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Viewing cable 09TOKYO1586, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/13/09

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TOKYO1586 2009-07-13 06:51 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO5396
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #1586/01 1940651
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 130651Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4520
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/USFJ //J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 7538
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 5211
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 9017
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 2709
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 5728
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0434
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 6459
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 6125
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 001586 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/13/09 
 
INDEX: 
(1) PM Aso decides to dissolve Diet on July 21, hold election on 
August 30 (Sankei) 
 
(2) Aso will not budge on his decision to dissolve Lower House on 
own initiative (Asahi) 
 
(3) LDP shocked by defeat in Tokyo assembly election; Move to remove 
Aso from office gaining momentum (Asahi) 
 
(4) DPJ unveils its administrative vision designed to establish 
national strategy bureau directly under prime minister and an 
committee of cabinet ministers to eliminate bureaucratic 
sectionalism (Yomiuri) 
 
(5) U.S. Consul General in Okinawa Kevin Maher says in pre-departure 
press conference that detailed reversion plan will be announced soon 
(Okinawa Times) 
 
(6) Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Kono confirms 
secret nuclear accord with ex-Vice Foreign Minister, to demand 
change in government reply (Tokyo Shimbun) 
 
(7) Russian president suggests negotiating Northern Territories 
issue based on return of only two islands (Sankei) 
 
(8) Competition between Japan and Italy over Nasiriyah oil field 
development right (Mainichi) 
 
(9) Profile of John Roos, U.S. ambassador-designate to Japan (Chuo 
Koron) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) PM Aso decides to dissolve Diet on July 21, hold election on 
August 30 
 
SANKEI ONLINE 
12:37, July 13, 2009 
 
Prime Minister Taro Aso indicated his intention to dissolve the 
House of Representatives at an emergency Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) executive meeting held at the Prime Minister's Official 
Residence in the afternoon of July 13. He also conveyed the same 
intention at a liaison meeting between the government and the ruling 
parties held after the LDP meeting. He plans to dissolve the Diet on 
July 21, and the official declaration of candidacy for the Lower 
House election will be scheduled for August 18, with the election 
being held on August 30. 
 
Secretary General Hiroyuki Hosoda, Election Strategy Council 
Chairman Makoto Koga, Hidehisa Otsuji, chair of the LDP caucus in 
the House of Councillors, and others were present at the emergency 
LDP executive meeting. 
 
(2) Aso will not budge on his decision to dissolve Lower House on 
own initiative 
 
ASAHI (Page 2) (Excerpts) 
Jul7 13, 2009 
 
Prime Minister Taro Aso yesterday stayed in his official residence 
 
TOKYO 00001586  002 OF 010 
 
 
all the day, except for his routine walk around the residential 
quarters. He made no comment on the result of the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Assembly election. There were no politicians, including senior 
ruling coalition members, who visited his residential quarters. Aso 
has not changed his intention to dissolve the House of 
Representatives on his own initiative, according to Aso's aide. 
 
At a press conference on July 10, the last day of the Group of Eight 
(G-8) summit, Aso stated: "I will soon make a decision" as to when 
to dissolve the Lower House. 
 
The reason for Aso having repeatedly stated that he will dissolve 
the lower chamber on his own initiative is his aim to seek to 
constrain the anti-Aso movements. 
 
Aso is proud that the public does not sympathize with the drive to 
remove him from office because there are no strong candidates to 
replace him in the LDP. In a poll conducted in early July by the 
Asahi Shimbun, 65 percent of respondents said that they did not 
understand the moves to unseat Aso as prime minister, while 22 
percent responded that they understood them. 
 
However, senior party members and faction leaders, who have 
supported Aso heads, have become increasingly alarmed that the LDP 
cannot fight in the general election under Aso's leadership. There 
is a possibility that Aso will be unable to ignore opinions in the 
LDP. 
 
Aso was given an advice by his aide that Lower House dissolution 
should be delayed in order to pursue the political donation scandal 
involving Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) President Yukio Hatoyama. 
The aim is to get ready to fight in the general election by pursuing 
the Hatoyama issue while putting off dissolution until July 28 when 
the current Diet session expires. However, there is no guarantee 
that the situation will take a turn for the better, but there is a 
risk that the calls for replacing Aso will gain greater strength. 
 
