VZCZCXRO7811
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0566/01 2381352
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 261352Z AUG 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0676
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0670

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000566 
 
SENSITIVE SIPDIS 
 
DEPT PASS TO LTC FRANK SOBCHAK, USSOCOM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OREP PREL PGOV MASS ML
 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL MARSHALL VISIT TO MALI 
 
BAMAKO 00000566  001.4 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: We warmly welcome CODEL Marshall's 
upcoming visit to Mali.  The CODEL?s visit will provide 
an important opportunity to highlight U.S. support for a 
moderate, majority Muslim democracy that stands as an 
example for West Africa and beyond.  Mali is a strong 
opponent of terrorism and a key member of the Trans- 
Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP).  Mali has 
made considerable progress since its 1991-1992 transition 
to democracy. Nonetheless, Mali faces serious 
socioeconomic and security challenges.  Mali's health, 
education and economic indicators remain among the lowest 
in the world.  U.S. assistance plays a crucial role in 
helping Mali to address these challenges by ensuring that 
Mali's political successes translate into tangible 
improvements for Mali's estimated 13 million people. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Mali?s security challenges are multi-faceted 
and involve a dormant Tuareg rebellion and a growing 
terrorist threat from Al Qaeda in the Lands of the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).  Although currently at low ebb, 
periodic fighting earlier this year between one Tuareg 
rebel/criminal group and the Malian military in the 
northern region of Kidal endangered the implementation of 
a peace agreement, known as the Algiers Accords, signed 
by the Malian government and Tuareg rebels in July 2006. 
Northern Mali also serves as an unwilling safe-haven for 
the Islamic extremist group AQIM which has held multiple 
Western and Malian military hostages ? although none at 
present ? and has assassinated one hostage and a Malian 
military officer. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) In late-June and early-July, Malian military 
forces engaged in battle members of AQIM with some 
success. U.S. military assistance, including training and 
provision of non-lethal material through the TSCTP and 
other programs, significantly assists the Malian Armed 
Forces to become more professional and to improve their 
capacity to defend themselves and to begin to take the 
fight to AQIM in the harsh desert environment of Northern 
Mali.  U.S. security cooperation is a key component to 
helping Mali meet its security needs and provide the 
stability it requires to prosper both politically and 
economically.   End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Malian Democracy and International Engagement 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) As a moderate majority Muslim multi-ethnic 
democracy with over 17 years of democratic experience, 
Mali serves as an example for west Africa and beyond. 
President Amadou Toumani Toure, who is known to Malians 
as "ATT," was re-elected to a second and final five year 
term as President in a free and fair election in 2007 
with more than 70 percent of the vote. 
 
¶5. (U) Mali is a responsible and engaged international 
partner.  It has a strong human rights record and is one 
of the few members of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference to be rated as "free" by Freedom House.  Mali 
is also a leader in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of press 
freedoms.  In addition to serving as the 2007 Chair of 
the Community of Democracies, Mali is active in the 
United Nations and other international organizations and 
has participated in several international peacekeeping 
operations.  Mali is also a solid partner in the fight 
against terrorism and an active participant in TSCTP. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Unfortunately, Mali's political progress has not 
been matched by improved social and economic indicators. 
Mali ranked 173 out of 177 countries on the United 
Nation's 2007 Human Development Index.  Mali's poor 
ranking is due in large part to literacy rates, health 
indicators and a per capita GNP that ranks among the 
lowest in the world.  These factors, along with periodic 
Tuareg unrest and the continued presence of al Qaeda- 
aligned terrorist elements in the country's sparsely 
populated northern regions, constitute serious threats to 
Malian democracy and regional stability. The United 
States plays a significant role in helping Mali to meet 
these challenges and reinforce almost two decades of 
democratic progress. 
 
