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Viewing cable 09SANTIAGO615, CHILE'S PRESIDENTIAL RACE: POLL POINTS TO A PHOTO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SANTIAGO615 2009-07-02 13:36 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Santiago
VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSG #0615/01 1831336
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 021336Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5150
INFO RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 2468
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
UNCLAS SANTIAGO 000615 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV CI
SUBJECT: CHILE'S PRESIDENTIAL RACE: POLL POINTS TO A PHOTO 
FINISH 
 
REF: A. SANTIAGO 579 
     B. SANTIAGO 548 
     C. SANTIAGO 524 
 
 1. (SBU) SUMMARY: According to the well-respected Center for 
Public Studies (CEP) poll released on June 18, Chile's 
presidential race is headed for a run-off between the 
opposition Alianza coalition's Sebastian Pinera and the 
governing Concertacion coalition's Eduardo Frei.  Analysts 
agree that the second round election will be tight, with the 
winner emerging with 51 to 52 percent.  Center-left pundits 
interpret the CEP poll as a positive signal for Frei because 
of the Concertacion's track record of pulling together before 
elections, the Bachelet government's record approval ratings, 
and Pinera's downward momentum.  Center-right observers think 
Pinera will win because of a weakened Concertacion and voter 
hunger for change.  One far-right pundit expressed pessimism 
at Pinera's chances in light of the CEP poll and cited 
growing divisions among conservatives, but said there is time 
for a turnaround. Both candidates will campaign with an eye 
towards attracting upstart, independent candidate 
Enriquez-Ominami and his supporters in the second round. END 
SUMMARY 
 
POLL SHOWS TIGHT RACE, PINERA TRENDING DOWN 
------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU)  The June 18 release of Chile's most respected 
public opinion barometer, the CEP poll, showed Sebastian 
Pinera -- from the center-right National Renewal (RN) party 
and part of the opposition Alianza coalition -- in the lead 
with support from 34 percent of registered voters, followed 
by Eduardo Frei -- from the center-left Christian Democrat 
(DC) party and part of the governing Concertacion coalition 
-- with 30 percent, and upstart, independent candidate Marco 
Enriquez-Ominami with 14 percent.  Pinera and Frei were tied 
at 39 percent in the likely second round run-off.  The poll 
also reported a record 66 percent approval rating for 
President Bachelet. 
 
3. (SBU) Pinera's overall support has dropped seven percent 
since the December 2008 CEP poll (from 41 down to 34 
percent), and his numbers are trending down on a variety of 
attributes, including his ability to solve the country's 
problems (from 45 down to 40 percent), sincerity (from 35 
down to 31 percent), and trustworthiness (from 49 down to 44 
percent).  Frei's numbers met or slightly exceeded 
expectations in overall support.  He registered gains when 
compared to the December 2008 poll in specific attributes 
such as inspiring confidence (from 50 up to 58 percent) and 
his preparedness to be president (from 56 up to 65 percent), 
where he outdoes Pinera by nearly 10 points.  Higher numbers 
for Frei were expected due to the fact that, during the 
December poll, he was only one among several possible 
Concertacion presidential candidates while the June poll is 
the first to measure support for Frei as the only 
Concertacion candidate. 
 
4. (SBU) The poll confirmed that Deputy Enriquez-Ominami, who 
recently resigned from the Socialist Party (PS) to run as an 
independent, has enough support from registered voters to 
impact the first round, but is unlikely to seriously 
challenge the main candidates.  Of the registered voters 
surveyed in the poll, 52 percent who opted for 
Enriquez-Ominami in the first round would vote for Frei in 
the second round, while 22 percent would support Pinera. 
Nineteen percent reported they would abstain and six percent 
were undecided. 
 
ALL SIGNS POINT TO RUN OFF, BUT OUTCOME IS UNCLEAR 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
5. (SBU) Election observers from across the political 
spectrum agreed the race will remain close and result in a 
run-off between Frei and Pinera, with the winner taking up to 
52 percent of the vote.  Pundits also concurred that 
Enriquez-Ominami's support will decline, predicting the 36 
year old parliamentarian will receive from seven to ten 
percent of votes in the first round.  With elections more 
than five months away, analysts noted the campaign is only 
just beginning and highlighted upcoming debates and the 
negotiation of congressional candidate lists as key 
indicators to track. 
 
