VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #1051/01 2430928
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 310928Z AUG 09
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2214
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9365
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0795

UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001051 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/P, EAP/PD - THOMAS HAMM 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
¶1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused news 
coverage August 29-31 on the visit of the Dalai Lama to Taiwan to 
offer blessings for the victims of Typhoon Morakot in southern 
Taiwan; and on the landslide victory of Japan's opposition 
Democratic Party of Japan in nationwide elections Sunday.  All major 
Chinese-language and English-language dailies also reported on the 
arrival of new AIT Taipei Director William Stanton Friday and his 
remarks made at the Taoyuan International Airport. 
 
¶2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, an op-ed in the 
mass-circulation "Apple Daily" discussed the Dalai Lama's visit to 
Taiwan and said it should become a win-win situation for all sides. 
An op-ed in the KMT-leaning "China Times," however, said President 
Ma Ying-jeou's unpredictable and inconsistent leadership style, as 
shown in his handling of the U.S. military aircraft coming to Taiwan 
in the wake of Typhoon Morakot and allowing the Dalai Lama to visit 
Taiwan, will be a problem that Beijing will want to resolve in the 
future.  An editorial in the pro-independence, English-language 
"Taipei Times" discussed the recent developments in 
Washington-Beijing-Taipei ties and concluded that "Beijing will want 
to ensure that it is the sole regional power upon which smaller 
players can rely," and naturally, it will "pressure the US to 
leave."  End summary. 
 
¶3. U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations 
 
A) "Dalai Lama's Visit to Taiwan Can Become a Win-Win Situation for 
All Sides" 
 
Professor Lin Chong-pin from Tamkang University's Graduate Institute 
of International Affairs and Strategic Studies opined in the 
mass-circulation "Apple Daily" [circulation: 520,000] (8/31): 
 
"... Beijing's current policy toward Taiwan: soft [power] will 
prevail over hard [power]; will proactively strive to win popular 
support [of the Taiwan people]; will insist on [preserving] face 
while being flexible in dealing with its substantive interests. 
Will Beijing continue [sticking to] such a line?  It depends on 
three factors: First, whether [the situation] inside mainland China 
will remain more or less stable.  Namely, will the competition among 
the [Chinese] government leaders [come out into the open]?  Will 
[China's] economy be out of control?  Will the disturbances in every 
walk of life [in China] be linked together to form any [uniformed] 
actions?  Second, will the official exchanges between China and the 
United States remain stable?  Third, will the Taiwan government show 
its 'friendly gesture' both in its words and deeds? 
 
"If the answers to the questions above are yes, then Beijing's soft 
policy toward Taiwan will remain the same, even though the 'honey 
moon' period between Hu Jintao and Ma Ying-jeou is already over. 
This is because mainland China's economy has already showed signs of 
improvement; Chinese and U.S. officials are having close contacts; 
the Ma administration has already quickly sent personnel to Beijing 
to explain the decision-making [process] behind the Dalai Lama's 
visit to Taiwan and the [Taiwan] authorities have exercised 
restraint by not meeting with the Dalai Lama.  The entire evaluation 
should be more positive than negative.  Judging from the current 
situation, the Dalai Lama's visit to Taiwan could result in a 
win-win situation for all sides.  President Ma has demonstrated his 
leadership by consulting with many people and then making a prompt 
decision -- a quite refreshing look [for Ma's leadership].  The DPP, 
on the other hand, revealed its capability to [launch] surprise 
attacks without A-bian [former President Chen Shui-bian]; the Dalai 
Lama has won more respect [from the Taiwan people] by cancelling his 
international [press] conference; and the Taiwan people suffering 
various disasters will be able to get blessings from the Dalai Lama, 
who manages to rise above religious bias and always maintains 
friendly relationships with all sides." 
 
