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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 19 TOKYO 001722 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/28/09 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Roos hits the books on Japan (Yomiuri) 
 
(2) LDP reveals manifesto for roadmap for doshu or regional bloc 
system (Yomiuri) 
 
(3) Interview with Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman 
Taro Kono on intent behind statement that "secret nuclear agreement 
existed" (Mainichi) 
 
(4) DPJ unveils manifesto aiming to realize Kantei-led politics 
(Mainichi) 
 
(5) Conceptual image of DPJ administration (Nikkei) 
 (chart omitted) 
 
(6) Interview with DPJ Secretary General Katsuya Okada: Determined 
to sever cozy ties (with bureaucrats) with change of government 
(Nikkei) 
 
(8) DPJ aware of high hurdles to Futenma relocation outside Okinawa 
(Nikkei) 
 
(9) Relocation of Futenma outside of Okinawa, secret nuclear accord 
not in DPJ manifesto (Ryukyu Shimpo) 
 
(10) Commentary: DPJ underscores "dialogue" in relations with U.S. 
in manifesto (Okinawa Times) 
 
(11) Reading the course of 2009 Lower House election; Point at issue 
in Okinawa: Differences in views on Futenma clear (Ryukyu Shimpo) 
 
(12) Pre-election poll on public trends (Tokyo Shimbun) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Roos hits the books on Japan 
 
YOMIURI (Page 4) (Full) 
July 28, 2009 
 
Honorary Professor Daniel Okimoto, friend of U.S. ambassador to 
Japan-designate 
 
U.S. President Obama has nominated John Roos (54), an attorney, as 
the next U.S. Ambassador to Japan. Roos is expected to arrive at his 
post in Japan soon after the Senate approves his nomination. He is 
an unknown figure in diplomatic circles. Interviewing him is 
prohibited until the Senate approves his nomination. The Yomiuri 
Shimbun asked Professor Emeritus Daniel Okimoto (66) of Stanford 
University, who has known Roos personally for more than 20 years, 
about Roos's political stance. 
 
-- When did you become acquainted with Mr. Roos? 
 
He was my student. Since he became an attorney, he has continued to 
consult with me regarding legal matters." 
 
-- How was he appointed to the post? 
 
"President Obama offered several posts to Mr. Roos from around 
 
TOKYO 00001722  002 OF 019 
 
 
February of this year. Mr. Roos chose the post of ambassador to 
Japan in around early April. He views Japan as the most important 
U.S. ally. He is interested in Japanese companies, economy, culture, 
and society. He has been to Japan many times on business. He also 
likes sumo wrestling, baseball and Kurosawa's films. His wife is 
interested in Japanese flower arrangement. " 
 
-- What advice did you give to Mr. Roos after his nomination? 
 
"I gave him several books on Japanese history, politics, culture, 
and economy, including former ambassador to Japan Reischauer's 
books. I also recommended books written by Haruki Murakami. I e-mail 
him important articles on Japan every day. He is studying hard about 
Japan, meeting former ambassadors to Japan Mondale and Armacost. I 
plan to hold as many study sessions as possible with Mr. Roos even 
after his nomination is approved." 
 
-- How did Mr. Roos become interested in politics? 
 
"He became interested in politics when he worked as an intern for 
six months at the White House during the Carter administration, when 
he was a student at Stanford University. He then became close to 
former Senator Bill Bradley and won his great trust. He has 
supported Democratic presidential candidates in the past 
presidential elections. 
 
--What is his basic political stance? 
 
"He is socially liberal. He is a defender of civil rights and calls 
for consideration to the poor, including the realization of a 
universal healthcare system. He is conservative in economic terms. 
He attaches importance to free trade. 
 
-- Is his relationship with President Obama still close enough to be 
able to talk to him directly? 
 
"They talked to each other directly using their cell phones during 
the presidential campaign. If he telephones the President at the 
White House now and leaves a message, the President himself will get 
back to him." 
 
-- Please tell us your expectations of Mr. Roos as ambassador? 
 
"Some say that he was nominated as ambassador for his contribution 
in raising funds for President Obama. However, that is not the case. 
He is a considerate person and a very competent attorney, who 
listens to other people's opinions. He has many acquaintances among 
politicians." 
 
(2) LDP reveals manifesto for roadmap for doshu or regional bloc 
system 
 
YOMIURI SHIMBUN (Top Play) (Excerpts) 
Evening, July 28, 2009 
 
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) on July 28 revealed a manifesto 
for regional decentralization, which it is advocating in the 
campaign for the upcoming Lower House election. The LDP has come up 
with a policy of adopting a doshu or regional bloc system of 
reorganizing the present system of prefectures six to eight years 
after setting up a review council and then enacting a basic law. The 
manifesto also mentions that of local governments' share in 
 
TOKYO 00001722  003 OF 019 
 
 
government-sponsored projects, maintenance and management expenses 
will be abolished in the next fiscal year. 
 
Concerning the doshu or regional bloc system, the manifesto for the 
first time mentions a roadmap of swiftly enacting a basic law that 
will incorporate principles and then switching to the system after 
setting a deadline. The policy platform also notes a policy of 
concurrently promoting the transfer of authority to Hokkaido as a 
model case. 
 
Regarding the share of local governments in government-sponsored 
projects, the LDP policy platform pledges the abolition of 
maintenance and management expenses for national roads and class-A 
rivers shouldered by local governments in response to a strong 
request made by local governments. It also pledges to limit 
government-sponsored projects to basic and wide-area ones and 
drastically review the cost-sharing system itself. 
 
The manifesto also proposes submitting and enacting a new 
comprehensive decentralization bill, which stipulates the abolition 
or curtailment of the central government's local branches and a 
revision to the system of the central government regulating services 
provided by local governments in detail by law. 
 
Also included in the manifesto is a policy of establishing a 
consultative organ for representatives of the central and local 
governments to discuss decentralization as requested by Osaka 
governor Toru Hashimoto and turning it into legislation. It also 
includes a policy of substantively reduce the number of projects, by 
limiting such eligible for government subsidies to those to repair 
the damage wrought by natural disaster. 
 
