VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0692/01 1961617
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 151617Z JUL 09
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6930
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 2734

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000692 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL CT
SUBJECT: AD HOC COMMITTEE ON MEASURES TO ELIMINATE 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MEETS JUNE 29 TO JULY 2 
 
 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The Ad Hoc Committee on Measures to 
Eliminate International Terrorism met from June 29 to July 2 
to discuss the Comprehensive Convention on International 
Terrorism (CCIT).  While all countries publicly expressed the 
belief that terrorism must be condemned and professed the 
desirability of bringing the negotiations to a conclusion in 
the near future, the continued refusal of OIC countries to 
accept the text from other counterterrorism conventions on 
the exclusion of the acts of armed forces from the scope of 
the Convention (e.g. Article 18) and the desire to exclude 
the actions of national liberation movements from the scope 
of the convention prevented any meaningful progress, as they 
have for the past eight years.  The OIC reiterated its 
previous alternative proposal on this provision and publicly 
remained steadfast that groups under foreign occupation and 
fighting for their right to self-determination should be 
exempted from the CCIT.  In private, Pakistan indicated 
during bilateral consultations that there may be an 
opportunity to reach a compromise with a number of OIC 
countries. 
 
¶2.  While the 2007 Coordinator's proposal did not receive 
strong support during the plenary or informal consultations, 
many delegations outside the OIC, including most EU 
countries, India, Russia and China, have signaled a 
willingness to accept the 2007 Coordinator's proposal as a 
way forward.  The USG advocated a return to the 2002 text, 
which was based on a formulation used in five other 
counterterrorism conventions, and signaled discomfort with 
the 2007 proposal while not formally rejecting it.  Both 
publicly and bilaterally, India stressed their desire finally 
to complete work on the CCIT (their initiative) in the near 
future.  Despite the lack of true progress, at the closing 
session the Chair, the Coordinator and many delegations 
stated that momentum had been generated and that the CCIT 
could soon be agreed upon, perhaps as soon as this fall.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶3. (SBU) ACTION REQUESTED:  USUN expects considerable 
pressure on the USG, particularly by India, between now and 
this fall's UNGA session to take constructive steps to move 
the process forward, either by embracing the 2007 
Coordinator's text or by proposing an alternative.  USUN 
requests that the Department assess whether the benefits of 
concluding the proposed convention are worth additional USG 
concessions.  If so, we request Department advice whether a 
further compromise along the lines of the 2007 Coordinator's 
proposal is consistent with protecting fundamental USG 
interests, or if the USG is prepared to suggest another 
approach that might similarly resolve the pending impasse in 
an acceptable manner.  There will be a Perm Rep-level session 
in mid-August in New York with India to discuss bi-lateral 
cooperation at the UN, and the Indians have made clear that 
the CCIT is their top priority.  USUN requests guidance in 
advance of those meetings, including any new Department 
proposals, that might provide a way forward. 
 
BUREAU AND US DELEGATION 
 
¶4. (U) The Bureau for the meeting was: 
Rohan Perera (Sri Lanka), Chairman 
Maria Telalian (Greece), Vice-Chairperson 
Ana Cristina Rodriguez-Pineda (Guatemala), Vice-Chairperson 
Namira Nabil Negm (Egypt), Vice-Chairperson 
Andi Xhoi (Albania), Rapporteur 
 
¶5. (U) The USG was represented by: 
Clifton Johnson, Assistant Legal Adviser for Law Enforcement 
and Intelligence (L/LEI) 
Mary McLeod, Legal Adviser, USUN 
James Donovan, Deputy Legal Adviser, USUN 
Peter Gutherie, Attorney-Adviser, L/LEI 
Timothy Schirmer, Intern, USUN 
 
OIC GROUP 
 
¶6. (U) Syria, on behalf of the OIC Group, spoke first at the 
June 29 morning plenary session, reiterated the previous 
(2002) OIC proposal on the scope of the draft proposal and 
stressed the need to make "a clear distinction between 
terrorism and the exercise of legitimate right of peoples to 
resist foreign occupation."   As in the past, Syria said that 
the OIC Group "supports a comprehensive strategy to combat 
terrorism that must address the root cause of terrorism, 
including unlawful use of force, aggression, foreign 
occupation, festering international disputes, denial of the 
right of peoples living under foreign occupation to 
self-determination, political and economic injustices and 
political marginalization and alienation."  Qatar, Egypt, 
Morocco and Saudi Arabia seconded the OIC statement. 
 
