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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000362 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA: NEW CHOD, OLD MINDSET 
 
Classified By: Ambassador McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  The nomination of Simeon Simeonov as Chief 
of Defense (CHOD) is a testament to the lack of appetite for 
serious reform.  In his previous position as Commander of the 
Air Force, Air Force modernization lagged far behind the 
other services.  A classic, myopic bureaucrat, he stifled 
innovation, failed to effectively leverage joint training 
opportunities with the United States and was unable to secure 
funds for his pilots to reach NATO standards for flight 
hours.  He was routinely chastised for poor performance by 
the Minister of Defense. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Simeonov's promotion was due largely to his close 
relationship with the President's Chief of Staff, Nikola 
Kolev (himself a former CHOD and Air Force Commander.) 
Kolev, and perhaps President Parvanov himself, seek to 
maintain control over the direction and speed of reform 
inside the MOD, by placing a malleable friend at the helm. 
The new CHOD fits this description, as do several other 
appointments controlling key nodes of the ministry, such as 
the new Inspector General and Joint Operations Commander, who 
both lack competence and integrity.  The full list of senior 
promotions included a few bright spots, such as several IMET 
graduates and good embassy contacts, but the ability of these 
talented reformers will be limited by the dead weight now 
piled on top of them.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3.  (C)  The nomination of Simeonov for a three-year term as 
the new CHOD elicited groans throughout the international 
defense community in Sofia.  Widely perceived as a failure in 
his previous position, the appointment was criticized in the 
media and scoffed at privately by Bulgarian career military 
officials.  Defense Minister Tsonev made a statement to the 
press distancing himself from the decision and implying the 
responsibility for the nomination rested solely with the 
President.  Technically, the nomination must come from MOD, 
be approved by the Council of Ministers and signed by the 
President, but in practice the Presidency is in a position to 
dictate in advance which candidates it finds acceptable.  The 
Minister, whose own career is now uncertain following 
national elections, was not willing to directly challenge the 
President's choice, but took the opportunity to swipe at the 
new CHOD in public, saying that he hoped Simeonov could 
accomplish as CHOD many of the key Air Force reform 
priorities he failed to achieve as Air Force Commander. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Two other appointments of concern are LTG Atanas 
Samandov as Joint Operations Commander and Major General 
Volodya Tsvetanov as the Chief Inspector.  Samandov, who will 
be in charge of all Bulgarian military operations, including 
overseas missions in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, is not 
considered to be a top-performer and has been widely rumored 
to be involved in corrupt defense acquisition deals. 
Tsvetanov is a disturbing choice as Inspector General since 
he is also widely considered to be corrupt, and is the 
brother (with a different surname) of disgraced former 
Bulgarian Interior Minister Rumen Petkov, who resigned last 
year in a scandal over his links to organized crime.  As part 
of the personnel moves, the previous Deputy CHOD VADM 
Lyutskanov and Joint Operations Commander LTG Pehlivanov, two 
close and constructive partners were removed from their 
positions, a deep net loss. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Not all of the 30 or so general officer appointments 
were bad.  Most were acceptable given the seniority and 
performance of the officers promoted.  Four of the 
nominations are particularly good news, since they include 
smart, energetic reformers with international experience such 
as participation in IMET programs:  Maj Gen Rumen Radev as 
Deputy Chief of the Air Force, BG Stefan Yanev as MOD 
Director of Security and Defense Policy, Maj Gen Konstantin 
Popov as Air Force Commander and RADM Plamen Manushev as 
Naval Forces Commander.  We can expect continued support and 
cooperation from this group, but their ability to stimulate 
bottom-up reform will be limited as their superiors, 
particularly the new CHOD, will be able to stifle any moves 
contrary to their interests. 
 
¶6.  (C)  COMMENT:  Despite our concern over three of the top 
appointments, the new crop of senior military officers will 
not prevent us from advancing our bilateral security agenda 
with Bulgaria.  In practice, the Bulgarian Defense Staff 
(previously called the General Staff) are policy implementers 
not policy makers, so even the CHOD will not be able to 
countermand clear political decisions on issues such as 
deployments to Afghanistan.  The troubling appointments 
represent a missed opportunity and demonstrate the 
unconstructive influence of the President and his staff, who 
 
SOFIA 00000362  002 OF 002 
 
 
have not challenged crooked procurements (and likely 
benefited from them) or vigorously supported real reform. 
Progress on planning, training and procurement reform will 
depend on the next Defense Minister who will need to battle 
with the entrenched interests of the Presidency and its 
allies.  We will continue to work with the new CHOD and use 
our assistance programs as a lever to secure progress on our 
key priorities:  expanding Bulgarian participation in 
overseas deployments and increasing the number and quality of 
deployable and NATO-interoperable Bulgarian military assets 
across all three services. 
 
McEldowney