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DE RUEHBO #2563/01 2251659
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P 131659Z AUG 09
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INFO RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 7889
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RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 2590
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UNCLAS BOGOTA 002563 
 
CODEL 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OREP EAID PGOV PREL SNAR PTER ETRD PHUM CO
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA SCENESETTER FOR CODEL PRICE (AUGUST 20-23) 
 
REF: A) STATE 80752 B) 07 BOGOTA 6697 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) We welcome the return of House Democracy Assistance 
Commission Chairman David Price and delegation to Colombia.  Your 
visit comes as a regional debate over a U.S.-Colombia Defense 
Cooperation Agreement has heated up and amidst significant political 
developments, as Congress exerts greater legislative independence. 
The Colombian Congressional session began July 20, and debates over 
several key issues have grabbed headlines, including a referendum to 
allow President Uribe to run for a third term, an important victims' 
rights law, and a political reform that would lessen the number of 
political parties, but make them more accountable to voters.  These 
debates are occurring in the context of legislative and presidential 
elections next spring. 
 
¶2. (SBU) As many members of the delegation know from previous 
visits, Colombia has progressed from a near failed state and 
terrorist haven to an economic, political, and social leader in 
Latin America in the past ten years.  Colombia has also achieved 
many security improvements and made notable progress in battling 
narcoterrorism, but human rights issues remain a significant 
concern.  The Government of Colombia (GOC) and U.S. Embassy are 
working together to expand these successes through a new 
Embassy/Colombia follow-on strategy to Plan Colombia-- called the 
Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI), which complements 
the GOC's recently completed National Consolidation Plan (PCN).  End 
Summary. 
 
Your Visit with the Colombian Congress 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Colombia has made much progress since the House Democracy 
Assistance Commission last visited two years ago with its Congress 
more vibrant than ever, but facing major challenges.  The 
Congressional leaders you will meet were surprisingly elected over 
President Uribe's preferred choices, and since the start of the July 
Congressional session, Congress has exerted greater independence 
from the executive branch.  Under the backdrop of presidential and 
legislative elections next spring, there are several important 
issues facing the Colombian Congress.  First, Congress must reach a 
decision on legislation that would allow President Uribe to run for 
a third, four-year term next year.  Procedural and substantive 
delays in conferencing the House and Senate bills have hurt 
prospects for this legislation.  The Uribe coalition seems to be 
fraying at the edges over reelection, with time working against them 
since the legislation needs to be approved by Congress and the 
Supreme Court and then put to a national vote by this November. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Another important theme is the approval in June of a 
political reform designed to punish politicians who collaborate with 
criminal and paramilitary elements, while also increasing party 
responsibility and accountability for members' voting records.  This 
landmark legislation ties Congressional votes to each member for the 
public record and now accounts for absenteeism.  Other significant 
changes include an increase in the percentage of required votes 
needed for a party to be officially recognized, thus reducing the 
number of minor political parties and creating more stability in the 
multi-party system; changes in finance laws; and the ability for 
members to switch parties. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Congress is also debating competing versions of a law 
designed to create a framework for reparations to victims of 
violence related to the ongoing armed conflict.  The Congress itself 
is operating under the shadow of a parapolitical scandal.  Thus far, 
86 members of Congress (of 268 total members in the House and 
Senate) have been investigated for ties to paramilitaries and six 
have been found guilty. 
 
Human Rights Challenges Remain 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (SBU) Colombia has publicly committed to improving its human 
rights performance, and we hope you will be able to reinforce the 
human rights message with the GOC leadership.  The Armed Forces 
dismissed over 50 military officers and enlisted men due to alleged 
involvement in extrajudicial killings, and the civilian prosecutors 
have developed criminal cases against several of them.  We are 
working with the Ministry of Defense to improve rules of engagement, 
and make sure that soldiers accused of human rights abuses are 
investigated by civilian prosecutors.  In addition, the Uribe 
Administration has been rocked by revelations of illegal electronic 
surveillance of Supreme Court justices, political opponents, and 
human rights groups carried out by the state intelligence service 
(DAS).  Labor unionist homicides declined 76 percent between 
2001-2008, yet in 2008 the number of labor homicides (for all 
causes) increased from 39 to 49--largely due to a spike in the first 
quarter.  Still, the murder rate for unionists is well below the 
national homicide rate.  As of June 2009, 18 murders of unionists 
have been reported this year. 
 