Making public appeal on differences with DPJ 
 
The LDP has indicated a roadmap for a shift to a doshu or regional 
bloc system in its manifesto for the Lower House election in order 
to make a public appeal on differences with the DPJ as well as to 
comply with the request filed by chiefs of local governments, such 
as Hashimoto. 
 
Under the regional bloc system, the existing prefectures will be 
reorganized into some 10 provinces and administrative work, 
authority and resources will be transferred to those provinces. 
 
The DPJ is showing a cautious stance to the regional bloc system 
from the perspective of strengthening and attaching importance to 
the role of basic autonomous bodies (cities, towns, villages). Its 
manifesto does not touch on the system. 
 
The LDP is presumably motivated by the desire to have mayors of 
municipalities cooperate not with the DPJ but with the LDP in the 
upcoming Lower House election. However, its manifesto does not show 
the specific image of the system. The transition period is set at 
six to eight years after the enactment of a basic law, leaving an 
unclear element. 
 
(3) Interview with Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman 
Taro Kono on intent behind statement that "secret nuclear agreement 
existed" 
 
MAINICHI (Page 2) (Full) 
Evening, May 27, 2009 
 
TOKYO 00001722  004 OF 019 
 
 
 
Interviewer: Taichi Nemoto 
 
There have been reports about a "secret nuclear agreement" under 
which Japan allowed U.S. vessels carrying nuclear weapons to call on 
Japanese ports and pass through Japanese territorial waters. While 
the Aso cabinet had consistently denied the existence of such an 
agreement, Taro Kono (LDP Aso faction), House of Representatives 
Foreign Affairs Committee chairman before the recent Diet 
dissolution, has declared: "A secret agreement existed. The 
government's false statements are unacceptable." We interviewed Kono 
on what his intent was in making such a statement. 
 
Q: Japan, an atomic-bombed country, is supposed to abide by the 
three no-nuclear principles of "not producing, possessing, and 
introducing" nuclear weapons. However, Mr. Kono, you have determined 
on July 11 that "the two governments signed a secret agreement" at 
the time of the revision of the bilateral security treaty in 1960. 
 
Kono: The United States has made the official documents public a 
long time ago. Former Ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer's 
statement (in 1981) also admitted the existence of the secret 
agreement, and retired Rear Admiral Gene LaRoque of the U.S. Navy 
testified (in 1974) that "nuclear arms were not removed when calling 
on Japanese ports." 
 
I also talked directly to former Administrative Vice Foreign 
Minister Ryohei Murata and many others recently and was given 
similar testimonies. This means that the secret agreement revealed 
by statements from the U.S. sides has also been confirmed on the 
Japanese side. 
 
Q: Still, the government denies this stubbornly. 
 
Kono: Even then President George Bush (senior) declared the removal 
of tactical nuclear weapons from aircraft carriers and other naval 
vessels in 1991. 
 
Q: Which means it is possible that ships carrying nuclear weapons 
had called on Japanese ports. 
 
Kono: The government claims that since there had not been any 
request from the U.S. for prior consultation, nuclear arms had not 
been brought in. Are they saying that U.S. ships removed the nuclear 
arms somewhere else before calling on Japanese ports and put them 
back on after leaving Japan? 
 
During the Cold War era, there might have been the need for the 
whole government to deny the secret agreement for the sake of 
Japan's security under the 1955 system of conflict between the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Socialist Party. 
However, the Cold War has ended, and at a time we should be talking 
about how to deter North Korea's nuclear weapons, we will get 
nowhere if we keep saying "there was no secret agreement." 
 
Q: Why do they continue to deny? 
 
Kono: It is not possible for the bureaucrats to make a decision to 
deny what previous prime ministers have said consistently. 
Therefore, politicians should take the initiative. Prime Minister 
Taro Aso or Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone only needs to make a 
political decision. 
 
TOKYO 00001722  005 OF 019 
 
 
 
Q: Are you saying the prime minister does not have the will to make 
such a decision? 
 
Kono: For sure, the rule of politics is that one has to take the 
responsibility for the consequence. In reality, a decision has not 
been made. This is the responsibility of the foreign minister. 
 
Q: From the layman's point of view, the prime minister can simply 
order the foreign minister to do so. 
 
Kono: I don't think so. It is primarily the foreign minister's 
responsibility. The foreign minister should make a decision and 
report to the prime minister. 
 
Q: Do you think this is very vexing? 
 
Kono: I think they should do it at an early date. 
 
Q: Did you talk to Foreign Minister Nakasone directly? 
 
Kono: My policy is I cannot talk without the other party's 
permission, so I will not say if we have talked or not. 
 
Q: What is the level of North Korea's threat? 
 
Kono: Apparently, the day when North Korea will be able to load 
warheads it developed on its own on missiles it produced on its own 
is approaching. 
 
Q: Very soon? 
 
Kono: Probably quite soon. 
 
Q: When? 
 
Kono: Ask the technical people. I don't know. However, we should 
think about what we should do if that happens. 
 
Q: U.S. President Barack Obama advocates nuclear disarmament. 
 
Kono: I also think that the ultimate solution is nuclear 
disarmament. However, this is not possible without resolving the 
problem facing us, North Korea. Furthermore, there is also the 
question of China's nuclear arms. Nuclear warheads need to be 
removed under a formula acceptable to all countries. 
 
Q: Will Japan allow bringing in nuclear arms until then? 
 
Kono: We need to have a free discussion on what strategy Japan needs 
to adopt for deterrence, including the option of Japan possessing 
nuclear arms. 
 
Q: Mr Kono, do you think Japan should also possess its own nuclear 
capability? 
 
Kono: I don't think so. It is unclear what benefits this will 
bring. 
 
Q: I believe the United States also does not want Japan to possess 
nuclear arms. 
 
 
TOKYO 00001722  006 OF 019 
 
 
Kono: That is a stupid question. What matters is not the United 
States' wishes. I think we should not follow the U.S. blindly; we 
should discuss "what does Japan want to do?" 
 
