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Viewing cable 09AITTAIPEI1033, MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09AITTAIPEI1033 2009-08-26 09:57 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #1033/01 2380957
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 260957Z AUG 09
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2188
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9349
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0781
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001033 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/P, EAP/PD - THOMAS HAMM 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused news 
coverage August 26 on the rapid spread of the H1N1virus in Taiwan 
and the Taiwan government's plan to cope with the threat of the 
epidemic; and on the on-going relief efforts and plans for 
reconstruction in typhoon-stricken southern Taiwan.  In terms of 
editorials and commentaries, an op-ed piece in the pro-independence 
"Liberty Times" linked the largest-ever military exercise launched 
by China's People's Liberation Army recently with a series of 
incidents happening in Taiwan in the wake of Typhoon Morakot and 
concluded that President Ma Ying-jeou's 'inaction' will likely 
expose Taiwan to an unnecessary military crisis.  A column in the 
conservative, pro-unification, English-language "China Post," 
however, said cross-Strait ties may be speeding up in the wake of 
Typhoon Morakot.  End summary. 
 
A) "China-U.S-Taiwan [Relations] -- Starting from the People's 
Liberation Army's Unprecedented Large-scale [Military] Exercise" 
 
Yun Cheng, a freelancer focusing on Taiwan issues, opined in the 
pro-independence "Liberty Times" [circulation: 700,000] (8/26): 
 
"... For Ma Ying-jeou, [all he needs to do] is to endure the 
[criticisms] about his poor performance in handling the response to 
Typhoon Morakot for a few days.  But the biggest difference lies in 
the fact that Ma's 'inaction' has resulted in the U.S. military's 
proactive offer to show its presence [in Taiwan].  Also, while the 
U.S. transport aircraft and mine-removing helicopters appeared in 
the airspace of Taiwan with 'subdued markings', the CVN-73 aircraft 
carrier of the [U.S.] Seventh Fleet was actually not far from [those 
aircraft].  It appeared that the international media also rushed to 
come to Taiwan as if they were expecting something big to happen. 
... 
 
"China was conducting its largest-ever [military] drill codenamed 
'Kuayue ('Stride') 2009' on August 11, mobilizing [troops from] four 
military zones -- Shenyang, Lanzhou, Jinan and Guangzhou -- for 
nearly two months, and the drill was held in the vicinity of some 
controversial areas such as North Korea, the South China Sea and 
Afghanistan. ...  As a result, the USS George Washington had assumed 
a defensive posture:  it departed its home port in Yokosuka, Japan 
on August 10 and made a [port] call on Manila, the first time in 
over thirteen years.  Also, the USS Nimitz, which is harbored far 
way in San Diego, started a journey westward in late July [in an 
attempt] to replace [the USS George Washington]. 
 
"Just when both the United States and China were 'interacting in a 
ritual-like manner,' several unusual incidents occurred in Taiwan 
one after another:  A [Taiwan] former chief of the general staff 
arrived in Beijing for a visit on August 8, just when Typhoon 
Morakot hit [southern Taiwan]; on August 9, five sections of the 
undersea cables near Taiwan were interrupted, and the U.S. Pacific 
Command twice took the initiative to express its willingness to 
provide rescue assistance [to Taiwan]; while other countries started 
to offer rescue assistance [to Taiwan] on August 10, the [KMT] 
authorities welcomed China's assistance; China's People's Liberation 
Army [PLA] launched its military drill on August 11, and Taiwan's 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an 'emergency' cable declining 
[rescue] supplies and teams from other countries; on August 12, six 
sections of [Taiwan's] undersea cables were damaged, and China 
turned down a port call by a naval vessel from Japan's Self-Defense 
Force; the situation began to change after Taiwan's premier changed 
his story and denied that [Taiwan] had rejected foreign assistance. 
On August 13, several media outlets in Taiwan suggested that Taiwan 
learn from the PLA's experience in conducting rescue missions; U.S. 
AID personnel arrived in Taiwan on August 14, and PLA Major General 
Luo Yuan urged Taiwan to review its alliance with the United States 
before [both sides of the Taiwan Strait] establish a military 
confidence-building mechanism; [President] Ma called for a national 
security meeting; a U.S. C-130 aircraft landed in Taiwan on August 
16; U.S. helicopters arrived in Taiwan on August 17, and the State 
Department denied that it needed to inform China [about sending 
military aircraft to Taiwan].  On August 18, China's Taiwan Affairs 
Office reiterated its willingness to provide helicopters [to 
Taiwan]; U.S. congressmen visited Taiwan via a military aircraft on 
August 20; the USS Nimitz arrived in Yokosuka on August 24. 
 
"... Regardless of the reasons and motives behind it, the incredible 
'consecutive inaction' by the Ma administration and China's 'timely' 
declaration of its willingness [to provide assistance to Taiwan] 
alone would be sufficient to allow the PLA to seize the opportunity 
to break through [Taiwan's] military command and control and land on 
Taiwan in the name of [providing] 'humanitarian' [assistance].  Once 
such a precedent is set, the U.S.-Japan security alliance may be 
damaged in an instant due to an 'emergency situation' happening in 
areas near Japan and thus turn the sixty-year-old strategic balance 
in East Asia upside down!  When [one] recalls the first week in the 
wake of Typhoon Morakot, [one may find that] even if the Ma 
administration were not regarded as plotting with Beijing, it is 
still possible that its aloofness and hasty action will result in a 
 
'misjudgment' by the United States, Japan and China and consequently 
expose Taiwan to an unnecessary military crisis.  The U.S. 
military's eagerness to 'show itself' [in Taiwan] must be [seen] as 
a 'preventative' [step]. ..." 
 
B) "Cross-Strait Ties May Be Speeding up" 
 
Columnist Frank Ching wrote in the conservative, pro-unification, 
English-language "China Post" [circulation: 30,000] (8/26): 
 
"... But this month, for the first time, American military aircraft 
returned to Taiwan and conducted joint operations with the Taiwan 
military -- the first such joint military operations since 1979. 
Remarkably, China did not object.  Beijing is extremely sensitive to 
anything that smacks of official relations between the United States 
and Taiwan, which it claims as part of its territory.  But this 
time, it was conspicuously silent.  This silence is a reflection of 
the profound changes that have taken place in relations among China, 
Taiwan and the United States since Ma assumed the presidency last 
year. ...  Typhoon Morakot has not only highlighted the changes in 
the delicate relationship involving Taipei, Beijing and Washington: 
It may even have the effect of speeding them up. 
 
"President Ma, who apologized for his administration's handling of 
the natural disaster, said that the army would shift its focus to 
disaster prevention and rescue, adding that Taiwan's enemy was not 
necessarily the Chinese across the Taiwan Strait, but could be 
nature.  He also said his government would reduce the number of 
Black Hawk military helicopters it had ordered from the United 
States and buy heavy lift helicopters instead to enhance its ability 
to conduct disaster relief and humanitarian missions.  All this, no 
doubt, was music to China's ears.  While rejecting China's 
helicopter offer, Taiwan did accept other aid from the mainland, 
particularly pre-fabricated units to house those who have lost their 
homes. ... 
 
"Taipei and Beijing have both talked about signing a peace 
agreement.  Negotiations on such a pact will no doubt be sensitive 
and prolonged.  But if both sides publicly indicate a change in the 
primary mission of the military, even without a reunification of 
[sic] the use of force by China, it could go far to improving the 
environment for talks to end 60 years of hostility across the Taiwan 
Strait." 
 
WANG