VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSJ #0622/01 2052300
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 242300Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1063
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 000622 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA, WHA/CEN AND USOAS, SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2019 
TAGS: AEMR ASEC CASC KFLO MARR AMGT PGOV PINR PREL
KDEM, CS, HO 
SUBJECT: TFHO1: ARIAS MAKES FINAL EFFORT FOR HONDURAS 
SOLUTION 
 
REF: A. SAN JOSE 608 
     ¶B. SAN JOSE 602 
     ¶C. SAN JOSE 587 
 
Classified By: Peter M. Brennan for reason 1.4 (d). 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. On July 22, President Oscar Arias presented 
his final proposal, a carefully balanced mix of his original 
Seven Points and a Micheletti counterproposal, to end the 
ongoing constitutional crisis in Honduras.  The "San Jose 
Accord (or Agreement)," as Arias called it (despite a lack of 
agreement on either side) laid out 12 points detailing a 
possible reconciliation including the return of Manuel Zelaya 
to the presidency and the moving forward by one month of 
national elections.  Zelaya representative Rixi Moncada, in 
her statement after Arias read his proposal, said that the 
"accord had failed" and repeatedly referred to the interim 
government as a "militaristic, coupist" regime.  Roberto 
Micheletti's representative at the press conference, Mauricio 
Villeda, was less antagonistic and said that "we respect the 
separation of powers" in government and would review Arias' 
proposal with the legislature and Supreme Court.  However, he 
still rejected the re-installation of Zelaya as president. 
Arias ended his part by saying that unless both parties 
agreed to discuss the San Jose Accord, his mediation was over 
and further mediation could take place at the OAS.  A brief 
review of the San Jose Agreement is in para seven.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) Late in the afternoon of July 22, President Oscar 
Arias convened a press conference on his "San Jose Accord," 
flanked by both Honduran delegations.  Approximately 20 
ambassadors, including CDA Brennan, from the diplomatic corps 
also attended the event.  In his opening statement, Arias 
reviewed the status of negotiations in San Jose up to that 
point and emphasized that the only way out of this stalemate 
was by a negotiated reconciliation.  Victory, he said, will 
go to both sides, or none at all. 
 
¶3. (U) Arias said that it was up to the delegations now to 
decide if they were going to sign the accord and that his job 
as mediator was to seek the peaceful re-establishment of the 
constitutional order and democracy in Honduras.  He 
underlined that unless both parties committed to work on the 
new accord, his mediating role was complete and that there 
were other routes for mediation to this conflict, such as the 
OAS.  He hoped that the Honduran delegations would now 
complete their part. 
 
¶4. (U) At this point, Arias proceeded to read, word for word, 
the entire 12 points of the San Jose Accord.  (NOTE: 
Actually, there are 10 substantial points, an implementation 
schedule, and a final declaration.  END NOTE)  Immediately 
after Arias' speech, Rixi Moncada (from Zelaya's delegation) 
forcefully read her statement and concluded by saying that 
the "agreement had failed."  She repeatedly referred to the 
de facto government as a militaristic and "coupist" 
("golpista" in Spanish) regime and would not sign this new 
"agreement."  Moncada added that: 
 
 -- From Saturday (July 18) until today nothing has happened; 
 -- their side had accepted Arias' Seven Point proposal, but 
Micheletti's had not; 
 -- we want to re-establish the constitutional order; 
 -- at the request of U.S. Secretary (of State) Clinton, we 
accepted President Arias' mediation, but the de facto regime 
did not; 
 -- we request that President Arias urgently cal on all SICA 
presidents, the OAS Permanent Councl and the UN Security 
Council to enforce their rsolutions based on domestic and 
international rights; and 
 -- this proposal failed because of the ntransigent de facto 
government. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Immdiately after Moncada spoke, Micheletti 
representative Mauricio Villeda said that he would take the 
proposal back to Honduras.  He emphasized, in a pointed jab 
at the Zelaya delegation, that "we respect the separation of 
powers" of government and "democratic institutionality."  His 
statement was far less antagonistic than Moncada's, but he 
firmly rejected any re-installation of Zelaya as president. 
Villeda added that: 
 
 -- Honduras is a country that has experienced a great deal 
of international interference; 
 -- the country is united and you can travel there and verify 
 
it; 
 -- this accord presents points already proposed, its 
calendar insists on Zelaya's return to power and the 
conformation of a conciliation government; 
 -- we are taking this proposal to our three powers and our 
general prosecutor; and 
 -- our authorities will be in touch with you to continue 
this dialogue. 
 
¶6. (C) After all of the statements, Costa Rican FM Bruno 
Stagno told us that there really was no viable option other 
than negotiation.  He said that "armed insurrection is not 
the answer."  He also agreed that neither side really wanted 
to go back to the OAS.  He added that behind closed doors, 
the delegations were not as "sharp" with each other and that 
there was still room for negotiation and time to peacefully 
resolve the crisis.  President Arias figured that it could 
take up to eight days for the next round of negotiations to 
begin. 
 
¶7. (U) Brief review of the 12 points of the San Jose 
Agreement: 
 
 -- Formation of a government of national unity and 
reconciliation comprised of representatives of the different 
political parties; 
 -- Political amnesty exclusively for political crimes 
committed before and after June 28, 2009 and until the 
signing of this agreement.  Likewise, signatories to the 
agreement would not initiate or continue legal actions on 
account of acts prior to July 1, 2009 arising out of this 
conflict for a period of six months; 
 -- Renouncement of the convocation of a constituent national 
assembly to amend aspects of the constitution that cannot be 
amended; 
 -- Consider moving forward national elections from November 
29 to October 28, 2009; 
 -- Command of the Honduran Armed Forces would transfer to 
the Supreme Electoral Tribunal one month prior to the 
elections; 
 -- Return of public authorities to positions they held prior 
to June 28, which implies the return of Jose Manuel Zelaya 
Rosales to the Presidency of the Republic until the end of 
the current governmental term on January 27, 2010; 
 -- Establishment of a Verification Commission (to be chaired 
by OAS and other Honduran and international suitable  figures 
to ensure that this agreement is carried out, and the 
establishment of a Truth Commission; 
 -- Normalization of relations between Honduras and the 
international community (requesting immediate revocation of 
measures or sanctions imposed against Honduras); 
 -- Entry into force of the Agreement of San Jose (upon 
signature); 
 -- Final Provisions (disagreements on interpretation or 
implementation of this agreement will be submitted to the 
Verification Commission); 
 -- Schedule for compliance with the Agreement (lists dates 
for compliance if this agreement had been signed); and 
 -- Final Statement (commitment to implementing agreement). 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶8. (C) With this proposal, Arias has left the ball firmly in 
the courts of Zelaya and Micheletti.  Both sides, though, are 
clearly dug in to their primary positions and have not budged 
on them.  With Arias' negotiations "complete," there is at 
this point no plan for next steps, no definite timetable, and 
no clear path to a resolution.  Costa Rica is hosting the 
11th Tuxtla summit next week (July 27) and Zelaya has 
confirmed his participation, so there may be further 
discussions on the margins of that event. 
BRENNAN