VZCZCXRO7057
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAD #0783/01 2161509
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 041509Z AUG 09 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2798
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0502
RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000783 
 
C O R R E C T E D   C O P Y (PARA 4 NAME CHANGED) 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2019 
TAGS: PREL EFIN ECON IR AF PK AE

SUBJECT: TREASURY A/S COHEN RAISES IRAN, NORTH KOREA, TALIBAN WITH UAE CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR 
 
REFS: A) ABU DHABI 737 
  B) ABU DHABI 736 
  C) ABU DHABI 575 
 
ABU DHABI 00000783  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified by CDA Doug Greene, reasons 1.4 (b, d). 
 
¶1. (S) On July 16, Treasury Assistant Secretary (A/S) for Terrorist Finance and Financial Crime David Cohen met with UAE Central Bank Governor Sultan bin Nasser al Suweidi in order to discuss progress on suggestions to protect the UAE's financial system from abuse by Iran. Governor al Suweidi opened the meeting by noting that the trip of Treasury Secretary Geithner (Refs A and B) so early in the tenure of the new administration signaled the strong ties between the U.S. and UAE. A/S Cohen concurred that the trip, culminating in the dinner with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan (MBZ), was a clear demonstration of strong links between the two countries. 
 
¶2. (S) A/S Cohen raised several issues including, progress made on curbing the financial relations of UAE banks with Iranian counterparts, combating Taliban financing mechanisms, the UAE's interest in joining the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and possible action against North Koran front companies in the UAE. 

IRAN 
---- 
 
¶3. (S) With regard to Iran's nuclear ambition, A/S Cohen highlighted Secretary of State Clinton's speech on July 15, as evidence that the U.S. continued to strongly oppose Iran's drive to acquire nuclear weapons and that U.S. overtures for possible dialogue were not an indication of a change in this position. For the time being, the new administration would increase sanctions only gradually as they developed their engagement strategy, but were ready to subject Iran to “crippling” sanctions if progress were not made. To make existing international sanctions as effective as possible, Cohen emphasized that the UAE and other countries with financial ties to Iran needed to maintain vigilance. Governor Suweidi agreed but recalled the suggestion of Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed the night before recommending a solution to the Palestinian situation as a means to allow moderate Arab elements to come on board and make the sanctions truly effective. In the absence of a settlement, Iran would continue to use the Palestinian issue to rally support from its Arab neighbors. Cohen replied that President Obama's appointment of a special envoy for the Middle East showed how seriously the administration viewed the Israeli-Palestinian situation, but that could not be allowed to divert focus from Iran. 
 
¶4. (S) A/S Cohen turned to the list of measures that Undersecretary (U/S) for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey had discussed with Suweidi during U/S Levey's trip to the UAE in May (Ref C). A/S Cohen asked what specific measures the Central Bank had taken to reduce ties between Emirates-NBD bank and its Iranian customers, to which Governor Suweidi replied that he had spoken to the bank's chairman in April and asked for a list of accounts it maintains for Iranian banks. The Governor instructed Chairman Ahmed al Tayer to find excuses to reduce the level of activity and then close many of these accounts. The Governor described these accounts as “windows for violations in the UAE's banking system.” The Governor stated that Emirates NBD had begun implementing his order, although closing accounts would take time. Without prompting, the Governor stated that he had received assurances from DIFC Governor Dr. Omar bin Sulieman that the DIFC was in the process of conducting an assessment of violations by Persia International Bank (PIB). Once the assessment was complete, the DIFC would move to close down PIB's operation in the free zone. 
 
¶5. (S) On the issue of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), designated by Treasury in September 2008, A/S Cohen reiterated the U.S. call for banks in countries where IRISL operated to stop honoring letters of credit issued for IRISL cargoes. 
Governor al Suweidi opined that much of this trade was not financed with letters of credit but more often through cash or barter arrangements. He had, however, asked Abdulrahim al Awadi, head of the UAE FIU to raise the matter with Dubai authorities and with the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and promised more pressure would be applied. 
 