Q: Japan and the U.S. agreed to hold regular consultations on the 
"nuclear umbrella" on July 18. 
 
Kono: That's right. But what about the "nuclear umbrella" 
specifically? I don't know. The secret agreement has not been 
acknowledged, and it is even unclear what sort of deterrence is in 
place. North Korea's nuclear arms and the nuclear umbrella - if the 
cabinet gives serious thought to these two issues, it is obvious 
that the government's statement needs to be revised. 
 
Q: You should become the foreign minister and make the secret 
agreement public. 
 
Kono: Well, I myself would like to become the foreign minister 
(laughs). If I tell the bureaucrats "gather the evidences on the 
secret agreement and bring them here," they will probably look 
everywhere and bring them to me. That is their job. 
 
Q: Are you sure they will really bring the evidence? 
 
Kono: The evidence (might have been destroyed and) might not exist. 
However, we have official documents and testimonies from the U.S. 
side. The matter can be settled with an admission by the foreign 
minister. 
 
Q: What if the prime minister stops you? 
 
Kono: In that case, I will have to resign from the cabinet. However, 
if the prime minister is opposed to this, he would not have 
appointed me in the first place. 
 
Q: Next year marks the 50th anniversary of the revision of the 
Japan-U.S. security treaty. Why is it that many former Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs officials are testifying at this point in time? 
 
Kono: I can feel that there are certain motives behind this. Perhaps 
these former officials are telling the government to change its 
statement in order to break out of the stalemate. 
 
Q: Is it because the incumbent officials do not dare to say so, and 
they are making the former officials talk on their behalf? 
 
Kono: I don't know. I really don't know. 
 
Q: You should have passed a resolution at your committee demanding 
that the government change its statement before the Diet was 
dissolved. The Diet was in session on July 15 and 17 after the 
motion of no confidence on the cabinet was rejected. 
 
Kono: Honestly, it was really a shame. If the resolution had been 
passed, we would have been able to avoid the worst scenario of the 
committee accepting the government's statement after the members of 
the Foreign Affairs Committee are replaced after the election. I 
could have convened the committee as the chair. The resolution could 
have been passed with a bare quorum and a unanimous vote by members 
from both the ruling and opposition parties. 
 
Q: Why didn't you convene the committee? 
 
TOKYO 00001722  007 OF 019 
 
 
 
Kono: The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) did not want to hold the 
meeting because Diet dissolution was imminent and the party's Diet 
Affairs Committee disapproved. (It's a shame because) I had stood 
firm despite the opposition of the LDP's Diet Affairs Committee. I 
negotiated with the DPJ but they said we can do it after the 
election. I think the important thing is not to point fingers at who 
is to blame but to engage in discussions on nuclear deterrence 
steadily. 
 
(4) DPJ unveils manifesto aiming to realize Kantei-led politics 
 
MAINICHI (Page 3) (Abridged slightly) 
July 28, 2009 
 
Naruyuki Tanaka 
 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) President Yukio Hatoyama unveiled 
yesterday the party's manifesto (campaign pledges) for the upcoming 
House of Representatives election featuring a plan to establish a 
lawmaker-led decision-making system putting an end to the 
bureaucracy-led system. Under this system, the DPJ plans to revamp 
the entire budgetary system which has been controlled by bureaucrats 
with the aim of eliminating wasteful spending of tax revenue to come 
up with funding for the DPJ's showcase policy measures, such as a 
child allowance. But the concrete picture of lawmaker-led politics 
remains unclear and a question mark is hanging over prospects for 
securing funding. 
 
Sending 100 lawmakers to ministries and agencies 
 
The DPJ manifesto begins with five principles, such as realizing 
politics led by lawmakers rather than by bureaucrats, making policy 
decisions strictly under the cabinet, and prioritizing national 
interests led by the Prime Minister's Official Residence (Kantei) 
over bureaucratic interests. The manifesto also includes five policy 
measures to realize the five principles. Hatoyama made the following 
comment at a press conference yesterday: "This will enable us to 
conduct politics without being controlled by bureaucrats. We will be 
able to use bureaucrats well and to fully demonstrate our 
leadership." 
 
At the top of the five policy measures is a plan to send some 100 
lawmakers to ministries and agencies as ministers, senior vice 
ministers, parliamentary secretaries, and assistants to ministers. 
But at present, some 70 ruling-party lawmakers are already placed at 
the ministries and agencies. Will an additional 30 lawmakers result 
in lawmaker-led politics? 
 
Deputy President Naoto Kan has explained, "It is important for each 
ministry to have a team of three parliamentarians as a minister, 
senior vice minister, and parliamentary secretary." The reason is 
because the DPJ thinks the unity of three lawmakers at each ministry 
is severed by bureaucrats. The DPJ system is designed for the three 
lawmakers at each ministry to meet at least once a week to 
strengthen their unity and to plan policies and make adjustments and 
decisions. 
 
A committee of ministers 
 
The manifesto also calls for setting up a committee of ministers for 
relevant ministers to discuss challenges that require interagency 
 
TOKYO 00001722  008 OF 019 
 
 
adjustments. The results of the meeting will be reported to the 
Prime Minister and a cabinet meeting without leaving matters to 
government officials. It has been customary for administrative 
vice-ministers to hold meetings to make adjustments on matters ahead 
of a cabinet meeting. The DPJ plans to abolish such meetings as a 
symbol of bureaucracy-led politics. 
 
The difference between a council of relevant cabinet ministers that 
is set up as necessary and a committee of ministers is unclear. It 
can be said that the ministers can display their leadership 
depending on how the system is operated. Questions also remain about 
what to do with administrative coordination between ministries and 
agencies. Policy Research Committee Chair Masayuki Naoshima said 
about meetings of administrative vice-ministers that they will be 
abolished as venues to make final decisions, adding that his party 
does not mean to deny administrative meetings. 
 