(3) LDP shocked by defeat in Tokyo assembly election; Move to remove 
Aso from office gaining momentum 
 
ASAHI (Page 2) (Excerpts) 
July 13, 2009 
 
The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its coalition partner 
New Komeito lost a majority in the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly, in 
yesterday's election, a prelude to the next House of Representatives 
election. Although many in the ruling parties believe that they 
cannot contest the general election under Prime Minister Aso's 
leadership, Aso has not budged from a stance of seeking an early 
dissolution of the Lower House. Can Aso cut through the center of 
the issue, while the noose is tightening around him? The political 
situation has become tense in a stroke. 
 
Former LDP Secretary General Tsutomu Takebe said last night in an 
interview by the Asahi Shimbun: 
 
"It is an historical crushing defeat. The best way would be for Mr. 
Aso to say, 'Let's hold a Liberal Democratic Party presidential 
election after the Diet session adjourns?' This week will be a 
critical juncture as to whether the party will split." 
 
Takebe indicated his view that a conclusion will be reached before 
 
TOKYO 00001586  003 OF 010 
 
 
the end of this week as to whether Aso would dissolve the Lower 
House or whether he would be forced to quit his post as prime 
minister. (TN: Aso announced July 13 that he will dissolve the Lower 
House on July 21) 
 
Anti-Aso groups have refrained from criticizing the Prime Minister, 
wary that the responsibility for the loss in the Tokyo race would be 
shifted onto them. However, former Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa 
Shiozaki and other junior and mid-level LDP lawmakers got together 
last night and confirmed that they would call for holding a general 
meeting of all LDP members to analyze the party's successive defeats 
in recent local elections. 
 
Many senior members of the LDP and factions are desperately trying 
to prevent an early Lower House dissolution, expecting that the 
headwind against the party will weaken. Former Prime Minister 
Yoshiro Mori met on July 9 with former LDP Upper House Chairman 
Mikio Aoki. The two shared the perception that it would be difficult 
for Aso to dissolve the Lower House immediately after the Tokyo 
assembly election. The secretaries general of the LDP factions 
shared the view that the Lower House should not be dissolved before 
July 28 when the current Diet session ends. 
 
A sense of alarm has risen in the New Komeito, as well. A senior New 
Komeito member already predicted yesterday afternoon the ruling 
parties' defeat in the election, indicating that the party's 
determination to urge Aso to put off dissolution. The New Komeito 
hopes that the Lower House will be dissolved at the end of the 
ongoing Diet session and the general election will be held on Aug. 
ΒΆ30. There are a growing number of cabinet ministers deserting Aso. 
One cabinet minister made this comment: "Most party members want 
(the Prime Minister) to voluntarily step down. Not only anti-Aso 
groups but party members with good sense think so." Another cabinet 
member said: 
 
"It's a crushing defeat. (The Prime Minister) will not be able to 
dissolve the Lower House. The New Komeito at least will not sign on. 
I will discuss the matter with other cabinet members. I think 
several cabinet ministers will not sign." 
 
Can Aso dissolve the Lower House even if he replaces some cabinet 
members? The dominant view in the LDP is that "It is not so easy to 
dissolve the Lower House" (former prime minister). One of 
influential lawmakers who have supported Aso remarked last night: 
"Now that I will give no advice to him." 
 
However, it is true that there are no specific ways to replace Aso. 
 
(4) DPJ unveils its administrative vision designed to establish 
national strategy bureau directly under prime minister and an 
committee of cabinet ministers to eliminate bureaucratic 
sectionalism 
 
YOMIURI (Page 1) (Abridged slightly) 
July 12, 2009 
 
An outline of the Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ) government 
organization reform plan became clear on July 11. The plan is 
designed to establish a national strategy bureau under the direct 
control of the prime minister and a committee of a small number of 
cabinet ministers with the aim of strengthening the politician-led 
decision-making system, if it takes over the reins of government. 
 
TOKYO 00001586  004 OF 010 
 
 
The plan, compiled by President Yukio Hatoyama, will go into the 
party's manifesto for the next House of Representatives election. 
 
