VZCZCKEI982
PP RUEHC RUCNAFG
DE RUEHBUL #2260/01 2181155
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 061155Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0681
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002260 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: PROVINCIAL CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
REF: A. KABUL 2120 
     ¶B. KABUL 2040 
     ¶C. KABUL 1560 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: Since the June 16 start of the 
presidential campaign period, the major candidates have 
followed traditional ethnic and tribal lines in their 
campaigns through visits to traditional provincial 
strongholds, with shows of strength in opponents' territory. 
Political deals with tribal and ethnic leaders still comprise 
the main focus for several campaigns (ref A), however, the 
major candidates' campaign activities also include directly 
engaging the people, in particular the recent televised 
presidential debate (ref B) and some of the larger campaign 
rallies.  Campaigning in the provinces shows the traditional 
versus the direct style of campaigning, seen in the small 
versus large rallies: smaller rallies represent the deals 
made with the traditional local powerbrokers, while the 
larger rallies are a newer phenomenon.  Violence continues to 
limit all campaigns in the most dangerous provinces.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Despite a campaign period limited to only two 
months by electoral law, active campaigning kicked off 
relatively slowly (ref C).  First posters and billboards of 
candidates appeared around Kabul, and per PRT reports spread 
swiftly to major provinces such as Kandahar, Herat and Balkh, 
and reached smaller provincial capitals such as Gardez by the 
end of June, but that was all.  While building name 
recognition held value, a position on the issues was not a 
priority for candidates.  In late June, PRT officers in 
Bamyan and Gardez separately reported that many influential 
local leaders were refraining from public support of any 
candidate, instead waiting to see who took a clear lead 
before they would decide. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Home Base and Enemy Territory - Provincial Visits 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) In Kandahar, often perceived as a lens to view 
traditional Pushtun politics, the Karzai campaign launched 
quickly in conventional Afghan style.  Two of Karzai's U.S. 
citizen nephews are managing the campaign in Kandahar and the 
first major political rally of the campaign season took place 
in Kandahar City on June 18 with approximately 1000 members 
of the Pushtu Barakzai tribe holding a rally in Kandahar city 
to show support for Karzai.  Karzai's campaign denied 
organizing the rally; however, the Barakzai tribe's close 
ties with Karzai's half-brother, Kandahar Provincial Council 
Chairman Ahmad Wali Karzai suggest it was probably less 
spontaneous then claimed. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) In another early move, on June 24 Balkh Governor 
Atta Mohammad Noor announced his support for Abdullah at a 
provincial administrative meeting.  He admitted that 
government officials cannot campaign for a particular 
candidate, but stated to the meeting that "as an individual, 
I vote for Abdullah."  His support in the province has been 
extremely helpful to Abdullah's efforts. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) On July 1, Abdullah started a new campaign trend 
when his appearance at a rally in political-hub Nangarhar 
drew an estimated 20,000 supporters from Nangarhar, Kunar, 
Laghman and Nuristan to downtown Jalalabad; in 2004, Karzai 
took 95 percent of the vote in Nangarhar.  The Nangarhar PRT 
officer reported participants that included ethnic-Uzbeks, 
Tajiks, and Pashtuns as well as a mix of tribal leaders, 
intellectuals, and mujahedeen.  The rally drew media and 
public attention and added momentum to Abdullah's candidacy. 
However, the ethnic mix of attendees, some bused in from 
neighboring provinces, could suggest that Abdullah's campaign 
was attempting to create the appearance of strength in 
Pashtun majority Nangarhar for a candidate perceived as Tajik 
by the Pashtun population.  Senior Abdullah Campaign Advisor 
Satar Murat told us Abdullah campaigned in Pashtun territory 
to prove he was not only a Tajik, but also a Pashtun. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) In contrast, in some areas with limited campaign 
activity - Farah and Uruzgan - PRT officers report that the 
lack of activity is perceived to reflect the lack of 
competition since Karzai is believed to have a strong lead 
there.  In 2004, Karzai won Farah with over 90,000 votes 
(compared to the almost 26,000 received by runner-up Yunus 
Qanooni (Kabul, Tajik) and Uruzgan with over 46,000 votes 
(Qanooni received 2,500 for second place).  In Kandahar, 
where security limits political activity, campaign activity 
remains extremely limited.  In 2004, Karzai won Kandahar with 
over 281,000 votes; Qanooni came in second with 9,202. 
However, difficult odds do not always equate to lack of 
campaign activity - in 2004 Karzai took popular campaign stop 
Nangarhar province with over 422,000 votes compared to number 
two Qanooni's 6,856. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) In Khost, where Karzai won over 207,000 votes in 
2004 (Qanooni received 2,173 for second place) he appears 
confident that Governor Qalandarzai can deliver a large 
Pashtun voter turnout that will support his re-election. 
Qalandarzai has been open with PRT officers about his desire 
for a position in the cabinet of a second Karzai 
administration.  In Ghazni, another low activity campaign 
area, Governor Osmamani told SRAP Holbrooke that he believed 
90% of the people would vote for Karzai.  In 2004, Karzai won 
over 238,000 votes in Ghazni with Qanooni taking 18,999 for 
second place. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Traditional Gatherings and Big Rallies 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Smaller and more traditional campaign events - 
often formed by tribal leaders - are a hallmark of the 
campaign.  On July 6, two rallies - one by members of the 
Ahmedzai tribe, one organized by the PC Chairman - announced 
support for Karzai.  On July 16, Second Vice-President 
Khalili led a several thousand person pro-Karzai rally in 
Jalalabad, but significantly smaller than Abdullah's July 1 
appearance, a potentially dangers shift for Karzai since 
Nangarhar represents the largest block of Pashtun voters in 
the country.  Several small rallies showed Abdullah support 
in Balkh on July 19.  In Uruzgan the same day 150 people 
peacefully marched through Tarin Kowt carrying Karzai 
election posters.  In Zabul on July 21 over 100 local leaders 
met to declare support for Karzai's candidacy. In Kunar, 300 
people - including parliamentarians and provincial council 
members - came together July 13 to demonstrate support for 
Karzai.  On July 25, MP and presidential candidate Ramazan 
Bashardost held a rally in Khost with around 450 attendees, 
and his campaign claims activity in seventeen provinces.  On 
July 15, around 200 people participated in a rally for female 
presidential candidate Ferozan Fana in Asadabad. Small 
rallies, particular those with the participation of local 
leaders, also indicate campaign infrastructure and 
organization.  However, many participants will attend solely 
for the free lunch provided by the candidate.  Some observers 
and even candidates have asserted that many Afghans are 
politically savvy and will take the payoff but vote for the 
politician of their choosing. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) On July 14 Abdullah told us he had visited Ghor, 
Uruzgan and Badakhshan after the Jalalabad rally and claimed 
that supporters had turned out in each location with 
3,000-5,000 attending each rally.  On July 17, Abdullah made 
a campaign stop in Herat where over 20,000 supporters cheered 
him on at a "rock-concert style" rally.  He followed that 
with a stop in Orgun - Paktika's largest town - where he 
participated in a 3,000 person shura and a July 28 Panjshir 
rally of around 3,000.  In a nation that has spent 30 years 
fractured by war and internal conflict and where political 
alliances are often secret, large displays of public support 
by multiple tribal and ethnic groups could offer a new 
appeal.  Abdullah and his supporters draw parallels between 
his campaign and the opposition movement in Iran.  His rally 
in Herat was most illustrative of this, with men and women 
assembled in blue banners and scarves, the color of the 
Abdullah campaign. 
 
