VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0994 2290937
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 170937Z AUG 09
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2126
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9339
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0772

UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000994 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/P, EAP/PD - THOMAS HAMM 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
Summary:  From August 15-17, Taiwan's major Chinese-language 
continued to give significant news and editorial coverage to the 
damage caused by Typhoon Morakot and to the United States' decision 
to send military aircraft to help Taiwan in the post-typhoon rescue 
and relief efforts.  Several major Chinese-language and 
English-language papers front-paged the U.S. rescue operations in 
Taiwan with banner headlines on August 17.  In terms of editorials 
and commentaries, an op-ed in the pro-independence "Liberty Times" 
criticized the Ma administration's delay in accepting the U.S. 
rescue assistance and said the delay was caused by the Ma 
administration's decision to uphold the one China policy.  End 
summary. 
 
"U.S. Military's Relief [Operations] for Taiwan Is Testing Ma" 
 
Lai I-chung, Executive Committee member of the Taiwan Thinktank, 
opined in the pro-independence "Liberty Times" [circulation: 70,000] 
(8/17): 
 
"... AIT and Japan's Interchange Association are the only two 
foreign agencies that have set up offices in Kaohsiung, and they 
immediately realized the serious [damage] caused by Typhoon Morakot. 
 Without the reports from these offices in Taiwan, the State 
Department, which insists on the one China policy, would not have 
overlooked the sensitive U.S.-China relations and expressed a 
willingness to send the U.S. military to assist [Taiwan].  It is 
impossible that Ma, who is incompetent in managing the affairs of 
state but is very sensitive to the one China [policy], was unaware 
of the military significance [of the move by the U.S. military]. 
Rumors had it that the National Security Council (NSC) had [earlier] 
suggested that [Ma] decline U.S. assistance first and then seek 
international assistance after China's Association for Relations 
across the Taiwan Strait had made donations [to Taiwan].  It is 
generally believed that the major reason [for doing so] was to 
uphold the one China [policy] and to lay bare [the Ma 
administration's] heart to Beijing.  But [the problem is that the Ma 
administration] has missed the most precious first seventy-two hours 
[following the disaster], and numerous victims have either died or 
been injured. 
 
"Given Taiwan's continuously chaotic disaster rescue system, in 
addition to [the concerns that the island's] original rescue 
capacity might be consumed by coordinating the U.S. military's 
rescue operations, the NSC, which was previously against the U.S. 
military's rescue assistance because of its insistence on upholding 
the one China [policy], will likely lose the trust [of both sides.] 
Thus, the NSC will not be able to contribute to the high-level 
communications between the two sides...  As for [the NSC's role in] 
the more complicated follow-on operations, the results are 
unimaginable.  New problems will ensue after the U.S. military is in 
Taiwan." 
 
WANG