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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001076 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA FOR A/S SHANNON, DAS MCMULLEN, AND, AND BSC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2019 
TAGS: PREL MARR BR CO
SUBJECT: WHA DAS MCMULLEN,S CLEARS THE AIR ON THE 
U.S.-COLOMBIA DCA, OPENS DIALOG ON REGIONAL ISSUES 
 
BRASILIA 00001076  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Lisa Kubiske.  Reason: 1.4 (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: WHA Deputy Assistant Secretary Christopher 
McMullen,s visit to Brazil and briefings to GOB officials on 
the U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) helped 
ease Brazilian concerns over the issue and spurred new dialog 
aimed at greater bilateral and multilateral cooperation with 
the United States. 
McMullen,s conversations with Brazilian Ministry of Foreign 
Relations (Itamaraty) officials and a senior presidency 
foreign policy advisor clarified U.S. intentions with the CDA 
as preparing part of a long-term strategy to decrease the 
U.S. military presence in South America. GOB officials 
expressed interest in greater dialog with the United States 
on security and regional issues and highlighted several 
opportunities for better cooperation and communication in the 
future.  It appears that the jarring public criticism of the 
DCA represents an effort to curry favor with Venezuela in 
advance of the UNASUL summit in Bariloche, with the goal of 
lowering tensions there and preserving UNASUL.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Charge hosted a lunch for DAS McMullen August 25 
with seven senior Itamaraty officials:  Under Secretary for 
Political Affairs Ambassador Vera Machado, Under Secretary 
for Latin America Ambassador Enio Cordeiro, Pol/Mil Advisor 
to Deputy Foreign Minister Guimaraes Ambassador Marcos Pinta 
Gama, Policy Planning Director Ambassador Hermano Telles 
Ribeiro, US/Canada/Inter-American Affairs Department Head 
(Assistant Secretary equivalent) Carlos Abreu, Transnational 
Illicit Activities Department Head Virginia Toniatti, and 
South America II Department Head Clemente Baena Soares. 
Separately, McMullen met with presidency foreign policy 
advisor Ambassador Marcel Biato.  McMullen also met with 
Colombian Ambassador Tony Jozame, who conveyed GOB 
officials, positive reception to the clarifications he had 
made on the DCA and to his assurances that Brazilian borders 
and sovereignty would continue to be respected. 
 
¶3. (C) In his conversations with GOB officials, McMullen 
explained the origins of the U.S.-Colombia DCA and emphasized 
that the DCA was meant to lay the foundation for a continued 
decrease in U.S. military presence in Colombia. McMullen 
highlighted the routine nature of the agreement and the 
explicit provisions requiring respect for Colombia,s and 
other nations, sovereignty.  McMullen explained that the DCA 
does not expand the scope of U.S. presence in Colombia, and 
made clear that the U.S. goal is to civilianize its presence 
in Latin America, in particular because we understand the 
history and sensitivity of U.S. presence in the region. 
McMullen stressed that the USG and GOC did not want to 
discuss the DCA prior to concluding negotiations, and only 
did so after the details were leaked to the Colombian press. 
He noted that such  agreements are so common that they should 
not raise suspicion.  McMullen acknowledged, however, that 
lack of information had raised concerns, which is why he was 
visiting Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina. 
 
NATIONAL, REGIONAL SENSITIVITIES ON FULL DISPLAY 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Itamaraty officials and Biato showed a great deal of 
interest in the details of the DCA. Machado said the GOB was 
surprised to find out about the agreement through the media 
and emphasized that part of Brazil,s concern stems in large 
measure from the lack of information available on the DCA. 
Machado identified security of the Brazilian Amazon and 
regional stability as important and sensitive issues for 
Brazil. She explained that there is a perception among 
Brazilians, especially those in the north, that the Amazon is 
a region coveted by foreigners searching for biodiversity and 
natural resources who have a hidden interest in taking it 
over. Therefore, any foreign presence near the Amazon region 
can become an explosive issue. Machado also highlighted that 
news of the DCA came out at a time of significant regional 
tensions and as Brazil was in the process of consolidating 
UNASUL as a mechanism for addressing those tensions. While 
respecting Colombia,s sovereign right to negotiate the DCA, 
Brazil could not ignore the serious implications for 
stability in the region. Biato explained that, as long as the 
United States maintains a presence in the region, it will be 
a difficult and neuralgic issue that will periodically 
resurface and require constant management. While Brazil 
understands the reasons for a U.S. presence in Colombia, 
 
