VZCZCXRO5914
OO RUEHSL
DE RUEHTC #0418/01 1941545
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 131545Z JUL 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3025
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2825
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0407
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2229
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 000418 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: ENROUTE TO YES ON MOST 
"ASKS" POST-2010 
 
REF: A. 09 THE HAGUE 0268 
     ¶B. 09 THE HAGUE 02...



216367,7/13/2009 15:45,09THEHAGUE418,"Embassy The Hague",
SECRET,09SECSTATE31102|09THEHAGUE238|09THEHAGUE268|09THEHAGUE78|09THEHAGUE9
2,"VZCZCXRO5914
OO RUEHSL
DE RUEHTC #0418/01 1941545
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 131545Z JUL 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3025
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2825
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0407
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2229
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03
THE HAGUE 000418
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: ENROUTE TO YES ON MOST
""ASKS"" POST-2010
REF: A. 09 THE HAGUE 0268
¶B. 09 THE HAGUE 0238
¶C. 09 THE HAGUE 0092
¶D. 09 THE HAGUE 0078
¶E. 09 SECSTATE 31102
Classified By: Politcial-Economic Counselor Andrew C. Mann for reasons
1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (U) This cable follows up on post's ""Netherlands
/Afghanistan: Getting to YES post-2010"" (reftel C).
¶2. (S/NF) SUMMARY: The Dutch consensus-based political
process for post-2010 commitments in Afghanistan remains on
track for a Cabinet decision in the fall followed by a
parliamentary review in late 2009 or early 2010. We
understand Labor Party (PvdA) leader/Deputy PM/Finance
Minister Wouter Bos is the only cabinet member not in
agreement with the details of a continued role in
Afghanistan. The Dutch consider this an internal decision;
overt lobbying will likely provoke greater resistance to our
desired goal. Therefore, discreet, coordinated engagement is
necessary to assist committed Dutch leaders in gaining
consensus from Bos and later approval by
Parliament. END SUMMARY.
----------
The Stakes
----------
¶3. (S/NF) Prime Minister Balkenende (Christian Democrats -
CDA), Foreign Minister Verhagen (CDA) and Defense Minister
van Middelkoop (Christian Union - CU) reportedly agree the
Dutch should support most of the ""Afghanistan Asks"" (reftel
E). Specifically they want to retain the Provisional
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Uruzgan with a force protection
of up to 500 personnel, and provide F-16's, intelligence
assets, airlift and attack helicopters, military trainers and
mentors, police mentors, medical units, special operations
forces, support for counter-narcotics initiatives,
agricultural development, and increased support for
governance and development programs. Bos, however, is highly
skeptical and he has failed to tip his hand as to his actual
position yet. We understand he may be supportive of most
""asks"" except the PRT and helicopter assets.
-------------------
The Critical Player
-------------------
¶4. (S/NF) Verhagen recently expressed great concern about the
Labor Party and specifically Bos, who continues to balk at
the Dutch presence in Afghanistan, particularly in Uruzgan
post-2010. Privately, Verhagen stated the Labor Party could
support ""staying in Afghanistan in some roles but not
continue in Uruzgan."" This contrasts with confidential
comments from the Labor Party defense spokesperson, MP
Angelien Eijsink, who favored continuing the PRT in Uruzgan
because of the investments to date in time, effort, funds and
lives. Additionally, she stated that as a member of NATO the
Dutch have a commitment to remain a viable part of the
mission. However, for the Labor Party to support continuing
with the PRT in Uruzgan, she said there must be a clear
understanding and commitment that the mission is solely
dedicated to ""stabilization and reconstruction.""
¶5. (S/NF) The poor showing of the Labor Party in the June
European Parliament elections (dropping from 23.7% of the
vote in 2004 to 12%, its all time lowest vote percentage in
any election) has put Bos under pressure from the rank and
Qany election) has put Bos under pressure from the rank and
file supporters, who generally oppose the military mission in
Afghanistan. His leadership of the party is questioned
regularly in the press - Labor Party faithful complain Bos
gave in on authorizing the purchase of a JSF test aircraft
earlier this year even in this difficult economic environment
and they are concerned the party leadership will support
raising the retirement age in Cabinet deliberations this
autumn. Still, as the party leader, he is key to the future
of the Dutch engagement in Afghanistan beyond 2010.
