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Viewing cable 09STATE77679, UN MISSION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09STATE77679 2009-07-24 20:42 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Secretary of State
VZCZCXRO6114
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHC #7679 2052057
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 242042Z JUL 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 6972
INFO DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS STATE 077679 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PREL KPKO CD CT
SUBJECT: UN MISSION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND 
CHAD CONSULTATIONS: TALKING POINTS 
 
1.  The UN Security Council is scheduled to hold 
consultations on the Secretary-General's report on the UN 
Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad on July 28. 
USUN may draw on the points in paragraph 2, as appropriate. 
 
2.  Begin Points: 
 
I would like to thank the Secretary-General for his report on 
the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic 
and Chad (MINURCAT).  Today I would like to make four points. 
 
First, recognizing the difficulties of deploying to a region 
like Chad and CAR, we remain concerned by MINURCAT,s 
inability to deploy properly trained and equipped troops in a 
timely manner.  The currently deployed contingent of 46% is 
not enough to provide the level of security and assistance 
demanded by the harsh conditions and general insecurity in 
the region.  Without a fully deployed and supported 
contingent, MINURCAT cannot provide the necessary level of 
security to the civilian population and humanitarians in the 
region.  Given the fragile security conditions in Chad and 
the Central African Republic, a security gap of any duration 
must be avoided.  We urge DPKO and DFS and all organizations 
assisting with the deployment to take immediate steps to 
expedite troop deployments, and ensure that those troops are 
adequately trained and equipped to perform the mission,s 
mandate, including by establishing consistent supply lines 
and logistical support for the mission. In continuing support 
of the mission, the United States will continue to provide 
equip-and-train programs to deploying African contingents. 
 
Second, while we are pleased that the activities of the 
UN-trained Chadian special police, the Integrated Security 
Detachment (DIS), have resulted in improved security in and 
around the camps, we continue to be concerned about serious 
deficiencies in the training, equipping, and professionalism 
of the DIS.  As shown by recent attacks on the DIS, it is 
critical the DIS be fully prepared and equipped to provide 
professional security services and be capable of defending 
itself against attacks from often eavily-armed bandits. We 
believe the DIS would benefit from additional UN training on 
criminal investigations, weapons handling, and police 
conduct.  Improved equipment and better living conditions for 
the DIS are also needed if it is to reach its full potential. 
We also question whether the DIS have adequate resources to 
prevent child recruitment by armed groups visiting those 
camps.  We strongly encourage MINURCAT to begin regular 
engagement with the GOC to improve the operations and 
capabilities of the DIS.  We would also like to know how the 
UN plans to continue financing the DIS and whether MINURCAT 
forsees, given the proper training, the DIS resuming 
humanitarian escort duties between the camps rather than 
MINURCAT doing this itself. 
 
Third, we are deeply concerned about the growing violence in 
the Central African Republic (CAR) caused by inter-ethnic 
disputes, banditry, and lawlessness.  Internal displacement 
around Birao has increased.  Due to limited capacity, local 
and national security forces in CAR are unable to prevent 
further 
violence.  MINURCAT must assess its ability to provide 
adequate security in northeastern CAR, and adjust its 
operations in order to maximize its capability to protect 
civilians and humanitarian actors in the area.  At a minimum, 
MINURCAT should ensure that the troop contingent deployed to 
Birao remains at full strength at all times and that they 
conduct as many patrols as feasible. 
 
Fourth, although the United States recognizes Chad,s right 
to maintain the security of its borders against attack, it is 
imperative the Government of Chad demonstrate a commitment to 
ending the proxy war with Sudan.  The insecurity caused by 
the operations of armed groups in Chad and Sudan jeopardizes 
the peace and security in the entire region, and undermines 
efforts to attain peace in Darfur and provide humanitarian 
assistance to the enormous refugee and IDP population in 
eastern Chad. We welcome the GOC,s and Sudan,s stated 
intention of working to ease tensions between the two 
countries and urge their continued cooperation in 
implementing the Doha accord and previous agreements aimed at 
normalizing relations between the two countries. We strongly 
believe the GOC and Sudan must work together to improve 
relations, end all military and logistical support to armed 
groups operating within their respective countries, and to 
use their best efforts to bring all parties to the bargaining 
table. 
CLINTON