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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 13 TOKYO 001632 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/17/09 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Campbell meets with Foreign Ministry officials to discuss N. 
Korean nuclear issue (Jiji) 
 
(2) U.S. assistant secretary of state indicates necessity to 
reconfirm significance of Japan-U.S. alliance (Asahi) 
 
(3) Professor proposes denuclearization negotiations with North 
Korea in stages (Mainichi) 
 
(4) IAEA director general-designate Amano calls on North Korea to 
return to Six-Party Talks at early date (Mainichi) 
 
(5) SDF scrambles against North Korean aircraft in April before its 
missile launches (Mainichi) 
 
(6) Editorial: Hatoyama statement a good chance to review three 
non-nuclear principles (Sankei) 
 
(7) DPJ willing to cooperate with NPOs in policymaking (Asahi) 
 
(8) SDP objects to DPJ President Hatoyama's remark on reviewing 
three no-nuclear principles, may become "source of dispute" in 
coalition government (Sankei) 
 
(9) Lower House election in aftermath of shock of Tokyo election 
(Part 3 - conclusion): DPJ senses apprehension about favorable wind; 
pork-barreling pressure also in DPJ (Nikkei) 
 
(10) JCP platform proposes policy cooperation with DPJ on 
issue-by-issue basis (Nikkei) 
 
(11) Researcher on Iran using "strategic ambiguity" on nuclear arms 
to enhance deterrence; Iran expected to become increasingly 
inflexible (Mainichi) 
 
(12) Sovereignty over Senkaku isles rests with Japan: U.S. Senator 
(Sankei) 
 
(13) Seiron column: Constraining desire and the Japan that knows 
"enough is enough" (Sankei) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Campbell meets with Foreign Ministry officials to discuss N. 
Korean nuclear issue 
 
JIJI (Online) (Full) 
July 17, 2009 (13:43) 
 
Visiting U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell met with the Foreign Ministry's Asian 
and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Director General Akitaka Saiki, North 
American Affairs Bureau Director General Kazuyoshi Umemoto, and 
Foreign Policy Bureau Director General Koro Bessho this morning at 
the Foreign Ministry. They are believed to have consulted on the 
U.S. nuclear umbrella and its deterrence in response to North 
Korea's recent nuclear test and missile launch. 
 
During the meeting, the two sides agreed that North Korea's nuclear 
development programs and its missile launches are a threat to 
 
TOKYO 00001632  002 OF 013 
 
 
(regional) security and unacceptable. They confirmed that Japan, the 
United States, and South Korea would continue their trilateral 
cooperation to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue. 
 
In addition, concerning the six-party talks on North Korea's 
denuclearization, the Japanese government is believed to have 
proposed reviewing an arrangement made to provide North Korea with 
fuel oil in return for disabling its nuclear facilities. 
 
After the meeting, Campbell paid a courtesy call on Foreign Minister 
Hirofumi Nakasone. Campbell, after winding up a series of meetings, 
told reporters: "We discussed all issues. We hope they will return 
to the six-party talks." 
 
(2) U.S. assistant secretary of state indicates necessity to 
reconfirm significance of Japan-U.S. alliance 
 
ASAHI ONLINE 
July 17, 2009 
 
Visiting U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell responded 
to an interview with an Asahi Shimbun reporter at the U.S. Embassy 
in Akasaka, Tokyo, today. In reference to Japan's proposal that 
Japan and the U.S. reconfirm the significance of the bilateral 
alliance on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the conclusion 
of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty next year, Campbell indicated the 
U.S. government's agreement with the Japanese view, remarking: "That 
seems to be a good idea." 
 
Japan is about to enter a politically unstable period as a change of 
government is taking on a touch of becoming a real possibility. In 
order to avoid the alliance from becoming less significant, Japan 
thinks it necessary to reconfirm the significance of the alliance. 
 
Japan and the U.S. reviewed their bilateral alliance in the 1990s, 
when the alliance as a setup in dealing with Soviet Union became 
meaningless following the collapse of the Cold-War structure. The 
two countries issued a Japan-U.S. joint declaration on security in 
1996 and renewed the guidelines for Japan-U.S. defense cooperation 
in 1997. 
 
Campbell cited these three points for reconfirmation: (1) the 
contribution of playing a key role in maintaining peace and 
stability in the Asia-Pacific region; (2) the examination of the 
present state; and (3) prospects for new challenges the alliance 
must deal with from now, such as global warming. 
 