THE HAGUE 00000418 002 OF 003
--------------------
Engagement Strategy
--------------------
¶6. (S/NF) Our outreach plan and talking points detailed in
reftel C remain the basis for our engagement with the Dutch:
- We appreciate the long-standing and significant
contribution in Afghanistan, specifically in Uruzgan, that
the Dutch have made.
- The Dutch are a valued partner in NATO's efforts to address
a common threat in a dangerous region.
- While it is an internal decision by the Dutch whether they
will stay in Afghanistan, we hope they will continue with
other NATO allies and other countries in ISAF as it
implements its new strategy.
- We hope the Dutch will continue their stability and
development efforts in Uruzgan to build upon the considerable
Dutch achievements there.
¶7. (S/NF) Bos, as Finance Minister and party leader, does not
deal directly with Afghanistan on a regular basis. Bos is
extremely skeptical of any discussion on this subject by U.S.
officials. He considers any discussion about post-2010
Afghanistan engagement to be an internal Dutch political
decision. Reportedly, Bos ""was not surprised"" but ""not
pleased"" when Afghanistan was brought up in his June 29
meeting with Secretary Geithner. He argued the Netherlands
was a small country which had already been doing its fair
share in Afghanistan. He also suggested other, bigger
countries were not pulling their weight.
¶8. (S/NF) Success in getting the Dutch to keep their PRT in
Uruzgan will hinge upon the Labor Party's recognition that
the Uruzgan mission is developmental in nature and sustained
commitment is needed to ensure the success of their
peacebuilding and development investments there. The Labor
Party could also be influenced by how much other countries
are ""stepping up to the plate"" in support of ISAF's new
strategy.
¶9. (SBU) The Cabinet has started its summer break, until
mid-August. When it returns, it will focus on the budget
which must be agreed on and presented to Parliament by
September 15 (Prinsjesdag). Since Bos is Finance Minister,
he will be pre-occupied until then.
¶10. (S/NF) MFA Deputy Director General Robert de Groot
discussed a plan with POLMILOFF on July 2 for engaging Bos in
forums considered to be ""inclusive"" - to avoid the appearance
of outside pressure. He suggested a cascade of
visits/forums/meetings involving USNATO Ambassador Daalder,
SRAP Ambassador Holbrooke, and perhaps UN Special
Representative Kai Eide. Obviously, we will take our cue
from the discussions PM Balkenende has with the President in
Washington July 14. After that, we suggest using the
courtesy call on Bos by the new U.S. Ambassador to the
Netherlands (whenever confirmed and credentials presented) to
find out what his concerns are, with an offer to put Bos in
contact with those senior U.S. officials who can respond to
them. We anticipate having USNATO Ambassador Daalder give a
public address on the new NATO strategy in Afghanistan in the
autumn. General Petraeus, CENTCOM Commander, is planning to
visit the Netherlands in mid/late September to participate in
commemoration activities for WW II 65th anniversary
Qcommemoration activities for WW II 65th anniversary
liberation events. We hope to have him speak to a small
group of parliamentarians, if his schedule permits. Likely
at the invitation of FM Verhagen or Development Cooperation
Minister Koenders (both of whom he has met), SRAP Ambassador
Holbrooke could then follow up with a visit and talk
effectively about the new strategy, the importance of Dutch
3D efforts in Uruzgan and the contributions other countries
are making.
¶11. (S/NF) We continue to be on the lookout for opportunities
to engage with decision makers locally as well as having
Washington leaders meet with senior Dutch officials.
Furthermore, we continue to engage other members of the Labor
Party who may be able to exert influence on Bos in the run-up
to the cabinet decision. Development Cooperation Minister
THE HAGUE 00000418 003 OF 003
Koenders, Defense Spokesperson Eijsink, Floor Leader Mariette
Hammer, and Foreign Affairs Spokesperson MP Martijn van Dam
to name a few. It will take teamwork and coordinated
engagement with the Dutch at all levels to ultimately obtain
their commitment post-2010.
FOSTER