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Viewing cable 09SEOUL1210, SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; July 31, 2009

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SEOUL1210 2009-07-31 06:15 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXRO0947
OO RUEHGH
DE RUEHUL #1210/01 2120615
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 310615Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5177
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 8934
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDI/OEA//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-Z//
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0085
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6375
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6458
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 1063
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 4807
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 3778
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 6974
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1319
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2638
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1715
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2325
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SEOUL 001210 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON KPAO KS US
SUBJECT: SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; July 31, 2009 
 
TOP HEADLINES 
------------- 
 
Chosun Ilbo 
ROK Household Debt Up 52 Percent in Past Five Years while Average 
Household Income Increases 25 Percent 
 
JoongAng Ilbo, Dong-a Ilbo, Hankook Ilbo, Seoul Shinmun 
New Loan Plan for Poor Students; Repayment 
can be Delayed until Work is Found 
 
Hankyoreh Shinmun 
ROK Gives Up Presidency 
for International Human Rights Agency 
 
Segye Ilbo 
President Lee: "We Cannot Afford to Go Slow 
on Corporate Restructuring" 
 
 
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 
-------------------- 
 
According to the Unification Ministry and military authorities, an 
ROK fishing boat carrying four crew members was seized and towed to 
a North Korean port yesterday morning after straying north of the 
border off the east coast. The ROKG called for the immediate release 
of the boat and crew members via an inter-Korean maritime 
communication line, but the North simply said that an investigation 
is underway. (All) 
 
A North Korean fishing boat, meanwhile, drifted into the ROK's 
waters in the West Sea (Yellow Sea) yesterday afternoon, but was 
shortly towed back by a North Korean patrol boat. (All) 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL NEWS 
------------------ 
 
Victor Cha, professor at Georgetown University and former Director 
for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council, said during a 
July 23 (Washington time) discussion with senior journalist Kim 
Young-hie that "if North Korea repeatedly demands bilateral talks 
(with the U.S.), Washington will find it difficult to continue to 
reject the North's demand." (JoongAng) 
 
 
MEDIA ANALYSIS 
-------------- 
-N. Korea 
---------- 
Yesterday's seizure by North Korea of an ROK fishing boat carrying 
four crew members received wide press coverage.  The media reported 
that the fishing boat was tugged away by a North Korean patrol boat 
after straying north of the border off the east coast yesterday 
morning.  According to media reports, the ROKG called for the 
immediate release of the boat and crew members via an inter-Korean 
maritime communication line, but the North simply responded that an 
investigation is underway. 
 
Most newspapers noted North Korea's previous practice of returning 
ROK ships within a few days if they mistakenly strayed into North 
Korean waters, and expected that the incident will not become a 
major variable in inter-Korean relations.  Right-of-center JoongAng 
Ilbo observed that how North Korea deals with this situation will 
become a gauge of future inter-Korean ties.  Conservative Dong-a 
Ilbo wrote in the headline: "Another Obstacle for Strained 
Inter-Korean Relations? A Bridgehead for Resuming Talks?" Moderate 
Hankook Ilbo's headline read: "Possibility that N. Korea May Use the 
Seizure as New Pressure Card against ROK" 
 
Right-of-center JoongAng Ilbo carried a July 23 (Washington time) 
 
SEOUL 00001210  002 OF 004 
 
 
discussion between its senior journalist Kim Young-hie and Victor 
Cha, professor at Georgetown University and former Director for 
Asian Affairs at the National Security Council.  The paper quoted 
Victor Cha as saying: "The Obama Administration will concentrate its 
efforts on resuming the Six-Party Talks in the first place, but if 
North Korea repeatedly demands bilateral talks, Washington will find 
it difficult to continue to reject the North's demand." 
 
