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Viewing cable 09STATE69808, GUIDANCE: LEBANON 1701 CONSULTATIONS, JULY 8

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09STATE69808 2009-07-06 21:39 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Secretary of State
VZCZCXYZ0010
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #9808 1872202
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 062139Z JUL 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0000
UNCLAS STATE 069808 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: UNSC PREL IS SY LE
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE: LEBANON 1701 CONSULTATIONS, JULY 8 
 
1. (SBU) This is an action message.  USUN is authorized to 
draw from the points in para 2 below as a basis for its 
participation in Security Council consultations on the 
Secretary-General's report on implementation of UNSC 
Resolution 1701 (Lebanon) scheduled for July 8, 2009, and for 
its public statements on the consultation. 
 
2. (U) Begin points: 
 
Thank you to Special Coordinator Williams and to Assistant 
Secretary-General Mulet for your briefings. 
 
This report, which we welcome, comes at an auspicious time. 
One month ago yesterday, the Lebanese state once again 
affirmed its independence in an electoral process that 
clearly represented the will of the Lebanese people. 
 
We look forward to working with the new Lebanese government 
and continuing to support Lebanese state institutions, such 
as the Lebanese Armed Forces.  It is our hope that the 
cabinet selection process continues to be conducted in the 
atmosphere of peace that marked the parliamentary elections 
and that the process will also be free of foreign 
interference.  The shape of Lebanon,s next cabinet is for 
the Lebanese alone to decide. 
 
These clear gains for Lebanon are amplified by the 
establishment of full diplomatic relations with Syria, but, 
as the Secretary General,s report indicates, there is much 
work outstanding before we can state that we have achieved 
full implementation of resolution 1701. 
 
Today I,d like to address four issues, which are, to a 
degree, interrelated:  control of the border, arms smuggling, 
armed militias, and Blue Line violations. 
 
First, despite the best efforts of Lebanon,s Common Border 
Force, whose additional planned deployment in the East is 
lauded by the Secretary General, the territorial integrity of 
Lebanon cannot be guaranteed without a clear delineation and 
demarcation of the common Lebanese-Syrian border, including 
in the Sheba,a farms area.  The Lebanese government has 
reiterated that its half of the Joint Border Committee stands 
ready to begin constructive work, and the Syrian government 
has indicated that it is in contact with the Lebanese 
government with the aim of convening a meeting of that body. 
When meeting U.S. officials in Damascus in early March, 
Syrian officials estimated that joint work would begin by 
early May.  However, the first meeting has not yet occurred. 
 
The repeated delays in beginning this crucial work lead us to 
ask:  what should be the role of the Security Council in 
facilitating improved security along the Lebanese-Syria 
border and, in particular, in promoting the urgent and 
necessary tasks of delineation and demarcation?  Given the 
delays to date, we would suggest that this is a serious issue 
for further discussion and that Council members should 
consider using their influence to speed this process through 
bilateral discussions with the parties involved. 
 
I also note that the Secretary General reports that the 
Common Border Force is arresting an increasing number of 
commercial smugglers.  We commend this as a sign of both 
increased efficiency and dedication among the agencies 
involved.  But what can we do to further improve the 
efficiency and success rate of this Force, and to ensure that 
it fulfills its primary goal of preventing the smuggling of 
weapons into Lebanon?  Should we consider coordinated 
provision of technical assistance and aid to the Lebanese 
Common Border Force, much as the international community, the 
United States included, has provided to build the capacity of 
the Lebanese Armed Forces and other Lebanese state 
institutions?  Has the time come to discuss a civilian 
monitoring mission sponsored by this Council?  Additional 
measures should be considered, as, disappointingly, not a 
single incident of weapons smuggling has been discovered to 
date. 
 
By Hizballah,s own admission, active arms smuggling is 
occurring across the Syrian border into Lebanon. 
If Hizballah is rearming, as Hizballah Deputy Secretary 
General Naim Qussem asserted in a speech on June 4th, then 
the arms it is obtaining must by definition be crossing the 
Lebanese frontier in clear violation of resolution 1701. 
Arms in the possession of Hizballah, and Palestinian 
rejectionist groups such as the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine ) General Command and Fatah 
al-Intifada, pose, according to the Secretary General, a 
threat to Lebanon,s security and the stability of the 
region.  Hizballah,s arms clearly violate resolutions 1559 
and 1701 and, in the words of the Secretary General, &pose a 
serious challenge to the ability of the Lebanese State to 
exercise full sovereignty over its territory.8  I would note 
that these arms also pose a danger to regional stability.  As 
described in the report, Hizballah,s Deputy 
Secretary-General has admitted that it has provided, via its 
cells in Egypt, &every type of support to Palestinian groups 
in Gaza, including military assistance over a long period,8 
an unwarranted and illegal interference in Egypt,s political 
affairs.  How can Hizballah purport to defend the sovereignty 
of Lebanon at the same time as it violates the sovereignty of 
other Arab states? 
 
The Secretary General suggests that the issue of militia arms 
be resolved through a domestic Lebanese process, but that 
process must ultimately result in Hizballah submitting to the 
authority of the Lebanese government and converting itself 
into a solely political entity. 
 
Moreover, this issue cannot be solely the concern of the 
Lebanese government, as Hizballah receives political and 
material backing from foreign states, especially Syria and 
Iran.  At the same time, we must work to address the 
outstanding political challenges that Hizballah has seized 
upon to justify its weapons, including the unresolved 
Sheba,a farms dispute, which requires but a signed map from 
Syria to affirm its stated position that Sheba,a is Lebanese 
territory, as well as Israeli Blue Line violations ) my 
final point. 
 
We must ask ourselves how we can work together to reassure 
the Government of Israel that its northern border and nearby 
citizens are secure, as well as how we might best ensure 
disarmament of Lebanese militias.  Until we can answer these 
questions, Israel has said it will persist with its 
reconnaissance over-flights of Lebanon.  While we recognize 
those over-flights as violations of the Blue Line, we also 
understand Israel,s justification for them:    this Council 
has not ensured that Lebanon has secured it borders in order 
to prevent the entry of illegal arms or related materiel.  In 
short, Hizballah has intentionally created the threat that 
leads to these Blue Line violations. 
 
In addition to my previous suggestions on the role the 
international community can play in helping Lebanon secure, 
delineate, and demarcate its border,  we would also do well 
to continue to robustly support UNIFIL,s mandate as laid out 
in resolution 1701. 
 
We should also continue to urge Israel to take further steps 
toward the implementation of resolution 1701, including by 
withdrawing from northern Ghajar village.  We think Israel,s 
sharing of technical strike data on cluster munitions is an 
excellent step toward building confidence in the region and 
would hope that the spirit in which it was offered might be 
reciprocated by other parties.  We also note that the 
trilateral meetings at Naqoura have provided an excellent 
basis for bilateral military cooperation, and are handling 
increasingly complex issues of mutual concern.  We encourage 
the parties to address all outstanding provisions of 
resolution 1701 in an equally collegial and productive manner. 
 
We ask these questions because all of us here have shown our 
interest in and commitment to solving the perplexing, but 
critical problem of how to best achieve full implementation 
of resolution 1701, which the United States views as 
essential to a free and independent Lebanon, secure in both 
its territory and in its exercise of full national 
sovereignty.  We applaud the work of the Secretary General 
and his representatives in Lebanon, and pledge our support to 
their efforts to further the implementation of resolution 
1701.  We would ask both Lebanon and Israel, as well as 
Syria, Iran and other regional states with a stake in this 
resolution, to do the same. 
 
End Elements. 
CLINTON