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Viewing cable 09SEOUL1176, SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; July 27, 2009

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SEOUL1176 2009-07-27 07:06 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXRO6878
OO RUEHGH
DE RUEHUL #1176/01 2080706
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 270706Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5117
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 8904
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDI/OEA//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-Z//
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0063
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6336
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6422
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 1039
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 4775
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 3748
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 6940
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1297
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2616
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1693
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2302
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 SEOUL 001176 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON KPAO KS US
SUBJECT: SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; July 27, 2009 
 
TOP HEADLINES 
------------- 
 
Chosun Ilbo 
Pharmaceutical Companies Offering a Year's Worth of Rebates in Lump 
Sums to Doctors and Hospitals that Prescribe and Purchase their 
Drugs, Ahead of Implementation of Law to Punish Pharmaceutical 
Rebates 
 
JoongAng Ilbo 
President Lee: "Moderate Pragmatism is the Basis of 
Lee Myung-bak Administration" 
 
Dong-a Ilbo, Segye Ilbo 
Court Rules against Regulating Private Cram School Tuition 
 
Hankook Ilbo 
Increasing Number of Middle-Class and Young People Becoming Credit 
Defaulters 
 
Hankyoreh Shinmun 
ROKG, Ignoring Controversy over Validity of Passage of Media 
Industry Reform Bills, Pushes "Follow-up Measures" 
 
Seoul Shinmun 
National Assembly Speaker Not to Accept Resignations of Main 
Opposition DP Lawmakers Who Want to Quit Legislative Posts in 
Protest of Passage of Media Reform Bills 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL NEWS 
------------------ 
 
North Korea's ambassador to the UN, Sin Son-ho, in a July 24 meeting 
with reporters, expressed the North's interest in resuming bilateral 
talks with the U.S. for the first time since the launch of the Obama 
Administration. (All) 
 
The North Korean ambassador, however, reiterated Pyongyang's 
previous position that the Six-Party Talks on the North's nuclear 
program "are gone forever." (All) 
 
According to the Tokyo-based Chosun Sinbo, North Korea opened its 
first fast-food restaurant in its capital in early June. (All) 
 
 
MEDIA ANALYSIS 
-------------- 
 
-N. Korea 
--------- 
All ROK media today gave prominent attention to July 24 press 
remarks by North Korea's ambassador to the UN Sin Son-ho in which he 
expressed the North's interest in resuming bilateral talks with the 
U.S. for the first time since the launch of the Obama 
Administration.  The North Korean ambassador was widely quoted: "We 
are not against dialogue.  We are not against any negotiation over 
issues of common concern." 
 
The media also noted that the North Korean ambassador reiterated 
Pyongyang's previous position that the Six-Party Talks on the 
North's nuclear program "are gone forever," quoting him as saying: 
"We have already made our position very clear.  We will never 
participate in the Six-Party Talks, ever again." 
 
Conservative Chosun Ilbo commented that even if North Korea returns 
to the negotiating table, the U.S. will not present it a package of 
rewards, given Secretary of State Clinton's remarks at the latest 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that the U.S. and its negotiating 
partners do not intend to reward North Korea just for returning to 
the table.  Chosun headlined its article: "Is N. Korea Trying to 
Escape International Isolation with Dialogue Card?" 
 
 
SEOUL 00001176  002 OF 006 
 
 
Right-of-center JoongAng Ilbo editorialized: "The North's intentions 
can be understood in several ways.  It is looking to prevent 
full-fledged implementation of UN sanctions.  By doing so, it hopes 
to mitigate its food and economic crisis and at the same time 
achieve its long-cherished goal of acquiring the status of a nuclear 
power.  However... the North must bear in mind that Washington is 
firmly committed to engaging in negotiations with the North in an 
irrevocable manner.  This is the core part of the 'comprehensive 
package' (recently proposed by the U.S.)" 
 
Left-leaning Hankyoreh Shinmun, in a July 25 (Saturday) editorial 
entitled "U.S. Sets in Motion Process for New Negotiating Framework 
with N. Korea," argued: "If North Korea refuses the hand being 
stretched out by the U.S., both China and Russia will readjust their 
relations with the North.  This is why the North should regard this 
(U.S. offer of a 'comprehensive package') as its last opportunity 
for negotiations." 
 
