VZCZCXRO1040
PP RUEHSK RUEHSL
DE RUEHVEN #0156/01 1891603
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 081603Z JUL 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6466
INFO RUCNCFE/CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE PRIORITY
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-5-DDPMA-IN/CAC/DDPMA-E// PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1746
RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//XONP// PRIORITY
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000156 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM 
NSC FOR NILSSON, HAYDEN 
JCS FOR J5 NORWOOD, COL SMITH 
OSD FOR ISA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL
SUBJECT: CFE/JCG--JULY 7:  RUSSIA INSISTS FLANK LIMITS MUST 
GO; CLAIMS NATO EQUIPMENT CEILING VIOLATIONS 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  At the July 7 Joint Consultative Group 
(JCG), Belgium delivered a joint statement on behalf of 22 
NATO states,  criticizing Russia for not providing its 
supplementary flank data as of 1 July as required by the 
Flank Agreement.  Using this segue, Russia (Ulyanov) referred 
to the third item in the Russian Aide-Memoire and stated 
emphatically that the Russian position on removing the flank 
limitations on Russia is uncompromising.  Ulyanov said the 
flank issue has to be resolved as part of a package solution 
and is necessary to restore the CFE Treaty. 
 
¶2. (SBU) In support of its claim that NATO has violated the 
CFE Treaty, Russia presented figures indicating percentages 
exceeded in all categories.  The U.S., Germany and Turkey 
rejected Russian allegations and reminded Russia that without 
having Russia's data it was impossible to understand or 
verify Russia's claim.  See Comment in para 17.  End Summary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
Belgium Reads a Joint Statement Reproaching Russia 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3. (SBU) At the 7 July 2009 JCG, Belgium (Kenes) delivered a 
joint statement (on behalf of Germany, the U.S., Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Spain, France, the U.K., Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and 
Turkey) which noted that Russia failed to provide its 
additional data on July 1 for battle tanks, armored combat 
vehicles and pieces of artillery in the flank region as 
required by the Flank Agreement.  (See JCG Journal 699 for 
full text) Russia was encouraged to resume full 
implementation of the CFE regime without further delay, 
including the provision of this data, consistent with its 
obligations. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
Coincidentally, Russia Wanted to Discuss Flank Holdings 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) immediately took the floor to 
continue his comments on the Aide-Memoire; focusing on the 
third paragraph which deals with the flank issue.  Ulyanov 
reminded colleagues that the issue of the flanks was resolved 
in 1990, but that subsequent geo-strategic changes, such as 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, 
prompted flank problems to emerge.  Ulyanov complained that 
Russia had ended up with a small quota and yet had a very 
large territory.  For a flank that comprised over 2.3 million 
square kilometers (a territory larger than the aggregate of 
the U.K., Italy, France, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Estonia and Romania) Russia had slightly more than 700 battle 
tanks, 580 ACVs, and 1008 artillery pieces for its whole 
flank region.  Russia's Northern Caucasus Military District 
that had previously been a rear district in Soviet times was 
suddenly a border district in an unstable region.  Despite 
raising concerns to other State Parties, Russia's concerns 
were not heeded as NATO was happy that Russia was 
disadvantaged.  The position of the NATO countries only 
changed when they realized that Russia was willing to take 
unilateral actions to correct this disparity. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In May 1996 during the Review Conference, the Flank 
Document was agreed to and signed.  Ulyanov stated that, even 
though it was an additional burden, Russia had committed to 
provide semiannual supplemental flank data and allow up to 10 
additional inspections per year under this document.  Ulyanov 
was not sure why Russia agreed to such terms then, and mused 
that perhaps because of its commitment to arms control. 
However, Ulyanov claimed that this was not part of the CFE 
Treaty and therefore not a legal obligation.  When A/CFE was 
signed in 1999, these provisions were also agreed by Russia 
in order to preserve the arms control regime.  But, this 
fragile balance was de facto violated by NATO Alliance 
expansion when Romania, Bulgaria, and the three Baltic states 
 
