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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 16 TOKYO 001625 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/16/09 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Imperial couple lay wreath at National Memorial Cemetery of the 
Pacific in Hawaii (Nikkei) 
 
(2) Signatures demanding general meeting of LDP Diet members 
submitted; Aso: "I will not run away or hide" (Yomiuri) 
 
(3) Conflict over joint plenary meeting intensifying between Aso 
group, anti-Aso group in LDP (Nikkei) 
 
(4) Many LDP members discontented with Aso (Sankei) 
 
(5) BOJ unable to come up with exit strategy: "Anxieties about the 
economy cannot be dispelled" (Yomiuri) 
 
(6) SDP secretary general criticizes DPJ Hatoyama's remark on three 
nonnuclear principles (Jiji Press) 
 
(7) Hatoyama's personal view on three nonnuclear principles causes a 
stir, leaves DPJ behind (Asahi) 
 
(8) Ex-Finance Minister Shiokawa: Debate security policy openly in 
general election (Sankei) 
 
(9) Right of individual self-defense becoming meaningless (Sankei) 
 
(10) Okinawa governor omits asking Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Gregson for closure of Futenma Air Station in three years (Ryukyu 
Shimpo) 
 
(11) U.S. assistant secretary of defense negative on returning 
Torishima at meeting with governor (Okinawa Times) 
 
(12) Gist of U.S. assistant secretary of defense's news conference: 
Watching environmental assessment; current realignment plan short 
cut to burden reduction (Okinawa Times) 
 
(13) Wife of U.S. assistant secretary of defense to serve as adviser 
to preparatory foundation for new international school in Okinawa 
(Okinawa Times) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Imperial couple lay wreath at National Memorial Cemetery of the 
Pacific in Hawaii 
 
NIKKEI -ONLINE (Full) 
12:01, July 16, 2009 
 
Bunta Tsunehiro, Honolulu 
 
The Emperor and Empress, who are visiting Hawaii, paid a visit to 
the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific (known as the 
Punchbowl) for a wreath-laying ceremony on the morning of July 15 
(morning of July 16, Japan time). This was the first visit by the 
Imperial couple to the Punchbowl since June 1994. 
 
More than 50,000 U.S. soldiers, including victims of the Pearl 
Harbor attack by the Japanese Imperial Army and those killed during 
World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War, and their 
families are buried at the Punchbowl. 
 
TOKYO 00001625  002 OF 016 
 
 
 
The Emperor and Empress were greeted with a 21-gun salute before 
they approached the platform for wreath-laying. The Emperor walked 
slowly to the platform in the downpour to offer a wreath of white 
and yellow flowers, while the Empress straightened the ribbon on the 
wreath. They then bowed and offered a silent prayer from about 30 
seconds. Later, they signed the memorial book. 
 
(2) Signatures demanding general meeting of LDP Diet members 
submitted; Aso: "I will not run away or hide" 
 
YOMIURI ONLINE (Full) 
12:47, July 16, 2009 
 
At a news conference in the morning of July 16, Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Takeo Kawamura commented on the signatures submitted by 
former Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Secretary General Hidenao 
Nakagawa and others demanding convening a general meeting of LDP 
members of both houses of the Diet. He said: "Prime Minister Aso 
will deal with this once (the party leadership) makes a decision," 
indicating that Aso intends to attend the meeting. 
 
Regarding the demand to reschedule the House of Representatives 
election, Kawamura indicated that this would be difficult to do, 
since "the prime minister has announced the date of Diet 
dissolution, and an agreement has been reached between the ruling 
parties." 
 
According to a senior government official, the prime minister said 
in the morning, "I will not run away or hide." He intends to attend 
the general meeting of Diet members if a decision is made to hold 
the meeting. 
 
(3) Conflict over joint plenary meeting intensifying between Aso 
group, anti-Aso group in LDP 
 
NIKKEI (Page 3) (Full) 
July 16, 2009 
 
Tension is running high in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). 
Former secretary general Hidenao Nakagawa has insisted on the need 
to drastically change the voters' sentiment. Nakagawa and some other 
members said they have collected enough signatures from lawmakers to 
hold an official joint plenary meeting of the party's members of 
both Houses of the Diet. Some members of major factions in the party 
have begun to call on the government to reexamine why the party 
suffered consecutive losses in the recent major local elections. 
Prime Minister Taro Aso and party executive members are eagerly 
trying to calm down the situation. Aso intends to go ahead with his 
plan to dissolve the Lower House on July 21, but it remains to be 
seen if the plan will be actually carried out. 
 
Speaking before reporters last night, Nakagawa proudly said: "We 
gathered more than 130 signatures. State Minister for Economic and 
Fiscal Policy Yosano and Agriculture Minister Shigeru Ishiba also 
offered their signatures." In order to open a joint plenary meeting, 
at least one third of all LDP lawmakers, or 128 signatures, must be 
collected. Initially, junior members of a conference set up by 
former chief cabinet secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki and other 
mid-ranking officials to prepare a new manifesto launched a 
signature campaign, but they gathered no more than 60 signatures or 
so. 
 
