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Viewing cable 09PRAGUE414, MOVING FORWARD WITH CZECHS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF EU

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09PRAGUE414 2009-07-15 14:38 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Prague
VZCZCXRO8062
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVK
RUEHYG
DE RUEHPG #0414/01 1961438
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 151438Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1575
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 000414 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR/ERA WLUCAS, EUR/CE FOR ASCHEIBE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EUN EZ EG PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: MOVING FORWARD WITH CZECHS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF EU 
PRESIDENCY 
 
REF: DIXON-EUR/ERA E-MAIL DATED 7.1.2009 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Now that the Czech EU Presidency has come 
to a close, emboffs have noticed several notable shifts 
within the GoCR - in tactical engagement within the EU, in 
Czech centers of power, and interestingly in high-level 
outreach to the USG.  The Czechs remain committed 
Euro-Atlantists and while they aspired to advance 
Transatlantic relations even further than they were able to 
during their EU Presidency, they continue to seek ways to 
strengthen these ties. There are also several areas of note 
(such as energy security, the Eastern Partnership, and 
limiting protectionist economic measures) where the Czechs 
feel they have substantially advanced issues within the EU 
over the last six months and where they continue to engage at 
the highest level.  End Summary. 
 
---------- 
Czechs Offer Highlights of Their Presidency 
---------- 
2. (SBU) During the Czech EU Presidency, the Czechs had to 
contend with the comments of the French and the collapse of 
their government, both of which they feel have undercut their 
credibility within the EU and the wider world.  In the later 
half of their presidency the Czechs took pains to emphasize 
their accomplishments, particularly in the areas of energy 
security, the Eastern Partnership, and avoiding protectionist 
measures in light of the economic downturn.  The Czechs even 
published two documents, "Results of the Czech Presidency in 
the EU Council" and "The most important legislative acts 
settled during the Czech Presidency" outlining these 
accomplishments (Ref A). 
 
3. (SBU) The strongly pro-American center-right Czech 
government had wanted to do more to strengthen transatlantic 
relations during their EU Presidency and were often 
frustrated by the lack of high-level U.S. interlocutors due 
to the pace of the U.S. transition.  While pleased to host 
the first U.S.-EU Summit with President Obama, they had hoped 
to leave a more lasting legacy such as a reinvigorated 
Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) or the launching of a 
U.S.-EU energy council.  They also were very public in their 
opposition to any EU protectionist measures and played a key 
behind-the-scenes role in pushing the European Commission to 
accept the U.S-EU interim beef agreement.  The Czechs will 
continue to support a strong transatlantic relationship and 
the elimination of transatlantic trade barriers.  In this 
area, Czechs are one of the closest U.S. allies within the 
EU. 
 
4. (SBU) The Czechs made energy security one of their main EU 
Presidency priorities and were widely praised for their 
handling of the January gas crisis and their ability to 
maintain EU consensus despite concerted Russian efforts to 
divide Europe.  The Czech EU Presidency also pushed through 
the Third EU Energy Liberalization package and 4 billion 
euros in EU funding for internal electricity and gas 
interconnections, carbon capture and storage pilot projects, 
and offshore wind farms.  The four billion euros also 
included 200 million euros in seed money for Nabucco and 100 
million for ITGI Poseidon.  Concerned about central and 
eastern Europe's dependence on Russian gas, the Czechs 
actively reached out to the Caspian energy producers and PM 
Topolanek became the first leader of an EU Presidency country 
to visit the Caspian region in that role.  The Czechs also 
held an EU-Southern Corridor Summit in May and Turkey 
subsequently signed the Nabucco intergovernmental agreement 
on July 13.  The Swedes recruited Czech MFA Energy Envoy 
Vaclav Bartuska to advise them during their Presidency and 
the Czechs are likely to continue to punch above their weight 
on EU energy issues for the foreseeable future. 
 
5. (SBU) With respect to the Eastern Partnership, for quite 
some time the Czechs have felt strongly that the EU needed to 
do more to engage its immediate neighbors and they were a 
driving force behind the very first summit with the EU's six 
Eastern neighbors this spring. The EU also pledged over 600M 
euros for the Eastern Partnership program aimed at 
encouraging internal reforms.  Now that there is a framework 
for discussions with these nations, backed up by the 
enticement of substantial EU funds, Czech MFA officials see 
this as an opportune time to press hard, particularly on 
human rights reforms.  Indeed, the European Commission met 
last month with Czech, Swedish, and Polish officials to 
discuss precisely how to carry forward internal reforms and 
support for civil society in these six nations, according to 
MFA Strategy and Analysis Deputy Director Martin Svarovsky. 
 