According to the plan, the national strategy bureau will be set up 
at the Prime Minister's Official Residence staffed by members from 
ministries, agencies, and the private sector. The bureau will be 
responsible for drawing up national strategies, including diplomatic 
plans. It will also present budgetary outlines that meet national 
strategies prior to the Finance Ministry drawing up a state budget. 
The Council on Fiscal and Economic Policy will be abolished as its 
functions are likely to overlap with those of the national strategic 
bureau. 
 
The panel of cabinet ministers will allow policies to be discussed 
by a small group of ministers directly connected to each individual 
issue. The DPJ hopes this approach will help eliminate harmful 
effects of bureaucratic sectionalism. The committee will be modeled 
after a similar system in Britain. The present system of 
administrative vice ministers' meetings will not be abolished, but 
their functions will be reviewed to prevent them from holding 
meetings to make adjustments ahead of cabinet meetings. 
 
The DPJ also plans to set up an administrative reform panel to 
review the overall administrative procedures to find wasteful 
spending and irregularities. The panel will be responsible for 
scrutinizing all budgets and systems and urging each ministry or 
agency to correct inappropriate procedures. 
 
The plan is also intended to alter the current system in which the 
ruling party is allowed to play a central role in the policymaking 
process. Specifically, the ruling party policy research council will 
be abolished, while about 100 lawmakers will be posted within the 
government to serve as ministerial aides in addition to the cabinet 
minister, vice minister and parliamentary secretary who are 
currently serving at each ministry. 
 
These three individuals will formulate and make decisions on 
policies at each ministry and agency. A DPJ government aims at a 
system in which the cabinet decides on matters in an integrated 
manner under the initiative of lawmakers. 
 
(5) U.S. Consul General in Okinawa Kevin Maher says in pre-departure 
press conference that detailed reversion plan will be announced 
soon 
 
OKINAWA TIMES (Page 2) (Full) 
July 11, 2009 
 
U.S. Consul General in Okinawa Kevin Maher held a press conference 
on July 10 ahead of his departure from the post. In it, Maher made 
the following comment regarding a master plan specifying details of 
(the return of) the six facilities south of Kadena Air Base, that 
have been agreed upon between the governments of Japan and the 
United as part of the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, "I don't 
know the specific timetable, but (the master plan) will be announced 
in the near future." He indicated that (the master plan) will be 
made public early before the end of the year. 
 
Under the realignment agreement, the master plan was supposed to be 
announced in March 2007, but two years and three months have passed 
without such an announcement. 
 
 
TOKYO 00001586  005 OF 010 
 
 
About the scale of Camp Zukeran that will be returned, Maher 
reiterated the explanation that talks are underway in Tokyo between 
Japan and the United States on matters, such as a plan for family 
housing. He said: "The Okinawa public might be skeptical (about the 
realization of the return (of the facilities)), but I personally 
think (the master plan) should be announced early. (The return of 
the facilities) will occur once Futenma Air Station and Guam 
relocation plans are successful." 
 
The governor will be asked next year for authorizing landfill work 
for using surface areas for constructing a Futenma Air Station 
replacement facility. The consul general expressed a view that the 
governor will give his consent to the plan, saying: "The governor 
thinks force realignment will work favorably for Okinawa. He has not 
tried to obstruct the environmental impact assessment procedures. He 
has been cooperative." 
 
Maher expressed his impression of his three-year assignment in 
Okinawa this way: "Okinawa residents' views on the security system 
have become pragmatic." He also developed his stock argument, 
noting: "In opinion polls, the base issue came fifth, sixth after 
the economy, employment and welfare as points at issue in elections. 
I don't think all frictions are gone, but I think many people in 
Okinawa have become aware that the U.S.-Japan security arrangements 
work to Okinawa's advantage." 
 
(6) Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Kono confirms 
secret nuclear accord with ex-Vice Foreign Minister, to demand 
change in government reply 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Top play) (Full) 
July 11, 2009 
 
In connection with the alleged secret agreement between Japan and 
the U.S. at the time of the revision of the bilateral security 
treaty in 1960 that allows U.S. ships and aircraft carrying nuclear 
weapons to stop over in Japan. House of Representatives Foreign 
Affairs Committee Chairman Taro Kono met with former Administrative 
Vice Foreign Minister Ryohei Murata in Kyoto on July 10 and 
confirmed the existence of this secret agreement with him directly. 
Kono wants the Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee to formally 
demand a change in the government's reply to the Diet that denies 
the existence of such an agreement. 
 