TOKYO 00001625  003 OF 016 
 
 
 
Yesterday, 17 more party members, including Nakagawa and Executive 
Council Deputy Chairman Hajime Funada, joined the junior members to 
collect signatures. Nakagawa and others stayed in a Tokyo hotel from 
the afternoon and made phone calls to lawmakers who were back to 
their electoral districts, in an effort to gather more signatures. 
 
Voices calling for summing up the party's consecutive election 
losses have began to be heard even among main faction members. The 
secretaries general of eight factions, including the Aso faction, 
agreed in their morning meeting that the party should hold a joint 
plenary meeting or another key decision-making panel meeting by the 
end of this week. Secretary General Hiroyuki Hosoda just replied: 
"Let me think of it." 
 
Members in major factions think that they might have no choice but 
to see the Diet dissolved under Prime Minister Aso. They have, in a 
sense, different dreams in the same bed with Nakagawa's group 
members, who are calling for Aso's voluntary resignation. But most 
of them share the view that they cannot initiate a campaign for the 
Lower House election before the prime minister reexamines the 
party's consecutive losses in the recent major local elections. A 
senior New Komeito member also said as though he were rejecting Aso: 
"The prime minister's responsibility for having delayed the election 
should be pursued." 
 
The party leadership is in a great quandary over how they should 
respond to such views. In a meeting of LDP lawmakers on July 14, Aso 
and Hosoda said the party would hold a meeting to sum up the 
elections, but they had in mind meetings that have no right to 
decide, such as a meeting of lawmakers or a bloc-specific 
conference. They intended to set up an arena for lawmakers to 
express their dissatisfaction. 
 
A joint plenary meeting is the second major decision-making panel 
meeting following a party convention. A plenary meeting has the 
authority to determine key items, such as a change in the party 
rules. If the Aso group and the anti-Aso group engage in mutual 
criticism, the intraparty fissure will come to light and such a 
state will inevitably have a negative impact on the next Lower House 
election. A senior LDP member said: "It is highly probable that the 
anti-Aso group may submit a motion calling on the government to move 
up the party presidential election and obtain approval from a 
majority of all party members (in the event that a joint plenary 
meeting is held)." 
 
Aso just told reporters at the Prime Minister's Official Residence 
last evening: "The secretary general will decide on what response 
the government should make." But he appears to have instructed the 
party leadership that a joint meeting must absolutely not be held. 
 
The anti-Aso camp has also no potential candidate who can draw 
public attention to succeed Aso. If Aso dissolves the Lower House on 
July 21 as he announced, it will become impossible to hold a 
presidential election. Some take the view that time has run out for 
"the Aso-dumping moves," but the conflict in the LDP is showing no 
signs abating. 
 
(4) Many LDP members discontented with Aso 
 
SANKEI (Page 3) (Abridged slightly) 
July 15, 2009 
 
TOKYO 00001625  004 OF 016 
 
 
 
Election Strategy Council Chairman Koga's resolution to resign: LDP 
to lose election strategist 
 
The aftershock following the crushing defeat of the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) in the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election 
and Prime Minister Taro Aso's plan to dissolve the House of 
Representatives (on July 21) continued to reverberate in the party 
on July 14, as well. Just when there were signs the move to seek 
Aso's resignation would soon quiet down, Election Strategy Council 
Chairman Makoto Koga's sudden announcement of his intention to 
resign gave another great shock to LDP members. Koga is the LDP's 
chief election strategist. Aso intends to refuse to accept the 
resignation. Because of the continuous squabbles in the LDP, more 
and more voters are breaking away from the LDP. 
 
"The secretary general does not have responsibility for the defeats 
in local elections, but the responsibility lies on me," said Koga in 
a deep threatening voice at a LDP General Council meeting held at 
noon July 14 in the Diet building. While participants were falling 
quiet, Secretary General Hiroyuki Sonoda, who was sitting next to 
Koga, said: "Well, well ..." Koga left his seat in silence and did 
not return. 
 
The atmosphere at the General Council meeting was unusual from the 
beginning. Five junior lawmakers, including Lower House member 
Yukari Sato, who are not council members, attended the session. 
Participants criticized the party leadership in succession. Former 
Secretary General Koichi Kato said: "I can't understand the fact 
that Lower House dissolution was decided so easily. Tsutomu Takebe, 
another former secretary general, also said: "The major 
responsibility for our party's loss in the Tokyo assembly poll lies 
with the party executives." They were apparently trying to stall the 
meeting. 
 
Koga did not reveal his real intention for his startling decision: 
had he exhausted his patience, was trying to protect Aso, or was 
there a deeper meaning? However, he calmly told the press corps: "It 
is only natural for me to quit. However, I have one condition for my 
resignation: that is to carry out the election following the 
schedule Prime Minister Taro Aso decided." 
 
With the day for Lower House dissolution approaching, the absence of 
the election strategist for the general election is creating quite a 
stir in the LDP. In addition, with this, Aso might lose the backing 
of the Koga faction, the third largest in the LDP, which was derived 
from the former Miyazawa faction, to which Aso belonged. 
 
Although Hosoda and Election Strategy Council Deputy Chairman 
Yoshihide Suga tried to persuade Koga not to resign, he refused to 
listen. 
 
Aso said on the night of July 14: "I have no intention to accept his 
resignation." However, Koga has given leave to the security police 
and chauffeur. Therefore, it will be difficult to persuade him to 
change his mind. 
 