USOSCE 00000156  002 OF 005 
 
 
joined NATO.  The flank agreement was torn in tatters because 
of these accessions.  Despite this situation, Russia still 
ratified the A/CFE in 2004.  When it was clearly understood 
in Moscow the imbalance of the situation, Russia decided 
suspension was necessary to restore the viability of the 
regime. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
New Flank Agreement Needed to Restore CFE Viability 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6. (SBU) Ulyanov went on to note that there are three 
preconditions for reaching agreement on a new flank 
agreement.  First, a flank balance/equilibrium must be 
restored.  Ulyanov alleged that in the flank, currently NATO 
states collectively have 12 times more Battle Tanks (BT) than 
Russia and that there are even some individual countries in 
the southern region that have 5 times more BT than Russia. 
Similar advantages are present in other equipment categories 
as well.  This equates to one force dominating Europe 
militarily.  Second, of a political nature, the territorial 
sub ceilings only apply to Russia and parts of Ukraine. 
Russia must be on an equal footing with other countries. 
Third, the flank ceilings impede Russia's ability to fight 
terrorism in the southern region.  Ulyanov stressed that this 
might be the most important reason that Russia insists on 
lifting the territorial sub-ceilings. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - 
We're Not so Bad, are Trying to Work with You 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Ulyanov then offered examples of how it has tried 
to take into account partner views.  In May 2008, RussiaQ,s 
former Chief of General Staff suggested that the flank regime 
should extend to parts of Europe (Bulgaria and Romania); the 
exception being Turkey which has areas that are not in the 
zone of application.  Russia remains ready to work on this 
proposal, but NATO positions remain static, its arguments 
unconvincing, and there has been no progress on NATO 
positions.  The flank issue must be part of the package 
solution. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The third precondition for reaching agreement 
involves the possibility that a partner needs additional 
CSBMs, and Russia is willing to consider this approach. 
Ulyanov stated that Russia itself needs no more CSBMs, 
however if another partner feels like they are necessary then 
that country need only elaborate its concerns and propose 
CSBMs.  Russia will consider these as long as the abolition 
of the legally binding sub ceilings occurs. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
U.S. Reply:  Cannot Discuss Russian Claim without Data 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) replied to Russia's charges by 
briefly observing that the flank issue is one that will 
not/not be resolved in the JCG.  There are first order issues 
that must be overcome in the existing high-level bilateral 
channels, augmented with Allies, before discussions in other 
venues can be productive.  He added that Allies have listened 
to Russia and have revised the flank limits twice in response 
to Russian concerns.  For instance, under A/CFE Russia is 
allowed 1500 battle tanks in the flank, a very large force. 
Neighbour expressed concern that today, SPs do not know how 
much TLE Russia actually has.  Since Russia's current data is 
not available, we can't accurately address the Russian 
claims, such as NATO has twelve times as many tanks.  The 
U.S. urged Russia to provide the Treaty data so that everyone 
may understand.  The U.S. also observed that A/CFE would 
address Russian concerns expressed today.  The way forward to 
A/CFE is the Parallel Actions Package. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
USOSCE 00000156  003 OF 005 
 
