VZCZCXRO5077
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBK #1901/01 2171022
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 051022Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7775
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAQPRIORITY 6830
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 001901 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
H PLEASE PASS TO SENATOR WEBB 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS PINS TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND SCENESETTER FOR SENATOR WEBB'S VISIT 
 
BANGKOK 00001901  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
 ¶1. (SBU) Senator Webb, Embassy Bangkok looks forward to 
welcoming you back to Thailand.  Your visit will afford a 
chance to express the United States' commitment for 
Thailand's democracy in meeting its current challenges and 
emerging strengthened, as well as to engage Thai officials 
and others on the U.S. foreign policy agenda in Asia, 
particularly challenges like Burma and North Korea.  It is 
also an opportunity to underscore our appreciation for the 
long-standing bilateral relationship, which has facilitated 
shared benefits in the fields of security, law enforcement, 
and intelligence efforts, as well as groundbreaking 
health/research collaboration and long-standing refugee 
support. 
 
CALM IN THE KINGDOM, BUT FOR HOW LONG? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Nearly eight months after your last visit, which 
came in the immediate wake of the late 2008 airport takeover 
and change in government, the political scene on the surface 
has calmed considerably, but it is likely the calm of the eye 
of a still churning storm.  Thailand remains deeply divided, 
politically and socially, and struggles to break free of an 
inward focus.  The traditional elite, urban middle class and 
the mid-south are on largely one side (Democrat in 
parliament, "yellow" in the street) and the political allies 
of Thaksin, with largely rural supporters in the North and 
Northeast on the other (opposition Puea Thai in parliament, 
"red" in the street). 
 
¶3. (SBU) Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva is a photogenic, 
eloquent 44-year old Oxford graduate who generally has 
progressive instincts about basic freedoms, social 
inequities, policy towards Burma, and how to address the 
troubled deep South, afflicted by a grinding 
ethno-nationalist Muslim-Malay separatist insurgency. 
Whether Abhisit can deliver on change is another matter. 
Although he has performed well, holding his government 
together and restoring stability in the face of significant 
political pressure is a persistent challenge.  He is beset 
with a fractious coalition, as well as a resurgent post-2006 
coup military.  His Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya is a 
capable strategic thinker, but Kasit is controversial due to 
his 2008 affiliation with the yellow-shirt People's Alliance 
for Democracy (PAD) movement.  Kasit recently had to answer a 
court summons regarding the 2008 PAD takeover of Bangkok's 
airports, leading to calls that he step down. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Since your last visit, the most dramatic political 
development was the mid-April red-shirt riots in Bangkok and 
Pattaya. The United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship 
(UDD), disrupted a regional Asian Summit and burned busses in 
Bangkok, leading to two deaths, after ex-PM Thaksin, now a 
fugitive abroad in the wake of an abuse of power conviction, 
called for a revolution to bring him home.  The opposition 
Puea Thai Party and red-shirt movement will continue to seek 
to drive Abhisit from office, call for changes to the 
constitution which ban Thaksin's cronies from participating 
in politics, and demand the amnesty for the former Prime 
Minister, who was convicted in a 2008 abuse of power case. 
The latest red-shirt move is to appeal to the King for a 
pardon for Thaksin, a not so subtle effort to drag a monarchy 
which is supposed to be above politics into the political 
fray; after several months of quiet after the April riots, 
the red-shirts have resumed weekly rallies.  The PAD 
yellow-shirt movement has indicated it will oppose all of 
these UDD initiatives. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Both major parties in Thai politics are favorable 
towards the U.S.; in fact, there are no radical, non-middle 
of the road parties represented in the Thai parliament.  On 
the street, while both yellow and red try to lay exclusive 
claim to the mantle of democracy, neither side of this split 
is as democratic as it claims to be.  Both movements reflect 
deep social concerns stemming from widespread perceptions of 
a lack of social and economic justice in Thailand, but both 
seek to triumph in competing for traditional Thai 
hierarchical power relationships.  New elections would not 
appear to be a viable solution to political divide, and 
political discord could very well persist for years.  We 
continue to stress to Thai interlocutors the need for all 
parties to avoid violence and respect democratic norms within 
the framework of the constitution Qd rule of law, as well as 
our support for long-time friend Thailand to work through its 
 
BANGKOK 00001901  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
current difficulties and emerge as a more participatory 
democracy. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Linked to the political uncertainty in Bangkok is 
the RTG's inability to resolve an ethno-nationalist Malay 
Muslim insurgency in southern Thailand which has claimed an 
estimated 3,500 lives since 2004.  The fundamental issues of 
justice and ethnic identity driving the violence are not 
unique to southern Thailand, and ending the insurgency will 
require the government to deal with these issues on a 
national level - which the on-going political instability in 
Bangkok has, to this point, prevented.  In the mean time, the 
insurgents use IEDs, assassinations, and beheadings to 
challenge the control of the Thai state in the deep South. 
The government has responded through special security laws 
which give security forces expanded power to search and 
detain people. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Underlying the political tension in Bangkok is the 
future of the monarchy.  On the throne for 62 years, the 
U.S.-born King Bhumibol is Thailand's most prestigious 
figure, with influence far beyond his constitutional mandate. 
 Many actors are jockeying for position to shape the expected 
transition period Thailand during royal succession after the 
eventual passing of the King, who is currently in poor health 
and rarely seen in public anymore. 
 