Prime Minister Aso glares at Hidenao Nakagawa 
 
Koga's sudden announcement of his intention to step down appears to 
have been effective to contain moves by anti-Aso groups. 
 
 
TOKYO 00001625  005 OF 016 
 
 
At a meeting of LDP Lower House members, held after the General 
Council meeting, Aso said: 
 
"We will take humbly, reflect on, and review the severe criticism of 
the LDP displayed in a series of elections. I have left the matter 
on the secretary general. We must now fight. In order to fight in 
the election, we have to unit. We will respond to a no-confidence 
motion without making a fuss. I want to build the LDP's strength 
along with you." 
 
Aso's strategy of starting a speech from expressing his reflection 
appeared to have succeeded because his remark was met by an 
explosion of applause. 
 
Yet, soon after this, tensions ran high in the meeting because 
former Secretary General Hidenao Nakagawa, leader of the anti-Aso 
force, raised his hand. He said: 
 
"I strongly object to dissolution that would benefit the Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ). Based on our reflection on the defeat in the 
Tokyo assembly election, it is necessary to completely change the 
LDP executive. I want to discuss this issue at a joint meeting of 
LDP members from both Diet chambers." 
 
Aso glared at Nakagawa with enraged eyes. If voices to fall in line 
with Nakagawa rose, Aso would have been forced into a corner. 
However, there was only thin applause. Nakagawa was instead jeered. 
 
 
At the Lower House plenary session, Nakagawa voted against the 
opposition's no-confidence motion against the Aso cabinet, while 
seeking Aso's resignation. His position is hard to fathom. He told 
reporters: "I decided to vote against the no-confidence motion in 
order to express my lack of confidence in the DPJ, which will 
boycott Diet deliberations from tomorrow." 
 
In order to listen to dissatisfaction and views in the party, the 
LDP leadership intends to hold a general meeting of all party 
lawmakers or a gathering alternative to the general meeting probably 
this week. Aso has indicated his intention to explain the causes of 
defeat in the Tokyo election at the planned meeting. The secretaries 
general of the LDP factions will discuss details on July 15. 
 
Holding such an occasion is the expression of the party leadership's 
confidence. Lower House members tend to stay in their constituencies 
when dissolution day approaches. The New Komeito, the LDP's junior 
coalition partner, which has agreed to hold the general election on 
Aug. 30, expressed displeasure with the turmoil in the LDP. At a 
liaison meeting of the LDP officials, Takebe criticized the 
leadership, but Diet Affairs Committee Chairman Tadamori Oshima 
said: "We arranged the schedule with the New Komeito, as well. There 
is not much time left before the terms of the Lower House members 
expire." His remark was able to quiet down opposition. Yet, 
dissatisfaction remains in the party. 
 
Kato twice met secretly on July 14 with Nakagawa at a Tokyo hotel. 
Kato was at the forefront of criticizing former Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi's structural reform policy, while Nakagawa is an 
adherent of the Koizumi's structural reform policy. It is abnormal 
for such bitter enemies to come across each other by chance. They 
decided to collect signatures to call a general meeting of LDP 
members from the two house of the Diet. It should be viewed that the 
 
TOKYO 00001625  006 OF 016 
 
 
two tacticians are now elaborating a secret plan. 
 
(5) BOJ unable to come up with exit strategy: "Anxieties about the 
economy cannot be dispelled" 
 
YOMIURI (Page 9) (Abridged slightly) 
July 16, 2009 
 
The Bank of Japan (BOJ) on July 15 extended the term of a package of 
measures to help companies manage their cash flow for three months 
until the end of December. This is because the central bank is 
acutely aware of the potential downside risk factors to the economy 
amid companies, mainly small- and medium-size businesses, still 
experiencing difficulty managing their cash flows. The central bank 
remained cautious about the future of the economy in its mid-term 
economic projection report "Outlook Report" as well. One can say 
that the extension of the term reflects the BOJ's strong 
determination to give top priority to stabilizing the financial 
market and shoring up the economy. 
 
Effect of constraining interest rate 
 
BOJ Governor Shirakawa during a press conference after the 
policy-setting meeting revealed that the BOJ has determined to 
extend the term with an eye on its impact on the financial market as 
a whole. He noted, "Companies, mainly small- and medium-size 
businesses, remain unable to eliminate anxieties about the economy 
due to uncertainties about the recovery of the economy." Companies 
with low ratings still find it difficult to issue commercial papers, 
compared with those with high ratings, bringing about a bipolar 
phenomenon. 
 
As measures to assist companies in managing their cash flow, the BOJ 
has carried out outright purchases of commercial papers and 
corporate debentures and special funds-supplying operations to 
facilitate corporate financing this year. The BOJ plans to end those 
operations, once market conditions improve, by characterizing those 
measures an unprecedented step that causes losses in the event of 
the companies fail. 
 
Concerning outright purchases of commercial papers and corporate 
debentures, the value of proposal tenders is continuing to fall 
below the amount to be raised since the spring this year. For this 
reason, there has been concern that those unprecedented measures 
could block the functions of the financial market, by dampening 
investors' desire to invest or undermining the self-sustaining 
interest rate adjustment function of the financial market. 
 