 
And Turkey Joins In 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10. (SBU) Turkey (Begec) thanked Russia for its comments and 
then proceeded to point out that although Russia claimed that 
the status of the flank commitments was not provided for in 
the Treaty, if one looks at Article 14, paragraph 1, it 
states that the flank regime should remain.  Furthermore, two 
months later there was a JCG decision that stated in Article 
XIV, paragraph 1, subparagraph 1, that the documents were 
legally binding and part of the Treaty.  Yes, NATO enlarged, 
but not in the Caucasus and Russia still has far more TLE in 
that region than the three countries located there.  If there 
are calls for balance in European levels, than there should 
be balance in regional levels also.  More succinctly, 
Russia's point was irrelevant since RussiaQ,s combined TLE is 
far more than that of the Caucasus states.  Turkey agrees 
that there is some discrimination in the Treaty as Russia had 
the largest amount of TLE so obviously equality was not a 
principle enshrined in the beginnings of the Treaty.  As for 
counter terrorism, Turkey says the flank limitations were 
revised to help the Russia in the Chechnyan War.  If Russia 
feels that the remaining three countries in the Caucus region 
are more threatening than the Chechnya era, then Turkey is 
ready to reevaluate and give thought to Russia's concerns. 
RussiaQ,s suggestion to expand the flank areas to include the 
exclusion zone contradicts the essence of the flank 
agreement.  As far as the exclusion of certain areas of 
Turkey, when Russia is ready to talk about its area east of 
the Urals,  Turkey will engage.  Regarding the additional 
CSBMs for the flank region, Turkey is happy with the current 
flank agreement and does not need additional CSBMs.  Although 
Russia claims its position is uncompromising regarding flank 
issues, Turkey sees Russia as merely being uncompromising 
about the Caucasus.  Russia can't explain its relations in 
the Caucasus only using CFE terms - it should update its 
foreign policy beyond the Treaty.  Turkey reaffirmed its 
position in accordance with the March 2008 NAC statement and 
paragraph 57 of the NATO Strasbourg Declaration. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
Russia Draws a Line in the Sand 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶11. (SBU) Russia responded to Turkey with just a "few" 
comments.  Ulyanov again asserted that the flank agreement 
semi annual information and additional inspections were not 
provided for in the old (current) Treaty.  These requirements 
are in A/CFE, however that has not entered into force and 
therefore is not legally binding.  Russia is not interested 
in increasing the ceilings in the flank.  This is 
unacceptable due to the enormous imbalances with NATO.  This 
would be political discrimination against Russia.  Moreover, 
there is a terrorist threat in its south that Russia must be 
able to deal with effectively without limits and 
discrimination.  Ulyanov said if the Turks don't need 
additional CSBMs, then neither did the Russians.  However if 
others want to discuss additional CSBMs, then Russia was 
willing to consider them.  He finished by reiterating that if 
the flank issue is not resolved, CFE is finished. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Ulyanov reminded others that Turkey enjoys a prime 
position because it has a large zone of exclusion in which 
they can build up armaments whenever they want.  Russia had 
previously taken note of Turkish requests to bear in mind 
special conditions for terrorism in southeast Turkey in the 
early 1990's; Russia is merely asking for the same 
understanding and support.  Ulyanov underscored that its 
position in regard to the flank issue is uncompromisable and 
if it is not resolved, restoring the viability of the CFE 
Treaty cannot be achieved.  He closed by emphasizing that 
"We are not bluffing or playing games or politics.  This is 
our real position and please interpret it this way." 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
USOSCE 00000156  004 OF 005 
 