Budget compilation at the Kantei 
 
The DPJ manifesto also calls for the establishment of a national 
strategy bureau directly under the Prime Minister to realize a 
Kantei-led decision-making system. Hatoyama has expressed his desire 
to appoint a policy research committee chair-level policy specialist 
as the chief of the national strategy bureau. The bureau will play a 
central role in shifting the budget-compilation power from the 
Finance Ministry to the Kantei. The DPJ plans to revamp the overall 
budgetary system by establishing an administrative renovation 
council under the bureau which is tasked with examining the budgets 
and a variety of systems to eliminate wasteful spending and 
wrongdoing. 
 
The establishment of the national strategy bureau and the 
administrative renovation council reportedly requires a legal basis. 
Whether or not such bodies can become functional before 
budget-compilation for fiscal 2010 start is uncertain. To begin 
with, the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP) was set up 
for the purpose of lawmaker-led budget compilation. The CEFP played 
a main role in the postal privatization program and regulatory 
reform under the former Koizumi administration. The difference 
between the CEFP and the two new bodies remains ambiguous. 
 
Kasumigaseki making preparations while remaining on alarm 
 
Hijiri Saito, Keisuke Ota 
 
All ministries and agencies are alarmed at the DPJ's plan to turn 
around the past policies by putting an end to the bureaucracy-led 
decision-making system. 
 
The DPJ plans to generate over 16 trillion yen by eliminating 
wasteful spending, using surplus funds in special accounts dubbed 
"buried treasure," among other means. A senior Finance Ministry 
official is unconvinced with the DPJ's plan: "Can the party really 
cut spending deeply? Lawmakers representing local constituencies 
might raise objections to reducing public works projects." 
 
The Finance Ministry is particularly concerned about the DPJ's plan 
to establish the national strategy bureau tasked with formulating a 
budget compilation policy. The bureau might rob the ministry of its 
traditional power to compile budgets. The Finance Ministry has 
promoted Shunsuke Kagawa, 52, who served as a secretary to former 
DPJ President Ichiro Ozawa when he was serving as deputy chief 
 
TOKYO 00001722  009 OF 019 
 
 
cabinet secretary under the then Takeshita administration, from the 
post of deputy director-general of the Budget Bureau to the post of 
deputy vice-minister for policy planning and coordination, a contact 
point with ministries and agencies and the Bank of Japan, apparently 
in a bid to preserve its influence even after a DPJ administration 
is launched. 
 
The Land and Transport Ministry is also highly alarmed for fear of 
losing its vested interests of road-use revenue as a result of the 
DPJ's pledge to make expressways toll free and to abolish the 
provisional gasoline tax rate. A senior ministry official expressed 
this hopeful view: "Even DPJ lawmakers want to see roads build in 
their constituencies. Once the party takes power, I think the DPJ 
will settle on a pragmatic policy course." 
 
The Land and Transport Ministry has decided to retain Hiroaki 
Taniguchi, 60, in his post as administrative vice-minister, and 
Makoto Taketoshi, 59, as vice-minister, who entered the minister in 
the same year as Taniguchi. It is customary for senior ministry 
officials who joined the ministry in the same year as a 
vice-minister to retire from the ministry. Rumor has it that the 
transport ministry has decided to keep Taketoshi in anticipation 
that Taniguchi will be fired as a result of locking horns with the 
DPJ. 
 
The Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Ministry is reacting 
negatively to the DPJ's plan to establish an income indemnity system 
for individual farming households. Administrative Agriculture 
Vice-Minister Michio Ide criticized the plan, saying, "Requiring a 
lot of paper work, the plan is not pragmatic." His comment was 
criticized by the DPJ as lacking political neutrality. Idei 
explained in response, "I do not intend to criticize all of the DPJ 
policies." 
 
Kenji Yamanouchi, 51, former director of the Foreign Ministry's 
First North American Division, has been appointed as counsellor of 
the Cabinet Secretariat. Yamanouchi served as a secretary to DPJ 
President Yukio Hatoyama when he was deputy chief cabinet secretary 
under the then Hosokawa administration. Yamanouchi is expected to 
become a secretary to Hatoyama when he becomes prime minister. 
 
(6) Interview with DPJ Secretary General Katsuya Okada: Determined 
to sever cozy ties (with bureaucrats) with change of government 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
July 28, 2009 
 
-- What is the top campaign issue for the House of Representatives 
election? 
 
The upcoming election will ask the voters' judgment on whether the 
current government should be replaced. The election provides an 
opportunity for the voters to express their views about whether they 
hope for a new kind of politics free of long-standing fetters. 
 
-- How are you going to change politics? 
 
We are determined to change the current relationship between 
politicians and government officials. Politicians are dependent on 
bureaucrats. Under the current mechanism, politicians, although they 
are representatives of the people, do not make policy decisions. 
Decisions are made neither by officials nor even the prime minister; 
 
TOKYO 00001722  010 OF 019 
 
 
 they are instead made by the bosses of the Liberal Democratic 
Party's policy cliques in the Diet. A switch in power is the sole 
means to end this mechanism. 
 
-- What is your party's line of victory or defeat? 
 
Our goal is to grab the reins of government. Even if we attain this 
goal, a rocky road lies ahead of us. The economic situation is 
gloomy, and people are becoming exhausted in their daily lives. 
Further, the nation sits on a massive debt. We must carry out policy 
measures with firm determination. 
 
-- Your party has pledged not to raise the consumption tax for the 
next four years. 
 
If and when we decide to raise the consumption tax, we will specify 
it in our manifesto for a national election. We will decide on the 
margin of such a hike, depending on what pension system is designed. 
We are still flexible about this point. We have not rejected 
discussion of a consumption tax hike. 
 
-- Are you going to set up an arena for the ruling and opposition 
parties to discuss pensions and other issues? 
 
A forum was set up in the Diet in the days of former prime minister 
Junichiro Koizumi, but it did not properly operate. If the ruling 
camp proposes setting such a forum as part of its election strategy, 
we will not agree. But if the other side is eager to discuss issues 
in a serious manner, we will welcome it. 
 
-- How does your party intend to raise the necessary fiscal resource 
of 7.1 trillion yen to finance such new policy measures as 
abolishing gasoline and other provisional tax rates? 
 
