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RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0335/01 1960818
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 150818Z JUL 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9825
INFO RUCNMTC/MISSI COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1709

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000335 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL MNUC KSCA ETTC KNNP TSPA
SUBJECT: HCOC: EU WORKSHOP ON STRENGTHENING THE HAGUE CODE 
OF CONDUCT, JUNE 26 
 
REF: UNVIE 314 
 
¶1.  Summary: In its role as European Union (EU) President, 
the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted a workshop in 
Prague on June 26 to promote further enhancement and improved 
functioning of the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) against 
ballistic missile proliferation.  The informal workshop 
brought together academics and governmental experts from 
nearly 40 countries. The 'Foundation for Strategic Research' 
(FSR), a French think tank with experience in implementation 
EU decisions, provided presentations and moderated the 
workshop discussion. The result of the workshop will be a 
"forward-looking" paper from the FSR for subscribing states' 
consideration. The EU appreciated the wide participation and 
was enthusiastic about the exchange of information. However, 
by contrast, there was little direct interaction between 
academic and governmental attendees and by the end of the day 
about a third of the seats were empty. End summary. 
 
EU Promotion of HCOC 
-------------------- 
 
¶2.  One of the aims of the decision of the Council of Europe 
in supporting the HCOC (Decision 2008/974/PESC) was to 
promote further enhancement and better functioning of this 
organization. The EU views HCOC as an important tool in 
preventing and countering ballistic missile proliferation. 
The Prague workshop was an awareness-raising event and also 
provided a forum for the exchange of ideas on how to enhance 
HCOC. Participants included representatives from thirty HCOC 
subscribing states, two non-subscribing states (Israel and 
Mexico) and two experts from academia and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs.) 
 
Presentations & Discussion 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3.  The FSR presented a broad overview of the trends in 
ballistic missile (BM) and space launch vehicle (SLV) 
programs. (Note: presentation material sent to ISN/MTR. End 
Note.) FSR reminded participants that countries can hide 
their BM programs behind SLV programs; it is difficult for 
outside countries to detect the level of development in a BM 
program if a country chooses to hide it.  While a country's 
BM program can grow out of a SLV program, according to the 
FSR Chair, a BM program requires additional skill sets and 
further development. Japan, for example, has foregone a BM 
program but has an advanced SLV program. 
 
¶4.  The FSR pointed to BM programs as the "tip of the 
iceberg" for WMD programs because most countries that possess 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have active BM programs. 
Therefore, they contend, HCOC can help identify the tips of 
these icebergs, as BM programs must make use of testing for 
their development. By observing testing of a subscribing 
state, the other states can make a more informed judgment of 
the launching county's program. 
 
¶5.  Professor Goetz Neuneck, from the Institute for Peace 
Research and Security Policy, as well as other academics 
present and the FSR in its presentations, argued that cruise 
missiles and even unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) should also 
be pre-notified. There is a trend towards small and medium 
launch vehicles they noted, and WMD could be added to these 
means of delivery as readily as to BMs. The trend to lighter 
SLVs brings SLV programs even closer to a country's BM 
program. 
 
¶6.  The Chair, summing up the academics' views, spoke of a 
"crossroads" in missile controls because the blurring of 
lines between the means of delivery could create confusion. 
He used the example of country launching an SLV being 
misinterpreted by its neighbors as a hostile missile. 
Therefore, the Chair concluded, HCOC is a practical tool, 
among others, in providing transparency in BM programs: its 
implementation and universalization would increase global 
security. 
 
Current State of HCOC 
--------------------- 
 
¶7.  The FSR Chair stressed that current HCOC Pre-Launch 
Notification (PLN) reporting is poor. Some 80 percent of the 
(approx.) 60 BM launches reported in open sources last year 
were from the U.S. or Russia. However neither country 
currently submits PLNs in HCOC. Of the remaining 20 percent, 
only a few come from non-subscribing states. One of the 
reasons for this is that developing countries are finding it 
simpler to contract SLV business to another country than to 
create and maintain a national launch capability. 
¶8.  In the session "Implementation of the HCOC: Results 
Achieved So Far," HCOC "Annual Declarations" were portrayed 
as a good tool to help build confidence and spread 
transparency. Last year, about 70 percent of the subscribing 
countries submitted an Annual Declaration and this was seen 
as a positive confidence building measure (CBM.) Promoting 
United Nations (UN) recognition was also seen by the Chair 
and the experts as a positive element of increasing awareness 
of HCOC because, unless specially prohibited by a UN Security 
Council resolution, all counties have the right to a peaceful 
BM program and HCOC can thus provide an element of 
transparency in states' programs. Bilateral and regional 
agreements to promote missile transparency were also 
encouraged, as was more general outreach. 
 
Cruise Missiles 
--------------- 
 
¶9.  On the scope of the HCOC reporting, the expert from the 
Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) shared 
that HCOC was one of the reasons non-subscribing states were 
focusing on development of cruise missiles (CM) rather than a 
BM program. He alleged there are some 13 countries that have 
started a CM program since 2004 and some counties are working 
on hyper-sonic cruise vehicles, all with a military purpose. 
Some of these states, this expert contends, would prefer to 
keep their missile development clandestine yet didn't want to 
hinder their participation in HCOC if they found it 
advantageous in the future. Also, he pointed out, as missile 
defenses get better, cruise missiles are needed for states in 
addition to BMs. The reasons he gave for this are that CMs 
are more accurate and can be used for up to 500 lb. of 
payload. And while they are slower then BMs, they are harder 
to detect because of point of launch and trajectory and the 
'shock value' is the same as delivery from BMs. Other experts 
agreed with the MIIS representative that CM programs are 
intrinsically linked to BM programs and the two cannot be 
separated as is currently the case with HCOC reporting of 
only BM programs. 
 