 
 
FEATURES 
---------- 
 
"IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR WASHINGTON TO CONTINUE TO REJECT NORTH 
KOREA'S REPEATED DEMANDS FOR BILATERAL TALKS" 
(JoongAng Ilbo, July 31, page 10) 
 
By senior journalist Kim Young-hie, reporter Park Seong-gyun and 
Washington correspondent Kim Jeong-wook 
 
Senior journalist Kim Young-hie interviewed Victor Cha, professor at 
Georgetown University. 
 
Victor Cha, professor at Georgetown University, has recently been 
named to an additional position.  He is serving as the first 
director of the 'Korea Chair,' which is in charge of Korean affairs 
at the Washington-based think tank the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies.  Professor Cha is leading an unofficial forum 
consisting of experts on the Korean Peninsula.  I interviewed 
professor Cha at the CSIS conference room regarding the prospects of 
the stalled North Korean nuclear issue. 
 
Kim Young-hie: "Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs, said in Seoul that if North Korea takes 
serious and irreversible steps toward nuclear dismantlement, the 
U.S. could offer a comprehensive package that would be attractive to 
North Korea.  What is the comprehensive package?" 
 
Victor Cha: "The comprehensive package will cover economic 
assistance including energy aid, the normalization of diplomatic 
relations with the U.S., and a peace treaty.  However, the Obama 
Administration is unlikely to seek normalization of relations before 
North Korea achieves complete denuclearization." 
 
KIM: "North Korea has reaffirmed that it is opposed to resuming the 
Six-Party Talks but it is not against dialogue with the U.S.  Do you 
think that the U.S. will agree to bilateral talks with North Korea 
and not the Six-Party Talks?" 
 
CHA: "It is the third time since 2003 that North Korea has declared 
the Six-Party Talks over.  It is just rhetoric.  Initially the Obama 
Administration will concentrate its efforts on resuming the 
Six-Party Talks, but if North Korea repeatedly demands bilateral 
talks, Washington will find it difficult to continue to reject the 
North's demands." 
 
KIM: Do you think that UN and U.S. sanctions against North Korea 
prompted North Korea to demand bilateral talks with the U.S.? 
 
CHA: I think UN sanctions played a direct role in making North Korea 
turn its attention to negotiation.  It was the same with the Banco 
Delta Asia (BDA) case.  Many people believe that sanctions against 
North Korea during the George W. Bush Administration led to North 
Korea's nuclear test, while the sanctions during the Obama 
Administration serve to lure North Korea back to the negotiating 
table.  This is ironic.  Even if North Korea appears to come back to 
the negotiating table, the U.S. should not easily lift the 
sanctions. 
 
KIM: There is a movie called "D-13 (Thirteen Days)," which concerns 
the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.  (In the movie,) then-Defense 
Secretary Robert McNamara abruptly interrupts the fleet commander, 
who is about to give an order to fire on a Soviet Union naval 
vessel.  When the commander protests by claiming the order to fire 
 
SEOUL 00001210  003 OF 004 
 
 
is just for warning, McNamara says, "What we are doing now is not a 
blockade of Cuba, but rather President Kennedy and Khrushchev are 
communicating with a new language.  Are President Obama and 
Secretary of State Clinton communicating with North Korean leader 
Kim Jong-il through a unique langue of sanctions and harsh rhetoric? 
 
 
CHA: I don't think so.  The sanctions this time are more than 
rhetoric or gestures.  Blockading Cuba was a temporary measure but 
the sanctions will be put in place until North Korea gives up its 
nuclear program.  The Bush Administration called on the 
international community to join in sanctioning North Korea. 
However, what differs considerably this time is that the 
international community is obligated to slap sanctions on North 
Korea. 
 
KIM: Some observers say that North Korea's nuclear test and 
long-range rocket launches came due to internal factors such as Kim 
Jong-il's ill health or power succession.  Is the U.S. responding 
based on such understanding? 
 
CHA: The U.S. responds to North Korea's actions, not to its internal 
factors.  The U.S position is that it will talk with North Korea if 
it seeks denuclearization, regardless of which regime comes to 
power.  The U.S. responds to North Korea's actions, not to its 
intents. 
 