The two countries are studying the possibility of President Barack 
Obama issuing some type of document, such as a declaration, when he 
visits Japan to attend the next session of the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum to be held next year. 
 
Regarding U.S. relations with Japan, in which a general election 
will be called soon, Campbell stated: 
 
"It is important for the U.S. to exchange views not only with 
officials of the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry but also 
with wide-ranging political parties and politicians. The U.S. is 
confident that it will be able to establish a solid relationship 
with Japan regardless of what type of government may be established 
in Japan." 
 
 
TOKYO 00001632  003 OF 013 
 
 
(3) Professor proposes denuclearization negotiations with North 
Korea in stages 
 
MAINICHI (Page 11) (Full) 
July 17, 2009 
 
Comments by Lee Jong Won, professor of international politics at 
Rikkyo University, as summarized by Masanori Hattori 
 
Normally, countries aspiring to become a nuclear power take the 
shortest route to possession of nuclear arms, but this is not the 
case with North Korea. It has been going back and forth between 
strengthening deterrence through the development of nuclear arms and 
using nuclear arms as a card in diplomatic negotiations. Its true 
motive is probably both the possession of nuclear arms and using 
this as a card to improve U.S.-DPRK relations. However, in reality, 
it does not have the capability to achieve both at the same time, so 
it has been zigzagging. 
 
A key to understanding the United States' stance toward North Korea 
from now on is the report issued by the think tank Center for a New 
American Security (CNAS), where the new Assistant Secretary of State 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell once served as the 
C.E.O. This report points out that regime change and the use of 
force are "illusions" and stresses the need for "strategic 
management" - preventing the following in the short-term: (1) 
transfer of nuclear technology from North Korea to other countries; 
(2) anxiety in the allies Japan and the ROK and regional nuclear 
proliferation; and (3) local conflicts - while working on 
denuclearization through multilateral frameworks and diplomacy in 
the long-term. 
 
The DPRK claims that it is a nuclear power, but the United States 
does not accept this. In reality, North Korea is not a nuclear power 
that possesses deployable nuclear weapons. What is needed now is a 
road map for comprehensive negotiations in stages to stop North 
Korea from becoming a nuclear power and make it commit to 
denuclearization. 
 
The U.S. has not been able to present a concrete and practicable 
plan for the improvement of bilateral relations in its negotiations 
so far, probably due to distrust of the DPRK and resistance at home. 
The following road map should be executed under the 
"action-for-action" principle to achieve: (1) conclusion of a peace 
agreement ending the Korean War; (2) improvement of U.S.-DPRK 
relations in stages (through talks and exchange of visits between 
senior officials, normalization of economic and trade relations, and 
ultimately normalization of diplomatic relations) and 
discontinuation of nuclear tests and the discarding of nuclear 
facilities; (3) verification of extracted plutonium; and (4) 
elimination of the DPRK's threat through the abandonment of nuclear 
arms and so forth. 
 
It is premature to conclude that North Korea has shifted in the 
direction of possessing nuclear arms irreversibly. The DPRK is a 
weak country surrounded by big regional powers like Japan and China. 
One aspect of its behavior is that it is resorting to intimidation 
out of a sense of isolation. The DPRK is different from Iran, a 
major power in the Middle East, on this point. It is still possible 
to realize policy change, not regime change, in North Korea by 
recognizing such "weakness" and using this as an incentive for 
improvement of relations. 
 
TOKYO 00001632  004 OF 013 
 
 
 
If the option of diplomatic negotiations is abandoned, the only 
other options are regime change, war, or an arms race. However, it 
is obvious that these will all destabilize the region. The use of 
force on the Korean peninsula will expose the ROK and U.S. Forces 
Korea to danger. China does not desire this, so this is not 
practical. 
 
There will probably be criticism that negotiation in stages based on 
this road map is merely "putting off the problem." However, it is 
also possible that internal changes may occur in North Korea in the 
process of reducing its nuclear capability. During the Cold War in 
Europe, the Helsinki Declaration (of 1975) on the coexistence of the 
East and West became a turning point that started exchanges between 
the two camps. The new wind from the outside eventually brought 
about internal changes in East Europe. Progress made in stages is 
not insignificant. 
 
