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RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVK
RUEHYG
DE RUEHCH #0608/01 2161352
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 041352Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8239
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CHISINAU 000608 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/UMB 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM MD
SUBJECT: What Comes Next: Expert Views 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  PLEASE PROTECT 
ACCORDINGLY 
 
REF: Chisinau 604 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Moldovan experts agree that the 
July 29 elections offer a chance for opposition 
parties to exercise power, although the 
constitutional provisions for establishing a 
government will make the process complicated.  The 
current ruling Communist Party of the Republic of 
Moldova (PCRM) retains the largest number of seats 
and may be able to block opposition initiatives. 
The four different analysts with whom we spoke 
each concurred that the four opposition parties 
will try to work together, but disagreed about 
whether this cooperation would successfully 
endure.  Another point of disagreement was the 
extent to which a non-PCRM government should 
prosecute alleged crimes and corruption by 
outgoing GOM officials.  On Transnistria, our 
analyst contacts believed that Chisinau's policy 
was unlikely to change significantly.  There was 
general relief that the election had gone smoothly 
and had produced results acceptable to the 
parties, despite the challenges ahead.  End 
Summary. 
 
 
Opportunity, yes Q capability, maybe 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) In separate meetings, TDY poloffs spoke 
July 31 and August 3 with four leading Moldovan 
political analysts to explore potential post- 
election developments.  Jockeying and speculation 
continue, complicated by Moldova's political 
system, (reftel) which will require either 
agreement by the two main blocs on a president or 
sufficient defections from one side to the other 
to reach the 61 votes necessary for electing a 
president.  The experts agreed that Moldova's 
opposition parties had gained a real chance to 
play a significant role in governing the country. 
However, their ability to remain unified and to 
develop policies beyond "out with the Communists" 
is much less clear.  Analysts agreed that the four 
opposition parties were united for the present, 
although views varied as to whether they would be 
able to govern together.  The parties hold a 
slender edge (53 out of 101 seats in Parliament) 
even for votes requiring a simple majority, so 
maintaining party discipline and interparty 
concord will be of ongoing importance on all 
votes. 
¶3. (SBU) Our contacts were in general agreement on 
the major differences among the four opposition 
parties.  The Liberal Party, (PL), which gained 15 
seats, is the most stridently pro-Romanian and 
anti-PCRM; its social policies tend toward the 
populist as seen in its support for lowering the 
retirement age.  The 18-seat Liberal Democratic 
Party (PLDM) is widely regarded as pro-business 
with some talented technocrats Q but also alleged 
ties to dubious privatizations.  The Our Moldova 
Alliance (AMN), with seven seats, has been in 
decline and our experts predicted it would 
disappear in the next elections.  The new face in 
the opposition, with 13 seats, is the Democratic 
Party (PD), led by former speaker Marian Lupu who 
defected from PCRM in June.  PD, formerly a 
marginal party, lacks a fully-developed ideology 
but several experts said it aspires to be a 
center-left social democratic party.  It is also 
the party best placed to reach out to PCRM 
assuming Acting President Voronin can forgive 
Lupu's "betrayal." 
 
Cooperate with PCRM, or shut it out? 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The question of how, or whether, the 
opposition should try to work with PCRM emerged as 
a clear area of disagreement. Some commentators 
favored trying to lure potential PCRM defectors to 
an opposition-led coalition, arguing that the 
PCRM's declining support combined with the example 
set by Lupu could ensure success.  Another analyst 
opposed any "cohabitation" with PCRM completely, 
 
CHISINAU 00000608  002 OF 002 
 
 
while the fourth argued for working with PCRM to 
nominate a compromise candidate for President. 
Such a person, perhaps former Prime Minister 
Greceanii (who is not a member of any party), 
would not be entirely in debt to either side and 
would be harder to manipulate.  In addition, the 
grave economic situation should push the 
opposition to "sharing the blame" by having at 
least some PCRM role in government formation. 
¶5. (SBU) Two of our experts raised the question of 
how to address alleged crime and corruption by 
PCRM officials.  One believed it crucial for the 
new government - which he expected could take 
power quickly despite the constitutional hurdles - 
to take immediate steps to "put people in jail" 
and restore public trust.  His colleague, who came 
back to this point several times, argued the 
opposite:  the PCRM retains substantial popular 
support, and for the opposition to appear to be 
engaged in a vendetta would further polarize an 
already difficult atmosphere.  Non-transparent 
prosecutions would damage a key opposition claim: 
that they are the proponents of rule-of-law and 
democratic "European" values. 
Transnistria:  major shift unlikely 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Regardless of how, or if, the government 
is formed, our contacts did not foresee a major 
shift on Transnistria.  Several commented that 
attempts to push forward on Transnistria could be 
counterproductive and consume energy that could be 
better spent on priorities in right-bank Moldova. 
Comment: 
-------- 
¶7. (SBU) Neither Transnistria nor the Russian 
presence there elicited strong emotions from any 
of our experts.  They all recognize that, however 
inter-party dynamics play out, domestic 
considerations come first.  End Comment. 
Chaudhry