BRASILIA 00001076  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Biato said, the GOB,s goal is to work to remove the 
conditions that make this presence necessary. 
 
¶5. (C) Both Biato and Machado requested greater information 
sharing and guarantees. Machado requested written assurances 
that equipment at the Colombian bases would not be used to 
violate the sovereignty of neighboring countries and that the 
U.S. presence would not expand beyond Colombia,s borders. 
(Colombian Ambassador Jozame told McMullen that GOB officials 
had asked the GOC to add a clause to the DCA specifying that 
actions are only to be undertaken within Colombian borders.) 
Machado also suggested that the DCA document be made 
available before the next UNASUL meeting, scheduled for 
August 28 in Bariloche, as she believed the provisions for 
respect of other nations, sovereignty would help allay 
concerns. 
 
TAKING THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEEK GREATER BILATERAL DIALOG 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) Biato stressed that, because of the history of U.S. 
presence in the region, the United States and Brazil need to 
have a more fluid dialog that allows Brazil to develop a 
level of trust regarding U.S. actions in the region. The goal 
is not to agree on everything, but to discuss sensitive 
issues so that Brazil can demonstrate to its South American 
neighbors that it has a full understanding of what the United 
States is doing in the region. Itamaraty officials expressed 
interest in restarting Pol/Mil talks, both on a formal and 
informal level, as a way to increase dialogue and smooth 
discussions on sensitive issues like the Colombian bases. GOB 
officials also raised the possibility of increased 
intelligence sharing between the United States and Colombia 
and other UNASUL countries. McMullen said such increased 
cooperation is worth exploring. 
 
PRESSING FOR INTERVENTION IN HONDURAS 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) GOB officials pushed for greater U.S. response and 
intervention in Honduras. Biato said Brazilian President Lula 
was pleased to hear from President Obama that the USG would 
consider addition measures in Honduras. He compared the 
pressure the United States is receiving on Honduras and 
Venezuela to the heat the GOB has taken for its stance with 
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay.  "It is the price you pay for 
doing the right thing." With Biato and Itamaraty officials, 
McMullen said the U.S. was prepared to ratchet up the 
pressure on the Micheletti de facto government.  However, he 
said that many in the United States perceive a contradiction 
in applying the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC) to 
Honduras without also raising IADC-related issues in 
Venezuela. Biato responded it is the GOB,s assessment that 
Venezuela is "not on the path toward" and "nowhere near" an 
authoritarian regime, and that they do not believe public 
criticism of Chavez is helpful.  Biato and Itamaraty 
officials suggested that it would be important for the United 
States and Brazil to discuss implementation of the IADC, as a 
common understanding of its provisions and requirements is 
essential to implementing it. 
 
POTENTIAL OPENING FOR TRILATERAL COOPERATION WITH BOLIVIA 
------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (C) Itamaraty officials highlighted their interest and an 
opening for possible trilateral cooperation on 
counternarcotics issues with Bolivia and the United States. 
Cordeiro said Brazilian Foreign Minister Amorim recently 
raised the possibility of joint cooperation with the United 
States in a meeting with the Bolivian Foreign Minister, who 
agreed it would be beneficial. Cordeiro asked for concrete 
ways in which the United States and Brazil could engage 
Bolivia.  He noted that Bolivian sensitivities with regard to 
DEA and, more broadly, U.S. respect for Bolivian sovereignty 
are substantial, and will need to be taken into account.  But 
he added that the Bolivians are waiting for a signal from the 
United States to increase engagement. Machado and Cordeiro 
stressed the importance of reinstating ATPDEA privileges. 
They said Brazil will replace USD 21 million of lost ATPDEA 
market in Bolivia, and Argentina USD 9 million. McMullen 
explained the U.S. efforts at bilateral dialogue with Bolivia 
and the complexities of certification and the ATPDEA process. 
 He agreed that a discussion on how our two countries could 
 