(4) IAEA director general-designate Amano calls on North Korea to 
return to Six-Party Talks at early date 
 
MAINICHI (Page 2) (Full) 
July 17, 2009 
 
Takashi Sudo 
 
Yukiya Amano, Japan's ambassador to the Permanent Mission to the 
International Organizations in Vienna who will become the next 
director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
held a news conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 
¶16. With regard to North Korea's nuclear issue, Amano said: "We hope 
that the Six-Party Talks will resume as soon as possible, that there 
will be progress in the denuclearization process, and that the IAEA 
will begin its operations," urging the DPRK to return to the 
Six-Party Talks at an early date. 
 
Commenting on Iran's nuclear issue, Amano stated: "Iran claims that 
(its nuclear activities) are for peaceful purposes, but it has 
little international credibility. We would like to obtain its 
cooperation on the implementation of UN Security Council 
resolutions," stressing that he hopes for Iran's voluntary 
cooperation. 
 
Regarding the concept of a nuclear fuel bank for the stable supply 
of fuel for nuclear power generation, which is being discussed at 
the IAEA, Amano indicated a cautious stance: "It is not advisable to 
proceed too hastily." 
 
(5) SDF scrambles against North Korean aircraft in April before its 
missile launches 
 
MAINICHI (Page 2) (Full) 
July 17, 2009 
 
The Defense Ministry Joint Staff Office on July 16 announced that an 
Air-Defense Force (ASDF) aircraft scrambled against an unidentified 
aircraft that was presumably a North Korean aircraft heading toward 
Japan in early April, a time when that nation launched missiles, 
which went over Japan. This is Japan's first scramble against North 
Korean aircraft in 10 years since a suspicious vessel case that 
occurred off Noto Peninsula. At the time, two SDF Aegis ships were 
deployed in the Sea of Japan. The unidentified aircraft was 
 
TOKYO 00001632  005 OF 013 
 
 
presumably collecting intelligence and engaging in warning and 
surveillance activity. 
 
According to the Joint Staff Office, the unidentified aircraft 
approaching Japan's territorial airspace and flying beyond the air 
defense identification zone (ADIZ), an act that requires prior 
notification to Japan, was confirmed by radar several times over 
several days before the missile launches on April 5. ASDF aircraft 
took off from JASDF Komatsu Airbase in Ishikawa Prefecture for eight 
times in total to scramble against the unidentified aircraft. 
 
Since the unidentified aircraft headed back over the Sea of Japan, 
the ASDF was unable to see it or take photos of it. However, it was 
confirmed from radar records that the aircraft took off from and 
landed on a North Korean base. 
 
(6) Editorial: Hatoyama statement a good chance to review three 
non-nuclear principles 
 
SANKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
July 17, 2009 
 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) President Yukio Hatoyama has 
indicated his intention to hold talks with the United States 
regarding the three non-nuclear principles (of not producing, not 
possessing, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons 
into Japan), including a review of the principle of not permitting 
the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. 
 
Triggered by remarks by a former vice-foreign minister and others, a 
heated debate is underway on a "secret nuclear pact." It can be said 
that Hatoyama's call for "thorough discussions," based on new 
realities, carries great significance. 
 
We hope that his statement will prompt the ruling and opposition 
parties to earnestly discuss the nuclear threat from North Korea and 
the modalities of the expansion of the deterrent (nuclear umbrella). 
Whether or not all the three nonnuclear principles are fit for 
reality must be examined regularly. 
 
Reportedly, Japan and the United States have made a secret deal to 
exempt port calls and passage through Japanese territorial waters by 
nuclear-armed U.S. warships from prior consultations. Throughout the 
Cold War era, Japan entrusted its security to the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella. It can be said that behind the past governments' decision 
not to disclose the existence of the pact concerning the 
introduction of nuclear weapons, political wisdom has dictated 
striking a balance between nuclear deterrence and the ideal of 
nuclear abolition. 
 
But ever since the United States adopted in 1992 the policy of not 
having its warships carry nuclear weapons with the exception of 
strategic nuclear-powered submarines, the pact has been a dead 
letter, losing its effectiveness. 
 
Despite that, arguments by some media and opposition parties have 
always revolved around the existence or nonexistence of the secret 
pact in connection with the (1974) LaRoque remarks and the (1981) 
Reischauer statement. The government, too, has avoided discussing 
the essentials of the three principles by just denying the existence 
of the pact. 
 