---------- 
 
PRAGUE 00000414  002 OF 003 
 
 
A More Subtle Czech Approach Within the EU? 
---------- 
6. (SBU) Officials within the Czech MFA Common and Foreign 
Security Policy (CFSP) Department recently commented to 
emboffs that they have learned quite a lot - especially when 
it comes to the formation of EU policy - in the last six 
months.  As an example, Deputy Director Sequensova noted that 
previously the Czechs would often state their opinion at an 
EU gathering and then hope the weight of their argument would 
convince others.  The Czechs learned that sometimes they were 
simply not engaged in debate or taken seriously if they were 
too rigid (especially when it came to their approach on human 
rights issues).  She commented that since leading the EU 
Presidency, the Czechs noted that some of the most effective 
member states laid the groundwork with other key members 
first and then basically present a fait accompli once the 
actual meeting occurred.  She noted that the Czechs now 
understand how effective this can be and that in the future 
they will put more effort into "lining things up" in advance. 
 The Czechs are also more confident and no longer feel the 
need to defer to the views of the larger, and older EU member 
states.  Deputy European Correspondent Magdalena Janesova 
noted that this is particularly true for the Czechs now when 
it comes to taking on France.  Sequensova also noted that 
when the Czechs first joined the EU in 2004 they felt obliged 
to study every subject.  According to Sequensova, leading the 
presidency has shown them that they would be better off 
studying and lobbying selectively. 
 
---------- 
Czechs Clamor for USG Attention 
---------- 
7. (SBU) As the Czechs slightly adjust their approach on 
advancing issues within the EU, they continue to engage the 
USG as in the past - seeking our insights and perspective on 
a range of subjects.  The frequency of this outreach by 
Foreign Minister Kohout in particular is of a different 
magnitude than under Foreign Minister Schwarzenberg.  While 
FM Schwarzenberg took an overarching view of issues and 
allowed those at the working level to advance issues, 
according to  Magdalena Janesova, from the time FM Kohout 
stepped into his new position, he has energetically engaged 
on a range of issues both within his MFA and with third 
countries.  This is significant because it is often at the 
Head of Government and Foreign Ministerial levels of the EU 
where leadership really makes a difference and Kohout appears 
eager to make his mark.  Unfortunately, Kohout's eagerness to 
engage his foreign counterparts on almost every foreign 
policy issue could backfire if he wears out his welcome. 
This would be unfortunate as Czech thinking often runs along 
similar lines to that of the USG.  With August holidays and 
Czech elections in October, we need to remain realistic as to 
what we can expect to see from Czech officials during the 
early fall. 
 
---------- 
Musical Chairs and Power Shifts 
---------- 
8. (SBU) Working with this Czech interim government, emboffs 
have noticed a definite shift in power and coordination from 
the Deputy Prime Minister's office (formerly led by Alexandr 
Vondra) to the MFA.  Indeed, the interim government scaled 
back Vondra's position in such a manner that Stephan Fule, 
who assumed the position, is simply the Minister of European 
Affairs while Jan Kohout was made Deputy Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister.  From the announcement of the new 
government, Kohout moved to transfer much of the 
responsibility for Summit preparations and substantive issues 
from Vondra's office to the MFA.  Also of note, the GoCR 
hired substantial numbers of young Czech professionals to 
support the Presidency, augmenting staffing in such places as 
the DPM's office as well as the MFA (and key Embassies such 
as their mission to Brussels which more than doubled in 
size).  While many of the most talented of these officials 
will be kept on, we are already seeing some departures, 
particularly in the logistical departments within the 
different ministries. Within the next six months there also 
will be a substantial number of MFA officials rotating to new 
posts, due in part to the recent lifting of the MFA freeze in 
transfers put in place last year to minimize transitions and 
staffing gaps during the EU Presidency. 
 
---------- 
Klaus as an Ongoing Distraction 
---------- 
9. (SBU) President Klaus, whose position is largely 
ceremonial in a normally functioning government, has assumed 
an increasingly significant role during this interim 
government.  This spring he represented the Czech Presidency 
 
PRAGUE 00000414  003 OF 003 
 
 
at several EU summits.  He has also created difficulties for 
the GoCR with the rest of the EU because he has been slow to 
sign several treaties - such as the accession to the 
International Criminal Court, which sat on his desk from last 
fall until July 9, 2009, and the Lisbon Treaty, which passed 
out of parliament to him in May 2009.  Klaus's foot-dragging 
did not help Czech credibility with the rest of their EU 
partners as the Czechs were the last EU member state to 
accede to the ICC.  While the Lisbon Treaty only passed 
through the Czech Parliament in May, Klaus' numerous 
objections make it all but certain that the Czechs will be in 
a similar, although much more awkward, position with their EU 
counterparts if Klaus holds up implementation of EU 
structural reforms defined in the Lisbon Treaty with his 
non-action. 
 
---------- 
Comment: An Ally Willing to Advance Issues of USG Interest 
---------- 
10. (SBU) The Czechs, who have always been strong 
Euro-Atlanticists, continue to engage in several key areas 
within the EU, where they may be able to have more direct 
influence over the shape of events to come.  Arguably they 
could be even more significant allies to work with in the 
upcoming year, now that they believe they better understand 
how to maneuver the levers of power within the EU and can 
revert to advancing their bilateral views without the 
constraint of having to represent the EU middle ground. 
However, the GoCR recognizes that it must surmount the 
credibly gap that exists with partners, not helped by the 
fall of the government, nor some of the actions of President 
Klaus. 
Law