Since there is 5 trillion yen (in untapped funds), raising the money 
will not be so difficult. There are some funds that can be 
discontinued next fiscal year and beyond (among the funds in the 
fiscal 2009 supplementary budget). It should be possible to 
immediately cancel plans to construct public facilities. 
 
Does the party still have no intention to issue deficit-covering 
bonds to fund its new policy measures? 
 
That (issuing no deficit-covering bonds) is our basic policy stance, 
but it is necessary to consider how to squeeze out the necessary 
fiscal resources. We have yet to discuss how to deal with the 
immediate fiscal issue. 
 
-- How about the possibility of extending the ongoing Self-Defense 
Force's refueling mission in the Indian Ocean beyond its expiration 
in January? 
 
I have no comment for now. It is necessary to make a comprehensive 
judgment. Prime Minister Aso called our stance on this issue 
"inconsistent," but although we are dissatisfied at the relevant law 
authorizing the mission, it is another matter to pull back the 
already dispatched troops. 
 
- Will the party change the government's mid-term goal of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions (by 15 PERCENT  from 2005 levels)? 
 
We intend to change the goal. We are aiming to assume the initiative 
 
TOKYO 00001722  011 OF 019 
 
 
in international negotiations by calling for a 25 PERCENT  cut from 
1990 levels. The government's annual economic and fiscal policy 
guidelines will come to naught. 
 
(7) Editorial: Examining policies for the 2009 Lower House election: 
Expectations and doubts about the pledges of DPJ aiming to capture 
political power 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
July 28, 2009 
 
The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has published its manifesto 
(campaign pledges) for the House of Representatives election on July 
¶27. It has put forth "five pledges" based on a complete reshuffle of 
the budget and elimination of wasteful spending, conveying its 
strong will for a change of administration. On the other hand, many 
of its specific policies consist of pork barrel spending, and the 
party undoubtedly gives the impression of evading discussions on 
revenue sources and increase in cost. 
 
At his news conference on July 27, President Yukio Hatoyama declared 
that, "We must create politics where the people play the central 
role to replace politics of relying on the bureaucrats since the 
Meiji Period," reiterating the need for a change of administration. 
 
Aiming to break down bureaucrat-led policymaking 
 
The DPJ presents in the manifesto a "blueprint of the 
administration," whose features include the following: (1) sending 
around 100 Diet members to serve as ministers, senior vice 
ministers, parliamentary secretaries, and so forth in the 
government; (2) politicians will coordinate policies through the 
"ministerial committees," and the administrative vice ministers' 
meeting will be abolished; and (3) creation of a "national strategy 
bureau" reporting directly to the prime minister, which will 
formulate a national vision and the outline of the budget. 
 
Its attempt to have Diet members, who have the mandate of the 
people, play a more active role in policy-making is commendable. 
However, the bureaucratic organizations are expected to resist 
fiercely the proposals for the reform of the civil service system, 
including a complete ban on amakudari (golden parachute) and a 20 
percent cut in personnel costs. We would like to know how the DPJ 
proposes to realize such reforms. 
 
The DPJ puts emphasis on rehabilitating the people's livelihood in 
its concrete policies. It plans to spend 7.1 trillion yen in FY2010 
and 16.8 trillion yen in FY2013 for the top priority policies. 
 
Specifically, a child allowance of 312,000 yen per child will be 
paid out each year until the child graduates from middle school; and 
subsidies will be provided to make public high schools virtually 
free of charge. Temporary tax rates for gasoline and other taxes 
will be abolished immediately and expressways will be made toll free 
in principle. Income compensation for farming households will be 
implemented from FY2011, and measures to relieve the shortage of 
doctors are also included. 
 
Support for parents will alleviate the declining birth rate, and 
lower gasoline tax will help the livelihood of residents in the 
regions who have to move around by car. The clarification of the 
order of priority in the road map will be helpful in enhancing the 
 
TOKYO 00001722  012 OF 019 
 
 
voters' understanding of these policies. 
 
Many questions also come to mind. First, what is the growth strategy 
for enhancing Japan's productivity and enlarging the pie, which will 
be the basis for the distribution of wealth? A perspective on "the 
Japanese economy in the world" is also absent. 
 
Agricultural policy is a typical example of pork-barrel largesse. 
While the DPJ claims that income compensation for farming households 
will regenerate agriculture and improve the food self-sufficiency 
rate, will Japan be able to improve the competitiveness of its 
agriculture without changing the old cost structure? The DPJ also 
says that it will promote the conclusion of free trade agreements 
(FTA), but the liberalization of the agricultural market will 
inevitably become an issue in this process. Its measures for 
economic revitalization, including regulatory and tax reforms, are 
inadequate. 
 
The review of postal privatization is also a cause for concern. The 
DPJ may have wanted to turn away from the reform policy of the 
Koizumi administration, but reversing the trend of "from the 
government to the private sector" contradicts its own policy of 
cleaning up the public interest corporations. 
 
The global warming prevention measures deserve compliment to a 
certain extent. The DPJ will aim for reducing greenhouse gas 
emission by 25 percent from the 1990 level by 2020. It will also 
consider the creation of an emission trading market and introducing 
a global warming tax. The idea of expanding the environmental field 
strategically is correct but does this not conflict with the policy 
of toll free expressways? 
 
Another question is about securing revenue sources and how to 
stabilize government finances in the future. The DPJ has cited the 
reduction or abolition of wasteful spending and special taxes and 
the utilization of special accounts and "buried treasure" as its 
revenue sources, but it has not identified specifically what items 
are to be reduced. 
 
The DPJ says that the details will be decided by the "administrative 
renovation council" consisting of some outside experts after taking 
over the administration. It is possible that the party intends to 
cover the fiscal shortfall by increasing the issuance of government 
bonds for the time being. It is also uncertain whether the new 
administration will be able to overcome the resistance of the 
interest groups and the ministries in making the budget cutbacks. 
 