KIM: During his meeting with President Obama this June, President 
Lee Myung-bak seemed to get the feeling that the U.S. thinks North 
Korea will not abandon its nuclear ambitions, regardless of economic 
rewards. 
 
CHA: President Lee understood the atmosphere in Washington 
correctly.  After the second nuclear test, many people began to 
think that North Korea will not abandon its nuclear ambitions. 
Still, the reason why the U.S. seeks negotiations with North Korea 
is that, although the goal is the denuclearization of North Korea, 
realistic efforts to freeze nuclear development at the current level 
are also necessary.  They think that a nuclear freeze is better than 
doing nothing and letting (the North) advance its nuclear program. 
 
KIM:  Former U.S. Vice President Al Gore is being mentioned as a 
special envoy to release the two U.S. female journalists in North 
Korea.  Is there any possibility that their release may lead to 
overall negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea or Pyongyang's 
return to the Six-Party Talks? 
 
CHA: It is always likely, since there is no limit to the 
negotiations.  However, it depends on who will be appointed as a 
special envoy.  Gore would focus on negotiations over the release of 
the journalists, and if Jimmy Carter or Bill Clinton visits 
Pyongyang, the story would be totally different. 
 
KIM: In the ROK, some people argue that the ROK-U.S. missile 
guidelines should be revised so as to put the entire North within 
missile range.  Will the U.S. agree to it? 
 
CHA: I do not think so.  However, if North Korea's military 
capabilities continue to grow, the Pentagon will have no choice but 
to consider a response.  Then, naturally, the issue (of extending 
the missile range) will inevitably rise to the surface. 
 
If Kim Jong-il suddenly dies, it will put the succession of power to 
Jong-un into doubt. 
 
KIM: Do you think that North Korea's succession plan involving Kim 
Jong-il's third son Jong-un will have a "soft landing"? 
 
CHA: The succession of power to Kim Jong-un is a very difficult 
issue.  North Korea has four factions: the military, the party, the 
cabinet, and the Kim family.  Even in a dictatorial society, a 
stable power transfer takes some time, but if Chairman Kim dies 
suddenly, there will be no time for that.  History shows that in a 
situation like that, many coups d'tat take place. 
 
SEOUL 00001210  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
KIM: Due to Kim Jong-il's heath problems, the situation in North 
Korea is uncertain.  Do (we) have emergency plans? 
 
CHA: The Roh Moo-hyun Administration did not want to discuss this 
issue in depth.  The Obama and Lee Administrations should have 
substantive talks, and in particular, they need to discuss (this 
matter) with China.  China's partial involvement is needed to work 
out a viable plan. 
 
KIM: Are such discussions with China under way? 
 
CHA: There is no discussion at the government level (track 1). 
Mindful of North Korea, China is reluctant to participate in such 
discussions.  But the private sector (track 2), including academic 
circles and think tanks, are unofficially showing much interest. 
 
KIM: How about the Obama Administration's policy team on the Korean 
Peninsula? 
 
CHA: Although Secretary Clinton plays a very important role, the 
person that deals with the North Korean nuclear issue on a 
day-to-day basis is Deputy Secretary James Steinberg.  Clinton, 
Steinberg, and Campbell are the three key figures.  Steinberg is 
very intelligent and greatly interested in the ROK, China, and 
Japan, while Campbell is very close to Clinton.  All three attach 
importance to the ROK-U.S. alliance. 
 
KIM: What are the prospects for the ROK-U.S. Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA)? 
 
CHA: The only way to get the ROK-U.S. FTA ratified is for the White 
House to take the lead.  Congress is not willing to move. 
Unfortunately the Obama Administration does not seem likely to take 
the lead due to the situation with party politics in the U.S.  One 
way is for the ROK to sign the FTA with EU quickly and pave the way 
for European companies to flock to the ROK so that U.S. businesses 
pressure Congress out of concern that they may lose the ROK market 
to European companies. 
 
 
 
STEPHENS