VZCZCXRO4852
PP RUEHSK RUEHSL
DE RUEHVEN #0153/01 1831050
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 021050Z JUL 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6457
INFO RUCNCFE/CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE PRIORITY
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1741
RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//XONP// PRIORITY
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000153 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM 
NSC FOR NILSSON, HAYDEN 
JCS FOR J5 NORWOOD, COL SMITH 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL
SUBJECT: CFE/JCG:JUNE 30:RUSSIA REPEATS ACCUSATIONS OF NATO 
VIOLATIONS AND MOVING GOALPOSTS; QUOTES BIBLE TO JUSTIFY 
POSITIONS 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  In a relatively lengthy JCG meeting, 
Canada refuted Russia's 16 June claim that Canada did not 
understand Russia's views on actions versus words.  Russia 
commented on its Aide-Memoire, stating that the Parallel 
Actions Package requires considerable work to flesh out 
necessary details which should be done in Vienna.  Russia 
said it requires a clearly defined timeline for all States 
Parties on ratification and urged provisional application. 
Russia also said following A/CFE signing in 1999, NATO 
referred to only one condition for ratification -- this being 
that Russian forces in the flank be reduced to within A/CFE 
limits.  Once Russia drew down its forces there and met 
NATO's one condition, NATO Allies allegedly created new 
conditions that Russia had to meet before they would submit 
A/CFE for ratification.  These were new "political" 
conditions. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The U.S. and other Allies declined to debate history 
with Russia, but did refute its allegations in general terms 
and referred to the high-level bilateral talks and the 
package as the way forward.  Subsequently, ten Allies took 
turns criticizing Russia in support of a French intervention 
condemning Russia for rejecting a CFE inspection by France. 
In reply, Russia accused NATO of seriously breaching the CFE 
Treaty as a consequence of enlargement, which in turn 
prompted charged replies from Turkey and Italy.  End Summary. 
 
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It all starts out normally with Canada Pushing Back... 
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¶3. (SBU) At the 30 June 2009 JCG, Canada (Linteau) refuted 
Russia's 16 June JCG charge that Canada did not understand 
Russia's claim that the Parallel Actions Package consists of 
"Russian actions for NATO promises."  Linteau thanked Russia 
for the Aide-Memoire and reassured Russia that the 
Aide-Memoire was being carefully studied in its capitol. 
Linteau said that Canada fully supports the Parallel Actions 
Package as the best way forward for progress on issues of 
concern to all States Parties.  Furthermore, Canada very well 
understands Russia's positions on CFE, but agrees with the 
Allied position regarding when Allies will move forward on 
ratification of A/CFE.  This is parallel actions by Allies 
and Russia, not "actions for promises" as alleged by Russia 
-- i.e., all move forward with matching steps so that all 
States Parties may fulfill their commitments while addressing 
concerns. 
 
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Russia Accuses NATO of Moving Goalposts on Ratification 
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¶4. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) thanked Canada for its support of 
the Russia-U.S. draft package of solutions, as well as for 
its "constructive" statement.   However, Russia did not agree 
with Canada's claim that conditions need to be met in order 
for NATO Allies to move forward with ratification.  Russia is 
familiar with this approach shared by all NATO states; 
however, the foundation for this position is political, not 
legal.  In the 1990s, conditions were set when all committed 
to the Istanbul Commitments and thereby agreed to rapid 
ratification of A/CFE. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Following A/CFE signing in 1999, NATO referred to 
only one condition for ratification -- it being that Russia 
was over-strength in the flank in the south.  Ulyanov 
explained that was due to its anti-terrorist operations in 
Chechnya.  Russia subsequently drew down its forces there and 
met NATO's condition.  At that point, NATO Allies created new 
conditions, new "political" conditions.  These "outside 
issues" have no relevance to the CFE Treaty itself.  Ten 
years ago all the legal conditions were met for ratification 
of A/CFE; only political conditions prevent all from 
fulfilling the Istanbul Commitments, Ulyanov alleged. 
 
USOSCE 00000153  002 OF 005 
 
 
 
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There seems to be a misunderstanding out there 
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¶6. (SBU) Ulyanov noted that in his contacts with other 
delegations, it was evident that there was not a clear 
understanding of Russia's matrix for future work.  Some think 
that NATO and Russia must first agree on the text, and that 
this will then serve as a tool for negotiations with other 
countries.  It is Russia's position that, if the U.S. speaks 
on behalf of all of NATO, which it seems to have a clear 
mandate to do, then any agreement between Russia and the U.S. 
will be final with no future fine tuning. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Ulyanov then offered clarifications on Russia's 
Aide-Memoire.  Russia wants direct reference in the Package 
to the necessity for States Parties to submit ratification 
instruments to the depository in order to prevent confusion 
(one country has already ratified the treaty but not yet 
deposited it, hence causing confusion).  There also needs to 
be a clearly defined timeline for the schedule of all States 
Parties on ratification of the A/CFE.  Last year Russia asked 
for an estimated schedule for ratification of the adapted 
treaty.  While many countries were in the position to ratify 
it within 6-8 months, a number of states indicated they may 
require up to two years.  Ulyanov noted that the accession of 
Albania and Croatia into NATO took less time than that; this 
shows the genuine priorities of NATO -- that NATO expansion 
has a higher priority than A/CFE. 
 