 
TOKYO 00001632  006 OF 013 
 
 
The bottom line is that the nuclear umbrella provided as part of the 
Japan-U.S. security setup has been Japan's ultimate security means. 
 
The emergence of new threats, such as North Korea's nuclear and 
missile tests, has resulted in uncertainty in Japan and South Korea 
and shaken their trust in the ultimate deterrent. There is even a 
view to discuss such approaches as sharing nuclear weapons between 
Japan and the United States and possessing nuclear weapons 
independently as a means to strengthen the deterrent. 
 
In view of this new situation, it is natural to review the principle 
of not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons. The Sankei 
Shimbun, too, has long called for a review of this principle because 
the nuclear deterrent does not work when port calls and passage 
through Japanese territorial waters are rejected. 
 
Hatoyama said, "A conclusion must be reached after conducting 
thorough discussions between Japan and the United States with an eye 
on the future." We hope the conviction behind this statement will 
not waver. In addition to talks with the United States, we want to 
see the ruling and opposition camps begin essential discussions at 
the Diet. Such actions will lead to an enhanced Japan-U.S. 
alliance. 
 
(7) DPJ willing to cooperate with NPOs in policymaking 
 
ASAHI (Page 4) (Full) 
July 17, 2009 
 
The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has decided to establish a 
system to formulate policies in cooperation with nonprofit 
organizations (NPO), with an eye on a change of government. By 
promoting the use of vitality in the private sector, the DPJ is 
aiming to put an end to the current bureaucracy-led policymaking 
system and to build a society that emphasizes lateral social 
relations. 
 
More than 300 persons linked to NPOs participated in "a meeting 
between citizen power and the DPJ" held at DPJ headquarters on July 
¶14. Policy Research Council Chairman Masayuki Naoshima said in the 
meeting: "We would like to steadily implement (policies) in 
cooperation with NPOs as the main provider of public interests." 
 
The DPJ has been promoting exchanges of views with citizens at a 
discussion panel the party set up. Once the DPJ takes over the reins 
of government, it intends to set up sector-specific committees with 
NPOs and deepen their relations. In a meeting of the panel on July 
14, a representative from an organization said: "We would like to be 
involved in every process of government, including the planning and 
implementing of official development assistance (ODA) projects." 
 
In the party head talks in May, DPJ President Hatoyama emphasized: 
"We will shed light on areas that have been pushed aside so far, 
such as volunteer and NPO activities." The DPJ intends to include in 
its manifesto for the upcoming House of Representatives election 
measures to increase donation deductions and designated NPO 
corporations. 
 
Under the designated NPO corporation system introduced in 2001, the 
number of organizations recognized as corporations is still small, 
so the DPJ intends to take measures to strengthen the foundations of 
NPO operations. The party intends to speed up authorization and 
 
TOKYO 00001632  007 OF 013 
 
 
other necessary procedures, and enhance the credibility of such NPO 
corporations by promoting information disclosure. 
 
The DPJ cites cost cuts as one of the main reasons for its 
willingness to approach NPOs. Focusing on this motive, Chiaki 
Matsubara, secretary of the NPO group C's, said: "It is improper for 
the government, with the aim of reducing costs, to approach NPOs as 
if they were subcontractors." It probably will become necessary for 
NPOs to consider how to ensure their autonomous nature in 
implementing activities. 
 
(8) SDP objects to DPJ President Hatoyama's remark on reviewing 
three no-nuclear principles, may become "source of dispute" in 
coalition government 
 
SANKEI (Page 5) (Full) 
July 17, 2009 
 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) President Yukio Hatoyama has created 
a stir with his remark that review of the three no-nuclear 
principles will be discussed with the United States after his party 
takes over the administration. Secretary General Yasumasa Shigeno of 
the Social Democratic Party (SDP), with which the DPJ hopes to form 
a coalition after assuming power, stated at a news conference on 
July 16: "There are various conditions for joining the coalition 
government. I don't think it is appropriate to negate an issue near 
and dear to us just like that," warning in strong terms that this 
may affect negotiations to form a coalition after the House of 
Representatives election. 
 
The SDP upholds strict adherence to the three no-nuclear principles 
in its manifesto (campaign pledges) issued on July 16. This has 
served to underscore the gap between the two parties on foreign and 
security policy matters. 
 
