VZCZCXRO1149
RR RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
DE RUEHAD #0808/01 2250434
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 130434Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2825
INFO RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 8391
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0097
RUEANFA/NRC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000808 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, ISN/RA (STUKALIN), ISN/MNSA (RUDOLPH) AND 
ISN/NESS (HUMPHREY) 
NRC FOR MDOANE, MFREELAND 
DOE FOR NNSA (VAN SICKLE, MCCLELLAND-KERR) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG TRGY AORC KNNP OTRA AE
SUBJECT:  OPPORTUNITIES FOR DOE/NNSA TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN UAE 
 
REFS:  A) ABU DHABI 585 
      B) STATE 57671 
  C) ABU DHABI 491 
 
ABU DHABI 00000808  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: During the August 3-5 visit of a DOE/NNSA and 
State delegation, UAE nuclear power officials expressed great 
interest in bilateral civil nuclear infrastructure engagement and 
formal cooperation in the fields of safety, security and safeguards, 
under the auspices of a bilateral implementing arrangement with 
DOE/NNSA.  UAE officials said human resource development, 
particularly for Emirati nationals, is a key priority.  U.S. 
officials identified several areas of potential cooperation related 
to the fields of safety, security and safeguards, including a 
comprehensive safeguards workshop for officials designated by the 
UAE.  Both sides agreed to seek completion of the implementing 
arrangement this fall.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Participants: 
 
UAE 
--- 
 
-- Amb. Hamad Al Kaabi, MFA Special Representative for International 
Nuclear Cooperation and UAE Permanent Representative to the IAEA 
-- Ali Abdulla Alhaj, Diplomatic Attach, MFA 
-- Dr. Bill Travers, Director General-designate, Federal Authority 
for Nuclear Regulation (FANR, under formation) 
-- Dr. Farouk El Tawila, Chief Scientist (designate), FANR 
-- Monira Al Kuttub, Director of Government & International Affairs 
(designate), FANR 
-- Russell Clark, Director of Education and Training (designate), 
FANR 
-- John Loy, Radiation Safety Manager (designate), FANR 
-- Mohammed Al Hammadi, Interim CEO, Emirates Nuclear Energy 
Corporation (ENEC, under formation) 
-- Padraic Riley, Communications Director, ENEC 
-- Christine Scheffer, Head of Human Resources, ENEC 
-- MAJ Mohamed Al Shamsi, Manager of Security and Nuclear Power 
Protection Program, Critical National Infrastructure Authority 
(CNIA) 
 
U.S. 
---- 
 
-- Monte Mallin, Director, Office of Global Security Engagement and 
Cooperation (GSEC), National Nuclear Security Administration, 
Department of Energy (DOE/NNSA) 
-- Dr. Kenneth E. Apt, Senior Technical Advisor, Office of Global 
Security Engagement and Cooperation, DOE/NNSA 
-- Deborah A. Rudolph, Physical Scientist, State ISN/MNSA 
-- Dr. Marc Humphrey, Physical Scientist, State ISN/NESS 
 
PURPOSE 
------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) The purpose of the joint NNSA/DOS visit was to propose an 
agency-to-agency arrangement for nuclear infrastructure cooperation 
that would be a concrete step in helping to implement the April 2008 
U.S.-UAE MOU concerning cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy.  U.S. officials stressed that this proposed cooperation 
would fall under a legally non-binding arrangement, and would 
provide specific subsidiary topics for technical collaboration; it 
is not a new framework for expanding the scope of cooperation.  In 
separate and combined meetings with the MFA, ENEC, and FANR, the 
delegation explained the scope, goals, and mechanisms of NNSA's 
International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP) 
program, giving examples of engagement related to infrastructure 
cooperation with an emphasis on safeguards.  The team sought to 
identify FANR and ENEC needs and how INSEP technical assistance 
capabilities could complement IAEA, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC), DOE/NE and other engagement efforts, including UAE commercial 
contracts. 
 
CONTEXT 
------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The UAE represents a unique and challenging opportunity for 
engagement because of its accelerated, well funded, and credible 
plan to develop civilian nuclear power, combined with a nearly 
complete lack of installed nuclear R&D, human resources, and other 
infrastructure.  Unlike other INSEP developing-state partners, the 
UAE is taking an unprecedented approach to civilian nuclear 
power-jumping to an operating nuclear power plant (NPP) by 2017 
 
ABU DHABI 00000808  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
without first establishing or building upon a national nuclear R&D 
capability.  Nevertheless, the UAE is working to assemble a core 
cadre of experts in the near future.  FANR and ENEC plans to provide 
nuclear engineering scholarships in the UAE andGQqQ1{#;Qo 
expedite a new partnership, reinforcing UAE's role in advancing 
common national security objectives and in setting a regional and 
global standard for national nonproliferation commitments.  As the 
UAE has no atomic energy commission-type organization and 
essentially no nuclear R&D, INSEP engagement with UAE would 
represent a new model for cooperation, based more fully on basic 
human capacity building and on education and training. 
 
