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DE RUEHTRO #0570/01 1961448
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P R 151448Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5036
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
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RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5574

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000570 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND AF/E (MBEYZEROV); AFRICOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/15/2019 
TAGS: PREL AU LY
SUBJECT: LIBYA'S AU SUMMIT SCORECARD: VICTORY (OF SORTS) FROM JAWS OF DEFEAT TRIPOLI 00000570 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, US Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

1.(C) Summary: Libya's hosting of the 13th African Union Summit faced myriad troubles from both political and logistical standpoints, but last-minute developments on both fronts helped Muammar al-Qadhafi snatch a victory from the jaws of defeat. On AU business, the headlines were often more impressive than the substance: the much-heralded push for African unity took a symbolic step forward, while allowing states to stall on implementation; and member states reiterated their call to have the International Criminal Court indictment against Sudan's President Bashir -- though there was no agreement for the 30 African parties to the court to withdraw. A potential walk-out by Western diplomats was averted when Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad cancelled his trip to the Summit's opening at the eleventh hour. That Libya was able to house and feed all attendees was a minor miracle, enabled by the hosts paying hefty sums on hospitality on the eve of the Summit. The pageantry was likely aimed at currying favor with African guests, while providing a not-so-subtle reminder of Libya's oil wealth for countries hesitant to join with al-Qadhafi's aggrandizing vision of unification but equally wary of losing out on Libya's dinar diplomacy. End Summary.

LIBYA'S OUTCOMES FROM THE SUMMIT -- WHERE'S THE BEEF?

2.(C) Muammar al-Qadhafi's chairmanship of the African Union (AU) Assembly has from the start served as a platform for the Libyan leader to burnish his international credentials and cement his position as a self-proclaimed "man of history". In a year flush with symbolic milestones -- the 40th anniversary of the coup that brought him to power, the 10th anniversary of the Sirte Proclamation leading to the formation of the African Union, Libya's seat on the UN Security Council, and senior Libyan diplomat Ali Treiki's presidency of the UN General Assembly all align in September -- al-Qadhafi has vigorously pursued his vision of a "United States of Africa" to secure his spot in the pantheon of great leaders. The push for unity, however, has been light on technical details and implementation. The 13th Ordinary Summit of the AU heads of state held July 1-3 in Sirte offered the unpredictable al-Qadhafi a "home-field advantage" to exert greater pressure on leaders to pay lip service to his continental ambitions.

3.(C) With his usual predilection toward controversy, al-Qadhafi made waves with his choices of invited guests. Embattled Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's scheduled but unfulfilled speaking role caused Western diplomats to scramble for guidance on how to react to expected rants against foreign intervention in Iran. (Note: Poloff saw several members of Libyan protocol guiding Iranian officials around the Summit venue on June 30 and members of the Spanish and Dutch delegations reported that Iranian officials were booked on the same cruise ship in which they had sought accommodation. End Note.) Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was also a last-minute cancellation, as the Egyptian Ambassador waited at Sirte airport expecting his arrival until at least 10am on July 1. During open sessions, al-Qadhafi's remarks were uncharacteristically brief, though his talking points were suitably delivered by a Ghanaian representative of the "traditional kings" of Africa, who called on the assembled to unify Africa per al-Qadhafi's vision.

4.(C) While the Summit was ostensibly aimed at agricultural development and food security in Africa, nearly all delegations arrived expecting a continuation of al-Qadhafi's forceful push for a supranational African Authority. After two days of closed-door session with little progress toward securing al-Qadhafi's agenda, several Tripoli-based ambassadors of AU member states told Poloff that they had been told to expect late-night meetings with the Leader on the evening of July 2.The Egyptian Ambassador told us that night that he expected that Libyan-sponsored initiatives for unity and withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC) would fail if al-Qadhafi was unable to propose a face-saving, compromise position.