THAI FOREIGN POLICY 
------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) If there is one area of policy difference between 
Thai political parties affecting U.S. interests, it may well 
be certain elements of foreign policy.  PM Abhisit and FM 
Kasit have stated that Thailand's foreign policy should 
reflect that it is a democracy, rather than being reduced to 
mere commercial interests of cabinet members, as they claim 
pro-Thaksin governments did. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Thailand's Burma policy has shifted noticeably since 
Abhisit/Kasit came to office last December.  Abhisit and 
Kasit met with Burmese activists, exiles, and 1990 MPs elect 
in March on the margins of an ASEAN summit, the first such 
engagement since 2000, pre-Thaksin.  As the Chair of ASEAN, 
Thailand released a May 18 ASEAN Chairman's Statement 
reminding the Burmese regime that ASEAN Leaders have called 
for the immediate release of Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) and that 
Thailand, as the ASEAN Chair, was gravely concerned about 
recent developments relating to ASSK.  The ASEAN and ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) Ministerial statements issued in Phuket 
by Kasit in late July adopted a similar tone. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Border tensions with Burma have increased since 
June as approximately 3,000 Karen have entered Thailand.  The 
refugee influx resulted from a Burmese Army and Democratic 
Karen Buddhist Army offensive against the Karen National 
Union.  FM Kasit has directed the MFA to work closely with 
NGOs to address the refugees' needs while in Thailand and to 
ensure they return home voluntarily. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Relations with Cambodia continue to be volatile, 
primarily due to a border dispute centered on 4.6 square 
kilometers of overlapping territorial claims adjacent to the 
Preah Vihear temple.  While Thailand and France in 1904-8 
agreed in principle on the Thai-Cambodian border, ownership 
of Preah Vihear was not decided until 1962 when the 
International Court of Justice ruled in favor of Cambodia. 
Tensions spiked in mid-2008 when the pro-Thaksin Thai 
government in power at that time supported Cambodia's 
application to UNESCO for the unilateral listing of the 
temple as a world heritage site.  The decision was seized by 
the opposition in order to attack the government.  Periodic 
clashes between the two sides' militaries since then have 
resulted in the deaths of at least seven Thai soldiers.  We 
continue to stress to the Thai interlocutors that the dispute 
should be resolved peacefully and bilaterally. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The rise of China, and the perceived absence of a 
focused U.S. presence in the region in recent years, is 
another strategic issue of concern to Thailand and the 
region.  Thailand does not seek to choose between the U.S. 
and China, rather preferring to have good relations with both 
and hoping the U.S. strengthens engagement in the region. 
There was universal praise for Secretary Clinton's 
ARF-related visit to Thailand in late July, including U.S. 
 
BANGKOK 00001901  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
accession to the Southeast Asian Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (TAC) and the holding of a U.S.-Lower Mekong 
Ministerial that underscored Secretary Clinton's comment 
that: "The U.S. is back in Asia."  That said, Thailand 
continues to develop closer relations with China.  The Thai 
military employs a range of Chinese weapons systems, and Thai 
and Chinese special forces have in recent years conducted 
joint exercises. 
 
ENDURING, PRODUCTIVE BILATERAL ALLIANCE 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) As one of five U.S. treaty allies in Asia and 
straddling a major force projection air/sea corridor, 
Thailand is crucial to U.S. security interests well beyond 
Southeast Asia.  Our bilateral military relationship provides 
distinctive force projection opportunities from Thai military 
facilities amid vital sea and air lanes that support combat 
and humanitarian assistance missions, and the opportunity to 
conduct live fire training exercises, both bilateral and 
multilateral, that are impossible to match elsewhere in Asia. 
 The COBRA GOLD exercise is PACOM's largest exercise.  The 
event has evolved to facilitate important objectives such as 
a greater role in the Asian Pacific region for Japan and 
Singapore and re-establishing a partnership with Indonesia. 
We access the Utapao Naval Air Field alone a 1000 times a 
year.  The base was a key for air-bridge operations to Iraq 
and for combat operations in Afghanistan.  Preserving such 
unfettered, unquestioned access requires engagement and 
remains a mission and USG priority.  Thailand has performed 
well on international peacekeeping missions, particularly in 
leading UN forces in East Timor, to which Thailand 
contributed 1,500 troops.  The RTG is currently preparing to 
deploy a battalion of peacekeepers for Darfur. 
 