In the meantime, if such measures are ended, the view that the BOJ 
has seriously adopted an exit policy of searching for the timing to 
end the monetary easing policy would spread on the market, raising 
the long-term interest rates, which would work adversely to the 
economy. 
 
NLI Research Institute Economic Department Director Koichi Haji 
pointed out: "The BOJ might be seeking the effect of containing 
interest rates, by thwarting people's attention from an exit 
strategy by means of extending the term of those exceptional 
measures." 
 
"Cannot be sure" 
 
 
TOKYO 00001625  007 OF 016 
 
 
In view of exports and production having clearly improved, the 
Outlook Report raised its economic outlook to "has stopped 
declining." The interim assessment in the Outlook Report maintained 
the scenario that the economy will pick up in the second half of the 
fiscal year or later. However, the outlook for growth in gross 
domestic product (GDP) has been revised downward. As such, the 
report maintained a cautious view of the economy in the future. 
 
This is because the recovery of U.S. and European economies is 
slower than anticipated. In addition, it is hard to expect domestic 
demand to expand due to the deteriorated employment and income 
conditions. 
 
Governor Shirakawa gave a cautious account: "The moves of employment 
and wage conditions are putting downward pressure on the economy. We 
cannot be sure of the future of the economy at the present moment." 
He also stopped short of categorically mentioning that the economy 
has bottomed out. 
 
Deflationary concern is mounting as can be seen by the downward 
revision of the outlook for corporate goods prince index (CGPI) for 
fiscal 2010. Uncertainties about the future of the Japanese economy 
still remain high. It will likely take still more time for the BOJ 
to end the unprecedented measures and adopt an exit strategy of 
shifting to a regular monetary policy. 
 
(6) SDP secretary general criticizes DPJ Hatoyama's remark on three 
nonnuclear principles 
 
JIJI (Full) 
July 16, 2009 
 
In a press conference this morning, Social Democratic Party (SDP) 
Secretary General Yasumasa Shigeno criticized Democratic Party of 
Japan (DPJ) President Yukio Hatoyama's controversial remark 
indicating the need for Japan to discuss with the U.S. future 
options for its three nonnuclear principles. Shigeno claimed that 
the remark might affect talks on a coalition government after the 
upcoming House of Representatives election, saying: "There are 
various preconditions (for the SDP) to play a part in a (coalition) 
government. I do not think it is proper (for Hatoyama) to deny, 
without any hesitation, what we think is important." 
 
(7) Hatoyama's personal view on three nonnuclear principles causes a 
stir, leaves DPJ behind 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Abridged slightly) 
July 16, 2009 
 
Nao Fujita 
 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) President Yukio Hatoyama was busy 
yesterday offering explanations about his statement that can be 
taken to mean a review of the principle of "not allowing bringing 
nuclear weapons into Japan" of the nation's three nonnuclear 
principles. It appears that he simply wanted to play up the need to 
discuss security affairs based on Japan's current situation relying 
heavily on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. If he expresses his personal 
views easily without trying to lead intraparty discussion, that 
tendency might raise questions about his qualifications as a 
candidate to become the next prime minister. 
 
 
TOKYO 00001625  008 OF 016 
 
 
Hatoyama held a press conference on July 14 in which he said based 
on the existence of a secret Japan-U.S. pact allowing port calls by 
U.S. warships carrying nuclear weapons: "Because there is a need, 
including the North Korean issue, (the matter) has been handled in a 
pragmatic manner." Hatoyama made this comment as his personal view. 
He also indicated that discussions are necessary about the principle 
of "not allowing bringing nuclear weapons into Japan." 
 
This was reported yesterday as Hatoyama having suggested allowing 
bringing nuclear weapons into Japan, drawing fire from the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP), which is considering launching a coalition 
government with the DPJ after the upcoming Lower House election. 
Many reporters raised questions asking Hatoyama's true intention. 
 
Hatoyama explained that there is no need to review the three 
nonnuclear principles even if (the government) acknowledges the 
"secret pact concluded in the past," saying, "At this point, there 
is no reason for the United States to have vessels carrying nuclear 
weapons call at Japanese ports." Hatoyama also said this about the 
possibility of allowing the introduction of nuclear weapons into 
Japan in the future, "The matter must be discussed earnestly between 
Japan and the United States," while stressing the threat from North 
Korea. 
 
Hatoyama's comment on the three nonnuclear rules wavered in the 
past, as well. In 2002, then Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda 
referred to a possibly review of the principles. In reaction, 
Hatoyama criticized Fukuda, saying, "The three nonnuclear principles 
are a national policy." Hatoyama also published a book in 2005 that 
includes his personal constitutional revision plan calling for the 
specification of the principles excluding the non-introduction 
rule. 
 
At heart, Hatoyama seems to be willing to allow "bringing nuclear 
weapons" into Japan. In his book published 2005, Hatoyama proposed 
referring to the Self-Defense Forces as a self-defense military 
(jieigun), claiming that the clause in the Constitution is totally 
out of touch with political reality. The thinking that security 
begins with acknowledging reality overlaps with a review of the 
three nonnuclear principles which have effectively become a dead 
letter. 
 
If Hatoyama calls for a review, it would strain the relationship 
between the SDP and the DPJ, which is split over striking a balance 
between the ideal of denuclearization and the reality of Japan's 
dependence on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The issue could serve as an 
impediment to the Lower House election, as well. Hatoyama has put 
off the review argument based on experts' notion that there is no 
need for the United States to have its nuclear-armed vessels call at 
Japanese ports. 
 