¶7. (U) At the June 30 plenary, Egypt repeated its call for a 
high-level conference on international terrorism (HLCIT) 
prior to conclusion of the CCIT to discuss counterterrorism 
issues, including the definition of terrorism, root causes of 
terrorism, the interplay of terrorism and human rights, and 
so on.  Syria chimed in that such a conference would be an 
important step toward adoption of the CCIT. 
Europe 
 
¶8. (U) The Czech Republic spoke on behalf of the European 
Union.  The EU indicated that it supported reaching agreement 
on the CCIT based on the coordinator's proposal of 2002 or 
the coordinator's proposal of 2005 (A/59/894) (note: the text 
of Article 20 of the 2005 proposal is the same as the 2002 
Coordinator's text for Article 18), but were "willing to 
examine any legally sound and well-founded proposals," and 
looked forward to an exchange of views with other delegations 
"including with regard to the coordinator's 2007 package 
proposal," which they were prepared to "consider seriously." 
As in the past, they said they would only support a HLCIT 
once the text of the comprehensive convention was agreed 
upon.  Comment:  The UK and France have indicated to us that 
they oppose the 2007 Coordinator's proposal, and appear to be 
blocking a EU position in support of the proposal. 
 
¶9. (U) Switzerland expressed the view that although the 
coordinator's proposal "still has room for improvement, it 
provides a basis for compromise." 
 
¶10. (U) Liechtenstein, noting the concerns expressed by some 
delegations about the coordinator's 2007 proposal, asked 
whether other delegations agreed to its assumption that the 
proposal did not change the obligations of states under 
international humanitarian law, and that while it was 
important to protect the "integrity" of international 
humanitarian law, "integrity" was different from "uniformity." 
 
WHA 
 
¶11. (U) Mexico spoke on behalf of the Rio Group.  While 
condemning terrorism, they stressed their "unequivocal 
conviction that the measures to combat international 
terrorism must comply at all times with international law, 
including international human rights law and refugee law." 
They expressed disappointment over the fact that an agreement 
has not yet been reached, due to differences over Article 18, 
and said it was their understanding "that the moment has 
arrived to reach a solution which reflects the common 
expectations and interests of all delegations."  With respect 
to the timing of a HLCIT, they echoed the EU and U.S. 
positions in advocating conclusion of the CCIT prior to 
convening a conference. 
 
¶12. (U) Cuba expressed support for the OIC's position that 
those parties fighting for their right to self-determination 
be exempted from the coverage of any definition or convention 
adopted by the Committee. Cuba favored holding the HLCIT 
prior to adoption of the CCIT. 
 
¶13. (U) Ecuador summarized the actions taken by their 
government to combat terrorism, specifically stricter 
enforcement and regulations related to terrorist financing 
and drug trade.  They also expressed the need for the 
Committee to address the victims of terrorist attacks, not 
just the perpetrators.  Ecuador also explicitly expressed 
support that UN actions taken to combat terrorism be taken at 
the regional level. 
 
ASIA 
 
¶14. (U) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea made a 
thinly veiled attack on the United States.  They expressed 
concern about "state-sponsored terrorism," states using the 
threat of terrorism as an excuse to overthrow governments 
they feel are hostile to their goals, and cited Iraq and 
Afghanistan as the prime examples of "state-sponsored 
terrorism." 
 
¶15. (U) India, which originally proposed the CCIT, championed 
speedy conclusion of the CCIT, both publicly and in bilateral 
meetings.  In their plenary statement, they stressed that 
"(n)o cause can ever justify terrorism,"  expressed optimism 
that an agreement on the Convention would be reached soon, 
and called on all delegations to "seriously examine the 
proposals before us."  In informal consultations, they 
indicated they supported the 2002 coordinator's text, but 
stated that the coordinator's 2007 proposal deserved serious 
consideration.  They supported waiting to hold the HLICT 
until after conclusion of the CCIT. 
 