----------------------- 
U.S. Assistance to Mali 
----------------------- 
 
¶7.  (U) The November 2006 signing of a Millennium 
Challenge Account compact with Mali made the United 
 
BAMAKO 00000566  002.4 OF 003 
 
 
States the largest bilateral donor to Mali.  It also 
cemented strong U.S.-Mali relations and better positioned 
Mali as a force for stability in a politically fragile 
region.  The USD 461 million compact entered into force 
in September 2007 and includes a USD 234 million 
irrigation project north of Segou and a USD 183 million 
airport renovation project.  USAID/Mali has an annual 
budget of approximately USD 97 million, which is focused 
on the health, agriculture, education sectors.   Mali is 
host to one of the largest Peace Corps programs in 
Africa,  with currently 115 peace corps volunteers and a 
further 65 trainees awaiting swearing-in.  The PCVs work 
on health, sanitation, water conservation and economic 
development. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Mali is an important ally in the fight against 
terrorism and a key member of the Trans-Sahara Counter- 
Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP).  TSCTP programming in Mali 
can be divided into programs focused on counter-terrorism 
and counter-extremism.  Important counter- 
terrorism programs include bilateral training exercises 
like Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCET) events. 
Counter-extremism activities include a broad range of 
Department of Defense supported humanitarian assistance, 
USAID development programs and public diplomacy 
outreach.  The Department of Defense's Humanitarian 
Assistance Program has contributed over USD 3 million to 
Mali since 1999 to build wells, construct schools and 
renovate health clinics.  Mali is an active participant 
in our small DOD International Military Education and 
Training (IMET) program. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Malians practice a predominately open and 
tolerant form of Islam and are therefore unreceptive to 
extremist messages.  Our TSCTP counter-extremism programs 
and our public diplomacy outreach are designed to promote 
moderate messages and ensure that Malians remain 
unreceptive to extremist ideologies.  TSCTP programs are 
administered jointly by the State Department, USAID and 
the Department of Defense.  USAID/Mali considers the 
northern region of Mali an important area and has 
undertaken activities there in a concerted effort since 
1999; as budgets have increased in the past two years 
USAID/Mali has ensured that a portion of the funding for 
each program has been dedicated to activities in Northern 
Mali.  In the past ten years, USAID/Mali activities in 
the north have included:  support to 35 rural health 
centers, the construction and reinforcement of 17 
community radio stations, the establishment of six 
community telecenters offering internet access, the 
conduct of conflict-mitigation activities, support to 
rice and horticultural commodities, the expansion of 
access to financial services.  The provision of 
scholarships and mentoring to 6,500 girls under the 
Ambassador's Girls Scholarship Fund was very successful, 
but funding is no longer available.   USAID/Mali 
continues with the creation of teacher training and 
radio-based instruction for children of nomadic 
populations.   USAID/Mali also receives additional funds 
from  TSCTP and the majority of these resources have been 
earmarked for  activities in the north that aim to expand 
economic opportunities for  youth, the Trickle-Up program 
for emerging entrepreneurs, construct  additional 
community radio stations, build capacity for local 
government,  and support the secular education component 
of madersas (religious schools) throughout the country. 
 
¶10. (U)  On the Public Affairs side, we have used 
cultural preservation grants to help Mali honor its 
Islamic heritage by protecting ancient Islamic 
manuscripts in Djenne and Timbuktu  and helping to 
preserve an ancient mosque in Gao.  We are also 
approaching the two year anniversary of the only American 
Corner in Mali.  Located in Gao, it has allowed us to 
quadruple our outreach to key contacts in the region and 
to further promote mutual understanding between Malians 
and Americans. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
------------------- 
Security Challenges 
------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Security concerns in northern Mali constitute a 
significant challenge for the Malian government. Mali has 
 
