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Viewing cable 09KABUL2327, TRANSFER OF AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE TRAINING CONTRACT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL2327 2009-08-11 15:54 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBUL #2327/01 2231554
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 111554Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0779
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
INFO RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DOJ WASHDC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS KABUL 002327 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR S/RAP, INL, INL/AP, SCA, AF 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PINS MARR SOCI PREL PGOV AF
SUBJECT:  TRANSFER OF AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE TRAINING CONTRACT 
RESPONSIBILITY 
 
THIS IS A JOINT MESSAGE FROM US AMBASSADOR AND COMISAF 
 
1.  Summary:  Ambassador and COMISAF join in recommending transfer 
of the responsibility for implementation of basic Afghan police 
training and field mentoring from the Department of State to the 
Department of Defense in order better to provide Afghan police the 
basic security skills needed in a counter-insurgency environment. To 
do so, DOD should generate and manage a new contract for the police 
training program when the current DOS contract with DynCorp expires 
in January 2010. We further recommend that DOS/INL should continue 
to contract for and manage specialized, INCLE-funded programs in 
civilian policing, police professionalization, women's police, 
family response units, and rule of law. 
 
End Summary. 
 
NEW DIVISION OF LABOR NEEDED 
---------------------------- 
2.  We recommend a shift in the division of labor and responsibility 
between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State 
DOS)in executing the multi-million dollar training program for the 
Afghan National Police (ANP).  Despite excellent coordination 
between the Embassy and Combined Security Transition Command - 
Afghanistan (CSTC-A), the lack of a single, unified chain of command 
has sometimes created confusion and unnecessary delays in 
implementing the program.  We must maximize program effectiveness, 
especially as the ANP training program ramps up in coming months. 
 
3. The Embassy's country team and CSTC-A agree that the police 
training program contract should be transferred from DOS (Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)) to DOD as 
soon as possible while minimizing the disruption of current training 
programs. Senior interagency approval will be required.  Under the 
new arrangement, the Chief of Mission (COM) would continue to 
provide police program policy, oversight and broad direction, while 
CSTC-A would have overall responsibility for implementing the 
policy, including contracting and contract management. 
 
4.  Ambassador and COMISAF further recommend that the transfer of 
responsibility coincide with the expiration of the current contract 
and beginning of a new one in January 2010.  Approval of the 
transfer now would provide time for limited bidding competition, for 
CSTC-A and the Embassy to fill staffing needs, and to reallocate the 
several distinct training programs between them.  For example, while 
CSTC-A would assume contract implementation for all basic police 
training, the Embassy's INL office would continue to manage certain 
specialized police training programs. 
 
BACKGROUND - DIVISION OF ROLES BETWEEN CSTC-A AND INL 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
5.  The Department of State assumed control of the Afghan National 
Police (ANP) training program in 2005, after the Germans launched 
the program in Kabul in 2003.  DynCorp was awarded the first 
contract and won the second contract when it was re-competed in the 
summer of 2008.  The current CSTC-A/Embassy INL relationship began 
in FY 2007, when funding for the ANP became part of DOD's budget for 
training and equipping the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF -- 
including the Afghan Army and Police).  CSTC-A transferred funding 
to INL, which managed the DynCorp contract and maintained the major 
training facilities while CSTC-A implemented the other program 
elements, including the recruiting, supply/equipping, and 
post-training support. 
 
6.  Since 2007, ANP training has evolved from its original focus on 
civilian policing to a widely expanded training curriculum including 
counterinsurgency and tactical skills, which are more similar to 
CSTC-A-run training programs for the Afghan National Army (ANA). 
Many aspects of this expanded role are more suited to U.S military 
management rather than INL's civilian policing experts.  At the same 
time, Embassy/INL has developed specialized areas of training in 
civilian policing such as the Criminal Investigations, Women's 
Police Corps and Family Response Units. 
 
NEW DIVISION OF TRAINING ROLES 
------------------------------ 
7.  Specifically, we recommend that CSTC-A  assume contractual 
responsibility for the primary ANP police training program, which 
would cover Regional Training Centers; Basic ANP training; mentoring 
within the Ministry of Interior and CSTC-A's Police Mentoring Teams 
embedded in ANP units in districts throughout Afghanistan. 
 
8.  Under this plan, INL would revert to its traditional police 
training role, generating a separate contract to support development 
 
of the full range of civilian police functions, including 
higher-level leadership and management, criminal investigation, 
professional development, the Women's Police Corps, the Family 
Response Units and other training.  Separate INCLE funds should be 
requested for these programs. 
 
9.  The actual timing of generating a new contract under DOD will 
depend on a variety of factors, most significant of which is the 
speed with which DOD and CSTC-A can award the contract and have the 
staff in position to administer it.  We recommend transferring the 
responsibility for the basic training contract in January 2010, when 
the current contract expires.  This transfer point offers the best 
balance of speed, practical feasibility, and compliance with DOD 
contracting rules. In the event that DOD is unable to properly 
compete, award and select a follow-on contract by the expiration of 
the current contract in January 2010, then the DoS should extend the 
current contract for a limited period until a new contract is 
awarded. 
 
