VZCZCXRO8569
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #2295/01 2220941
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 100941Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0736
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002295 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM AF
SUBJECT: AFGHAN ELECTIONS: NEGATIVE PUBLIC PERCEPTION 
OVERSHADOWS FRAUD SAFEGUARDS 
 
REF: A. KABUL 2018 
     ¶B. KABUL 2019 
     ¶C. KABUL 1902 
     ¶D. KABUL 2238 
     ¶E. KABUL 993 
     ¶F. KABUL 1466 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  With just over two weeks remaining until 
the August 20 presidential and provincial council elections, 
concerns about fraud have recently exploded into the public 
consciousness.  Many factors have contributed to this issue, 
including reports of a reduction in the total number of 
polling centers that will open, and inflammatory public 
statements by candidates.  The largest contributing factors 
are the Independent Election Commission's (IEC) limited 
public outreach to explain the safeguards in place against 
fraud and the negative public opinion of the Electoral 
Complaints Commission (ECC) and its effectiveness.  The 
frequently reported media perception that the elections will 
not be free and transparent now potentially poses a greater 
threat to the legitimacy of the results than any actual 
fraud.  See septel for the steps the ECC is making to improve 
the public perception.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------- 
Lack of Transparency... 
--------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) A May 25 German-funded poll revealed that only 32% 
of respondents believed the election would be transparent. 
This lack of trust in the electoral system has been reflected 
recently in numerous media reports, as well as from MPs, 
other candidates, and civil society.  The Parliament summoned 
officials from the IEC on August 8 to hear about preparations 
for the elections and fraud prevention tactics, noting their 
concern over interference by Afghan government officials in 
the elections.  Presidential candidate Dr. Abdullah Abdullah 
held a press conference the same day calling on the Ministry 
of Interior to investigate the deaths of his elections 
supporters and said the government had failed to ensure 
security for the presidential candidates and their campaign 
managers.  A group of Kabul University students voiced 
concern that outside powers, politicians, and warlords would 
control the elections, noting this disillusion would lead to 
a lower voter turn out, especially among the youth. 
 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Nearly every candidate has raised concerns about 
electoral fraud.  The amorphous "coalition" of minor 
candidates (ref A) that has thus far failed to produce a 
consensus candidate, raised consistent concerns about the 
lack of transparency on August 4.  Major and minor candidates 
alike have expressed concern about the potential of fraud - 
from Sayed Jalal's claim that 6,000 ballot boxes are waiting, 
pre-stuffed, and will be distributed on election day to win 
the day for Karzai, to the subtler allegations of illicit 
campaign finance contributions flowing into Abdullah's 
coffers from Iran, to reports that Afghan currency had 
depreciated by 7% due to the large influx of foreign funds 
used to support campaigns. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
...Increases the Possibility of Violence 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Early August remarks attributed to senior Abdullah 
Campaign Advisor Abdul Satar Muran suggested that a Karzai 
victory could only be reached by fraud and would be met by 
violence.  Although Abdullah and Muran denied the most 
inflammatory statements such as "the people rising up with 
kalishnakovs," Muran told us protests would take place if the 
people thought widespread fraud led to a false election 
result.  MP Sayed Ishaq Gailani (Abdullah supporter) and his 
cousin, MP Hamed Gailani (Karzai supporter) told us 
separately that violence is a real possibility after the 
elections, if the population believes that widespread fraud 
was used to produce the election result. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Poor Public Outreach & Unclear Changes 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The IEC, with the technical support of UNDP and the 
international community, has instituted a fairly robust set 
of electoral safeguards (ref B).  However, an imperfect voter 
registry has provided the basis for fears of proxy voting and 
"ghost" voters using fraudulent voter registration cards - 
particularly for women.  Although Afghan law and IEC 
regulations prohibit proxy voting, its prevention will 
ultimately lie with the integrity of polling center workers 
and their accurate understanding of the process; two factors 
 
KABUL 00002295  002 OF 002 
 
 
that cannot be predetermined. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Monitoring of potential fraud then falls to 
observers - international and domestic - and candidate and 
party agents (ref C).  In recent days several candidates have 
complained to us that the IEC is not adequately staffed to 
process candidate's requests for accreditation by their 
agents. On August 2, Abdullah voiced concern that only 6,000 
of the 11,000 agents for whom his campaign had submitted 
registration had been accredited by the IEC (ref D).  The 
elections team is working with the IEC to streamline the 
process for this procedure.  Observation may diminish the 
scale of fraud, but we doubt enough observers and candidate 
agents will be in place to suppress all such incidents. 
 
---------------------------- 
Weak ECC Fans Fears of Fraud 
---------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Due to lack of public trust in the judicial system, 
the electoral law requires the establishment of the ECC for 
each electoral cycle.  The ECC exists as an independent body 
to investigate complaints against candidates and implement 
appropriate punitive measures (ref E).  However, the ECC has 
operated out of step with the electoral timeline.  Although 
moderately successful in eliminating candidates with DIA 
connections during the challenge period (ref F) - with its 
late constitution, slow establishment of provincial offices 
and minimal public outreach it has so far failed to prove 
itself as a regulating factor in the electoral process.  See 
septel for the steps the ECC is making to improve the public 
perception related to fraud, with our support. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) With only two weeks remaining until voting day, the 
ECC has received around 280 candidate complaints. 
Unfortunately, its successes - the elimination of two 
provincial council candidates who had not resigned from 
government appointments as required by the electoral law - 
are overshadowed by presidential candidates' nearly constant 
allegations to us and to the media that the ECC is not 
responding to their election law complaints.  The ECC has a 
responsibility to weed-out complaints that do not meet the 
standard and parameters set by the electoral law - a problem 
that occurs even in complaints made by major opposition 
candidates.  However, the ECC's unresponsiveness in informing 
the public and individuals as to the status of filed 
complaints decreases its ability to control the process and 
its message.  In an August 2 public meeting, the IEC told 
donors that the ECC had not taken action on complaints filed 
regarding the failure of certain candidates to submit 
required campaign finance documents. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The ECC anticipates it will receive around 4,000 
complaints in the immediate aftermath of the election.  Many 
of those will likely not meet the required standard of 
evidence or fall outside the limited parameters of the ECC's 
mandate.  However, without improved public outreach and a 
feedback loop providing information on the status of filed 
complaints, the ECC's work will continue to be overshadowed 
by negative perceptions. 
 
EIKENBERRY