Shigeno voiced this criticism: "The three no-nuclear principles 
constitute a basic national policy for Japan, the only atomic-bombed 
country. This is a serious problem." He added the remonstration 
that, "If he intends to become the prime minister in the near 
future, he should realize that the prime minister's statements carry 
much weight." SDP deputy leader Seiji Mataichi also criticized 
Hatoyama: "(Mr Hatoyama) makes too many statements that cause 
misunderstanding. If he had said 'we will abide by the three 
no-nuclear principles,' there would be no problem." 
 
Many DPJ members are careful about provoking the SDP on policy 
issues because "even if we control a majority in the Lower House 
after the election, we cannot maintain a majority in the House of 
Councillors without the cooperation of the SDP and other parties." 
(senior DPJ official) One senior party official expressed his 
displeasure with Hatoyama's statement on July 16: "He makes too many 
unnecessary remarks before the election. Even if that is really how 
he feels, he should just keep quiet." 
 
(9) Lower House election in aftermath of shock of Tokyo election 
(Part 3 - conclusion): DPJ senses apprehension about favorable wind; 
pork-barreling pressure also in DPJ 
 
NIKKEI (Page 1) (Abridged slightly) 
July 16, 2009 
 
Taking a side glance at the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which 
 
TOKYO 00001632  008 OF 013 
 
 
has been in disarray, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is in its 
prime. DPJ junior lawmakers, who are taking to the streets in their 
home constituencies, are feeling a favorable wind for them as they 
felt in recent local elections. 
 
The DPJ has 112 House of Representatives seats. Election Campaign 
Committee Chairman Hirotaka Akamatsu openly expressed the 
possibility that the DPJ will secure "249 seats if I may humbly 
predict" in the next Lower House election. The 249 seats exceed a 
majority of the Lower House. 
 
As the possibility of the DPJ taking over the reins of government 
moves closer to reality, the party's internal strife has slipped 
into the shadows. The DPJ has been watching the political brouhaha 
coolly, but risky factors lurk behind the driving force of the DPJ. 
 
 
At a standing officers council meeting on July 7, a lawmaker who is 
close to Deputy President Ichiro Ozawa questioned: "What does it 
mean in three years' time?" The lawmaker posed this question because 
he had found out that the DPJ's manifesto for the next general 
election stipulated that an income compensation system for 
individual farming households would be implemented in fiscal 2012. 
This is the very showcase policy that forced the ruling camp to lose 
a majority in the House of Councillors in the 2007 election. 
 
Secretary General Katsuya Okada explained to the lawmaker, saying: 
"We should prioritize our policies. There is a limited amount of 
fiscal resources." However, the lawmaker rebutted: 
 
"My electoral district is in a prefecture in which there are many 
farmers. We should tell voters we will implement it when we take the 
reins of government. If we say in three years' time, they think the 
DPJ lacks drive." 
 
Although Okada got control of the situation, he is increasingly 
drawing criticism within the DPJ. 
 
With regard to scrapping the provisional gasoline tax rate, 
President Yukio Hatoyama calls for immediate abolition, while Okada 
asserts that the rate should be scrapped in two years' time. Okada 
eventually agreed to completely scrap the gasoline tax rate 
immediately after the DPJ assumes political helm. 
 
In exchange for the immediate abolition of the provisional tax 
rates, the payment of child allowance would be halved for two years. 
A total amount of 20.5 trillion yen of necessary expenditures for 
four years from fiscal 2010 would be reduced to 16.8 trillion yen. 
 
Although the DPJ, which is concerned about being criticized as 
engaged in old-fashioned pork-barreling, plays up its realistic 
approaches, the party plans to appropriate seven trillion yen in 
fiscal 2010 for such measures as removing part of highway tolls and 
free high-school education. A senior Policy Research Committee 
member said: "With an eye on the Upper House election in the summer 
of 2010, we want voters to feel the change of government." 
 
If the DPJ, which does not hold a majority of the Upper House, wins 
a single-party majority in the Lower House in the next general 
election, it will not be able to enact any bills without the 
cooperation of the Social Democratic Party and New People's New 
Party. 
 