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Another pitch for Provisional Application of A/CFE 
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¶8.  (SBU) Russia went on to stress that it understands that 
there are no absolute guarantees of having A/CFE ratified 
within 12 months--the executive branches can not provide a 
guarantee since ratification depends on the Parliaments. 
Therefore, in its Aide-Memoire, Russia proposed provisional 
application of A/CFE, similar to what was done in the 
beginning of the 1990s when Germany requested provisional 
application of the CFE Treaty.  Provisional application of 
A/CFE could be accomplished in two stages. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The first stage would be 6-9 months long when all 
states make the political commitment to act IAW the 
objectives of A/CFE and to comply with its limitations.  In 
the second stage, after the majority of states have ratified 
the adapted treaty, then provisional application would go 
into effect.  Russia is not asking for concessions -- 
provisional application provides the requisite predictability 
of implementation of A/CFE in addition to addressing the 
concerns of countries that have spoken out against the 
Russian moratorium.   Ulyanov then promised to provide 
further explicatory statements on the Russian Aide-Memoire 
before the summer break. 
 
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Allied Support for Canada's Stand 
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¶10. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) supported Canada.  Turning 
then to reply to Russia, Neighbour noted that the U.S. had 
already responded to Russia's points on a number of occasions 
-- we had replied in Vienna, in Berlin 3 weeks ago, and in 
the high-level bilateral negotiations.  However there were 
two points that he would make in response.  The first 
concerned Albania and Croatia--without claiming to speak for 
a legislative body, he observed that there was a long period 
of implementation of their Membership Actions Plans.  This 
allowed parliaments to prepare for ratification so that the 
ratification legislation could be quickly approved.  In 
contrast, the actions and approach of the Russian Federation 
 
USOSCE 00000153  003 OF 005 
 
 
at present on CFE do not provide the encouragement for 
legislatures to begin anytime soon to prepare to consider 
ratification of A/CFE.  Russia's actions, such as 
"suspension," have had the opposite effect.  Second, while 
saying his delegation had no intention of debating historical 
details, Neighbour observed that the Istanbul Commitments 
were part of the package in Istanbul that enabled the 
signature of all parties to A/CFE.  He emphasized that "host 
nation consent" was an integral part of the package deal 
then, and is in both A/CFE and CFE.  It is also part and 
parcel of the Parallel Actions Package, which is the best way 
forward. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The Czech Republic (Reinohlova), Germany 
(Schweizer) and the UK (Gare) similarly expressed support for 
the Canadian statement.  Schweizer (stressed that at the 
highest levels, NATO has made it perfectly clear that it has 
a great interest in the CFE regime and in ratifying A/CFE. 
Agreeing with the UK, Schweizer reiterated that it was not 
political promises for political promises, but political 
intent.  Here in the JCG we can only talk about formulations 
because we're not Parliaments and we're not ratifying.  It is 
a question of pre-conditions and the Parallel Actions 
Package. Germany agrees with Russia when it says the Package 
can't be opened again, but we must establish a precondition 
of negotiations so that we can move forward to ratification 
of A/CFE. 
 
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Can we have that in writing? 
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¶12.  (SBU) The UK expressed gratitude to Russia and the U.S. 
for their statements and asked whether Russia would append 
its comments -- both today's and its promised future 
clarifications -- to the journal. To the surprise of many 
delegates, Ulyanov stated that he would refrain from 
appending his statement, that his oral statement was 
sufficient.  He explained that the statement would first need 
to be agreed upon by the Russian Interagency; "comments and 
clarifications take time to get approved."  Ulyanov stated 
that he intentionally spoke slowly and therefore his 
colleagues had ample opportunity to write down what he said. 
He would answer any and all questions. 
 
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Russia Urges Bilateral Talks on Package Details in Vienna 
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¶13.  (SBU) Ulyanov said he referenced Albania and Croatia to 
demonstrate that the accession of new NATO states was a 
greater priority than ratification of A/CFE.  Albania and 
Croatian accession took a year, but some countries say it may 
take up to two years for ratification of A/CFE.  Turning to 
host nation consent, Russia has it to be in South Ossettia 
and Abkhazia. States that don't agree with Russia apparently 
view host nation consent from a U.S. definition.  However, 
the U.S. does not respect host nation consent.  For example, 
U.S. forces have been in Cuba for over 50 years without host 
nation consent from Fidel Castro and despite Cuba having 
asked for the U.S. to leave.  Also, the U.S. went into Iraq 
without host nation consent.  Allies should find a country 
with a more honest record than the U.S. for adhering to the 
principle of host nation consent to argue this point for them. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Ulyanov further amplified Russia's position.  He 
said that on 5 May at the JCG, the U.S. delegation said first 
there would have to be agreement on the parallel package in 
the high-level bilateral track.  Russia can't agree to that. 
The specific details are integral part of the package.  If 
there are no details, then there is no package.  Ulyanov 
urged his colleagues and other countries to step up this 
process.  It is hard to negotiate such a large package with 
so many details at high levels.  This is why Russia suggested 
 
USOSCE 00000153  004 OF 005 
 
 
that to complement U.S.-Russia high-level bilateral meetings; 
there should also be meetings in Vienna that follow the 
U.S.-Russia format to work out details in support of high 
level talks.  Both Russia and the U.S. already large 
delegations with instructions from their capitols here in 
Vienna who have the knowledge to work these details.  This 
would help achieve a full-fledged Parallel Actions Package. 
 