Path to fiscal health not visible 
 
The manifesto makes no mention of increasing the consumption tax 
rate. While President Hatoyama admits the need to discuss this 
issue, he has said that there will be no tax hike in four years. Its 
posture of deferring the problem is unwise. The DPJ says it will 
enact amendments to the Pension Law by 2013 which will introduce a 
minimum pension funded by the consumption, among other things. It 
needs to give a clearer explanation not only on pensions, but also 
on its overall thinking on the social security systems. 
 
The manifesto lacks concrete plans to restore fiscal health in a 
situation where the long-term debts of the national and local 
governments have reached 1.7 times of the GDP. Even though prospects 
for the economy and tax revenues remain uncertain, it is the 
 
TOKYO 00001722  013 OF 019 
 
 
responsibility of a political party seeking to take over the 
administration to outline a plan for restoring fiscal health. 
Ambiguity in fiscal discipline will give rise to distrust of the 
market and of Japan's government finances. 
 
There is no doubt that foreign and security policies were given low 
priority in the process of drafting the manifesto. The document 
contains such vague expressions as "a close and equal Japan-U.S. 
alliance relationship" and "the realization of world peace and 
prosperity" but does not touch on such issues as what to do with the 
Maritime Self-Defense Force's refueling mission in the Indian Ocean 
in the future. 
 
The Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) efforts to draft its manifesto 
have been much delayed. We ask that each political party clarify its 
position on the major issues and step up their policy debate as soon 
as possible. 
 
(8) DPJ aware of high hurdles to Futenma relocation outside Okinawa 
 
RYUKYU SHIMPO (Page 2) (Slightly abridged) 
July 28, 2009 
 
Ahead of the forthcoming general election for the House of 
Representatives, the Democratic Party of Japan (Minshuto) has now 
released its manifesto or campaign pledges. The DPJ manifesto, 
however, does not incorporate the party's advocacy of relocating the 
U.S. military's Futenma airfield outside Okinawa Prefecture. This is 
because the DPJ is becoming aware of the high hurdles ahead. "There 
is no change in our policy (of relocating Futenma airfield outside 
Okinawa Prefecture)," DPJ Policy Research Committee Chairman 
Masayuki Naoshima said yesterday after the DPJ released its 
manifesto. However, he stressed that it would not be easy to do so, 
saying: "The hurdles are high. We will have to make various 
preparations." 
 
Another reason is that the DPJ has yet to reach a consensus on 
security among its members. One DPJ member said: "Our party's 
Okinawa vision proposes relocating Futenma airfield outside Okinawa 
Prefecture, but there is also a question about whether that is 
possible. There are various opinions within the party, including 
those who agree with the government's plan to relocate Futenma 
airfield to Henoko (in Nago City). We are not necessarily in 
agreement." 
 
In the Diet, the DPJ raised an objection to an agreement reached 
between the Japanese and U.S. governments on relocating U.S. Marines 
from Okinawa to Guam. On this issue as well, there is a split of 
opinion in the DPJ. "The reason why we opposed the Guam relocation 
pact is because it was contingent on the relocation of Futenma 
airfield to Nago," DPJ Secretary General Katsuya Okada explained in 
a press conference on July 24. However, Naoshima said yesterday: 
"The Guam relocation pact is in the form of a treaty between the two 
countries. If we change the course of action or do things in a 
different way just because there is a change of government, 
diplomacy will not function." 
 
Another DPJ member said. "We cannot touch security issues so easily. 
The LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) will find fault with us. That's 
like providing them with ammunition with which to attack us." The 
DPJ is divided over its security policy, and the LDP could use that 
as a weak point to attack. The DPJ member therefore stressed that 
 
TOKYO 00001722  014 OF 019 
 
 
the DPJ tried to constrain the LDP from attacking the DPJ. 
 
One DPJ officer explained: "When it comes to base issues, we will 
have to negotiate with the United States. We don't want our image to 
seem anti-U.S. for the first impression. For now, we will not 
clarify our attitude (to relocate Futenma airfield outside Okinawa 
Prefecture). This is an intentional strategy in order to start 
negotiations with the United States." 
 
Naoshima implied his consideration for the United States, saying: 
"The Japan-U.S. relationship is a cornerstone. This will not change 
(even if the DPJ comes into power). We will have to create a 
relationship of mutual trust with the Obama administration and will 
have to communicate with each other to avoid misunderstandings." 
 
(9) Relocation of Futenma outside of Okinawa, secret nuclear accord 
not in DPJ manifesto 
 
OKINAWA TIMES (Page 1) (Full) 
July 28, 2009 
 
Tokyo - The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) issued its manifesto 
(campaign pledges) for the House of Representatives election on July 
¶27. The policies on foreign affairs and defense, including policies 
on the U.S. military bases in Okinawa, follow those in the Policy 
Index 2009 published on July 23. Although the party claims that its 
position on the relocation of the Futenma Air Station outside of 
Okinawa remains unchanged, there is no mention of this issue in the 
manifesto. Regarding U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) realignment and the 
military bases, the DPJ says it will "suggest the revision of the 
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)" and "deal with this in the 
direction of a review." Except for the base issue, there is nothing 
in the document on Okinawa's economic development. 
 
"Secret agreement" also not included 
 
Policy Research Committee Chairman Masayuki Naoshima emphasized 
that, "Our basic thinking remains unchanged." He explained that the 
reason why the relocation of Futenma outside of Okinawa has not been 
written into the manifesto is that: "If you ask me whether that can 
be implemented immediately after the change of administration, the 
truth is it will be difficult," indicating that this matter will be 
discussed after building a relationship of trust between Japan and 
the U.S. 
 
On the question of reviewing USFJ realignment plans, Naoshima 
pointed out: "This is an agreement between governments. The 
relocation (of U.S. Marines in Okinawa) to Guam, in particular, is 
now a bilateral treaty. Diplomacy will not be viable if policies 
change with the change of administration." He made no mention of any 
concrete plans for the review. 
 