TOKYO 00001632  009 OF 013 
 
 
 
"Mr. Ozawa? I think the position of secretary general is most 
suitable for him," said one member of the group (of about 50 
members) led by Deputy President Ichiro Ozawa. Ozawa has made 
efforts to support new-face candidates as official responsible for 
election strategy. It is said that the number of members in the 
Ozawa group will be about 100 after the Lower House election. 
 
A senior DPJ member, who has distanced himself from Ozawa, is 
worried, noting: "If nothing is done, the DPJ will actually be 
controlled by Ozawa." 
 
The DPJ has gained support of the public by denying LDP-style 
politics. Some DPJ members are now aware of LDP-style practices that 
have appeared in their party. Will a favorable political wind 
continue to blow for the DPJ? Voters will make a judgment. 
 
(10) JCP platform proposes policy cooperation with DPJ on 
issue-by-issue basis 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Abstracted) 
July 17, 2009 
 
In a press conference yesterday, Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 
Chairman Kazuo Shii announced the party's basic platform for the 
upcoming House of Representatives election. The platform stresses 
its willingness to become a constructive opposition party and to 
offer cooperation on policies acceptable for the party on an 
issue-by-issue basis if a government led by the Democratic Party of 
Japan (DPJ) is launched after the Lower House election. Bearing in 
mind the fact that the DPJ won a tremendous victory in the latest 
Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election and that the JCP lost its 
seats, the JCP revised it conventional stance of criticizing the DPJ 
as having the same qualities as the ruling parties. 
 
Shii said: 
 
"With the voters' judgment in the Tokyo election, a new political 
phase has emerged. There is a growing possibility that a government 
led by the DPJ will be inaugurated. We think it is necessary to take 
an appropriate attitude to fit the new situation." 
 
In the Tokyo election, the JCP decreased its seats from 13 to 8. 
Shii added: 
 
"We will propose measures on each issue in a positive manner and 
offer cooperation in implementing agreed measures on an 
issue-by-issue basis. We will play the role of a promoter but also 
play the role of a breakwater when the government goes in the wrong 
direction." 
 
The basic platform emphasizes: "We are determined to elicit a 
decisive judgment in the next general election to have the Liberal 
Democratic Party and the New Komeito hand over the reins of 
government and not to allow them to form a grand coalition." In 
reference to relations with a DPJ government, the platform proposes 
that the party would explore ways for cooperation on each agenda 
item, such as a revision of the Worker Dispatch Law, and also notes 
that if specific measures to raise the consumption tax or revise the 
Constitution are put forward, the party will try to obstruct them. 
 
The JCP fielded candidates in all 300 single-seat constitutions in 
 
TOKYO 00001632  010 OF 013 
 
 
past Lower House elections in principle, but it will put up 152 
candidates in the upcoming election. It will place emphasis on the 
proportional representation segment. The number of constituencies in 
which LDP and DPJ candidates engage in a one-on-one fight is 
expected to increase in the election. The LDP is concerned that the 
votes for the JCP might go to the DPJ. 
 
(11) Researcher on Iran using "strategic ambiguity" on nuclear arms 
to enhance deterrence; Iran expected to become increasingly 
inflexible 
 
MAINICHI (Page 11) (Full) 
July 17, 2009 
 
Comments by Koichiro Tanaka, director of JIME Center, Institute of 
Energy Economics, Japan, as summarized by Ken Uzuka 
 
Looking back at the UN Security Council's economic sanctions in the 
past two and a half years, the reality is that Iran has expanded its 
uranium enrichment, built heavy- water reactors, and proceeded 
steadily with its nuclear development program. 
 
The Iranian government claims that due to the 9 percent annual 
increase in electric energy consumption, it wants to build some 20 
commercial nuclear reactors in the future. The international 
community is not concerned about the civilian use of nuclear 
reactors but fears that the production of plutonium and uranium 
enrichment at the heavy-water reactors may lead to the development 
of nuclear weapons. The Iranians give the explanation that the 
heavy-water reactors will be used to obtain isotopes for medical and 
other purposes, and uranium enrichment is meant to obtain fuel for 
light-water reactors. If the Iranian facilities accept inspections 
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime and 
monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of 
fissile materials, it is practically impossible for these facilities 
and equipment to be converted for military use. 
 