5.(C) Talks with delegation heads and a 14-hour final session apparently led to such a compromise. Press reports announced "milestone" decisions toward unity and a strong rebuke of the ICC. However, the final draft of a decision to form an AU Authority to replace the current secretariat provides little by way of detail and leaves an opportunity to leave the agreement unimplemented while still allowing al-Qadhafi to claim a measured victory. Diplomats from AU countries in Tripoli said the Libyans "invented" decisions taken at the April Extraordinary Summit to make unity a "fait accompli" and derided Qadhafi's vision for unity as "a dream that is out of touch with the needs of Africans". Several observer delegations obtained early drafts of an ICC motion that called on member states to not cooperate with the Court. The final vote, however, did TRIPOLI 00000570 002.2 OF 002 not/not call on States Party to withdraw from the Rome Statute and called for non-cooperation only in the case of Sudan's President Bashir. Qadhafi's heavy-handed tactics left several delegations bristling, with South African President Jacob Zuma and Botswanaian Vice President Merafhe publicly deriding the Leader's stewardship of the Summit and expressing doubt that the agreements would amount to progress toward unity. Other business, including a resolution calling on the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on Eritrea for its support of al-Shabaab, was reportedly shepherded by the AU Commission and not/not the Libyan hosts.

SUMMIT PLANNING: ALMOST PERFECT, BUT NOT QUITE

6.(C) From the beginning, it was clear that Libyan officials sought to promote a Qadhafi-centric dog-and-pony show vice the Summit's stated goals of Agriculture and Infrastructure Development. Diplomatic missions in Tripoli were given various moving dates for when "everything about the Summit" would be explained. A June 17 meeting to explain logistics attended by dozens of ambassadors ended abruptly when the Summit Organizing Committee chair left the dais to answer a phone call without providing details to the assembled diplomats. The Beninese ambassador, who had been given the microphone to ask a question, repeated "I demand to be acknowledged by the [now absent] chair" for at least five minutes while the rest of the crowd filed out.

7.(C) On a June 20 tour of Sirte, it was clear that neither detail nor substance had featured prominently in Libyan planning. Apartments reserved for delegations (and planned for handover as public housing after the Summit) were in various stages of construction and no provision had been made for food, transportation to Sirte (a six-hour drive from Tripoli), or ground transportation during the Summit. Hotels and villas reserved for African heads of state and ministers, on the other hand, were prominently shown to assuage African embassies that their delegations would be accommodated in opulence befitting Libya's comfortable financial position. Delegations arriving during the Peace and Security Commission meeting June 24-26 or the Ministerial meetings on June 28-30 reported that food was difficult to locate, with one delegate informing USAU colleagues that she had slept in a chair for the first two nights of the proceedings.

8.(C) By the afternoon of June 30, however, Libyan officials apparently decided to open the purse strings to complete all last-minute details. Light shows, electronic signs, and free food met attendant pomp as heads of state arrived in Tripoli. Shuttle jets between Tripoli and Sirte began operations, bringing in planeloads of foreign diplomats and "traditional African kings". Foreign workers abounded: hundreds of Turkish and Greek hospitality staff manned kitchens, buffets, temporary coffee tents, and floating hotels. One waiter told Poloff that he had been notified of his travel to Libya less than 24 hours before getting on a plane to Sirte. Throughout the conference, foreign laborers continued public works projects near delegation lodging sites, including paving sidewalks and building beachfronts.

9.(C) Comment: That Libya did not suffer the embarrassment of public derision for their handling of the AU Summit is a testament to the power of its purse. African delegations were well cared for -- ministers and heads of state were housed in expansive villas. Observers lived in a much more Spartan manner, on foam beds in public housing flats. Libya's goal of catering to its African guests likely served a dual purpose: currying favor with African leaders while not-to-subtly reminding them of Libya's wealth. At the same time, the Sirte venue allowed the GOL to "hold hostage" delegations reluctant to go along with al-Qadhafi's aggrandizing vision. In the end, Libya's last-minute preparations may have been a blessing in disguise; many African delegations indicated that they decided to focus on bilateral meetings due to pessimism on the official agenda. The Libyan summit experience is one we may see again, as some GOL interlocutors have begun laying the groundwork for yet another Extraordinary Summit, to be held coincident to the 40th anniversary of the Qadhafi revolution, which will be marked September 1. End Comment. CRETZ