¶6. (S) A/S Cohen raised the issue of progress on more closely monitoring financial transactions between the UAE and Iran. The Governor said the UAE Central Bank was in the process of introducing a real time screening system that would allow the Central Bank to block any transactions it thought necessary. He stated that the Central Bank currently receives transactional data from Melli and Saderat, but does not have the ability to screen and block transactions real time. He noted that the Central Bank just recently developed this capacity for exchange houses, and that his IT team was working on implementing the same system for all banks in the UAE. He hoped the system would be complete in the coming months. Cohen also asked about prospects for placing UAE Central Bank personnel directly in Bank Saderat and Bank Melli, the Governor said that after the coming Ramadan period, the Central Bank would appoint a full time official to carry out this assignment. The Governor stated that this action in itself will significantly increase Central Bank control over these Iranian banks and send a strong signal to the market. 
 
¶7. (S) In response to A/S Cohen encouraging adherence to the various FATF advisories concerning Iran, including possibly cutting off all correspondent relations, the Governor cautioned against a total severing of financial links, arguing that it would be better to focus now on better scrutinizing and reducing the number of suspect transactions. Cohen cautioned that as Crown Prince Mohamed bin Zayed had stated, time was not on our side and that significant measures had to be taken as soon as possible. The Governor agreed that the Central Bank should do something about Iranian correspondent accounts, but asked for more time with this request. 

AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN 
-------------------- 
 
¶8. (S) A/S Cohen raised the issue of financing for the Taliban originating from o flowing through the UAE to Pakistan and Afghanistan. Governor al Suweidi said the Central Bank was examining the possibility of lowering the threshold reporting requirement for cash moving to or from Pakistan, but that the MFA urged caution as the Government of Pakistan would likely object to Pakistani expatriates appearing to be singled out for extra scrutiny. A/S Cohen countered that U.S. authorities believed the amounts being smuggled were larger than the Governor believed, and that U.S. agencies such as ICE could provide training for UAE customs personnel to better screen for potential cash couriers. The Governor asked Treasury to share names and detailed information when possible so that the Central Bank could close accounts and/or freeze funds. 

FATF 
---- 
 
¶9. (S) With regard to FATF membership, Governor al Suweidi characterized the UAE as the financial “gateway” between the Gulf and the international financial community handling over 50 percent of all regional transactions. He opined that the UAE represented a more important partner for FATF than many of the smaller countries which made up the original FATF membership. The Governor also stated that UAE FATF membership would help strengthen the capabilities of the regional MENAFATF. A/S Cohen promised he would discuss the issue with his colleagues and commended the UAE for its desire for FATF membership, but cautioned that the UAE would have to be ready to meet performance thresholds set by FATF. 

NORTH KOREA 
----------- 
 
¶10. (S) A/S Cohen closed the meeting on the subject of North Korea and UN member obligations to freeze assets and block transactions associated with North Korean persons designated pursuant to UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, including transaction only potentially related to North Korea's proliferation program. He drew specific attention to the UN designations in April 2009 of the North Korean company KOMID and Tanchon Bank as being responsible for spearheading Pyongyang's proliferation efforts. The Governor said he would send out a circular to all UAE banks instructing them not to handle any North Korea-related transactions. A/S Cohen also passed information on two Dubai-based individuals working for Tanchon and on the KOMID-controlled Dubai-based company Green Mountain Electronics. 
The Governor promised to request further information from the Dubai Police and to direct the accounts to be frozen immediately. 

¶11. (S) Comment: UAE Ambassador to the U.S. Yousef al Otaiba specifically requested that Governor al Suweidi join the dinner with Treasury Secretary Geithner and Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (septel). Otaiba shared that the Governor is very cautious when it comes to Iran, so he wanted the Governor to hear the UAE's policy on Iran directly from MBZ. Following the dinner, the Governor was clearly more forward leaning and cooperative with respect to financial measures. End comment. 

¶12. (SBU) This cable has been cleared by David Cohen, Treasury Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Finance and Financial Crime. 

GREENE