B) "Cross-Strait Politics Returns to Fundamentals" 
 
Former DPP Legislator Julian Chu opined in the KMT-leaning "China 
Times" [circulation: 120,000] (8/31): 
 
"... Similar to the U.S. helicopters coming to [provide] rescue 
assistance in Taiwan, the Dalai Lama's visit to Taiwan to offer 
blessings [to the Taiwan people] may not necessarily have any 
political implications.  But for Beijing, the former case involved 
the wrestling [of power] between China and the United States, while 
the latter was related to the conflicts concerning [cross-Strait] 
unification and [Taiwan] independence, so naturally [the Dalai 
Lama's visit] will keep Beijing on its toes.  Comparatively 
speaking, the Dalai Lama's visit to Taiwan should be classified as 
one of the 'three untouchables' (i.e. Tibetan and Xinjiang 
independence, Taiwan independence, and the June 4th [Tiananmen 
Square Incident]) in terms of Beijing's foreign relations, and its 
political sensitivity ranks much higher than the U.S. military 
aircraft coming to Taiwan.  But Ma chose to act in an opposite way: 
he merely informed Beijing in advance about the U.S. military coming 
 
to Taiwan. 
 
"It is expected that Ma will try the best he can to mend the 
[broken] relations [with Beijing] by using all-out efforts to reduce 
the political implications of the Dalai Lama's visit to Taiwan.  But 
even so, Ma's unpredictable and inconsistent decision-making style 
in terms of [Taiwan's] cross-Strait policy will inevitably become a 
problem that Beijing wants to resolve. ..." 
 
C) "Not a Good Month for Beijing" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] editorialized (8/30): 
 
"It must have been a bad past few weeks for Beijing officials to 
basically tell the US to get the hell out of the region -- but 
that's exactly what it did last week during two days of negotiations 
on maritime safety between Chinese and US officials, when it 
requested that the US phase out and eventually end maritime 
surveillance in the region.  The meeting, called in response to a 
series of near-accidents off the Chinese coast earlier this year, 
came at a time when China was least expected to be flexing its 
muscles before Washington. After all, with US President Barack Obama 
still new in office and his China policy just shaping up, Beijing 
has everything to gain from treading carefully, especially when 
Washington is courting its help in resolving the global financial 
crisis. 
 
"Some could argue that this is an indication of Beijing's growing 
self-assurance, or simply the result of rising Chinese nationalism 
under President Hu Jintao. This is unlikely, however, because China 
isn't sure-footed enough yet to order the US around, and many are 
still undecided as to whether the US and China are strategic 
partners or strategic competitors. It is surprising that Beijing 
officials would risk undermining the budding relationship with a US 
administration that is widely seen as more amenable to China's 
objectives than its predecessor.  Beijing's hardening stance is the 
result of something else altogether: its sense of weakness on a core 
issue -- Taiwan. ... 
 
"What derailed this carefully tuned minuet wasn't careless policy or 
growing friction; rather, it was the immediate environment -- over 
which China has no control -- that changed and is now forcing a 
policy realignment. First came Typhoon Morakot, which devastated 
southern Taiwan earlier this month. Soon afterwards, US military 
aircraft, helicopters and officers were for the first time in many 
years officially setting foot on Taiwanese soil, which had an 
important symbolic impact on Beijing's perceptions. To add insult to 
injury, the Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, has been 
invited to visit Taiwan, something that would have been 
inconceivable prior to Morakot. ... 
 
"That Morakot and conflict in Myanmar, in addition to unrest in 
Xinjiang, would occur almost simultaneously has made Beijing less 
confident of its ability to determine the future course of the 
region. It has also made it more aware that despite its well-crafted 
-- and so far successful -- policy of ensuring stability along its 
border and in the region, some variables remain out of its control. 
As all these developments have invited -- or risk inviting -- 
intervention by outside forces, Beijing will want to ensure that it 
is the sole regional power upon which smaller players can rely. One 
way to achieve this, of course, will be to pressure the US to 
leave." 
 
STANTON