The U.S. and Israel suspect that Iran has secret nuclear facilities 
and undeclared fissile materials and might suddenly withdraw from 
the NPT and plunge into the manufacture of nuclear weapons. However, 
Iran has consistently denied any intentions to produce nuclear arms. 
Unless the U.S. or Israel launches a military attack, it will 
probably not take precipitous action. 
 
Even if the purpose of Iran's nuclear development is for energy, its 
secondary objective is to maintain ambiguity on nuclear arms while 
indicating it possesses the capability to develop such weapons. Such 
"strategic ambiguity" has a deterrence effect. This is a completely 
different approach from North Korea, which has been showing off its 
development of nuclear arms for intimidation. 
 
The U.S. once suspected Iraq of possessing weapons of mass 
destruction (WMDs), forced it to declare everything, and eventually 
waged war in 2003. Iran believes that the U.S. toppled Iraq in full 
awareness that Iraq did not have WMDs from inspections by the United 
Nations and other bodies. As long as Iran perceives the U.S. and 
Israel as a security threat, it will not be possible to ask it to 
declare everything. 
 
Even after the turmoil following the presidential election, Iran 
will probably pursue its nuclear development. Meanwhile, President 
Mahmud Ahmadi-Nejad suspects that the U.S. and the European 
 
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countries were behind the political upheaval, and obviously, he will 
be even more inflexible in future nuclear negotiations. The 
six-nation framework consisting of the five permanent UN Security 
Council (UNSC) members and Germany is not expected to be effective, 
and negotiations will consist mainly of direct talks between the 
U.S. and Iran. U.S. President Barack Obama will have to defer 
dialogue since the legitimacy of the second Ahmadi-Nejad 
administration is questionable. Even if President Obama disregards 
doubts about the legitimacy of the election results, he will face 
pressure from Congress. A cooling off period of one to two months is 
probably necessary. 
 
We would like to first watch the inauguration of President 
Ahmadi-Nejad for his second term in July and what he will do at the 
UN General Assembly in September. Another key point is what the U.S. 
is going to do about the "state of national emergency with respect 
to Iran" expiring in November. The state of emergency was first 
declared after the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was seized in 1979. Unless 
the United States compromises, Iran will regard this as the 
"continuation of a hostile act," and this will make dialogue even 
more difficult. 
 
(12) Sovereignty over Senkaku isles rests with Japan: U.S. Senator 
 
SANKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
July 17, 2009 
 
Yoshihisa Komori, Washington 
 
Former Navy Secretary Jim Webb, an influential Senator close to the 
Obama administration, stated in a July 15 congressional hearing on 
territorial disputes that the United States has already recognized 
Japan's sovereignty over the archipelago of Senkaku isles. The U.S. 
government in recent years seemed to have avoided declaring that 
far. In the hearing, however, an expert stated that the United 
States returned Okinawa and the Senkaku isles to Japan after the war 
and it is therefore natural to say the United States has recognized 
Japan's sovereignty over the Senkakus. 
 
Democrat Senator Webb is close to President Obama and is an 
influential policy promoter in the Senate for the Obama 
administration. 
 
The Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs held a hearing that day on maritime territorial disputes in 
Asia. Webb, who chairs the subcommittee, presided over the hearing. 
In his opening remarks, Webb critically took up China's sovereignty 
claims in the South China Sea and in the East China Sea. He stated: 
"Despite Japan's control over the Senkaku Islands since the end of 
World War II-and the recognition by others, including the United 
States, of Japan's sovereignty over these islands-China still claims 
publicly its sovereignty over the Senkakus." 
 
The U.S. government basically takes a neutral stance on territorial 
disputes between other countries. The Obama administration's 
predecessors in recent years admitted that the Japan-U.S. Security 
Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands. Even so, the impression is 
strong that they had avoided declaring sovereignty over the 
Senkakus. 
 
Richard Cronin, a researcher at the Stimson Center, is familiar with 
China's moves in Southeast Asia. Cronin testified before the 
 
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subcommittee and supported Webb's view, stating: "The State 
Department has so far taken a basic principle of nonintervention in 
territorial disputes in general. That is probably why the State 
Department has avoided saying anything definite about the Senkaku 
Islands as well. However, we can say the Senkaku Islands are 
special, because the U.S. government returned the Senkaku Islands as 
well as Okinawa." 
 