 
OPINIONS/EDITORIALS 
------------------- 
 
U.S. SETS IN MOTION PROCESS FOR NEW NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK WITH N. 
KOREA 
(Hankyoreh Shinmun, July 25, 2009, Page 23) 
 
Despite sanctions on North Korea, the U.S. is advancing discussions 
on the "comprehensive package" of incentives for the North.  This is 
a starting point to form a framework for negotiations aimed at 
fundamentally resolving the North Korean nuclear issue.  The U.S. 
should use this atmosphere to join hands with other related nations 
in resuming negotiations as soon as possible. 
 
During the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which ended on July 25, U.S. 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that if North Korea takes 
irreversible steps toward denuclearization, the U.S. and its 
partners would move forward on a package of incentives, including 
rewards such as U.S.-North Korea diplomatic normalization.  For the 
first time since the launch of the Obama Administration, Clinton 
presented a large framework for negotiations with North Korea. 
Prior to this, while visiting the ROK, U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell laid out a 
"two-track" approach toward North Korea consisting of dialogue and 
sanctions, but put an emphasis on dialogue.  This confirms 
Washington's intention to seek negotiations soon after the North 
stops provoking and makes clear its commitment toward nuclear 
dismantlement. 
 
Washington's intention has reportedly been delivered to North Korea 
through a direct channel.  Regarding the two U.S. female 
journalists, who have been detained in North Korea for over three 
months, the U.S. seems to be actively exchanging views with North 
Korea.  The foreign ministers of the Six-Party nations, except North 
Korea, also met during the ARF and shared the need for dialogue with 
North Korea.  In other words, the conditions are being created for 
the U.S. and North Korea to start negotiations while maintaining the 
Six-Party framework. 
 
At issue is North Korea's stance.  Pyongyang continuously has been 
saying something to the effect that Washington's hostile policy is 
to blame for all conflicts.  However, the North should realize that 
efforts to resolve the nuclear issue must go hand in hand with the 
improvement of U.S.-North Korea relations and that nothing can be 
resolved without dialogue.  Furthermore, as shown in the fact that 
the UN Security Council resolution regarding tougher sanctions on 
North Korea is being implemented after its unanimous adoption, North 
Korea's isolation has deepened more than before.  If North Korea 
refuses the hand being stretched out by the U.S., both China and 
Russia will readjust their relations with the North.  This is why 
the North should regard this (U.S. offer of the "comprehensive 
package") as its last opportunity for negotiations. 
 
The ROKG should refine the comprehensive package and give active 
support to efforts to make negotiations with Pyongyang effective. 
 
SEOUL 00001176  003 OF 006 
 
 
Before that, of course, Seoul should play a key role in creating an 
atmosphere favorable to negotiations.  To this end, we should first 
improve stalled inter-Korean ties.  Rather than sitting idly by and 
waiting for North Korea to change its behavior, the ROKG should 
first show a different attitude to the North from a broad 
perspective. 
 
 
ΒΆS. KOREA MUST NOT BE EXCLUDED FROM TALKS WITH THE NORTH 
(Chosun Ilbo, July 27, 2009, Page 27) 
 
North Korea's envoy to the UN Sin Son-ho on Friday told reporters in 
New York his government is not against dialogue on issues "of common 
concern." 
 
It has become customary for North Korea to propose talks after 
committing a provocation that rattles the world.  In talks held 
under such circumstances, North Korea has deceived the international 
community and bolstered its nuclear capabilities.  The Barack Obama 
Administration has repeatedly vowed not to be swayed by Pyongyang's 
tactics, reducing the chances of success of North Korea's latest 
maneuver. 
 
But the present stalemate cannot continue indefinitely.  The U.S. is 
seeking direct talks with North Korea, provided the North 
unconditionally returns to the Six-Party Talks.  Sin on Friday said 
the Six-Party Talks are "gone forever."  But a shift in that stance 
could immediately lead to direct talks between North Korea and the 
U.S. 
 
Or if North Korea makes leaps and bounds in its development of a 
nuclear warhead, long-range missile and uranium enrichment, the U.S. 
government and the international community could face intense 
pressure to negotiate with it.  The chances of such a scenario are 
even greater if China continues to refrain from pressuring North 
Korea while seeking to maintain the status quo.  Either way, North 
Korea and the U.S. will end up face to face at a dialogue table. 
 
