VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0322/01 1881559
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 071559Z JUL 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9792
INFO RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000322 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR D(S), P, T, S/SANAC, IO, AND ISN 
DOE FOR NA-20, NA-24, NA-25, NE-1, NE-6 
NRC FOR OIP DOANE, HENDERSON, SCHWARTZMAN 
NSC STAFF FOR SCHEINMAN, CONNERY 
ALSO FOR LEADERSHIP ANALYSIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/04/2019 
TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA
SUBJECT: IAEA LEADERSHIP TEAM TRANSITION AND U.S. INFLUENCE 
IN THE AGENCY 
 
REF: A. UNVIE 148 
     ¶B. UNVIE 102 (NOTAL) 
     ¶C. UNVIE 089 
     ¶D. UNVIE 076 
 
Classified By: CDA Geoffrey R. Pyatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The IAEA transition that will come as DG 
ElBaradei's term ends November 30 provides a once-a-decade 
opportunity to overcome bureaucratic inertia, modernize 
Agency operations, and position the new director general for 
strong leadership from the DG's office.  Yukiya Amano's 
arrival as DG will undoubtedly see some turnover at the 
Deputy DG level, but we see a mixed picture as to the depth 
and breadth of change in senior management changes further 
down. Despite whatever intentions Amano may harbor upon 
taking office, a renewal in some key positions will take 
time, as several senior IAEA officials recently received 
promotions or extensions of their contracts, or both.  This 
"burrowing in" will ensure continuity of some experienced 
leaders but may also confront the next DG with fixed networks 
of collaboration that resist supervision. Identifying a 
desirable DDG for Nuclear Safety and Security should be a top 
U.S. priority. End Summary. 
 
DG Succession a Reform Opportunity 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) The entry into office of Ambassador Yukiya Amano as 
IAEA Director General (to a four-year term to begin December 
1, 2009) should trigger a reordering of senior management 
posts throughout the Agency over the months that follow. 
IAEA departments are headed by the six Deputy Directors 
General, all of whom are under contract into 2010.  We 
understand from the Japanese Mission that Amano would want 
most senior personnel to remain in place for some time, to 
brief him in and provide a smooth transition.  However, some 
turnover of the current DDGs in the first year of Amano's 
term is to be expected and encouraged.  A combination of (not 
always ironclad) IAEA-mandated retirement for positions below 
the D level at age 62 (60 for those hired before 1990), 
national and gender balance, and other factors complicate 
what should otherwise be the appointment of the most 
qualified people, committed to modernizing the Agency for 
anticipated challenges and for adopting new modes of 
networking, financing, and building excellence in fields 
where the Agency should be the lead.  The current roster of 
DDGs, profiled below, requires our consideration in this 
light. 
 
¶3.  (C) Safeguards (SG), Olli Heinonen, Finland - By 
tradition this department is not be held by an NPT nuclear 
weapons state.  Heinonen's current contract runs through 
summer 2010 and he has told Msnoff in the past he expected to 
retire at that time, based largely on personal considerations 
(but see next para).  After the DG's slot, the DDG/Safeguards 
position is the most important at the IAEA to achieving 
high-priority U.S. national security objectives related to 
Iran, DPRK, Syria, and the generally rigorous application of 
IAEA safeguards globally.  DDG Heinonen has played a 
particularly important role under ElBaradei by working to 
keep key safeguards investigations on an appropriate 
technical path.  The DDG/Safeguards position will remain 
essential under Amano's leadership, however, as we expect the 
new DG to apply less of a political filter to the conduct of 
safeguards investigations.  Thus, the decisions of the 
DG/Safeguards on Iran, Syria, and other sensitive cases may 
be the de facto final word for the Agency's safeguards 
approach in the states about which the U.S. cares the most. 
 
