this year, 
and U.S. Army police mentors hold out greater hope for success 
there.  Still, it may not be enough to assuage the fears of the 
population that the ANP will be able to protect them against 
insurgent and criminal attacks.  The "Ring Road 500" are an example 
of an idea spreading across Afghanistan at present-the revival of 
unofficial, tribal-based security forces for urgent security 
operations. Several provinces are arming militia for election 
security. The relationships between these groups, official security 
forces, and Kabul Ministries are unclear. So too are their chains of 
command and prospects for de-mobilization or integration into ANSF 
after their ostensible purpose has been filled. Much of the 
international community strongly opposes the creation of unofficial 
security forces. However, in the absence of successful police 
development at the district level, Afghan communities will continue 
to turn to the time honored-though treacherous-practice of arming 
"reliable" local allies to meet their most pressing security needs. 
 
 
EIKENBERRY