 
Turkey Rejoins 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Turkey quickly pointed out that it has two 
exclusion zones: one for VD99 and one for CFE.  These zones 
include territory in its Asian area (vice European). 
Emphasizing that CFE is a treaty on "European" armed 
forces, it was Turkey's political goodwill that prompted it 
to be one of the few countries to accept limitations on its 
Asian territory under the CFE Treaty.  Turkey owes nothing, 
and if there was a price to be paid, then it was paid at the 
signing of the 1999 flank agreement.  Ulyanov could not 
resist reminding everyone that several Central "Asian" 
countries were also part of VD99, obviously not having 
territory in Europe.  Turkey got the last word by repeating 
that it had stated that it was one of a few countries, not 
the only exception. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
We Were so Naive 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Under Agenda item 3(C) Limitations, Russia 
(Ulyanov) returned to the topic of NATO non-compliance and 
blatant violation of the established Treaty limits. 
Acknowledging he has explained this numerous times, Ulyanov 
said he would re-explain Russia's position since Allies were 
asking many questions.  Ulyanov declared that no single 
alliance or state should be in a position to dominate others 
militarily.  In 1990 we agreed to achieve balance of group 
levels, rules of sufficiency, and rejected the concept of 
hegemony.  Equal group ceilings were established, but one 
group no longer exists - the Warsaw Pact.  In 1990, Article 2 
of the Treaty listed 16 members of the Washington Agreement, 
now there are 28 members.  As Turkey pointed out last week, 
CFE does not ban expansion the expansion of alliances, but it 
does have an impact on the arms regime in Europe. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Today aggregate national ceilings of NATO 
armaments exceed the treaty limitations although many NATO 
states have reduced their armament.  Ulyanov enumerated that 
NATO exceeds BT limitations by 30%, ACVs by 33%, artillery 
pieces by 26%, combat aircraft by 22% and attack helicopters 
by 27%.  In the flank they have physically (not virtually) 
surpassed levels of BT by 27%, ACVs by 46%, and artillery 
pieces by 26%.  NATO states should reduce the group levels so 
they don't violate the Treaty. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) NATO pursued expansion without attention to arms 
control.  NATO says that the CFE Treaty limits only apply to 
the original 16 members.  Ulyanov coyly did not want to raise 
the issue of trans-Atlantic solidarity, but some NATO members 
claim that new NATO members are not equal to the old members; 
but this is an internal issue for NATO.  Today Belgium spoke 
for 22 nations, not 28 because 6 of these NATO Allies are not 
members of this treaty.  Yet, all 28 nations are single 
aggregate wholes.  Twenty-eight nations are part of a 
military alliance and yet some of these countries refuse to 
join the CFE Treaty.  In the early 1990's Russia was naQve 
and trusted NATO promises that it wouldn't expand.  Russia 
trusted that the Baltics would remain neutral, but they went 
ahead and joined this military treaty and yet they do not 
want to join the arms control regime.  NATO in aggregate 
violates the group ceilings especially in the flank region. 
Ulyanov asked when and how its partners intend to remove 
these violations. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
2nd Round with Russia 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶17.  (SBU) The U.S.(Neighbour) recalled the statements made 
last week by two state Parties, emphasizing that we should 
not focus on blocs or alliance groups.  That reflects Cold 
War thinking and it is time to look forward.  Referring to 
 
USOSCE 00000156  005 OF 005 
 
 
yesterday's positive statements from the Moscow Summit, 
Neighbour confirmed that our leaders are not thinking in 
bloc-tQbloc terms.  No blocs are recognized in the A/CFE. 
A/CFE addresses Russian concerns and remains the way forward. 
 Ulyanov pointed out that perhaps if blocs don't exist, then 
there should be no more collective statements from NATO. 
Turkey (Begec) replied by simply stating that it does not 
accept the Russian allegations that NATO is violating the 
Treaty and that Russia has no legal claim.  As far as the 
flank agreement is concerned, the geographical scope was 
narrowed by removing several oblasts (i.e. Pskov, Volgograd, 
etc) thus reducing the area concerned.  Turkey scoffed that 
now it is unpleasant to be accused of grossly violating the 
flank agreement. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Germany (Schweizer) attempted to undercut Russia by 
explaining away the "misunderstanding."  Schweizer said 
that when Belgium spoke it was not representing a bloc, but 
rather a group of nations who had a common way of thinking. 
We were simply like-minded states, not a bloc that was 
threatening Russia.  Obviously the limitations are important 
because they are a separate item on the agenda.  Changing 
tone, Schweizer then asked for Russia to provide the basis 
for the figures it presented since he recognized that one can 
always present figures in new ways and can depict things 
differently.  Germany pointed out that it doesn't have data 
from Russia, but it does from the other 29 countries. 
Regarding national ceilings, one needs to evaluate 
circumstances and know the information about serviceability 
of units, ability to deploy, international missions, etc to 
put numbers in the proper perspective.  In summary, Schweizer 
stressed that this was a backward way of thinking and that 
A/CFE had replaced this system with new territorial ceilings. 
 
¶19.  (SBU) Russia acknowledged that it had accepted the flank 
limitations in 1999, but in 2002 this deal was violated by 
NATO's expansion.  These limitations simply are not 
acceptable anymore.  They are unwarranted.  Russia is ready 
to seek common solutions and have serious discussions but its 
Western colleagues are not ready for that. 
 
¶20. (U) The next JCG will be held on July 14 under Belarus 
chairmanship. 
Christensen