¶10.  (U) Karzai has waited until the last weeks of the 
campaign period before making a large push to directly engage 
the public since, according to some observers, he believes 
that the final two weeks are the ones that will be 
remembered.  His presence at the large rally in Dar-e-Kayan 
in Baghlan province on August 1 showed the start of this 
phase of his campaign.  Karzai,s August 5 Gardez rally 
brought 13,000 people, and a speech about issues in addition 
to the traditional rhetoric; Karzai,s embarking on his first 
major campaign speech shows a shift in tactics for a 
candidate who declined to participate in the televised debate 
just a week before. 
 
----------------------- 
Violence Curbs Activity 
----------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Campaign related violence has also been on the 
upsurge in recent weeks.  Although it appears focused against 
the process instead of targeting a single candidate and 
ideological ideal, it serves as a reminder for both 
candidates and voters of the Taliban's role in the electoral 
process.  On July 15, unidentified gunmen shot Abdullah's 
campaign manager in Kapisa.  On July 22, minor candidate and 
lower house MP Mullah Salaam Raketi, a former Taliban 
commander survived an ambush in Baghlan.  On July 26, 
Karzai's first vice-presidential candidate Marshall Fahim's 
motorcade was attacked by insurgents while in Kunduz.  On 
July 27, a suicide bomber was caught by the Afghan National 
Police outside the Lashkar Gah office of minor presidential 
Shah Nawaz Tani. On July 28, an Abdullah campaign official 
was shot in Laghman in a reported Taliban ambush.  On July 
29, a Khost campaign office of Abdullah was blown up at 
night, causing no casualties.  On the same day, a bomb went 
off in a Karzai campaign office in Herat. 
 
 
EIKENBERRY