Hatoyama's announcement of his personal view at a press conference, 
while indicating that the party is not conducting discussion is also 
a problem. 
 
The DPJ plans to make public the "secret pact" once it takes power. 
How is the party going to pave the way for its goal of 
denuclearizing Northeast Asia, while considering, after launching a 
DPJ administration, the acknowledgement of nuclear weapons having 
been brought into Japan in the past and a willingness to allow such 
in the future? 
 
 
TOKYO 00001625  009 OF 016 
 
 
There are all sorts of forces in the DPJ, such as a former socialist 
group upholding the three principles, a conservative cluster who 
think that discussing Japan's nuclear option will push China toward 
the denuclearization of North Korea, and a group aiming to urge the 
United States to abandon the preemptive use of nuclear weapons to 
achieve what Secretary General calls the "partial coverage of the 
nuclear umbrella." The DPJ's manifesto for the forthcoming Lower 
House election is also centered on domestic affairs. Hatoyama does 
not show any signs of opening the Pandora's box and leading the 
party's discussion on the nuclear issue. 
 
How is the party going to strike a balance between the country's 
dependence on the nuclear umbrella and the DPJ's challenges aiming 
at a Japan-U.S. alliance based on equality of a new age? The DPJ's 
policies include many outstanding issues that might result in 
friction between Japan and the United States, such as the 
realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and a drastic review of the 
Status of Forces Agreement. 
 
Where should the three nonnuclear principles be positioned in 
fraternal diplomacy? If there is no clear vision or leadership to 
bring the party's discussion to a conclusion, talks with the Obama 
administration that aims at a nuclear-free world will go nowhere. 
 
Statements made by Hatoyama on July 14 and 15 
 
(At a press conference on July 14) I have my own view. As the three 
nonnuclear principles have been upheld, (the matter) has been 
handled in a pragmatic manner. Because there is a need, including 
the North Korean issue, I believe we should think in that direction, 
but the party is not conducting a discussion. A conclusion must be 
reached swiftly. 
 
(To the press corps on July 15) It is clear that there has been a 
secret pact (between the Japanese and U.S. governments allowing 
bringing nuclear weapons into Japan). It is funny that the 
government still insists that the pact does not exist. It was 
imperative to conclude the clandestine pact in the past. In reality, 
there is no reason for the United States to have vessels carrying 
nuclear weapons call at Japanese ports. The three nonnuclear 
principles have been abided by. They will not be violated in the 
near future. Nevertheless, Japan and the United States should 
actively discuss the threat from North Korea and America's expanded 
nuclear deterrence. 
 
Hatoyama's assertions in the past 
 
(In June 2002 -- "The three nonnuclear principles are a national 
policy.") 
(At a press conference when he was serving as DPJ president. In 
reaction to (then) Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda's reference 
to the possibility of reviewing the three principles.) 
 
(Hatoyama's book titled Draft New Constitution (Shin Kenpo Shian) 
published in 2005) 
 
"Preamble - Desiring that a permanent and universal socioeconomic 
cooperation and collective security systems will be established in 
the world, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, to pledge to 
continue making ceaseless efforts." 
 
"Article 53 (Not to possess weapons of mass destruction) - To 
 
TOKYO 00001625  010 OF 016 
 
 
prohibit developing, manufacturing, and possessing weapons of mass 
destruction, including nuclear weapons and biochemical weapons." 
 
"(Article 53) is a documentation of nonnuclear policy which was a 
symbol of postwar pacifism. Japan is allowed to possess nuclear 
weapons depending on how the current Constitution is interpreted, 
and the limits to the country's self-defense war potential have 
become clear with this provision. It is the announcement of Japan's 
resolve to promote efforts for the elimination of nuclear weapons 
and international disarmament as the country's diplomatic goal." 
 
(8) Ex-Finance Minister Shiokawa: Debate security policy openly in 
general election 
 
SANKEI (Page 1) (Full) 
July 16, 2009 
 
Masajuro Shiokawa, former finance minister 
 
Prime Minister Taro Aso has decided to dissolve the House of 
Representatives as early as July 21. Debate in the Diet will now 
cease. Looking back at the regular Diet session since January, both 
the ruling and opposition parties advocated giving top priority to 
livelihood issues, as if being led by the nose by the slogan of a 
certain party, and deliberations had focused on pork barrel budget 
allocations in the name of responding to the economic crisis. Other 
than that, Diet proceedings were dominated by the sickening endless 
disputes over political funds. There was little discussion of 
Japan's response to the worldwide economic crisis and international 
contributions to make its presence felt. 
 
It is most regrettable that despite North Korea's launching of 
ballistic missiles and its second nuclear test, the question of how 
to make Japan's security systems adapt to changes in the 
international situation has not been discussed at all. We Japanese 
are sick and tired of exchanges delving into scandals. Many people 
are concerned about the security of this country under the present 
setup and whether Japan will be able to maintain a honorable 
position in the international community in the future. They would 
like to hear the politicians speak out clearly on the future of 
Japan. 
 