BRASILIA 00001076  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
engage Bolivia on counternarcotics cooperation would be 
useful. 
 
MEANWHILE, OUT IN THE MEDIA 
------------------------ 
 
¶9. (U) During McMullen,s discussions with GOB officials, 
media outlets were highlighting comments by FM Amorim 
regarding Brazil,s deep concern over the DCA and demanding 
that the United States answer to the region,s concerns. 
Amorim this week has publicly demanded transparency and 
guarantees with the U.S.-Colombia DCA, insisting that 
language be included in the agreement limiting the use of the 
equipment at the bases to combating narcotrafficking and the 
FARC. Following the phone call between President Lula and 
President Obama, Amorim told the press that President Obama 
is considering a request to meet with UNASUL countries in the 
near future.  And even after various USG efforts to explain 
the nature of the DCA, Amorim continued to refer to the bases 
as "foreign bases" and claimed that the agreement and the 
"foreign presence" could bring to South America "problems 
that are not from the region." 
 
 
COMMENT:  WHAT BRAZIL IS UP TO 
------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) DAS McMullen,s visit to explain the DCA was well 
received by the GOB as fulfillment of promises by General 
Jones during his visit and, we understand, President Obama 
during his phone call with President Lula, to provide greater 
detail on the DCA.  The openings on Pol-Mil talks, CN 
cooperation with Bolivia, and discussions of the IADC are all 
indications of a new posture toward the United States that 
suggest the GOB heard, internalized, and wants to respond to 
the expressed interest in broader and more transparent 
communication brought by National Security Advisor Jones and 
other senior Administration officials over the last few 
weeks.  We believe there is a genuine desire on the part of 
the GOB to explore greater options for bilateral cooperation. 
 
¶11. (C) In light of the private overtures made to McMullen, 
Amorim,s continued outbursts to the press are jarring.  In 
explaining these press statements to Charge and PolCouns, 
Biato has both suggested, in the first instance, that the 
press has an axe to grind and cannot be trusted to accurately 
convey the GOB,s position.  There is some truth to this, as 
Brazil,s major newspapers have consistently expressed 
disagreement with the GOB,s regional foreign policy, but it 
does not account for what are clearly accurate quotes from 
Amorim.  In this regard, Biato has explained that, as Brazil 
tries to maintain its role as mediator among its bickering 
neighbors, the GOB has to stay in the center of the regional 
debate.  In this instance, this has required the GOB to shift 
its public rhetoric toward Venezuela.  In other words, 
although Amorim,s comments seem to be heightening emotions 
rather than lowering them, the GOB has assessed that 
Venezuela is the more problematic neighbor to deal with, and 
sees public statements supportive of its position as helpful 
in gaining support from President Chavez for taking a less 
confrontational tone at the upcoming UNASUL summit in 
Bariloche. 
 
¶12. (C) It is entirely plausible that Amorim,s antics are 
aimed at making things easier for Brazil in Bariloche.  Biato 
has told us that Lula was initially reluctant to agree to the 
meeting, as they saw the potential for it to add to the 
uproar over the DCA.  Brazil,s main goal for Bariloche is to 
prevent it from destroying the still-shaky UNASUL or 
relations with a U.S. Administration with which it is 
desperate to cultivate a deeper dialogue. 
 
¶13.  (U)  DAS McMullen has cleared this message. 
KUBISKE