Regional Tensions Flare 
----------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) The rifts between Colombia and its neighbors, Venezuela and 
Ecuador, have widened over recent scandals related to the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) terrorist group.  The 
computers of the deceased FARC Number Two, along with a recently 
released video of a FARC military chief, point to FARC monetary 
contributions to Ecuadorean President Correa's presidential campaign 
as well as Ecuadorian leniency for FARC activities within Ecuador. 
President Chavez again recalled his ambassador to Colombia following 
press revelations in July that Swedish made anti-tank 
missiles--originally sold to the Venezuelan military--were 
discovered in FARC hands (he returned to Bogota in August).  The GOC 
has remained calm in the face of Chavez's provocative rhetoric, 
which included threats to deploy forces to the border, suspend trade 
ties, and nationalize Colombian owned businesses in Venezuela. 
 
¶8. (SBU) A Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) now nearing 
completion with Colombia would provide U.S. access to seven 
Colombian military facilities to facilitate cooperation to combat 
narcotics trafficking and other transnational crime.  The DCA 
updates existing agreements that date back to 1952, and would not 
increase the U.S. military footprint in Colombia.  Nevertheless, 
Venezuelan President Chavez, joined by leaders from Ecuador, 
Bolivia, and Argentina, reacted to news of the negotiations with 
harsh complaints over an increased U.S. military presence in the 
region.  Chavez expressed fears of an American invasion of Venezuela 
and said he felt the "winds of war blowing in the continent."  Even 
moderate governments, like Brazil and Chile, demanded an 
explanation.  From August 4-6, President Uribe visited seven South 
American presidents to reassure them that the agreement did not 
entail the establishment of U.S. bases and was a continuation of 
bilateral counternarcotics and security cooperation.  The rhetoric 
from Caracas has calmed somewhat as a result and Uribe may attend a 
regional summit on security issues on August 28 in Argentina. 
 
Post-Plan Colombia Initiatives 
------------------------------ 
 
¶9. (U) To consolidate the gains of Plan Colombia, we have developed 
the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI), which meshes 
with Colombia's own National Consolidation Plan (PNC).  Our efforts 
initially focus on three priority areas of on-going conflict, drug 
trafficking, and social marginalization.  PNC/CSDI has prioritized 
addressing the lack of state presence that enables coca production 
and illegally armed groups, and seeks to establish state presence in 
strategic, under-governed parts of the country.  The plan is 
centered on increasing territorial control in these areas to provide 
security for communities; to achieve permanent eradication; to 
transfer security responsibility to the police; and to provide a 
wide range of socio-economic services.  CSDI's core assumption is 
that security is the precondition for development, which gives 
communities a stake in the long term future of their region, which 
is in turn the surest way to long-term security in traditionally 
marginalized rural and vulnerable populations. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The civilian lead of the PNC has yet to take full charge 
of consolidation efforts, leaving the Ministry of Defense (MOD) 
organizationally in front.  This leadership vacuum means that the 
USG is both partner and catalyst in this effort, 
supplying planning and flexible funding to get consolidation from 
concept to implementation.  Other obstacles include the need for a 
comprehensive GOC security strategy to transition from military to 
police in "consolidated" territories; more clarity on a 
post-eradication strategy; stronger presence of the justice sector 
in CSDI areas; and increased funding support for PNC ministries in 
the GOC budget. 
 
The Future and Cartagena 
------------------------ 
 
¶11. (SBU) Your visit to Cartagena holds many keys to the issues that 
will play a major role in Colombia's future.  With security issues 
largely resolved already, the effectiveness of our CSDI efforts will 
likely become evident in the Montes de Maria zone near Cartagena 
within a year.  You will visit the Coordination Center that meshes 
civilian development, law enforcement, and military efforts to 
develop the Montes de Maria zone.  Drug traffickers have 
increasingly turned to seaborne shipments of drugs either in speed 
(go-fast) boats, self-propelled semi-submersible boats or hidden in 
commercial cargo.  Maritime counter-narcotics interdiction will be 
ever more vital to our efforts to combat drug trafficking.  Our 
joint efforts had unparalleled success in 2008, with record seizures 
of cocaine on the high seas, which coupled with a record year in 
eradication led to double digit increases in the price of cocaine in 
the U.S and decreases in its purity. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The coastal region is home to a large percentage of 
Colombia's African descendant population.  Cartagena's charismatic 
and dynamic mayor is Afro-Colombian and her rise reflects grass 
roots efforts to increase Afro-Colombian political participation 
that we have nurtured.  Despite important progress in recent years, 
Afro-Colombians still face daunting discrimination and remain the 
country's poorest, short-lived and often internally displaced group. 
 The future of the fifth of Colombia's population that is 
Afro-Colombian will help determine the course for the country.  The 
GOC has warmed to grass-roots Afro-Colombian efforts, and the 
Colombian Congress is poised to take action on sweeping 
anti-discrimination and affirmative action legislation supported by 
President Uribe. 
BROWNFIELD