BAMAKO 00000566  003.4 OF 003 
 
 
weathered two Tuareg rebellions (one in 1963 and a second 
during the 1990s) since independence.  In May 2006 Tuareg 
rebels attacked two Malian military outposts in northern 
Mali and rekindled fears of another prolonged rebellion. 
President Toure resisted calls from some Malian political 
leaders to force a military confrontation with the rebels 
and instead opted for dialogue mediated by Mali's 
northern neighbor, Algeria.  In July 2006 Mali and the 
Tuareg rebels signed a peace agreement, known as the 
Algiers Accords, which pledged to provide increased 
development and infrastructure support to Mali's three 
northern regions.  In 2007 a dissident group of Tuareg 
rebels/criminals led by Ibrahim Bahanga resumed attacks 
against Malian military posts and convoys.  Bahanga held 
several dozen Malian soldiers hostage for nearly six 
months until Libya helped negotiate their release in 
March 2008.  In January 2009, Bahanga lost the support of 
the other main rebel group ? the Alliance for Development 
and Change (ADC).  Subsequently, Malian military units, 
supported by militia elements, chased Bahanga out of 
Northern Mali into exile in Libya.  Unfortunately, this 
was only achieved after the Malian Army lost more than 20 
soldiers who had insufficient means to defend themselves 
against Bahanga's attack. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Although Tuareg unrest is generally confined to 
the region of Kidal, rebels in the past have orchestrated 
early morning attacks against military outposts in the 
regions of Gao and Segou.  Algerian-brokered discussions 
aimed at uniting disparate Tuareg rebel factions and 
facilitating a return to the Algiers Accords framework 
continues presently.  President Toure remains committed 
to a negotiated settlement with Tuareg rebel leaders. 
Key aspects of the Algiers Accords not yet implemented 
include the creation of special military units composed 
of Northern and Southern Malians, the reintegration into 
the army of former Tuareg deserters, and a boost to 
economic development in the north. 
 
¶13. (SBU)  In addition to the periodic Tuareg friction, 
Mali's sparsely populated and vast northern regions also 
serve as a haven for smugglers, bandits and terrorist 
elements.  The Malian government is unable to fully 
secure these zones due to their size and remote nature, 
and due to the Malian military?s lack of both materiel 
and desert training.  Algerian Islamic extremists, 
formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and 
Combat (GSPC) but now called al Qaeda in the Lands of the 
Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM), continue, to Mali's embarrassment 
and anger, to use northern Mali as a safe haven.  AQIM 
held, at one point, up to six Western hostages.  After 
protracted negotiations and a ransom payment, all but one 
British hostage were freed. The British hostage was 
murdered after a deadline for ransom payment was broken. 
Shortly thereafter, an AQIM supporter assassinated Malian 
Army Colonel Lamana ould Bou in his home in Timbuktu. 
Subsequently, the Malian government decided to take the 
fight to AQIM in Northern Mali despite its evident 
disadvantage.  Special Malian military units, 
supplemented by some irregular elements, engaged AQIM in 
battle in late-June and early-July 2009.  Initial success 
later turned to a set-back when Malian troops were 
ambushed several kilometers outside of Timbuktu.  A 
recent AFRICOM assessment identified critical shortfalls 
with Malian logistics capabilities, including transport, 
communications, and intelligence.  Improving these 
capabilities is a current interagency focus. 
 
------------------------------ 
Comment: U.S. Support for Mali 
------------------------------ 
 
¶14. (SBU) Your visit to Mali will give you firsthand 
knowledge of the importance of U.S. security cooperation 
to Mali?s stability and prosperity.  Mali's status as a 
leader in democracy, human rights and tolerance make U.S. 
engagement with Mali, and support for Mali's security and 
development even more critical. We remain convinced the 
U.S. policy, and the Embassy?s, is correct: listen to a 
broad range of people, support implementation of the 
Algiers Accords, foster increased professionalism and 
capacity of the Malian Armed Forces, and stress the need 
to strengthen and preserve Mali?s unitary multiethnic 
democracy as the fight against AQIM is pursued.  End 
comment. 
 
MILOVANOVIC