But we cannot allow U.S.-North Korea talks to end up tacitly 
recognizing the North's nuclear weapons as an established fact. 
Even if direct talks do not produce such results, South Korea must 
be prepared to shoulder the national security, political and 
economic burden. 
 
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said during the ASEAN 
Regional Forum that if North Korea enters a process of irreversible 
denuclearization, the U.S. government is willing to offer a 
"comprehensive package" including establishment of formal diplomatic 
relations, a permanent peace treaty, and energy and economic aid. 
And the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea and the South's 
economic assistance to North Korea could be included in the agenda 
of talks. 
 
The U.S. and China begin their first-ever talks on diplomatic and 
economic strategy today.  North Korea is said to be among the main 
items on the agenda.  No matter how strong the Seoul-Washington 
alliance may be, we must avoid the situation of having our own fate 
discussed at talks that do not include us, between Washington and 
Beijing or Pyongyang.  We need to see realistic measures that can 
guarantee our right to voice our demands. 
 
But most of all, we must prepare a broad mid- to long-term national 
strategy and achieve domestic unity at least in terms of dealing 
with North Korea.  The latest set of sanctions must continue until 
the North shows a definite shift in its attitude, and then we must 
prepare for what will happen beyond that stage. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
NORTH MUST ADJUST STRATEGY 
(JoongAng Ilbo, July 27, page 34) 
 
 
SEOUL 00001176  004 OF 006 
 
 
North Korea has suddenly expressed interest in holding talks with 
the U.S.  North Korea's Ambassador to the UN, Sin Son-ho, said, 
"North Korea is not against dialogue.  We are not against any 
negotiation over issues of common concern."  These remarks by North 
Korea, which came amid escalating UN sanctions (against North 
Korea), are intended to ease these sanctions through dialogue with 
the U.S.  Whatever the reasons, it is good that North Korea 
expressed willingness to engage in dialogue.  There is no way to 
peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear issue without dialogue. 
 
 
The U.S. has urged North Korea to return to the negotiating table, 
while presenting a comprehensive package.  The U.S. has maintained 
its position that it will not provide new rewards to North Korea 
until it resumes talks and implements nuclear freezing and 
disablement, which it repeatedly rolled back.  However, the U.S. is 
not opposed to having bilateral talks with North Korea within the 
framework of the Six-Party Talks.  It appears to be reasonable that 
the U.S. is in this position, given the issue of two U.S. 
journalists detained in North Korea.  Therefore, attention is 
turning to whether Ambassador Sin's remarks will lead to talks 
between the U.S. and North Korea. 
 
The North's intentions can be understood in several ways.  It is 
looking to prevent the full-fledged implementation of UN sanctions. 
By doing so, it hopes to mitigate its food and economic crisis and 
to achieve its long-cherished goal of acquiring the status of a 
nuclear state. 
 
However, if North Korea sticks to its "past habit" of trying to gain 
from resorting to brinkmanship and pretending to talk, its 
intentions would be merely an empty imagination.  There is a 
prevailing opinion among people in the U.S. that the U.S. should not 
repeat its old negotiation pattern with the North.  They argue that 
the U.S. took phased steps by accepting North Korea's "word for 
word" and "action for action" approach, but could not prevent North 
Korea from reneging on their promises - reprocessing plutonium and 
conducting nuclear tests.  The North must bear in mind that 
Washington is firmly committed to engaging in negotiations in an 
irrevocable manner.  This is the core part of the 'comprehensive 
package' (recently proposed by the U.S.)  Above all, North Korea 
should clarify its intention to discard nuclear arms.  It should 
stop insisting that it should have nuclear weapons to protect itself 
from the U.S.  Otherwise, negotiations with the U.S. will not yield 
productive results. 
 
If North Korea abandons its nuclear ambitions and acts like a 
responsible member of the international community, the international 
community including the U.S. will extend a helping hand to 
Pyongyang.  In particular, the U.S. has proclaimed that the 
comprehensive package will include a variety of measures which North 
Korea would be "attracted" to, such as the normalization of 
diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the north.  The ROKG has 
long studied and prepared in various ways to help North Korea 
develop its economy.  But if North Korea continues to seek 
nuclearization and intends to hold talks only to turn the tables, it 
is evident that these assistance measures will become futile.  The 
North should keep in mind that "dialogue for the sake of dialogue" 
no longer works. 
 