6. (SBU) Center-left analysts argued the CEP poll points 
towards a second-round Frei victory.  They believe 
traditional Concertacion voters will be joined by at least 
half of Enriquez-Ominami's supporters to deliver the 
election.  The Concertacion has a history of being 
disorganized early on, but always manages to unite behind its 
candidate when it counts.  Observers noted that Frei's 
agreement to end Communist Party exclusion from Congress -- 
by agreeing to run Communist candidates on Concertacion lists 
in select districts -- was a shrewd decision that could 
generate an important one to two percent from the far left. 
Record approval ratings for President Bachelet and lukewarm 
support from Chile's far-right will make it extremely 
difficult for Pinera to cobble together 51 percent in the 
second round. 
 
7. (SBU) Center-right analysts disagreed and claimed the CEP 
poll shows signs of a Pinera victory.  They highlighted the 
fact that the Alianza has never held a lead in the polls at 
this stage of the race and argued that Enriquez-Ominami's 
emergence underscores a hunger for change.  They seized on 
the weakness of the Concertacion parties, noting the PS has 
three former members running for President. (NOTE: Candidates 
Enriquez-Ominami, Senator Alejandro Navarro, and Jorge Arrate 
are all ex-PS. END NOTE.) Several months ago, these analysts 
believed Pinera's only chance at winning was a first round 
knockout.  The CEP poll revealed the possibility of a second 
round triumph if Pinera can rally members (believed to be 
lukewarm to Pinera) of the far-right Independent Democratic 
Union (UDI) party -- the other half of the Alianza coalition 
-- and attract at least one-third of Enriquez-Ominami's 
voters. 
 
8. (SBU) One far-right observer expressed pessimism at 
Pinera's chances, stating that a hoped-for 40 percent support 
in the CEP poll was a psychological barrier that Pinera 
failed to surpass.  He lamented Pinera's inability to craft a 
coherent campaign message.  Moreover, a recent controversy 
over Pinera's support for government distribution of the 
"morning-after pill" in Chile highlighted the latent 
divisions within the Alianza coalition.  Social conservatives 
doubt Pinera's commitment to defending their positions, rural 
conservatives think Pinera is favoring his own RN party's 
congressional candidates over UDI candidates, and true-blood 
nationalist conservatives have always questioned Pinera's 
credentials because of his opposition to Pinochet during the 
1988 plebiscite.  The growing divide between Pinera and the 
various conservative constituencies will make it difficult to 
garner campaign support and generate strong conservative 
turn-out in the first and second rounds. 
 
SUPPORT FOR ENRIQUEZ-OMINAMI REFLECTS DISAFFECTION 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
9. (SBU) Analysts agreed that the young, media-savy, 
inde-pendent Enriquez-Ominami polls well among voters who are 
disaffected by political parties and turned off by the other 
candidates.  These voters are primarily Concertacion members, 
the far-left, and newly politically engaged young people. 
Enriquez-Ominami's candidacy is perceived by political 
observers as a product of generous media coverage.  One 
analyst even argues, with numbers in hand, that the 
politically conservative media holding company that owns El 
Mercurio increased its coverage of Enriquez-Ominami in April 
and early May in order to impact the CEP poll (and thus, the 
argument goes, generate more competition for Frei).  This 
coverage, combined with the candidate's open discussion about 
controversial issues such as gay marriage and the 
"morning-after pill", explains his surprising rise in the 
polls. 
 
10. (SBU) Analysts noted that Enriquez-Ominami never expected 
to be in this position, so he has little to lose.  His 
inexperience, undetermined policies, and lack of 
institutional support make it unlikely that he can seriously 
challenge Frei and Pinera.  The CEP poll showed that 58 
percent of registered voters have already decided they will 
not vote for him.  Still, he continues to pick up steam, the 
latest being Humanist and Green party endorsements and the 
addition of his father, prominent Senator Carlos Ominami, to 
his campaign after resigning from the PS on June 27. 
Analysts acknowledged that both Frei and Pinera will campaign 
with an eye on Enriquez-Ominami voters for the second round. 
 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
11. (SBU) While the elections are still five months away, the 
challenges facing the main candidates are clear.  Pinera must 
attempt to simultaneously rally his base and court 
Enriquez-Ominami voters.  He especially needs the UDI to 
actively campaign and get out the vote.  Frei will try to 
focus all of his attention on Pinera for the first round, 
then attempt to unite the Concertacion and pull disaffected 
voters back to fold for the second round.  Even if 
Enriquez-Ominami has benefited from generous press coverage, 
his numbers reflect legitimate dissatisfaction with Chile's 
political parties and candidates.  He has almost no chance of 
winning, but his unexpected candidacy has added color to an 
otherwise predictable campaign. END COMMENT. 
SIMONS