VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #2759/01 2401959
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 281959Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0389
INFO RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 8051
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 9094
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 0538
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 2749
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 8706
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0537
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 4177
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 2509
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAWJC/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

UNCLAS BOGOTA 002759 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PTER PHUM EAID SNAR CO
SUBJECT: GENERAL SAAVEDRA SENDS POSITIVE SIGNALS ON SECURITY 
STRATEGY FOR PNC 
 
REF: A) BOGOTA 2276 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) The Embassy's Colombia Strategic Development Initiative 
(CSDI) working group met August 24 with Colombian Army General 
Carlos Saavedra, who coordinates implementation of the GOC's 
security strategy in relation to the National Consolidation Plan 
(PNC).  Many areas targeted for CSDI assistance are still largely in 
phase one of the strategy: securing territory.  Saavedra emphasized 
that the GOC has an integrated, inter-institutional national 
security plan but at the same time expressed frustration at lack of 
coordination among military, police, and civilian GOC agencies. 
Saavedra suggested a program of high-level trips to CSDI priority 
areas to establish the specific security conditions.  The General 
also offered his views on security and the lack of cooperation of 
the local government in Tumaco, Narino.  Overall, the meeting 
resulted in positive signals for progress.  End Summary. 
 
STILL IN PHASE ONE 
------------------ 
¶2. (SBU) On August 24, members of the Embassy's CSDI working group 
met with General Carlos Ovidio SAAVEDRA Saenz, Chief of Army 
Operations and COLMIL PNC lead, to discuss the details of the GOC's 
security strategy for the PNC.  Saavedra told us that they were 
working on a complete security map outlining the influence of both 
illegal armed groups and the armed forces in all consolidation 
areas.  He added that in many locations where CSDI activities are 
planned, the GOC was still on the offensive, advancing and 
recovering territory, and as such only in "phase one" of the "clear, 
hold, and build strategy."  He noted recent successes, however, that 
caused the GOC to shift several areas from red (non-permissive for 
consolidation) to yellow (transitional, where social and economic 
projects could be implemented with sufficient security for local 
inhabitants). 
 
AREA COMMANDERS KEY 
------------------- 
¶3. (SBU) Saavedra admitted that despite the PNC serving as a 
national security plan with an integrated and inter-institutional 
approach, poor implementation on the ground and a lack of unclear 
operational roles and procedures remained serious impediments. 
Saavedra noted that there was no high-level forum within the GOC to 
discuss consolidation security strategy in Bogota and recognized 
that the Embassy was meeting separately with the Center for 
Coordinated Integrated Action (CCAI), the Colombian National Police 
(CNP), and the Colombian military.  He suggested that meetings need 
be raised to "the level of decisions" rather than simple information 
exchanges.  For General Saavedra, area commanders are essential in 
order to evaluate current conditions, and offered to lead visits to 
CSDI priority zones to meet with those area commanders to get their 
security assessments (Note:  Post will collaborate with Saavedra on 
participating in these visits to heighten awareness of how CSDI can 
assist.) 
 
URBAN TUMACO NOT THE REAL PROBLEM IN NARINO 
------------------------------------- 
¶4. (SBU) On security plans for Tumaco, General Saavedra told us that 
the rural areas in the municipality of Tumaco and the rest of 
western Narino, particularly along the Ecuadorean border, are the 
real problems and not the city of Tumaco.  In many rural areas, he 
asserted, the absence of state-provided services and state presence 
has led to an environment ripe for illegal armed groups.  He added 
that the uncertainty of the upcoming election year is creating a 
delicate situation in the region and that the appropriate balance of 
public forces to address the security problems along the Pacific 
region is 60 percent army and 40 percent police.  General Saavedra 
also emphasized the need to encourage healthy participation by 
locally elected officials, whose agendas often differ from that of 
the national government. 
 
BACRIM A POLICE PROBLEM 
----------------------- 
¶5. (SBU) When asked how the PNC envisions transferring security 
responsibilities from the military to the police in stabilized 
areas, Saavedra was vague but told us that relations between the CNP 
and the Colombian military have never been better and that they are 
 
beginning to talk more.  He added that the fight against BACRIM 
(organized criminal bands) is a police problem because the issue is 
not territorial control but rather rule of law.  However, getting 
sufficient numbers of capable prosecutors into these zones is "not 
easy," he lamented.  Saavedra said they are hoping for increased 
financing for the Prosecutor General's office (Fiscalia) to create 
the needed legal structures, including sixteen new prosecutors to be 
assigned to consolidation areas. 
BROWNFIELD