Paying lip service to peace is still prevalent in Japan. However, 
the reality in the world is that it is more than obvious that a 
peaceful environment secured only by the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), 
which is tasked with an exclusively defensive mission, and U.S. 
Forces Japan (USFJ) is becoming untenable. 
 
In the postwar period and the era of the East-West Cold War, 
security was perceived as something provided for free. 
 
However, other countries in the world have made major sacrifices to 
strengthen their military capabilities. International terrorist 
organizations are becoming increasingly active, and the newly 
emerging economies are intensifying their competition to grab 
resources in Africa and elsewhere. Conflicts are multiplying 
everywhere. Missiles fitted with nuclear warheads could one day fly 
over Japan from North Korea, and the reality is such that a minor 
incident may trigger a situation that threatens peace in the 
extensive exclusive economic zone (EEZ). 
 
Backed by its economic growth, China is rushing on with the 
 
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modernization and reinforcement of its military power. The presence 
of Chinese armed forces in Northeast Asia, Central Asia, and the 
Pacific has indeed become much more prominent. On the other hand, 
the United States is maintaining a friendly relationship with China 
and is modifying its policy toward Japan in its effort to rectify 
its unipolar hegemonism. Now is the time for Japan to review its 
security policy based on this perception of such a harsh reality. 
 
Any political party aspiring to become the ruling party after the 
next Lower House election should clearly spell out how it intends to 
deal with the most basic policy for a country, security. 
 
It will no longer be possible to adopt the attitude of the Liberal 
Democratic Party so far of relying only on the U.S. to ensure the 
safety of Japan alone. It is also unacceptable for a party like the 
Democratic Party of Japan to be divided and have no unified opinion 
on security. Deputy President Ichiro Ozawa's statement that "the 7th 
Fleet will be sufficient for U.S. presence in the Far East" is 
absurd. 
 
The forthcoming general election, which will be taking place amid 
the upheaval in Japan's security environment, should not be treated 
as a story of who won or lost in which constituency. To make the 
election campaign meaningful, the major political parties should 
present policies in answer to the simple question of "is Japan 
secure?" We have no need for "please-all manifestoes (campaign 
pledges)" that are like street stalls at a shrine fair. 
 
(9) Right of individual self-defense becoming meaningless 
 
SANKEI (Page 7) (Full) 
July 13, 2009 
 
Toshio Watanabe, Takushoku University president 
 
North Korea will never give up its nuclear arsenal since its very 
existence depends on its nuclear weapons. North Korea is a tiny poor 
country in the Far East that no one will turn to see if it is 
without nuclear weapons. North Korea would then have no 
international influence. Without such weapons, North Korea cannot 
create political cohesion at home, nor can it maintain its dynasty. 
 
Half-baked pressure cannot coax North Korea to give up its nuclear 
weapons. This has already been substantiated completely since the 
first nuclear crisis. In 1994, North Korea broke away from the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and declared its intention 
to continue its nuclear development program. Actually, have the 
Six-Party Talks in Beijing produced any results? Japan is in a boat 
called the Six-Party Talks with countries that are figuratively in 
the same bed with different dreams, behaving to appear to be doing 
something. This is falsehood in itself. 
 
North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006 and the 
second nuclear test in May this year. During that time, North Korea 
launched a number of missiles, including long-range missiles that 
passed over Japan. What did Japan do then? Everyone knows North 
Korea has up to 300 Nodong intermediate-range ballistic missiles 
targeting Japan. What if North Korea has deployed nuclear weapons? 
Japan would be finished in that case. 
 
Japan's Foreign Ministry bureaucrats and politicians could have 
imagined such a situation. However, they have done nothing with the 
 
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backing of major news media that have made it a categorical 
imperative to say Japan should not overreact and should deal with 
North Korea through diplomatic means, even without clearly showing 
their approaches and the efficacy thereof. 
 
The United Nations Security Council has unanimously adopted a 
resolution for additional sanctions on North Korea. Japan and the 
United States teamed up to incorporate cargo inspections in the UNSC 
resolution to inspect cargoes onboard ships to and from North Korea. 
The Kantei (i.e., the prime minister's office) and the Foreign 
Ministry seem to be pleased with this resolution. However, the 
resolution only asks U.N. member nations to inspect ships with the 
consent of their flag states. This resolution might have only a 
breeze-like influence on North Korea, which is now being elated in 
high spirits with its recent second nuclear test. 
 
Undoubtedly, North Korea's nuclear weapons are targeted at Japan. 
Curiously, however, Japan still has no law for ship inspections. 
Assuming that a special measures law for inspecting the cargoes of 
North Korean ships will be enacted in time, however, North Korea is 
almost unlikely to be amenable to ship inspections. North Korea may 
rather regard such ship inspections as an armed attack, and its 
ships may fight back. What will Japan do then? How will it step into 
the scope of weapons use and the like? These points are really 
unclear. 
 
When it comes to national security, we must not have any wishful 
thinking. What if a country is without its preparedness in the event 
of an emergency? In that case, another country could take advantage 
of it to launch an attack. Japan has utterly forgotten to put 
diplomatically and militarily effective pressure on North Korea, and 
Japan has done nothing. Japan, encountering North Korea's ballistic 
missile launch and nuclear test, pretended to shake its fist. 
However, the enemy is now completely looking down on Japan. 
 