¶14. (SBU) The U.S. and Thailand have extensive cooperation in 
medical research.  Approximately 400 Mission staff work on 
health issues, making the Embassy one of the USG's largest 
efforts to fight the world's most dangerous diseases: 
malaria; TB; dengue; HIV/AIDS; and pandemic influenza.  CDC, 
USAID, USDA/APHIS, and the Armed Forces Research Institute of 
Medical Sciences (AFRIMS) closely collaborate with Thai 
counterparts on basic research and trial vaccines.  The 
sophistication of the Thai scientific and public health 
community makes collaboration as useful to the USG as it is 
to the Thai.  A number of important breakthroughs, such as in 
the prevention of HIV/AIDS transmission from mothers to 
children, were developed here, and several phase III, double 
blind trials for potential HIV vaccines are currently ongoing. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Forty years of law enforcement cooperation 
initially focused on counter-narcotics efforts has expanded 
to all aspects of transnational crime, defending U.S. 
interests and securing extraditions of both U.S. citizens and 
third country nationals, and building capacity in the Thai 
criminal justice system.  Eighteen federal and local law 
enforcement agencies are currently represented in the 
Embassy.  The U.S. and Thailand co-host the International Law 
Enforcement Academy, a regional platform to promote law 
enforcement professionalism.  The extradition case of Russian 
arms trafficker Viktor Bout, wanted in New York on charges of 
conspiring to provide arms to terrorists, is our current law 
enforcement top priority.  The court decision is expected 
August 11, your first day in Thailand. 
 
¶16. (SBU) On refugees, Thailand continues to host more than 
114,000 registered Burmese refugees and has allowed the 
resettlement of nearly 10,000 refugees to the U.S. this 
fiscal year, for which we are grateful.  We continue to push 
for greater self-sufficiency activities to end the 
"warehousing" of refugees unwilling or unable to resettle 
abroad. About 4,000 Burmese refugees crossed into Thailand in 
June in response to an offensive by government-allied militia 
groups.  Thailand has provided temporary protection to this 
latest influx, comprised mostly of women and children.  A 
group of 5,000 Lao Hmong is also of concern.  158 
UNHCR-recognized refugees have been confined in an 
immigration jail for 2.5 years.  Another 4,700 are in an 
army-run camp in Phetchabun.  The RTG and Government of Laos 
have insisted the issue will be handled bilaterally, although 
the RTG recently assured the United States that none will be 
forcibly returned to Laos.  We have also been invited for the 
first time to discuss the issue in a trilateral format on 
August 7 at the Phetchabun. 
 
BANGKOK 00001901  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
THAI ECONOMY CONTINUES TO STRUGGLE 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) The United States and Thailand have long enjoyed a 
robust trade relationship; annual bilateral trade has been 
over $32 billion in recent years. Cumulative U.S. investment 
over the past twenty plus years is estimated at $23 billion. 
There is a large American Chamber of Commerce with some 650 
members; you will have an opportunity to address the AMCHAM 
membership at lunch on August 17.  While U.S. direct 
investment is down this year largely due to the global 
economic crisis, many U.S. firms receive preferred national 
treatment in a number of sectors under the bilateral Treaty 
of Amity and Economic Relations, the bedrock of our economic 
relationship since 1966.  A number of large U.S. investments 
in petrochemicals, computer parts, and automotives use 
Thailand as an export manufacturing base for the region. 
Thai officials still need to do more to strengthen the 
overall investment climate, particularly on customs reform 
and intellectual property rights enforcement. 
 
¶18. (SBU) The global economic crisis hit Thailand's 
export-driven economy particularly hard over the last year. 
Exports, historically the bright spot of the Thai economy, 
declined 23.5 percent over the first six months of this year 
when compared to the same period last year (with exports to 
the U.S. declining 27.1 percent). The tourism industry, 
another longtime economic growth generator, has experienced a 
serious decline in the number of tourist arrivals for the 
past 10 months; tourist arrivals in June alone fell 18.6 
percent year-on-year.  With the lessons of the 1997 financial 
crisis under its belt, the banking sector remains sound due 
to strong regulation and minimal exposure to risky or toxic 
assets. The economy went into official recession with a 7.1 
percent drop in GDP the first quarter of this year. Forecasts 
show a three to five percent GDP contraction for all of 2009. 
If global trade activity remains depressed, Thailand's 
export-dependent economy likely will continue to suffer 
significant losses this year. 
JOHN