Peter Dutton, who is a professor at the Naval War College and 
familiar with China's ocean policy, also testified before the 
subcommittee and stressed that China's territorial claim over the 
Senkaku isles is weak-grounded, stating: "Territorial rights are 
based on effective rule and monopolistic control over that region. 
When it comes to the Senkaku Islands, however, China does not 
satisfy these two conditions, so its sovereignty claim is weak." 
 
(13) Seiron column: Constraining desire and the Japan that knows 
"enough is enough" 
 
SANKEI (Page 7) (Abridged slightly) 
July 17, 2009 
 
By Iwao Nakatani, Director of the Mitsubishi UFJ Research & 
Consulting 
 
The G-8 summit meeting held in Italy (L'Aquila Summit) is now over. 
The major features of the meeting this time were that the world has 
realized that it is impossible for the G-8 to settle global problems 
on its own and that the G-14 and the G-20 that include emerging 
countries have significantly increased their identity. 
 
The world has definitely taken a step forward from the age of 
one-nation hegemonism centered on the U.S. and the age centered on 
industrialized countries to a multi-polar world, where emerging 
countries exercise greater influence. 
 
The problem is whether expanding the summit to a G-14 or G-20 level 
will settle difficult problems challenging the world. It appears 
that if the G-20, which accounts for nearly 90 percent of world GDP 
can come up with effective settlement measures in concert, 
international crises can certainly be solved. If that is the case, 
we can pin hopes on the world in the 21st century. 
 
However, the situation is not that easy. First, it is highly 
inefficient to decide matters, based on a council-like system. Since 
various countries' interests are at odds over many issues, it would 
become even more difficult to settle key issues. For instance, 
industrialized countries and developing countries are at odds over a 
numerical target to cut carbon dioxide by 2050. The G-8 summit 
failed to set a specific target. 
 
Thorny issue of state egoism 
 
It is the state that decides on policies in the modern world, where 
nationalism is a dominant ideology. Each country deals with domestic 
problems through its own decision-making process. However, when it 
comes to cross-border issues, such as the global environment issue, 
the poverty issue, approaches to the collapse of the bubble economy 
and the handling of such issues as energy and high food prices, 
countries must rely on the formation of consensus at such settings 
as the G-14 or the G-20. 
 
 
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Or, such international agencies as the UN, the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank will have to deal with those 
problems. 
 
However, there are no international talks that guarantee consensus 
building. Consensuses formed at such settings are not often legally 
binding. International agencies, such as the UN, do not have 
sufficient decision-making ability. The fundamental reason for that 
is priority is given to state egoism. 
 
Jacques Attali in his recent work titled "Une Breve Histoire de 
L'avenir" (The Japanese title is 21-seiki no rekishi = the history 
of the 21st century) predicts the future of the world. He is very 
pessimistic about the immediate future of the world, predicting that 
global capitalism will continue to run amok for the next several 
decades, making such global issues as water and energy shortages, 
high food prices and the destruction of the global environment more 
serious. He says that this could trigger great migrations of 
thousands of people beyond national borders and international 
disputes. The worst scenario is that a country that has fallen into 
a hopeless situation might use a nuclear weapon. In that event, 
humans would suffer a devastating blow. 
 
Jacques Attali's prediction 
 
Is it possible to thwart a situation like this? Attali views it is 
impossible to do so for the time being. That is because, he says, as 
long as state egoism and endless desire of individuals behind it is 
accepted, overall harmony would be treated as a secondary matter. 
Unless individuals realize that constraining their desire and 
contributing to the happiness of other people is in fact the only 
way for them to become happy, humans cannot but plunge into the era 
of a "super-conflict." 
 
"Constraining their desire is the very way humans should be" has 
long been the basis of the Eastern religions, starting with 
Buddhism. However, the Western sense of values that introduced 
market principles, which approve individuals' desire, has dominated 
the world in the history we have followed. Needless to say, this has 
significantly improved the global standard of living. However, if 
excessive capitalism is to lead the world to disruption in the world 
of the 21st century, the only way to rescue the world from the ruin 
would be for humans to learn ways to constrain their desire and 
implement such. 
 
I do not know to what extent Attali's prediction is correct. 
However, I have no doubt that a clue to settling problems can be 
found in the philosophically fundamental theme of how to constrain 
human desire. Perhaps the writer is not the only one who expects 
Japan to be able to contribute in this regard, as it used to have a 
cultural tradition of "enough is 'as good as a feast.' 
 
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