Even the United States may not be ready to intercept North Korean 
missiles if they are not targeted at the United States. In fact, 
Secretary of Defense Gates have declared so. I wonder why Japanese 
politicians and bureaucrats do not think there is something 
reasonable about this U.S. choice since the Japanese government's 
interpretation of the right to collective self-defense remains the 
same as ever. We should rather think it is questionable whether the 
United States will faithfully carry out its obligation to defend 
Japan even while knowing the United States may become a target of 
North Korea's long-range missiles. It is reasonable to think this 
way, isn't it? 
 
The Japanese government's view of national security goes: "Japan's 
self-defense capability allowed under the Constitution's Article 9 
must be at a minimum necessary level for self-defense, and Japan is 
not allowed to have offensive weapons in any case since doing so is 
beyond the scope of a minimum necessary level for self-defense." In 
a nutshell, this is a defense-only posture. This is beautifully 
reflected in Japan's military systems. 
 
Japan currently does not have weapons like ground-based long-range 
antisurface missiles that can reach a foreign country and submarines 
that launch cruise missiles. Japan also does not deploy fighter 
bombers that can fly as far as enemy bases or Maritime Self-Defense 
Force vessels loaded with precision guided missiles. The MSDF's 
Aegis-equipped ships, whose level of intelligence-gathering 
capability is extremely high, are also for defensive purposes. This 
 
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means that Japan's right to individual self-defense is already 
hollowing out before its right to collective self-defense. 
 
"Diplomacy per se cannot work well alone, nor can its stratagem 
attain its objectives without the backing of military power." This 
is from the words of Yukichi Fukuzawa (who was a leader of Japan's 
civilization and enlightenment in the Meiji era and is also known as 
a philosopher and educator who founded Keio University). 
 
The truth of that theory in the Meiji era remains unchanged even 
nowadays. Japan, after opening it to the world and going through the 
Meiji Restoration, went to war with China and Russia. I know more 
than enough that the environment of the times in those days differs 
from that today. However, the geopolitical situation surrounding 
Japan was and is overflowing with tensions. Nevertheless, there is a 
far cry difference between leaders in those days and leaders today 
when it comes to the awareness of national defense and the 
capability of crisis management. Is Japan a state? 
 
(10) Okinawa governor omits asking Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Gregson for closure of Futenma Air Station in three years 
 
RYUKYU SHIMPO (Page 1) (Excerpts) 
July 16, 2009 
 
The Japan policy team of the U.S. Department of Defense led by 
Assistant Secretary Wallace Gregson met Governor Hirokazu Nakaima at 
the prefectural government office on July 15. The governor handed 
over a letter listing demands, including the reduction of noise at 
Kadena Air Base. Although the list mentioned the removal of the 
danger posed by the U.S. forces' Futenma Air Station, it did not 
call for bringing about a state of closure of Futenma in three 
years, which was one of the governor's campaign pledges. 
 
Asked why a state of closure in Futenma was not included in the 
list, the governor said: "There are some technical issues involved. 
We are dealing with this at the working team level (with the Tokyo 
government)." Also not included was a demand by Okinawa Prefecture 
and Nago City to move the Futenma replacement facility further 
offshore. Nakaima explained: "I am not in a position to engage in 
direct negotiations. Since we have been telling the government 
repeatedly, I assume that they are working on it (negotiations with 
the U.S. side)." 
 
In response to the governor's demand for the revision of the Status 
of Forces Agreement (SOFA), Gregson said that, "We are constantly 
studying how to improve the situation," stressing that this issue 
will be dealt with by improvement of SOFA operations. Regarding the 
flight of non-Okinawa based aircraft to Kadena Air Base, he pointed 
out that "there is a need to be familiar with the conditions around 
Okinawa," emphasizing the need for training. 
 
Gregson held a meeting with the mayors of six municipalities hosting 
U.S. bases in Okinawa on the morning of July 15. He received 
requests from each on specific issues, including moving the Futenma 
replacement facility further offshore and avoiding aircraft takeoffs 
on the Kadena base in the early morning, but he did not give any 
response. 
 
(11) U.S. assistant secretary of defense negative on returning 
Torishima at meeting with governor 
 
 
TOKYO 00001625  014 OF 016 
 
 
OKINAWA TIMES (Page 1) (Slightly abridged) 
July 16, 2009 
 
U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security 
Affairs Wallace Gregson met Governor Hirokazu Nakaima at the 
prefectural government building on July 15 to exchange views on the 
base issues in Okinawa. In response to the governor's demand for the 
return of the Torishima gunnery range, Gregson said: "We do not have 
any solution in the near future. We will continue to consult with 
the Japanese government, but the U.S. forces need to train in order 
to defend Japan under the Japan-U.S. security treaty," indicating 
that live fire shooting exercises will continue. 
 
Nakaima sought the reduction of noise at Kadena Air Base, the 
removal of the danger posed by Futenma Air Station, the 
consolidation and reduction of military bases, and a drastic review 
of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) because "the 
people of Okinawa strongly desire the reduction of the excessive 
burden imposed by the bases." 
 
Gregson explained that under the U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) 
realignment process, the majority of the exercises of the USFJ and 
the Self-Defense Forces will move to Guam, and this will lead to the 
lightening of the burden. He stressed that: "The U.S. wants to 
implement the return of military bases linked to the relocation of 
the Futenma base as soon as possible. We would like to implement the 
2006 road map steadily." 
 