Kono told Tokyo Shimbun on the same day that Murata had confirmed 
the existence of a document related to the secret agreement 
"although he does not remember the details of the wording" and that 
there was a document handed down from one vice minister to the next. 
Kono said, "From now on, the government's reply to the Lower House 
Foreign Affairs Committee that 'the secret agreement did not exist' 
will be unacceptable," indicting his plan to demand a change in the 
government's reply. 
 
He also revealed that the committee will pass a resolution demanding 
a change in the government's reply. 
 
The government has consistently denied the existence of the secret 
agreement after this was reported in the media. 
 
At the Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 1, Foreign 
Minister Hirofumi Nakasone has given the following reply: "Previous 
prime ministers and foreign ministers have denied the existence of 
 
TOKYO 00001586  006 OF 010 
 
 
the secret agreement. The introduction of nuclear weapons by the 
U.S. forces requires prior consultation, but the U.S. government has 
never requested consultation." Director General Kazuyoshi Umemoto of 
the North American Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
stated: "I have never seen the so-called secret agreement and has 
never briefed the foreign minister on this." 
 
If a resolution is passed at the Diet, it is highly possible that 
the government will be forced to change its reply. According to 
Kono, in response to the request for him to testify at the committee 
as an unsworn witness, Murata said that, "It will be difficult for 
me to go to Tokyo for personal reasons," but he was positive about 
Kono and others traveling to Kyoto to question him. 
 
Murata served as administrative vice minister for foreign affairs 
for about two years from 1987. 
 
(7) Russian president suggests negotiating Northern Territories 
issue based on return of only two islands 
 
SANKEI (Page 1) (Full) 
July 11, 2009 
 
Takao Sato, Moscow 
 
According to an Interfax report, Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev 
indicated at a news conference held after the G-8 L'Aquila Summit in 
Italy on July 10 that the Japan-Soviet Joint Communique (signed in 
1956) will be the basis of negotiations on the Northern Territories 
issue. This document stipulates the return of the islands of Habomai 
and Shikotan to Japan after the signing of a bilateral peace 
treaty. 
 
This shows that the Russian position remains unchanged from that 
during the previous Putin administration, attesting to the fact that 
there had been no progress made at the Japan-Russia summit meeting 
on July 9. 
 
Medvedev stated at the news conference: "Russia regards the 1956 
joint communiqu as the only legal document. Dialogue should be 
based on this document." 
 
Russian sentiments toward Japan in connection with the Northern 
Territories issue have deteriorated rapidly after the Diet enacted 
the special measures law for the promotion of a solution to the 
Northern Territories issue, which stipulates for the first time that 
the Northern Territories are "an integral part of Japanese 
territory." There have been a number of demands in Russia to suspend 
negotiations on the territorial dispute and the "visa free exchange 
program" allowing the exchange of visits between Japanese citizens 
and residents of the Northern Islands. A mass rally has just been 
held in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk on July 10 to protest Japan's legal 
revision. 
 
(8) Competition between Japan and Italy over Nasiriyah oil field 
development right 
 
MAINICHI (Page 4) (Full) 
July 12, 2009 
 
Cooperation between government and private sector 
 
 
TOKYO 00001586  007 OF 010 
 
 
A Japanese consortium involving Nippon Oil Corporation (ENEOS) and 
an Italian firm are competing to secure the right to develop the 
Nasiriyah oil field in southern Iraq. Japan is aiming to secure the 
right in a joint effort between the government and the private 
sector, based on the bitter experience of losing the concession 
rights for the Khafji oil field in Saudi Arabia, the first oil field 
developed by a Japanese company. The Iraqi government will designate 
a contractor shortly. Since the Italian company is pulling out all 
the stops, the situation is still touch and go. 
 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) Minister Toshihiro Nikai at a 
meeting with visiting Iraqi Oil Minister Husayn al-Shahristani on 
July 9 made a remark backing Japanese companies' efforts to secure 
the Nasiriyah oil field development right. He indicated the 
government stance of assisting with construction of infrastructure 
in Iran, such as the building of railroads: "I would like you to 
confer on the matter with related companies. The Japanese government 
will provide full assistance." 
 