¶10.  France did not see cruise missiles as being incorporated 
into the HCOC mechanism in the near future. It took nearly 
five years to define "ballistic missiles" and merely defining 
"cruise missiles" will take some time. The French 
representative pointed out too, with economic incentives, 
nothing is being concretely discussed for HCOC adherence. A 
more basic reason why countries may choose not to join, the 
French participant acknowledged, is some countries don't want 
other countries to see their missile development. Yet, 
because it is the "responsible thing to do" for a 
co-operating country, there is, nonetheless, a great desire 
from France for universalization. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
------------------ 
 
¶11.  The Chair recognized that HCOC was a good starting point 
for BM non-proliferation. The United Nations Institute for 
Disarmament Research expert reflected this view, pointing out 
the "demands" of HCOC are almost trivial. By not using the 
PLNs and annual declarations, subscribers are wasting a 
valuable opportunity. He saw parallels with the Organization 
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) noting the 
OPCW implementation support unit "keeps the ball rolling." 
Also, he noted that the India-Pakistan exchange could be used 
by HCOC as a good example of regional agreements on missile 
transparency. 
 
¶12.  The expert from Chinese Arms Control and Disarmament 
Association (CACDA) indicated that the current low reporting 
of missile launches through PLNs was not very encouraging. 
(Note: Technically CACDA is a NGO but likely to have very 
strong PRC government connections. End note.) He asked 
whether HCOC had any measures to enforce this requirement and 
whether there were any assessment measures to ensure 
adherence. He pointed out that missile defense tests involve 
multiple counties and that regional issues impact the 
perception of threat to any one country. CBMs, on a voluntary 
and flexible basis, are to be encouraged. This expert pointed 
out that if HCOC showed more flexibility, then more countries 
would become subscribers. 
 
¶13.  The Czechs, speaking on behalf of the EU, saw the HCOC 
as 'their child' and the EU policy in the HCOC regards PLNs 
as a central element of transparency. The EU presidency has 
made strong demarches concerning HCOC. The Czech presidency 
is encouraged by the change in atmosphere as evidenced by 
U.S. President Obama's speech in Prague, even if it contained 
nothing specific about HCOC. The hope of the EU is PLNs will 
be de-coupled with the implementation of the Russia - U.S. 
Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC), as the JDEC is a very 
complicated process and is, they believe, "a bilateral 
issue". HCOC is not a perfect tool, the Czech representative 
emphasized, but it is a start for creating better trust. 
 
¶14.  The Chair pointed out that while the HCOC was "a child 
of the EU" in a historical sense, it is now the 
responsibility of the 130 subscribing states to help it 
through its "teenage growth crisis." Until the HCOC 
mechanisms work as they should, the organization will remain 
in "crisis". The Chair saw some ideas emerging from the 
workshop as practical, but others were contradictory and 
needed further debate. He used North Korea (DPRK) as an 
example of why a country may want to join HCOC: if the DPRK 
wants to be seen as a country in good standing in the 
international community it is for them to become an HCOC 
subscriber and implement its commitments -- which are not 
very difficult. Some 90 HCOC subscribers do not have Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) membership and HCOC could 
also be seen as a way to enhance that very important regime. 
 
Follow-up 
--------- 
 
¶15.  The I-ECC, an electronic means of communication for the 
HCOC, is being developed by the FRS. The EU contends that 
such a means of communication will further the objectives of 
the HCOC. By September, a pilot system will be discussed 
within the EU. Afterwards, a trial version will be made 
available for all subscribing states to view and provide 
comments. The FRS Chair stressed that at next year's HCOC 
annual meeting, the I-ECC will not be presented as a "take it 
or leave it" product; rather, it is very much a work in 
progress and the EU would welcome comments and suggestions on 
the I-ECC proposal. 
 
¶16.  A follow-up workshop will be hosted by a future EU 
Presidency. It will focus on the future of HCOC, and feedback 
from the Chair's report of the Prague workshop will be taken 
into account in shaping that agenda. All subscribing states 
will be asked for input. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶17.  The EU continues to make their best case for all HCOC 
subscribing states to move to full compliance with the HCOC 
"requirements." The use of FRS to research and present the 
current state of affairs with BM program and the HCOC as an 
organization was well received. However, while the intent to 
have an exchange between academics and government experts was 
well intended, the actual exchange was formal, at best. The 
afternoon session of the workshop was not well attended; 
unfortunately, it was in the afternoon when some of the more 
interesting exchange took place. The two non-subscribers in 
attendance (Mexico and Israel) were not engaged in the 
discussions, apparently even on the margins. It is likely the 
EU and the FSR will enthusiastically use the results of the 
workshop as partial input for their next workshop. The U.S. 
position on JDEC implementation before HCOC PLN reporting is 
the '800 pound guerrilla' in the room; everyone at this 
workshop hope that issue will be resolved so further progress 
can be made with HCOC as a CBM. 
 
PYATT