¶16. (U) China indicated that it could live with either the 
2002 coordinator's text or the 2007 coordinator's text. 
 
 
U.S. POSITION 
 
¶17. (U) Cliff Johnson addressed the Committee for the USG on 
June 29.  He stated that the U.S. remained supportive of a 
CCIT "that would strengthen the existing international 
counterterrorism legal regime and reinforce the critical 
principle that no cause or grievance justifies terrorism in 
any form."  He emphasized that the United States saw the CCIT 
as a law enforcement tool that must be predicated on a shared 
and clear understanding of two principles:  (1) that the CCIT 
cannot provide a pretext for terrorist groups to claim their 
criminal acts are excluded from the scope of the convention 
in the name of national liberation, resistance to foreign of 
occupation, or any other justification or motivation and (2) 
that, as with prior counterterrorism conventions, the CCIT 
should not reach state military action, which is subject to 
other regimes.   He noted that these issues had been 
successfully and consistently dealt with in five previous 
counterterrorism instruments, and stated that the USG had not 
"been persuaded 
that there are deficiencies that need to be remedied in this 
standard language that the international community has 
adopted five times before."  At the June 30 session, Peter 
Gutherie reiterated the long-standing USG view that 
consideration of a HLCIT would be appropriate only after work 
was completed on the CCIT.  Otherwise, such a conference 
risked divisive and unconstructive divisions among states in 
their perception of and efforts to combat terrorism rather 
than global cooperation and commonality in fighting it. 
 
ISRAEL 
 
¶18. (U) Israel stated that the CCIT must reflect the firm 
resolve of the international community against any terrorism, 
in any form; any ambiguity was not acceptable.  The CCIT must 
also reflect the basic moral and legal principle that the 
murder of innocents can never be justified.  While the 2002 
coordinator's text was most in line with their view, they 
were prepared to discuss "all new ideas."  Finally, in 
Israel's view, any HLCIT should be conducted after an 
agreement by the Ad Hoc Committee. 
Africa 
 
¶19. (U) Senegal and Ghana urged countries to show flexibility 
on wording and to strive to reach an agreement as soon as 
possible. 
 
COORDINATOR'S INTERVENTIONS 
 
¶20. (U) Telalian remained a staunch proponent of her 2007 
proposal for Article 18.  In her report to the plenary on 
June 29 concerning bilateral contacts and informal meetings 
she held prior to the meeting, she stated that despite nine 
years of negotiation and "recognition among delegations that 
the negotiations are in a state of inertia," she detected 
"guarded optimism" that delegations might "begin to project 
periods within which the current process may be concluded." 
"A little push of goodwill and a realization that the 
twenty-fifth mile of the marathon has been reached might help 
the process move forward." She decried a persistent tendency 
"to hold on to previously held positions while signaling a 
willingness to remain engaged," and to "read specific 
situations, events and circumstances into the proposed text." 
 "Natural as that mindset might be for lawyers, it needs to 
be eschewed when involved in a legislative exercise of the 
type that we embarked upon," where "the essential role is to 
project principles." 
 
¶21. (U) Telalian sought to "distill" "principles and points 
of convergence" as follows:  (a) the draft convention is 
designed to serve as a law enforcement instrument, an 
instrument for ensuring individual criminal responsibility on 
the basis of an extradite or prosecute regime; (b) the draft 
convention cannot be viewed in isolation of other rules of 
international law, but as an additional building block in an 
already existing legal framework; (c) three existing legal 
regimes are implicated by the draft convention-law under the 
UN Charter, international humanitarian law, and international 
and national "security law" (which separates when 
administering justice the activities of the civil 
administration from those of the military)-and IHL in 
particular is not to be prejudiced by the draft convention, 
i.e., the draft convention is not intended to impose 
international humanitarian standards on States that are not 
otherwise bound by them or to supersede such obligations 
where they exist; (d) there is precedent in other 
counterterrorism instruments for excluding activities of 
armed forces during an armed conflict (but given the 
exclusion, consideration might be given to changing the work 
"comprehensive" in the draft convention's title); (e) such 
exclusions do not grant armed forces impunity. 
 