At a news conference held before the meeting, Gregson commented on 
the demand of Nago City and others to move the Futenma replacement 
facility further offshore. He said that, "Considering the 
operational requirements of the U.S. forces and the impact on the 
local community and the environment, we have decided that the 
current plan satisfies all three requirements," indicating that any 
change in the location will be difficult. 
 
Gregson came to Okinawa on July 13 with Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense Michael Schiffer, Country Director for Japan Suzanne 
Basalla, David Bice, executive director of the Joint Guam Program 
Office, and Assistant Secretary of the Navy BJ Penn. They visited 
Camp Schwab, where the Futenma replacement facility will be located, 
and had briefings from Ro Manabe, chief of the Okinawa Defense 
Bureau, and Sumio Tarui, Ministry of Foreign Affairs ambassador for 
Okinawa affairs. The group also met the mayors of Nago, Uruma, 
Okinawa, Kadena, Ginowan, and Urasoe. 
 
The U.S. officials headed for Tokyo on July 15. 
 
(12) Gist of U.S. assistant secretary of defense's news conference: 
Watching environmental assessment; current realignment plan short 
cut to burden reduction 
 
OKINAWA TIMES (Page 2) (Full) 
July 16, 2009 
 
Assistant Secretary of Defense Wallace Gregson: The purpose of this 
visit is to see with our own eyes the status of U.S. forces 
realignment in Okinawa. The U.S. government recognizes Okinawa as a 
region playing a very important role in the Japan-U.S. alliance and 
is aware of the burden being imposed. It agreed to realignment in 
order to reduce the burden while also maintaining the alliance's 
deterrence. It is very important to implement the realignment 
 
TOKYO 00001625  015 OF 016 
 
 
package smoothly, and this is the fastest way to reduce the burden 
on Okinawa. 
 
Q: Okinawa Prefecture and Nago City demand moving the construction 
site further offshore. 
 
Gregson: Various options were considered and we decided at an early 
stage that the current plan meets the requirements of U.S. military 
operations and requirements pertaining to impact on the local 
community and the environment. We are watching the Japanese 
government's ongoing environmental assessment procedures. It will 
make the final decision on the construction site based on the 
results of the assessment. 
 
Q: U.S. Marine Corps Commandant James Conway has testified that it 
is possible to review the Futenma relocation plan. 
 
Gregson: I think the commandant's statement was in the context of 
the Marines' management of troop training and equipment. However, 
the U.S. government believes that the current plan, which has been 
discussed with the Japanese government, is the best option. 
 
Q: What happens if the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which 
demands relocation outside Okinawa, comes to power? 
 
Gregson: The U.S. is not in a position to comment on Japan's 
election. However, the agreement was reached not with a political 
party, such as the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) or the DPJ; this 
is an intergovernmental agreement. We hope that the Japanese 
government will not change its view in order to fulfill the 
obligations under the bilateral security treaty. 
 
Q: It is said that the cost of Guam relocation may increase. 
 
Gregson: It is quite common that the actual cost estimate becomes 
much higher than the original estimate. New ideas are added to the 
basic plan. The U.S. will closely examine if there is any need to 
make additions, but Japan's share in the budget has been set. It 
will not be asked to make additional contributions. While we are on 
schedule to complete the project by 2014, construction work for 
improvements on the facility will continue even beyond that date. 
 
Q: What is your outlook for the Japan-U.S. alliance? 
 
Gregson: The Japan-U.S. relationship has been the most important 
bilateral relationship for the U.S. since the security treaty was 
ratified. The U.S. wants to further reinforce the relationship in 
order to enable joint operations in disaster rescue, humanitarian 
aid, and other missions. We hope that under the realignment 
framework, air, ground, and naval forces from both countries will be 
able to conduct joint ground and air exercises in and around Guam. I 
think we will also be able to conduct joint exercises (in Japan) in 
Camp Fuji, Yausubetsu, and other locations. 
 
(13) Wife of U.S. assistant secretary of defense to serve as adviser 
to preparatory foundation for new international school in Okinawa 
 
OKINAWA TIMES (Page 2) (Full) 
 
The Okinawa Kokusai Gakuen Establishment Preparatory Foundation, 
which is the body responsible for setting up "Okinawa AMICUS 
International" in Uruma City -- an international school catering to 
 
TOKYO 00001625  016 OF 016 
 
 
the children of researchers working at the Okinawa Institute of 
Science and Technology (OIST) -- appointed Cynthia Gregson, wife of 
U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Wallace Gregson as an adviser on 
July 15. 
 
The appointment was based on Mrs Gregson's past record of 
wide-ranging international exchange activities in Okinawa at the 
time when her husband was the Okinawa area coordinator of the U.S. 
forces, the highest ranking U.S. military officer in Okinawa, in 
2001-2003. Mrs Gregson served then as the chairperson of the Okinawa 
chapter of Ikebana International. She will serve as adviser to the 
foundation for about two years until July 8, 2011. 
 
The foundation says that it wants to "borrow Mrs Gregson's wisdom on 
such matters as recruitment of teachers, curriculum development, and 
fund raising for the construction of the school building." 
 
POST