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RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9835
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001041 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA FOR A/S SHANNON, DAS MCMULLEN, AND, AND BSC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2019 
TAGS: PREL MARR BR CO
SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S THINKING ON COLOMBIA-US DEFENSE 
COOPERATION AGREEMENT 
 
REF: A. BOGOTA 2520 
     ¶B. QUITO 0715 
 
BRASILIA 00001041  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Lisa Kubiske, reason: 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The GOB has started to backtrack on its 
negative and kneejerk response to the U.S.-Colombia Defense 
Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and appears open to 
conversations to set straight the disinformation campaign 
produced by Brazil,s more left-leaning neighbors. After his 
August 6 meeting with Colombian President Uribe, Brazilian 
President Lula began mediating the tensions in the region 
set off by the DCA and presented a moderate stance on the 
Colombian bases during the Union of South American Nations 
(UNASUL) meeting in Quito on August 10 and agreed to attend 
a summit in Bariloche on August 28. GOB officials have been 
receptive to efforts by the Colombian Ambassador in Brazil 
to provide more information and transparency on the 
negotiations between the United States and Colombia and 
have expressed interest in the same engagement from USG 
officials. In conversations with various senior USG 
officials over the last two weeks, GOB officials have 
consistently maintained that their primary interest in the 
region is stability. Adverse reaction to the DCA 
demonstrates that there remains a significant degree of 
mistrust in Brazil regarding U.S. intentions in the region. 
End summary. 
 
BRAZIL,S INITIAL RESPONSE 
------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) The GOB,s first reaction to the U.S.-Colombia 
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) appeared to be based on 
a lack of information and fear that the DCA was aimed at 
countering a threat from Venezuela. In late July, Brazilian 
President Lula said "I,m not happy with the idea of another 
U.S. base in Colombia" and Foreign Minister Celso Amorim 
told the press "what worries Brazil is a strong military 
presence whose aim and capability seems to go well beyond 
what might be needed inside Colombia." There were news 
reports that Amorim was working with Spain to coordinate a 
political effort from the EU and Latin American countries 
against the alleged expansion of a U.S. military presence 
in Colombia. Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Marco 
Aurelio Garcia and Amorim complained to National Security 
Advisor General Jim Jones during his August 4 visit to 
Brasilia (septel) about the way the information and 
announcement of the U.S. accord with Colombia were being 
managed. Garcia highlighted the Amazon as being Brazil,s 
main concern because so often there is talk about 
internationalizing the rain forest. He, and several other 
Brazilian officials, said that the tension in the region 
caused by the U.S.-Colombia DCA puts Brazil in a bad 
situation. The Brazilian media quickly seized on the 
rhetoric against the DCA propagated by the more 
left-leaning elements in the region and Brazilian 
government, fueling what the Colombians have called a 
disinformation campaign. Many of the stories printed in 
Brazilian press in late July and early August were 
sensationalist and based on little fact, mischaracterizing 
the bases as U.S. bases and the accord as an attempt to 
militarize the region. 
 
LULA TAKES URIBE,S MESSAGE ON BOARD AND TO UNASUL 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) President Uribe,s whirlwind tour through Latin 
America August 4-6 to explain the scope of the DCA 
succeeded in allaying some of Brazil's fears (REF A). 
According to GOB and GOC statements to the Brazilian press, 
Lula, Amorim, and Minister of Defense Nelson Jobim met with 
Uribe for two hours on August 6, maintaining a positive 
tone throughout the meeting while expressing concerns over 
the use of Colombian military bases by the United States. 
Lula emphasized to Uribe the importance of working closely 
with all South American countries to counter 
narcotrafficking, independent of "external intervention." 
Lula also tried to convince Uribe to participate in the 
next Union of South American Nations (UNASUL) meeting to 
maintain an open dialogue over the bases. Amorim announced 
that the GOB saw Uribe,s visit as a very positive gesture 
and recognized that Colombia is a sovereign country with 
the right to negotiate the use of its air bases with the 
 
BRASILIA 00001041  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
United States. But he asked that the accord be negotiated 
"with transparency." 
 