 
CLOSING SESSION 
 
¶22. (U) Talelian spoke first in the July 2 plenary on her 
consultations during the meeting and doggedly touted her 2007 
proposal.  She asserted:  "There was no desire to revert to 
the pre 2007 position."  She noted that her proposal was 
aimed at overcoming the impasse that had been reached and had 
to be understood as part of an overall CCIT package, and 
argued that "any attempt to slice the elements would mean 
affecting the overall balance that ought to be achieved.  It 
is not in the spirit of the proposal nor was it the 
motivation behind it that it would be open to delegations to 
pick and choose which parts of the elements they found 
favorable and to discard those they disliked."  Looking 
forward to a "concrete outcome" in the fall, she argued that 
delegations should not be too concerned about alleged 
vagueness or ambiguities in her proposal, because the 
interpretation and application of the convention are the 
primary responsibility of the parties to the convention :"The 
words or terms which may appear vague, obscure and 
indeterminate will have their own dynamic and assume 
concreteness, clarity and determinacy in specific fact 
situations as relevant authorities assume their roles of 
interpretation and application. That is the functioning of 
law in society and it is happening now as we speak." 
 
¶23. (U) In their closing statements, most delegations that 
spoke asserted that there is momentum in the process and 
expressed hope that agreement was just around the corner. 
 
¶24. (U) Sweden spoke first on behalf of the EU.  They stated 
that the CCIT should and would become a vital instrument in 
criminal prosecutions, but should not alter or create new 
obligations for countries under IHL.  They said they were 
committed to reaching an agreement, welcomed the 
coordinator's efforts and reiterated that they were open to 
considering the coordinator's 2007 proposal seriously. 
 
¶25. (U) Syria spoke on behalf of the OIC, and reaffirmed the 
OIC's commitment to the process of negotiations.  Syria 
reiterated the OIC's previous (2002) proposal on the scope of 
the CCIT, but was "still willing to consider the 
coordinator's proposal." 
 
¶26. (U) Brazil spoke on behalf of the Rio Group and stated 
that the coordinator's proposal was "a good basis for 
discussion."  This sentiment was shared by Cuba; however, 
Cuba reiterated its view that legitimate political struggles 
aimed at self-determination should be exempted. 
 
¶27. (U) Norway attached great importance to conclusion of the 
CCIT. 
 
¶28. (U) India stated that given the increasing momentum 
within the Committee the time was right for formal adoption 
of the CCIT.  Pointing to the 2002 text and 2007 
Coordinator's proposal, they trusted that with the guidance 
of the Chairman and the collective wisdom of delegations 
final agreement could be reached.  They urged member States 
to show flexibility to achieve their common goal. 
 
¶29. (U) Argentina thanked the coordinator for her efforts, 
and said there was a need to make progress to finalize the 
CCIT. 
 
¶30. (U) Russia noted (erroneously) that the CCIT had been 
under negotiation for 13 years.  Russia believed it was time 
to move to conclusion and give terrorist organizations a 
clear message that the UN took the issue very serious and 
would do all in its power to bring groups that engage in 
terrorist activity to justice.  Russia detected positive 
signals from the bilateral consultations held during the 
week, and was prepared to facilitate negotiations. 
 
¶31. (U) Ghana stated that delegations need to trust the U.N. 
and fellow member-states to enforce the provisions of the 
CCIT in a reasonable way and not be concerned about latent 
ambiguity.  Rather delegations should focus on the underlying 
principles of the document condemning terrorist activity. 
Ghana could support the 2007 Coordinator's proposal. 
 
¶32. (U) The U.S. stated that it supports conclusion of a 
convention that condemns terrorism in all its forms and that 
it looked forward to working with the Chairman and other 
delegations toward that end. 
 
