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PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
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DE RUEHCP #0369/01 2401051
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 281051Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5139
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCP/USDAO COPENHAGEN DA PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-ISA-EUR// PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 COPENHAGEN 000369 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/NB, EUR/RPM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MARR DA
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS DEFENSE MINISTER -  SOREN GADE IN 
AN EXPANSIVE MOOD 
 
REF: KAO - BELL EMAIL 8/27/2009 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  On August 26, Ambassador paid an 
introductory call on Minister of Defense Soeren Gade.  The 
Minister was in a talkative mood, and conducted a very 
cordial meeting in which no contentious issues were raised. 
He did, however, drop a few surprise hints concerning the 
possibility of relocating the Danish military's Greenland 
Command to Thule, about creating some sort of NATO Arctic 
Forum, and about the prospect for Denmark to eventually drop 
its ESDP opt-out with the EU (but not any time soon).  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Ambassador, accompanied by the Defense Attache, met 
with Minister Gade for nearly an hour.  The Minister was 
accompanied by his number two, Permanent Secretary of State 
for Defense Lars Findsen, as well as Deputy Permanent 
Secretary of State for Defense (Strategy and Policy) Kristian 
Fischer.  Minister Gade frequently consulted a one-page list 
of talking points, but as frequently digressed into 
tangential points and anecdotes. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The Minister began by expressing his overall 
satisfaction with U.S.-Danish defense relations.  He 
indicated he had been an admirer of President Reagan; 
applauded the initiative of Secretary Rumsfeld in 
transforming NATO structures; and is deeply appreciative of 
his close relationship with Secretary Gates.  Minister Gade 
expressed satisfaction for the positive way in which any 
U.S.-Danish military issues are speedily resolved, as well as 
for the rapid progress being made bilaterally on developing 
technical countermeasures against Improvised Explosive 
Devices (IEDs). 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Minister Gade was especially pleased to have been 
able to obtain Danish agreement on the need to upgrade the 
radar facilities at Thule.  He acknowledged that maintaining 
Thule was expensive for the U.S., but believes that Thule 
will only become more important as time passes and the Arctic 
shipping lanes open up.  He then made a surprising mention 
that, eventually, Denmark might wish to relocate all or part 
of Greenland Command to either Thule, or Nuuk, or perhaps 
both.  He also said that, as the Arctic becomes more 
important, it might be useful for NATO to create a framework 
for dealing with Arctic issues, perhaps similar to the 
NATO-Ukraine Forum. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The Ambassador picked up the reference to NATO to 
ask about the Strategic Concept development.  The Minister 
asked Kristian Fischer to respond.  Fischer briefed that a 
meeting of the ""Eminent Persons Group,"" which he said 
included former Secretaries of State Albright, and perhaps 
Powell, was scheduled to take place in Copenhagen on November 
¶5.  The work of this group is supposed to lead to a new 
Strategic Concept in time for the NATO Lisbon summit in 
autumn 2010.  (NOTE:  We checked with USNATO which was 
unaware of any such meeting in Copenhagen (ref).  END NOTE.) 
 
¶6.  (SBU) In response to the Ambassador's congratulations on 
the near-unanimous party support for new 5-year Danish 
Defense Agreement, Minister Gade said that he ""took 
advantage"" of the current high level of respect which Danish 
soldiers enjoy throughout the country, to get almost all 
political parties to agree to the plan.  He was especially 
pleased to have been able to increase the defense budget, a 
first in many years (and virtually unique in Europe this 
year). 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The Minister then turned to the subject of the 
Baltic states (""our Eastern partners and Allies"").  He 
claimed to share their view that some sort of more ""visible"" 
support for their sovereignty was needed.  He indicated that 
some kind of NATO ""footprint,"" such as ) but not limited to 
) Air Policing, was vital to reassure these nations of 
Allied support.  He made it clear that he was not suggesting 
""stupid structural"" additions, such as NATO headquarters or 
bases; but exactly what he had in mind was left unmentioned 
(as was the Russia-Georgia war).  He did claim that the NATO 
Secretary-General would soon be launching a discussion of 
this topic. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  In response to the Ambassador on the Danish 
""opt-out"" for security and defense matters within the EU, 
Minister Gade reiterated that the original Danish position 
had been based both on a dislike for duplicating NATO 
structures, and on an instinctive fear that Eurocrats might 
become in a position to order Danish forces to deploy 
 
COPENHAGEN 00000369  002 OF 002 
 
 
overseas.  However, after several years of being ""out,"" the 
Minister was coming to a different perspective.  Now, it was 
possible to see a variety of positive aspects to the EU 
missions abroad, includnig to be able to influence the 
discussion.  It has become clear that Denmark currently has 
zero influence within the EU on defense matters; and Danish 
forces are losing some valuable opportunities to train with 
EU battle groups.  Nonetheless, Minister Gade volunteered 
that a referendum ) required to change the Danish opt-out ) 
would not be called anytime soon, as there is no political 
constituency for doing so.  He also expressed skepticism 
about EU defense ambitions, claiming they were much too large 
for current economic realities. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Finally, in discussing the Ambassador's recent trip 
to Greenland's capital Nuuk, Minister Gade expressed some 
exasperation about what he termed the Greenlanders' ""victim 
mentality.""  He seemed resigned to the fact that even a 
recent report by the Danish Institute for Military Studies 
into the 1968 crash of a B-52 (concluding that there never 
was a ""lost H-bomb"") had failed to achieve closure on the 
subject.  In this connection, the Ambassador asked about a 
report that the Danish Ministry of Health is preparing to 
release about radioactivity in Greenland.  While he did not 
know the contents of the report, he gloomily predicted that 
whatever it might say, it would inevitably feed the ""victim 
mentality."" 
FULTON