UAE INTERESTS 
------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) MFA Amb. Al Kaabi said the UAEG is very interested in 
expanding bilateral nuclear cooperation with the USG, within the 
context of the 2008 MOU and the 123 Agreement currently under 
Congressional review.  Al Kaabi noted that capacity building and 
developing a cadre of expertise is very important to the UAE, 
specifically developing safeguards capacity, a State System of 
Accountability and Control (SSAC), and physical security.  ENEC CEO 
Al Hammadi identified physical protection (including radioactive 
source and NPP security) and training (human resource development, 
HRD) in nuclear engineering as ENEC's most pressing needs.  In 
addition, he expressed serious interest in fuel services 
cooperation, to which State referred him to the reliable nuclear 
fuel services working group of Global Nuclear Energy Partnership 
(GNEP).  ENEC also suggested cooperation in the area of cyber 
security, principally for reactor operations.  FANR DG Travers 
stressed his organization's need for safeguards infrastructure, SSAC 
capability, and nuclear regulation.  He also agreed that IAEA 
Additional Protocol (AP) implementation was a priority and mentioned 
radioactive source safety and security as an important "side 
element."  Travers also noted FANR's strong interest in cooperation 
and assistance in nuclear regulation with the NRC (where he was 
formerly affiliated). 
 
COOPERATION TO BE PURSUED 
------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Officials agreed the formal Implementing Arrangement (with 
minor modifications) would probably best be signed by DOE for the 
U.S. and MFA for the UAE, thus ensuring UAE federal coordination of 
the bilateral cooperation and allowing for FANR and ENEC participate 
equally, with the possibility of CNIA participation as well.  UAE 
officials are looking into such an approach would work from their 
perspective, but were optimistic.  All parties agreed that once the 
Arrangement is in place, the technical collaborations by counterpart 
organizations can proceed expeditiously at the working level under 
negotiated "action sheets" that would specify the objectives of the 
project, the participants from both sides, milestones, and target 
date for completion. 
 
¶7. (SBU) In response to UAE priorities, the U.S. delegation proposed 
a phased approach for bilateral engagement based on a) advancing 
common nonproliferation objectives, b) developing infrastructure 
(stressing HRD) in targeted areas, and c) responding to UAE's 
accelerated nuclear energy development.  The phased cooperation 
would begin broadly with opportunities for accelerated development 
of national human capacity in nuclear safeguards and security basics 
and, over time, development of skills to meet emerging technical 
requirements.  The first phase could involve a comprehensive 
workshop on safeguards fundamentals, in the United States, for UAE 
representatives who will be involved in safeguards and security. 
(Note: At this time, the depth of expertise at ENEC and FANR is 
thin, and there are few Emiratis who could participate is such a 
course. End Note.)  The second phase of INSEP cooperation would 
focus on UAE expertise "gaps" that are identified as its 
infrastructure begins to take shape, and expertise of the U.S. 
national labs would be tailored to meet these specific requirements 
as the UAE program progresses.  The bilateral cooperation between 
NNSA and UAE will also factor in current Technical Cooperation 
projects that UAE has with the IAEA. The intent is not to duplicate 
effort, but rather to leverage between IAEA and bilateral efforts. 
For instance, the USG can offer UAE training and fellowships, once 
infrastructure is built up, through the IAEA programs. Additionally, 
an idea posed in meetings with UAE officials was to provide a U.S. 
expert through an IAEA project, possibly one in human resources 
 
ABU DHABI 00000808  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
development. 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) The following potential areas for bilateral cooperation 
were identified by the U.S. side and agreed to as a useful list by 
the UAE, with the understanding that some may be more appropriate 
for later phases of cooperation and others could be incorporated 
into earlier phases: 
 
-- Technical training in nuclear safeguards, including SSAC and AP 
implementation 
-- Best practices in radiation protection 
-- Implementation of international security agreements, e.g., the 
IAEA Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 
(CPPNM), the related INFCIRC 225, and UNSCR 1540 
-- Implementation of the UAE's new nuclear law (pending 
ratification) through development of subsidiary safeguards and 
security regulations, directives, guidelines, etc. (complementary to 
cooperation with the NRC) 
-- Export control end-use training and commodities identification 
-- Emergency planning 
-- National environmental monitoring and baseline characterization 
-- Low- QdQ'He document would be ready for signature at the September 
IAEA General Conference, although Al Kaabi noted it is an aggressive 
target. 
Upon completion of the agreement, State and DOE will seek to 
determine UAE interest in a tailored UAE course on safeguards 
fundamentals and begin making arrangements as appropriate. 
 
¶10. (U) The DOE/State delegation has cleared this cable. 
OLSON