With regard to the lack of any mention of the "secret nuclear 
agreement" between Japan and the United States, Naoshima said: "The 
government still denies its existence. The facts are unclear. We 
will get a clear picture of the situation and make a decision after 
taking over the administration." 
 
Naoshima sought understanding for the foreign and defense policies 
in the manifesto, stating: "It is necessary to build trust between 
Japan and the U.S. and hold dialogue to avoid misunderstanding. Such 
is the basis of diplomacy. Therefore, the wording tends to be a bit 
 
TOKYO 00001722  015 OF 019 
 
 
subdued." 
 
In the manifesto, the DPJ calls for "building a close and equal 
relationship" between the two countries and says that Japan "will 
formulate an independent diplomatic strategy, engage in division of 
labor with the U.S., and fulfill Japan's responsibility 
positively." 
 
(10) Commentary: DPJ underscores "dialogue" in relations with U.S. 
in manifesto 
 
OKINAWA TIMES (Page 2) (Full) 
July 28, 2009 
 
Shogo Nishie, Tokyo Bureau 
 
Behind the decision not to mention the relocation of the Futenma Air 
Station outside of Okinawa in the manifesto (campaign pledges) for 
the House of Representatives election issued by the Democratic Party 
of Japan (DPJ) is the party's desire to put forward a "dialogue 
policy," instead of a "tough posture" in dealing with the U.S., 
which disapproves of changes in the policy on military bases. There 
is no denying that the process leading to serious discussions on 
these issues after building a relationship of trust between the two 
countries - how much time it will take, for instance - has not been 
defined. 
 
There is an opinion in the DPJ that Futenma's relocation outside of 
Okinawa is the party's standing policy, so there is no need to write 
this into the manifesto. Furthermore, some officials were defensive 
even before the manifesto was published, saying: "Non-inclusion (in 
the manifesto) does not mean that the policy will not be 
implemented." (mid-ranking Diet member) Therefore, "this is within 
the scope of what was expected." (government source) 
 
However, the absence of a concrete policy direction in the manifesto 
for a general election meant to choose the administration will be 
seen by the voters as a lack of will to implement the policy or the 
absence of such a policy posture. The DPJ will be put to an even 
tougher test in terms of how it will present plans for realizing 
policies and its governing ability from now on. 
 
On the other hand, diplomacy is not a one-way process. It is 
difficult to reach an agreement simply by asserting one's position. 
While a senior DPJ official says "it will not take much time" to 
review foreign policy, it is actually not easy to build an "equal 
Japan-U.S. relationship" as stated in the manifesto. The DPJ will be 
tested in terms of the administration's stance and its 
responsibility to explain to the people in the process of strategic 
negotiations with the U.S. in the future. 
 
(11) Reading the course of 2009 Lower House election; Point at issue 
in Okinawa: Differences in views on Futenma clear 
 
RYUKYU SHIMPO (Page 2) (Full) 
July 26, 2009 
 
With respect to the U.S. base issue, the ruling and opposition camps 
are split over the evaluation of the roadmap of the realignment of 
U.S. forces in Japan, which was agreed upon between Japan and the 
United States. In particular, a plan to build a facility replacing 
Futenma Air Station in the Henoko district in Nago is a strong point 
 
TOKYO 00001722  016 OF 019 
 
 
at issue in the Okinawa electoral district. The ruling bloc is 
promoting a plan to build a new base in Okinawa, while the 
opposition camp is against the idea of building a new base in 
Okinawa. Continuation of the realignment of U.S. forces with the 
continued existence of the LDP-New Komeito coalition, or its review 
due to a change of government? 
 
Public pledges of each political party regarding U.S. force 
realignment and the Status of Forces Agreement are drawing much 
attention. 
 
For the purpose of eliminating the danger of Futenma Air Station, 
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the New Komeito are 
promoting the plan to relocate it to Henoko within the prefecture 
rather than to a site outside the prefecture, a much more difficult 
task. The LDP Okinawa chapter's view is that it is ideal to move the 
air station out of the prefecture and that it was a painful decision 
to relocate it within the prefecture. A New Komeito prefectural 
headquarters source commented: "We have endorsed the governor's 
difficult decision to relocate the air station to a site within the 
prefecture." 
 
Meanwhile, the opposition camp is opposed to the idea of building a 
new base in the prefecture as running counter to the goal of 
reducing the excessive burden on Okinawa. But the opposition 
parties' responses vary, with one calling for relocation outside the 
prefecture or outside the country, and another insisting on the 
unconditional reversion of the air station. A person connected with 
the Social Democratic Party (SDP) Okinawa chapter took this view: 
"The (Japan-U.S.) agreement goes against the wishes of the people of 
Okinawa. We are determined to realize the popular will opposing the 
relocation." The Japanese Communist Party's (JCP) Okinawa chapter is 
calling for the unconditional reversion of the base, with one 
saying: "Reviewing the relocation plan is insufficient. Futenma Air 
station, which is most dangerous in the world, must be closed down 
immediately." The local Okinawa Social Mass Party says it is best to 
relocate the base abroad. The stance of the political group Sozo and 
the People's New Party Okinawa branch is that they would discuss a 
variety of options, including the base's integration into an 
existing facility in the prefecture and relocation to a site outside 
the prefecture or even outside the country. The Democratic Party of 
Japan (DPJ) Okinawa chapter is pointing to a place outside the 
prefecture, saying, "Okinawa does not need a base replacing Futenma 
Ari Station." But there is no mention of removing Futenma out of 
Okinawa in the DPJ's policy index for 2009, which will serve as the 
foundation for its manifesto. 
 
Every time an incident or accident occurs, the Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA) becomes an impediment, for instance, to detaining a 
U.S. serviceman believed to have committed (an incident or accident) 
or conducting environmental research on a base, preventing the 
prefectural government from taking the initiative in dealing with 
such situations. Although the prefectural government is calling for 
a drastic review of the SOFA, the central government's response has 
been confined to the realm of improving the operation of the pact. 
The call for a SOFA review has not made headway. 
 