FACTORS IN DOS AND DOD CONTRACTING POLICIES 
------------------------------------------- 
10.  Department of State (DOS) Contract Policies:  Under USG-wide 
directives, both DOS and DOD acquisitions policies preclude the 
appointment of other agencies' personnel from holding responsibility 
for contract oversight or management in "mixed contract 
administration services."  This means that it is not legally 
allowable for INL to cede operational control of contractors to 
CSTC-A as long as INL is responsible for managing the contract.  The 
contract itself is not transferrable. 
 
11.  Department of Defense (DOD) Contract Policies:  Current DOD 
contracting policy is to avoid entering into large, all-encompassing 
contracts like the existing INL contract with DynCorp.  DOD needs 
time to develop separate Statements of Work (SOWs) for each aspect 
of the contract under consideration.  DOD contracting policy also 
usually requires a time-consuming "full and open competition" for 
contracts.  However, DOD can shorten the process under exceptional 
authority for 'Unusual and Compelling Urgency', subject to a senior 
DOD policy decision.   Beyond establishing the 'unusual and 
compelling urgency' of the Afghan case, such a decision also would 
depend upon DOD and CSTC-A having the necessary staffing to manage 
the contract. 
 
CONTRACT TRANSFER RECOMMENDATION 
-------------------------------- 
12.  The current contract expires in January 2010, with an extension 
clause built-in.  INL had originally planned to extend the contract 
through April 2010, to match it up with INL's over-arching Civilian 
Police contract.  In light of the new imperative to transfer basic 
police training responsibility to CSTC-A, the Embassy and CSTC-A 
recommend generating a new contract under DOD when the current 
contract expires in January 2010.  CSTC-A is currently working 
toward this goal.  This is the Embassy's and CSTC-A's preferred 
option.  There are several advantages to this recommendation:  It 
would allow time for a limited competitive bidding process and for a 
smooth transition between the DOS and DOD.  On the other hand, it 
would not give the CSTC-A commanding general the immediate 
operational control he would prefer to have, and CSTC-A may not have 
time to break up the contract into smaller elements for separate 
contracting, as normal DOD contracting policy stipulates.  The 
January time frame will also not allow for DOD's normal "full and 
open" competitive process.  DOD would have to scramble to complete 
the acquisition process in time.  If DOD failed to meet the January 
2010 deadline, there would be pressure to extend the current 
contract on a month-to-month basis.  Finally, INL may not have time 
to obtain INCLE funding for the police training programs not covered 
by CSTC-A. 
 
PENDING POLICY AND PROGRAM DECISIONS 
------------------------------------ 
13.  Support for the Justice and Corrections Programs:  These 
Embassy-managed programs are crucial to the developing Rule of Law 
system in Afghanistan.  There is dedicated space at several RTCs for 
both programs and the programs are planning to expand their presence 
to the others.  Before control of the RTCs is transferred to CSTC-A, 
it will be vital to guarantee continued RTC support for these 
programs in the provinces. 
 
14.  Separation of Training/Mentoring Responsibilities:  There are 
several programs, such as the Family Response Units, Women's Police 
Corps, and Criminal Investigations Training, and police 
professionalization courses that should stay within the Embassy's 
scope of responsibilities.  The exact list will need to be 
 
discussed, funding sources arranged, facilities agreed to, etc.  To 
improve the existing coordination for all police training programs 
between the Embassy and CSTC-A, the Embassy proposes embedding State 
Department officer of appropriate rank and experience at CSTC-A, 
with authority over the contract. 
 
15. The Embassy currently employs six Police Advisors (PAs) as 
personal services contractors.  The PAs provide civilian police 
expertise, continuity in the program, and considerable day-to-day 
program management.  The Embassy will need to retain some of PAs, 
based on the extent of its role in police training.  CSTC-A still 
needs to determine if they will absorb the remaining PAs under a 
separate contract. 
 
16.  Air Wing Support:  CSTC-A will need to arrange airlift support 
for the program, since it does not have its own resources. 
Currently, the INL/NAS Air Wing provides passenger and cargo support 
for the police training program.  The police program consumes over 
80% of the Air Wing's flying hours and is partially reimbursed 
through ASFF funds in accordance with the DOS-DOD MOA.  CSTC-A's 
airlift needs will dramatically increase as ANP training is 
expanded.  This is a substantial issue that will need to be resolved 
well in advance of the prospective program transfer. 
 
17.  Asset Turnover:  NAS will have to account for the police 
program's facilities and equipment and conduct a proper transfer of 
these government-purchased items to CSTC-A for use in the follow-on 
contract.  All of the non-expendable equipment and facilities 
constructed at the training centers will eventually be turned over 
to the GiROA, but a complete accounting will need to be made for 
transfer to CSTC-A.  The land use agreements between the U.S. 
Embassy and the Government of Afghanistan also will have to be 
modified. 
 
18.  Action request:  We recommend that the Department of State and 
Defense: 
 
--(1)  Approve the proposed change in the division of police 
training roles and responsibilities between the Embassy and CSTC-A; 
 
--(2)  Negotiate and implement the needed policy operations, and 
contractive decisions; and 
 
--(3)  Sign a new Memorandum of Agreement between the DOD and DOS. 
 
 
EIKENBERRY