¶4.  (C) Mission assumes the USG would welcome extending 
beyond 2010 the close and constructive relationship we have 
had with Heinonen, and we have queried Heinonen as to his 
availability.  He said early this past spring he did not 
discount the possibility he could stay until 2012, but not 
longer.  He plans to review his situation over the summer 
"once the dust has settled" from the DG election and it is 
more apparent what other personnel changes will take place in 
the DG's office and other senior ranks of the Agency.  In 
light of Heinonen's ongoing personal decision process, 
Mission recommends we confine within the USG any early 
thinking about possible replacements.  Mission will continue 
to touch base with Heinonen on his thinking as it 
evolves. 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Management (MT) - Incumbent David Waller, U.S., in 
the job since early 1993, recently reaffirmed to Charge he 
wishes to remain under a new contract.  As in analogous 
positions in the UN system, there is long tradition for the 
U.S. holding this job, which has potential oversight of all 
IAEA programs as well as management policies and budgeting. 
The Management DDG is the Agency's second-in-command, and 
Waller is usually the Acting DG when ElBaradei travels 
outside Vienna.  His role has been especially critical in the 
ongoing debate over budget and resources. The Japanese 
Mission tells us Japan understands the management DDG to be 
the "American seat" and that Amano would personally favor 
keeping a U.S. national in this role.  In the latter years of 
the ElBaradei administration, DDG Waller has not always 
exercised influence over programmatic areas or staffing as 
the USG had hoped.  On staffing, however, the history of 
top-floor overrides of the Agency's own recruitment process 
predates the current leadership.  The true final say and veto 
power on personnel appointments, down to the level of program 
manager jobs, resides with the DG, but this was true in the 
Hans Blix era as well.  In broader management terms, the 
Agency has made significant but uneven progress in reform, 
measured for example against the UNTAI agenda: "little to no" 
progress on disclosure of internal audits to member states or 
whistleblower protections; "some" progress on an independent 
ethics function, implementation of IPSAS, and on program 
support costs (a running sore with USG); better performance 
on independence of internal oversight, financial disclosure 
by senior officials, and public access to information about 
the agency. 
 
¶6.  (C) Safety and Security (NSNS).  Incumbent Tomihiro 
Taniguchi, Japan, informed UNVIE's Nuclear Safety Attache 
early in 2009 that he was under contract through November 
2010 and intended to stay; Taniguchi's DDG colleague Olli 
Heinonen affirmed to us in late March his understanding that 
Taniguchi wants to remain perhaps even beyond that date. 
However, after his election on July 2, DG-designate Amano 
told Russian IAEA Governor Berdennikov and U.S. Charge that 
Taniguchi would step down concurrent with Amano's succession 
to the DG's office, emphasizing that "Japan is a modest 
country" and would not seek to hold the DG and a DDG slot 
concurrently. (Note: Taniguchi's early departure would be a 
matter of appearances for Japan; there is no legal provision 
barring a DDG serving under a DG of the same nationality. End 
note.)  Taniguchi has been a weak manager and advocate, 
particularly with respect to confronting Japan's own safety 
practices, and he is a particular disappointment to the 
United States for his unloved-step-child treatment of the 
Office of Nuclear Security.  Moreover, of the twenty-four 
management positions in the department, the U.S. holds only 
one, a P-5 position as head of the Incident and Emergency 
Center.  That is, there are no U.S. managers anywhere in the 
IAEA's safety and security technical areas. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) This DDG position requires a good manager and 
leader who is technically qualified in both safety and 
security.  The DDG needs to be an activist to 
institutionalize and insist on broad member state acceptance 
of nuclear security -- preventing terrorist or criminal 
diversion of material from civil nuclear facilities -- as a 
core Agency mission.  However, the DDG must also have a 
strong safety background.  The department can and should 
exercise a direct and substantial impact of the levels of 
safety and security in all of the Member States.  This 
department is writing draft safety and security legislation 
and draft regulatory and security guidance documents that are 
being used by Member States to create their nuclear programs. 
 "NSNS" performs safety and security peer reviews of 
facilities and provides recommendations for improvements.  It 
also performs an enormous amount of training on all areas of 
safety and security.  As Washington colleagues have pointed 
out, the new DDG must instill a culture of cooperation with 
other Agency elements, including Nuclear Energy and Technical 
Cooperation, in order to improve these services.  We are 
aware of differing views in Washington on the advisability of 
"elevating" nuclear security, potentially as a separate 
department (ref D), an idea that Iran now advocates.  Our 
bottom line is that the U.S. should push for technical 
competencies in both safety and security. 
 
¶8.  (C) Technical Cooperation (TC), Ana Maria Cetto, Mexico. 
TC is the department most in need of a change in culture and 
 
process.  It administers assistance projects as entitlements, 
in which the proposals of the beneficiary states rather than 
an independent analysis of development needs and capacities 
are decisive.  Although some of her subordinates are much 
stronger, Cetto's reputation is as an enabler of TC's 
"entitlement" approach.  Ms. Cetto, the only female DDG at 
present, may be prepared to depart in 2010.  The United 
States should encourage selection of a manager committed to 
implement the management structures put in place by Cetto's 
predecessor, which have become mere formalities under Cetto. 
Japan knows that China is interested in returning to the 
ranks of the DDGs, and the Chinese may have a strong 
candidate for the TC DDG position who is currently serving as 
TC Director for Asia.  If the Chinese secure this position, 
the new incumbent would likely be male, creating an 
imperative for the purpose of gender balance to appoint a 
woman to another of the DDG positions (see also para 17, 
below). 
 