Iraq, which is suffering from the aftereffects of the Iraq War, 
approved foreign companies' entry into the development of domestic 
oil and gas field so as to secure funds to finance the 
reconstruction of the nation. It carried out bidding for eight oil 
and gas fields in late June. Of those projects, a consortium formed 
by BP, the largest oil company in Britain, and China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was awarded the contract to develop the 
Rumaila oil field, one of the largest oil fields in Iraq. 
 
Bidding for the Nasiriyah oil field falls under a separate framework 
from bidding for those eight oil and gas fields. Consortiums of 
Japan, Italy, and Spain are negotiating with Iraq on the oil field's 
development. Iraq has narrowed down the bidders to a consortium of 
Japanese companies' formed by ENEOS (the largest domestic primary 
oil distributor), Inpex Corporation, and JBC Corporation (a major 
plant engineering firm); and Italy's Ente Nazionare Idrocarburi. Oil 
Minister al-Shahristani on the 10th told reporters that he will 
reach a decision shortly, saying, "We have completed technical 
screenings. All we have to do now is financial adjustments." 
 
Security of esources 
 
Securing the Nasiriyah oil development right is of vital 
significance to Japan. Japan purchases almost all the crude oil it 
consumes on the oil market. Crude oil prices skyrocketed last year 
due to emerging countries' economic development and the influx of 
speculative money into the oil market, dealing a blow to the 
Japanese economy. It has now become difficult to secure stable 
supplies of crude oil due to mounting resources nationalism. 
 
However, if Japanese companies secure rights to develop oil fields 
abroad, it will be possible for the nation to procure crude oil on a 
stable basis even in the event of an emergency. Oil fields, in which 
Japan has a large ratio of interest, are called "Japanese-flag oil 
fields." Arabian Oil's Khafji oil field is one of those oil fields. 
 
However, Japan's interest in the Khafji oil field expired in 2000, 
when the Japanese side showed reluctance to accept a condition the 
Saudi Arabia set in renewing Japan's concession rights - building 
mining railways. Japan also transferred most of its interest in the 
Azadegan oil fields in Iran due to pressure from the U.S. to suspend 
the development of the oil field, making an issue with the nation's 
nuclear development. 
 
TOKYO 00001586  008 OF 010 
 
 
 
The government has set a goal to raise the ratio of oil produced 
from Japan-developed oil fields to imported crude oil to 40 PERCENT 
by 2030. According to METI, the ratio as of the end of 2007 stood at 
about 19 PERCENT . For this reason, securing the Nasiriyah oil field 
development right is an important issue in terms of energy security 
as well, according to ENEOS executive. It is also Japan's long-held 
ambition. 
 
Fifty-fifty chance 
 
In a bid to secure the Nasiriyah oil field development right, 
Japan's consortium has proposed that it help Iraq to build 
infrastructure, such as oil refineries and power plants, and provide 
financial assistance through the Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation (JBIC). ENEOS Chairman Fumiaki Watari said in 
confidence, "I have some leads." 
 
ENEOS has independently developed oils fields in the North Sea and 
in the Gulf of Mexico. Daily outputs from those oil fields total 
130,000 barrels. Daily production of 600,000 barrels is expected 
from the Nasiriyah oil field. An ENEOS executive expressed his 
hopes, saying: "There will be no other opportunity for Japan to 
become involved in the development of an oil field on this scale." 
Domestic demand for oil is bound to drop. However, the company wants 
to lead this opportunity to a pillar of earnings, since overseas 
demand, mainly in emerging countries, is solid. 
 
According to a related source, Japan was ahead of Italy as of May. 
However, Italy reportedly made additional proposals regarding 
conditions. The chances of the Japanese consortium to win the 
development right are said to be about fifty-fifty. 
 
(9) Profile of John Roos, U.S. ambassador-designate to Japan 
 
CHUOKORON (Pages 182-183) (Full) 
August 2009 
 
Five hundred thousand dollars for France, 100,000 dollars for the 
UK, and 500,000 dollars for Japan: These are the respective amounts 
of political donations raised by the people appointed by U.S. 
President Barack Obama as ambassadors to the above countries in the 
past presidential election. However, these are merely figures known 
to the mass media. It is quite possible that the sums of money 
actually collected might be much more substantial. 
 