All parties in the prefecture are calling for a revision to the 
SOFA. There are differences in views between the prefectural 
chapters of the ruling LDP and the New Komeito and their 
headquarters in Tokyo. Challenges lie ahead for them to come up with 
specific revision plans. The DPJ's Okinawa chapter is also insisting 
 
TOKYO 00001722  017 OF 019 
 
 
on moving Futenma out of the prefecture. Whether the DPJ will 
include such a plan in its manifesto remains to be seen. 
 
View of each party or party prefectural chapter about building 
Futenma replacement facility 
LDP Okinawa chapter SDP Okinawa branch JCP Okinawa committee New 
Komeito Okinawa headquarters 
Modify the plan premised on the relocation within the prefecture. 
Immediate, unconditional, and total reversion of the air station. 
Immediate closure and removal of the air station. Support the 
governor's decision to relocate the base in the prefecture. 
DPJ Okinawa chapter Okinawa Social Mass Party  Sozo People's New 
Party Okinawa branch 
Move the base out of the prefecture, including abroad Remove the 
base to a site outside Japan. Consider options, including the base's 
integration into an existing facility in the prefecture and its 
removal out of the country. Consider options, including the base's 
integration into an existing facility in the prefecture and its 
removal out of the country. 
 
(2009 Lower House election news-gathering team) 
 
(12) Pre-election poll on public trends 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Full) 
July 28, 2009 
 
Questions & Answers 
(Figures shown in percentage) 
 
Q: To what extent are you interested in the forthcoming general 
election for the House of Representatives? 
 
Very interested 46.8 (44.1) 
Somewhat interested 37.7 (38.7) 
Not very interested 12.8 (13.2) 
Not interested at all 2.5 (3.9) 
Don't know (D/K) + no answer (N/A) 0.2 (0.1) 
 
Q: Which political party's candidate are you going to vote for in 
your single-seat constituency in the general election? 
 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 16.1 (16.1) 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 31.7 (34.1) 
New Komeito (NK) 3.7 (2.8) 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 3.8 (2.1) 
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 1.1 (0.9) 
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 0.5 (0.1) 
Reform Club (RC or Kaikaku Kurabu) --- (---) 
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) --- --- 
Other political parties, groups --- --- 
Independent candidate 0.5 (1.7) 
None 2.5 (3.6) 
Undecided 38.8 (37.5) 
D/K+N/A 1.3 (1.1) 
 
Q: Which political party are you going to vote for in your 
proportional representation bloc? 
 
LDP 15.6 (15.6) 
DPJ 30.7 (36.2) 
NK 4.9 (4.2) 
 
TOKYO 00001722  018 OF 019 
 
 
JCP 5.0 (3.4) 
SDP 1.1 (1.2) 
PNP 0.9 (0.1) 
RC --- (---) 
NPN 0.1 (---) 
Other political parties, groups 0.1 (---) 
None 2.6 (3.4) 
Undecided 37.4 (34.7) 
D/K+N/A 1.6 (1.2) 
 
Q: What do you weigh the most when you vote in the general 
election? 
 
Social security, such as pension and healthcare 40.2 (40.9) 
Economy, job security 29.9 (30.7) 
Taxation, such as consumption tax 8.5 (8.4) 
Decentralization, administrative reform 7.5 (6.9) 
Constitutional reform 2.4 (1.9) 
Foreign relations, national security 3.1 (2.3) 
Politics and money 4.2 (4.4) 
Political heredity 1.0 (1.2) 
Other answers 1.0 (0.6) 
D/K+N/A 2.2 (2.7) 
 
Q: Are you going to vote in the forthcoming election? 
 
Yes for sure (including early voting) 73.1 (75.4) 
Yes if possible 22.4 (21.1) 
No 3.2 (3.0) 
D/K+N/A 1.3 (0.5) 
 
Q: What form of government would you like to see after the next 
general election? 
 
LDP-led coalition government 18.6 (14.8) 
DPJ-led coalition government 38.6 (39.3) 
LDP-DPJ grand coalition 11.6 (16.7) 
New framework through political realignment 19.4 (20.8) 
D/K+N/A 11.8 (8.4) 
 
Q: When comparing Prime Minister Taro Aso and DPJ President Yukio 
Hatoyama, who do you think is more appropriate for prime minister? 
 
Taro Aso 22.8 (21.0) 
Yukio Hatoyama 48.5 (48.4) 
D/K+N/A 28.7 (30.6) 
 
Q: Is there a political party you usually support? 
 
Yes 33.8 (32.1) 
No 65.1 (67.1) 
D/K+N/A 1.1 (0.8) 
 
Q: (Only for those who answered "yes" to the foregoing question) 
Then, which political party do you support? 
 
LDP 42.5 (47.8) 
DPJ 32.4 (31.0) 
NK 11.0 (8.9) 
JCP 10.0 (5.7) 
SDP 1.8 (3.8) 
PNP 0.5 (0.1) 
 
TOKYO 00001722  019 OF 019 
 
 
RC --- (---) 
NPN --- (---) 
Other political parties, groups --- (---) 
D/K+N/A 1.8 (2.7) 
 
 
Q: (Only for those who answered "no" to the foregoing question) If 
you were to support a political party, which political party would 
you like to choose? 
 
LDP 17.4 (18.0) 
DPJ 37.0 (43.1) 
NK 1.8 (1.8) 
JCP 2.8 (2.7) 
SDP 1.8 (1.4) 
PNP 1.7 (0.3) 
RC 0.1 (0.2) 
NPN 0.3 (---) 
Other political parties, groups --- (---) 
Still none 35.3 (31.4) 
D/K+N/A 1.8 (1.1) 
 
Q: Do you support the Aso cabinet? 
 
Yes 18.4 (20.6) 
No 71.4 (72.8) 
D/K+N/A 10.2 (6.6) 
 
Polling methodology: This survey was conducted across the nation on 
July 25-26 by Kyodo News Service on a computer-aided random digit 
dialing (RDD) basis. Among randomly generated telephone numbers, 
those actually for household use with one or more eligible voters 
totaled 1,768. Answers were obtained from 1,241 persons. 
 
ZUMWALT