¶9.  (C) Nuclear Energy (NE), Yury Sokolov, Russia - With the 
right mix of expert authority, impartiality, and material 
assistance, this department can play an even greater role in 
ensuring that wherever nuclear power is developed, it is done 
so responsibly, safely, securely, with proliferation 
consciousness and safeguards by design.  Agency veterans 
recall the NE department was established by hiving off 
nuclear energy from the earlier department of nuclear energy 
and safety, which was led by a Russian DDG.  As reported in 
ref B (captioned), the Russian Federation will likely be 
determined to retain this DDG position regardless of 
Sokolov's personal availability. 
 
¶10.  (C) Nuclear Sciences and Applications (NA), Werner 
Burkart, Germany - Burkart has indicated he will leave the 
Agency at the completion of his current contract, which we 
understand to be November 2010.  Burkart is generally viewed 
as a nice guy and skilled scientist but an unambitious 
bureaucratic leader.  He advocates rationalizing staff and 
structures that he finds wasteful.  One example -- for 
technical cooperation (TC) projects in which his department 
or NE are required to assign project officers, the parallel 
TC project officers are, like those in NA and NE, typically 
from a nuclear engineering background, and consequently apt 
to cut out their redundant counterparts in the technical 
bureaus.  A second example -- the IAEA's laboratory 
structure, including the safeguards analytical laboratory 
(SAL), falls organizationally under NA (i.e., for management 
and personnel policies) as a service to the Safeguards 
Department, but is paid for with safeguards funds.  A 
transfer of the SAL to the Safeguards Department, which 
Burkart supports, is underway, based on a recommendation by a 
Canadian management consultant. 
 
The DG's Outer Office - Perpetuating Team ElBaradei? 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶11.  (C) As IAEA Secretariat staff consider the future under 
a DG Amano, many are musing about "Who runs the agency?" in 
that circumstance.  We reported ref C that a Spring 2009 
STAFFDEL visitor heard from Secretariat officials the concern 
that a Japanese corporate model of management and internal 
communication could come to the Agency.  However, speaking 
with Charge on July 2, Amano emphasized (unprompted) that it 
would not be his intention to pack his inner office with 
Japanese nationals, as "that would send the wrong message." 
Whatever their presumptions about the changes ahead, several 
senior IAEA officials have secured their positions in the 
Agency for a period into the post-ElBaradei era.  Among those 
burrowing in are some of the Mission's most frequent and 
policy-relevant interlocutors (and ElBaradei's high-level 
troubleshooters), some of whom have not always been helpful 
to U.S. positions. 
 
¶12. (C) In early February 2009, Vilmos Cserveny of Hungary, 
chief of the Office of External Relations and Policy 
Coordination (EXPO), was promoted to the title of Assistant 
Director General (ADG) while retaining his function running 
EXPO.  Cserveny shared with DCM that his contract was 
extended through 2013.  The ADG title is considered a 
"personal promotion" according no enhancement of authority, 
and it would likely return to disuse after Cserveny's tenure. 
 As background, current DG ElBaradei held the same title 
while he was EXPO chief 1993-7.  While Cserveny is viewed as 
a partisan of ElBaradei, we know him to be a consummate 
 
bureaucratic survivor who is likely to tack strongly towards 
Amano in the new structure. 
 
¶13. (C) In late 2008, Cserveny's deputy Tariq Rauf of Canada 
received a personal promotion, from the P-5 to D-l level, and 
contract extension through 2011.  As in the case of his boss, 
Rauf's job duties remain the same.  The practice of granting 
"personal" D ranks to senior P-5 personnel is not uncommon in 
the Agency.  Rauf's title is Head, Verification and Security 
Policy Coordination within EXPO.  Among other duties, he is 
the coordinator of Secretariat efforts to develop mechanisms 
for IAEA-administered assurance of nuclear fuel supply to 
states that may suffer a politically-motivated cutoff, e.g., 
an international nuclear fuel bank.  Despite his usefulness 
on this particular issue and in routine scheduling and 
information exchanges, Rauf is not wholly trustworthy and is 
viewed as close to Russian interests.  Also, he has been an 
unhelpful presence on Iran.  Amano is aware of all this, and 
Rauf will be significantly weakened by the change in DG. 
 