There is no denying that the foremost reason why John Roos, 54, was 
appointed by President Obama as the next ambassador to Japan is that 
this was a reward for his services in the election campaign. Just 
like ambassador-designate to France Charles Rivkin, president of an 
entertainment company in California, and ambassador-designate to the 
UK Louis Susman, a former bank executive, there is nothing in the 
career history of this topnotch Silicon Valley lawyer that suggests 
connections with Japan or any diplomatic experience. 
 
Roos was born in San Francisco. He joined the California bar after 
graduating from the Law School of elite Stanford University in 1980. 
Setting his eyes on Silicon Valley near his university -- an area 
enjoying an IT industry boom -- he joined a local law firm and 
became involved in corporate mergers and acquisitions. In 2005, he 
became the CEO of that law firm, which counted Google and other 
major companies among its clients. 
 
TOKYO 00001586  009 OF 010 
 
 
 
Roos has had no experience in public service and has had little 
media exposure, so his personality is little known. A Yomiuri 
Shimbun correspondent approached him directly at his house in an 
exclusive residential area near Silicon Valley in late May, but he 
would not say anything at all, telling the reporter he had "no 
comment" on his appointment as ambassador. He was wearing casual 
attire, a white shirt and dark blue trousers, and was driving his 
Toyota Prius to take his son to school. The impression one gets is 
not that of a capable lawyer but that of an ordinary American dad. 
 
However, he has a long record of support for the Democratic Party. 
In 1984, soon after he became a lawyer, he took off from work for 
one year to concentrate on campaigning for former Vice President 
Walter Mondale, who was running for president. He had been a 
supporter of Obama even before he announced his candidacy. He has 
built a close relationship with Obama and can pick up the phone and 
call him anytime. 
 
It is said that there are three types of U.S. ambassadors to Japan 
-- first, experts on foreign policy or Japan, such as former Harvard 
University Professor Edwin Reischauer and former Under Secretary of 
State Michael Armacost; second, heavyweight politicians, such as 
Mondale and former House of Representatives speaker Thomas Foley; 
and third, individuals who do not have diplomatic experience but are 
close to the president, such as former Ambassador Thomas Schieffer, 
who is a close friend of former President George Bush. 
 
Needless to say, Roos belongs to the third type. The State 
Department had at first endorsed Harvard University Professor Joseph 
Nye, a renowned international political scientist, but the White 
House pushed Roos. This can be said to be a case of type three 
shoving aside type one. 
 
While type three is rather rare among ambassadors to Japan, for the 
United States as a whole, there have been many cases of supporters 
being given ambassadorial posts after a presidential election. 
 
For sure, there has been no lack of criticism. 
 
The American Academy of Diplomacy, a private group formed by former 
diplomats, recommends reducing the ratio of inexperienced 
ambassadors from the current 30 percent to about 10 percent. David 
Rothkopf, researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, voices the following criticism on Roos' appointment: "This 
sends the message (to Japan) that political fundraising is more 
important than expertise in diplomatic exchanges with the number two 
economy in the world and an important ally in East Asia." 
 
For now, the Japanese government welcomes Roos' appointment. Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Takeo Kawamura said, "He enjoys the great 
confidence of the President, and this is a sign of the importance 
attached to the Japan-U.S. alliance." However, it is unclear how 
helpful a personal relationship with the president will be for the 
job of ambassador. 
 
Former Ambassador Schieffer was instrumental in arranging a meeting 
of the families of the abduction victims with President Bush, but he 
was unable to stop the president from removing North Korea from the 
list of state sponsors of terrorism. When an ambassador differs with 
the home government in Washington, the president gives priority to 
the home government's policy in most cases. Roos has even less 
 
TOKYO 00001586  010 OF 010 
 
 
political and diplomatic experience than Schieffer, who had been a 
politician at the state level and the ambassador to Australia before 
coming to Japan. He will need to develop his own views on the 
Japan-U.S. relationship before anything else. 
 
According to gossip in Washington, Roos has purchased a large number 
of books on Japan and is studying very hard. We will have to see the 
outcome of his studying. It is believed that Roos will arrive in 
Japan around the fall, after obtaining Senate confirmation of his 
appointment. 
 
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