BILATERAL MEETINGS 
 
¶33. (SBU) The U.S. delegation met with Pakistan, Russia, 
India and Telalian in bilateral sessions to discuss the draft 
resolution and progress of the CCIT.  Pakistan took a 
relatively moderate stance, and asserted that there was room 
 
 
to meet a compromise with most OIC countries in Article 18. 
Pakistan did not offer any details of what the elements of a 
compromise might be, however.  Further, it gave no indication 
that the Coordinator's 2007 proposal would be acceptable to 
the OIC and suggested that it needed modification. 
 
¶34. (SBU) Consistent with what it had previously told USUN, 
Russia said that it wanted to get the CCIT completed and was 
willing to be very deferential to the agenda of other 
delegations in meeting this goal.  The Russian representative 
also indicated that they refrained from openly supporting the 
2007 Coordinator's proposal during the opening session due to 
our statement in support of the 2002 text. 
 
¶35. (SBU) The Indian Deputy Perm Rep told the USDEL that the 
OIC and others had understood the opening USG intervention as 
a clear rejection of the 2007 Coordinator's proposal.  He 
pressed the USDEL hard to urge the Chair to "take the bull by 
the horns" and move the process forward by, for example, 
issuing a Bureau text.  The Indians made clear that they 
would be happy with either the 2002 or 2007 texts, and that, 
if the USG is not prepared to accept the 2007 proposal, 
wanted us to put forward an alternative, e.g. returning to 
the 2002 text perhaps with some preambular language giving a 
nod to the OIC position.  They did not seem inclined to 
introduce an alternative to the 2007 proposal themselves. 
 
¶36. (SBU) Telalian stated that she believed the OIC was ready 
to make some concessions on the text, but wanted to maintain 
a united front until someone else (presumably the USG) made 
the first move.  She stated that she believed her proposal 
was reasonable and that it represented a "package" proposal 
that was not subject to modification.  Furthermore any 
concerns about ambiguity would be effectively dealt with by 
courts in an appropriate manner.  She called on the U.S. to 
make statements in support of her text to rally support 
within the Committee as a whole. 
 
¶37. (SBU) Comment:  Despite the rhetoric, there were no 
concrete signs that the OIC had moved off positions that have 
stymied conclusion of this Convention for the past eight 
years.  Likewise, European interest in the Convention seems 
to have waned and few countries seemed (with the significant 
exception of India) to view its conclusion as a priority. 
The OIC reiterated its position that certain acts which would 
otherwise be covered by the CCIT should be excluded from the 
scope of the CCIT because they are undertaken in the name of 
national liberation.  This position not only runs contrary to 
USG interests, but also to the universally accepted principle 
that no cause or purpose justifies terrorism.  OIC countries 
similarly questioned text adopted in five previous 
counterterrorism conventions that excluded State military 
conduct from their scope.  While there is renewed political 
momentum to conclude the CCIT, a "compromised" CCIT will 
undercut the existing international counterterrorism legal 
framework that has been steadily built up by the United 
States and its allies over the past two decades through the 
conclusion of 16 sectoral specific international conventions. 
 As such, the U.S. participants stressed throughout 
consultations that any resolution will only be worthwhile if 
the result is a Convention that makes a meaningful addition 
to this framework and respects the approach taken in other 
conventions of excluding state military actions from its 
scope while ensuring that terrorist acts of national 
liberation movements are included within the scope of the 
CCIT. 
 
¶38. (SBU) While a number of delegations are looking to the 
United States to take the lead in resolving the present 
impasse, it is far from clear that such a role would actually 
result in a satisfactory text rather than a new baseline from 
which OIC countries and others would seek further 
compromises.  Looking ahead to the late summer and fall, the 
USG will need to assess whether the benefits of entering into 
this convention is worth further concessions.  If so, the 
Department should consider whether the USG could accept the 
2007 Coordinators proposal (or another alternative) as a 
final compromise and, if so, how best to create the 
conditions for such a solution to emerge in the negotiations 
in a way that lead to its adoption rather than further OIC 
demands for concessions.  End comment. 
RICE