¶14.  (C) Among others staying on is the Director of the 
Office of Legal Affairs, Johan Rautenbach, whose contract in 
late 2008 was extended through 2011.  Cautious to the point 
of reticence in most settings, Rautenbach generally projects 
an image of standing apart from the political fray.  However, 
he has been known to render legal opinions in furtherance of 
his "client's," i.e., ElBaradei's, interest, and involves 
himself unhelpfully in Agency-internal debates over tactics 
in the conduct of sensitive safeguards investigations. 
Rautenbach's Amcit 
deputy, safeguards expert Laura Rockwood, is also likely to 
stay on. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Other key Mission interlocutors will or may move 
from current roles under a new DG.  One significant loss will 
be that Kwaku Aning of Ghana, who intends to depart the IAEA 
at the end of 2010.  Aning holds the D-2 position as 
Secretary of the Policy Making Organs (chief interpreters of 
rules of procedure and the drafters of most chair's or 
rapporteur's summaries).  This is the only D-level position 
held by a G-77 country.  British national Graham Andrew, 
Special Assistant to the DG for Science and Technology, is 
under contract through August 2011.  He has told Msnoff 
privately he would like to support the next DG over a 
transition period and beyond, but would move to other duties 
in the Agency for the duration of his contract if required. 
Andrew would need a new contract to stay in the Agency beyond 
August 2011 to 2013, when he would reach the IAEA retirement 
age (62).  ElBaradei's Chef d'Cabinet, Dutch diplomat Antoine 
Van Dongen, also has been extended through 2010.  Having 
known ElBaradei since their time together at NYU Law School 
in the 1970's, Van Dongen is a strong ElBaradei loyalist 
whose role in an Amano cabinet remains to be determined. 
 
Comment and Recommendation 
-------------------------- 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Mission enjoys an excellent relationship with U.S. 
DDG Waller and counts him as an asset.  He provides insight 
into Agency operations and is an interpreter and advocate of 
the Agency to important audiences, for example from the U.S. 
Congress.  Waller has been highly successful in bringing 
Amcits into positions in his department, though much less so 
in other departments.  In Management the U.S. currently holds 
two Director positions, one D-1 and one D-2, and five Section 
Head positions, with a total of 24 Amcits working in the 
department.  The signals from both Waller and DG-designate 
Amano are that we may rely on Waller remaining in this 
function for the time being, should Washington so decide. 
 
¶17.  (C) The expected departure of DDG Taniguchi requires 
that we search for a compelling individual to lead the safety 
and security department in fashioning and institutionalizing 
(politically and financially) the IAEA role in combating 
nuclear terrorism and embedding safety culture in the 
(potentially) fast-growing global nuclear power sector.  The 
safety and security of nuclear facilities and material around 
the world over the next ten years will be very important to 
the U.S., involving potential issues of regional security, 
energy policy, and growth in the commercial nuclear industry 
at home and globally.  It is in our interest to be directly 
involved in the selection of a next DDG through whom we can 
increase the complement of U.S. nationals performing these 
crucial functions.  There are rumors that Canadian Ambassador 
 
Marie Gervais-Vidricaire is interested.  As she lacks 
technical experience, this would not be a helpful outcome 
from the perspective of our subject-matter experts, but the 
USG could be in an awkward position if confronted with a 
determined request for support from Ottawa.  Also on the 
Vienna scene there are rumors that France, a country with a 
heavy technician presence and influence already in the safety 
and security areas, may move to build upon this predominance. 
 
¶18. (C) With regard to the DDG/Safeguards, Olli Heinonen, 
Mission recommends that we remain discrete but open to an 
extension of his tenure should he seek it and similarly 
discrete in USG-internal brainstorming on potential 
successors.  Relevant to our deliberations on the Safety and 
Security as well as Safeguards Departments, ref A examined 
approaches to staffing, reviewed current opportunities for 
American citizen employment at professional levels across the 
Agency, and noted some key positions for which U.S. citizens 
would not be eligible (due to national balance or traditions 
against staffing from nuclear weapons states) but where U.S. 
interests require that competent incumbents fulfill those 
roles. 
 
¶19. (C) In weighing replacements for DDGs Cetto and Burkart, 
leading Technical Cooperation and Nuclear Applications, 
respectively, we must try to address the overlap in their two 
Departments that has created stubborn redundancies and 
inefficiencies.  These have not been resolved despite years 
of investigations, reports, and recommendations.  Both 
Departments have fierce political defenders in the G-77, 
preventing serious reform efforts (particularly in the case 
of TC).  Mission recommends we pay vigorous attention to the 
future leadership of these two Departments, as the only way 
to fix their management will be from the inside. 
 
PYATT