¶4. (C) PolOffs met August 18 with Colombian Ambassador to 
Brazil Tony Jozame, who incidacted that Lula took on board 
Uribe,s clarifications of the DCA and U.S. use of Colombia 
air bases during Uribe,s August 6 visit to Brasilia. Jozame 
noted that, following the discussions with Uribe, Lula 
proved very helpful to the Colombians during the UNASUL 
summit in Quito by presenting a more moderate discourse and 
balancing Chavez,s rhetoric. Brazilian media reported that 
Lula and Argentina President Cristina Kirchner led an 
effort to prevent heated rhetoric regarding the 
U.S.-Colombia military cooperation from dominating the 
summit. During the event, Lula called for a UNASUL meeting 
with Presidents Obama and Uribe and noted the importance of 
hearing the views of Colombian officials regarding the U.S. 
presence in Colombia. In great part to Lula,s moderating 
efforts, the UNASUL declaration made no reference to the 
controversy surrounding the U.S.-Colombia DCA. Brazilian 
Ministry of Defense (MOD) contacts told EmbOffs that Lula 
did not stay until the end of the UNASUL meeting because 
Brazilian MOD Nelson Jobim prevailed on him not to, in an 
attempt to defuse the tension over the issue in Quito. 
Brazilian military officials have in recent weeks told 
Brazilian press and USG officials that they do not see the 
DCA as a regional threat. 
 
COLOMBIAN MISSION CAMPAIGNING ITS VIEWS 
------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Uribe told Brazilian officials that he had tasked 
his ambassador in Brazil to meet with the Brazilian Senate 
to explain fully the DCA and share with the Brazilians the 
documents of the negotiations with the United States. 
Jozame told the PollOff that he had already met with 
several members of the Brazilian Congress and was scheduled 
to meet with several other senior Brazilian officials and 
Latin American missions in Brasilia to discuss the DCA. 
Jozame also shared the documents he was sending to every 
Brazilian member of Congress, which included: a personal 
two-page letter from the Ambassador explaining the positive 
progress Colombia has made in recent years in its 
partnership with the United States to counter 
narcotrafficking, titled "Colombia: Yesterday and Today;" a 
two-page document outlining the objectives of the DCA with 
the United States; and a two-page document with nine points 
explaining what the DCA with the United States is and seven 
points explaining what it is not, written in an effort to 
clarify the disinformation that has been published in the 
press and advocated by Venezuela,s Chavez and others during 
the UNASUL meeting. (Note: these documents have been sent 
to WHA/BSC. End note.) Jozame said his clarifications were 
well received by Brazilian members of Congress and that he 
has invited Brazilian officials to visit the Colombian 
bases if they want to see it for themselves. 
 
¶6. (C) Jozame suggested that USG officials reach out to the 
GOB as well to give them greater detail and information on 
the DCA, to "clear the air," and to counter misinformation. 
Jozame also welcomed the coordination of efforts and 
messages being given to the Brazilians. 
 
PRESIDENCY ADVISOR EXPLAINS BRAZIL,S REACTION 
-------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Foreign Policy Advisor Ambassador Marcel Biato 
explained Brazil,s reaction to the DCA in a meeting with 
the Charge on August 19. He denied that it represented an 
effort to promote UNASUL at the expense of the United 
States. Rather, he said, Brazil,s main interest is to 
maintain peace in the region and that putting the lid back 
on regional tensions required moving the GOB,s public 
discourse to the middle of the debate (i.e., making 
statements critical of the United States) in order to 
maintain its ability to act as a mediator. Biato thought 
the USG should understand well the context in which Brazil 
is trying to work and would know not to react to negative 
statements. Biato described Lula,s meeting with Uribe as 
positive and said that Lula was reticent to attend the 
upcoming meeting in Bariloche for fear it would stir up 
conflict again. As Uribe had agreed to go, however, Lula 
would attend. 
 
BRASILIA 00001041  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
COMMENT: STABILITY, LACK OF TRUST AT ISSUE 
----------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Brazil,s foreign policy in South America is driven 
primarily by a desire for stability, as seen in its 
repeated assumption of a mediator role during crises and 
push for multilateral forums to facilitate communication 
and cooperation. Brasilia,s negative reaction to the 
announcement of the U.S.-Colombia DCA was, in the first 
instance, a response to the tensions the DCA ignited in the 
region and part of what Brasilia saw as a pragmatic effort 
to dissolve the strain. 
 
¶9. (C) In tandem with this fundamental concern, less 
pragmatic elements within the Lula government and Brazilian 
media clearly have sought to exploit the DCA incident to 
boost Brazil,s leadership at the expense of the United 
States. At the same time, the incident played on 
deep-seeded and broad-based suspicions of U.S. intentions 
in South America, based on the Brazilian reading of past 
U.S. intervention in the region. Taken together with 
Brazilian concerns about the Fourth Fleet and long-standing 
worries about losing the Amazon, this latest incident has 
brought to the fore the low level of trust many Brazilians 
have in the United States, which is a key consideration as 
we seek to expand our bilateral partnership. 
 
KUBISKE