 
FEATURES 
--------- 
 
PUBLIC BELIEVES GNP'S PASSAGE OF MEDIA LAWS WILL HARM BROADCASTING 
INDUSTRY 
(Hankyoreh Shinmun, July 27, 2009, Pages 1, 4, and 5) 
 
By Reporters 
 
A nationwide survey shows 51.2 percent in the GNP strongholds of 
North and South Gyeongsang Provinces believe the media industry 
landscape will deteriorate. 
 
 
SEOUL 00001176  005 OF 006 
 
 
A survey shows that seven out of ten citizens consider the Grand 
National Party's (GNP) railroading of media legislation "wrong." 
Moreover, 61.5 percent view the passage of this legislation as 
invalid. 
 
In a nationwide telephone survey of 1,000 men and women, age 19 and 
older, conducted by ResearchPlus at the request of the Hankyoreh, 71 
percent of respondents answered that it was "wrong" for the GNP to 
pass media legislation in spite of opposition parties' objections. 
In contrast, 21.6 percent of respondents believe the media 
legislation has been "well handled."  In another item regarding 
procedure, 61.5 percent of respondents believed that the passage of 
the legislation was invalid because of the second balloting and 
proxy voting that occurred in the same session of the National 
Assembly. This was in contrast to the 31.5 percent who consider the 
legislation to be valid. 
 
The survey also shows that citizens believe the GNP railroaded the 
bills because it wanted to create a broadcasting environment 
favorable to itself by opening up the way for pro-ruling party media 
conglomerates - Chosun Ilbo, JoongAng Ilbo and Dong-A Ilb - to enter 
the broadcasting market.  Respondents also believe that democracy in 
South Korea, and the critical monitoring functions of the press, 
will be greatly curtailed if this media legislation is implemented. 
 
When asked to select a response regarding the objective of allowing 
cross-ownership in newspapers and broadcasting industries, 36.2 
percent of respondents selected, "To form a broadcasting environment 
favorable to the Grand National Party."  Another 19.1 percent 
selected, "To aid the entry of the Chosun Ilbo, Dong-A Ilbo and 
JoongAng Ilbo into broadcasting."  In contrast, "To develop South 
Korea's media industry" and "To relieve the broadcasting oligopoly" 
were selected by 18.5 percent and 14.6 percent of respondents, 
respectively.  These results indicate that the public primarily 
believes that the recently passed media legislation was intended to 
preserve the GNP's political power and to afford special privileges 
to pro-ruling party media, rather than to increase the diversity of 
public opinion and expand the range of channel options, as the GNP 
claimed during the early stages of drafting the three media-related 
bills. 
 
In response to an item regarding the media legislation's impact on 
democracy in South Korea, 53.1 percent of respondents chose, "It 
will get worse."  Only 19.3 percent selected, "It will get better." 
In response to a question about press freedom following enactment of 
the amended laws, 56.4 percent of respondents believe that it will 
get worse, more than twice the 20.4 percent of those who believe it 
will improve. 
 
Survey participants also predict that the public interest character 
of the press, its monitoring and criticism functions, and the 
representation of a diverse range of opinions will face a major 
threat.  A mere 17.0 percent of respondents answered that the public 
interest character of the press will improve after the amendments 
are enacted, while more than three times as many, 54.8 percent, 
predict that it will deteriorate.  In addition, the survey results 
show that the number of responses from the Gyeongsang Provinces, the 
bedrock region for the GNP, predicting deterioration numbers 51.2 
percent, far outstripping the 21.3 percent predicting improvement. 
 
Respondents also expressed concerns about the monopolization of 
public opinion by media conglomerates.  The number predicting that 
such monopolization will become more serious than it is currently is 
nearly six times greater - at 64.6 percent - than the 11.8 percent 
predicting that it will grow weaker.  Among respondents who support 
the GNP, 38.0 percent believe that such monopolization will become 
more severe, and 24.0 percent believe that it will decrease. 
 
The results have a margin of error of plus-or-minus 3.1 percent at a 
95 percent confidence level. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
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STEPHENS