¶15. (SBU) In a brief reply, the U.S. (Neighbour) responded 
that a number of first order issues must be resolved in talks 
in the current bilateral format.  Only then could talks in 
other venues be productive; to do otherwise this would 
disaggregate the Package. 
 
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Allies Pile-on Russia over Inspection Refusal 
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¶16.  (SBU) France reported that on 23 June, Russia refused a 
CFE inspection in the flank inspection zone.  This inspection 
would have occurred during the timeframe of 29 June-5 July. 
France "condemned" Russia's refusal of the inspection and 
noted the consequential inability of France to use this 
valuable tool for transparency and verification.  Turkey, the 
U.S., Romania, Italy, Belgium, Portugal, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Germany, and Georgia expressed support for France's 
statement that called attention to Russia's non-compliance to 
the CFE Treaty. 
 
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Noncompliance?  I'll tell you what's noncompliance... 
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¶17.  (SBU) In response to the Allied condemnation of Russia's 
refusal of France's inspection, Ulyanov said he would refrain 
from the ritual response regarding inspections.  He pointed 
out that a number of delegations used the term 
"noncompliance," however only three weeks earlier, he had 
raised the serious violation of quantitative elements of the 
treaty and asked when they would be removed.  He planned to 
share specifics at the next meeting of the JCG.  Nonetheless, 
noncompliance by certain States Parties, nay, the "breach of 
the agreement" persists.  Ulyanov demanded to know when 
partners intended to cease this brazen breach of the existing 
treaty. 
 
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Turkey and Italy slap Russia with legal rebuttals... 
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¶18.  (SBU) Turkey (Begec) immediately responded with a 
reminder that it had provided a legally-based rebuttal 3 
weeks ago to this allegation of noncompliance.  Obviously 
irritated, he explained that NATO enlargement does not equate 
to a breach of the treaty nor noncompliance.   Ulyanov agreed 
that the "expansion" of NATO was not a breach of the CFE 
Treaty; however, he argued that breaches occurred as a result 
of the consequences of the expansion of NATO.  Limits set 
forth by the existing treaty (Article IV) were breached. 
Begec took the floor again and pointed out that CFE divided 
States Parties into two groups* "Western Group" and "Eastern 
Group," which at the time, corresponded to the unnamed 
then-NATO and Warsaw Pact. Begec noted that it can't be a 
breach since the Treaty did not foresee a change to these 
groups. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Italy (Negro) provided full support for the Turkish 
comments, adding that Article Two of the Treaty defined the 
State Parties and noting that this was not a moving 
article--it doesn't change with the years.  Therefore, no 
violation could have occurred since there was no provision 
regarding future composition of the two groups. The U.S. 
(Neighbour) stated that the U.S. fully agreed with the 
Turkish and Italian analysis -- they are absolutely correct 
 
USOSCE 00000153  005 OF 005 
 
 
that there was no violation of the treaty.  However, the 
solution to Russia's concerns is addressed by A/CFE and the 
route forward to that is the Parallel Actions Package. 
 
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Violation of the Treaty?  Let's talk about what happened a 
year ago... 
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¶20.  (SBU) Not missing an opportunity to remind the JCG of 
recent events in Georgia, Georgia (Giorgadze) highlighted 
that while Russia had used the term "gross violation" in its 
previous comments about NATO expansion,  there had in fact 
been a violation of the Treaty that occurred only last year 
when Russia invaded Georgia. 
 
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Why are we arguing about something we agree about? 
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¶21. (SBU) Germany (Schweizer) stated he had listened 
attentively and was amazed at the discourse.  It seemed that 
everyone had forgotten why in 1999 there was an attempt to 
achieve consensus to sign A/CFE.  Political changes caused 
the need for changes of CFE.  That's why A/CFE came about and 
it was determined to have national and territorial ceilings. 
This legalistic discussion doesn't help regarding the NATO 
expansion and its affects on an outdated treaty.  The 
important aspects of the CFE regime are the matter at hand 
now.  Ratification of A/CFE is the means of continuing the 
notification, verification and implementation regimes. 
Everyone needs to move forward on A/CFE, not look backward. 
 
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The final benediction... 
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¶22. (SBU) Ulyanov asserted that everyone needed to step up 
their efforts to find mutually acceptable agreements.  Then, 
in his final repartee, and seemingly as a means of 
summarizing and justifying his points, Ulyanov, with a 
straight face, quoted the Bible, "It is easier to see the 
splinter in another's eye than to see the log in your own 
eye." 
Scott