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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PHNOM PENH 000489 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, P, D, IO, DRL 
NSC FOR L. PHU 
PACOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM KJUS PREL EAID CB
SUBJECT: WHAT IS HAPPENING TO THE HARD-EARNED POLITICAL 
SPACE IN CAMBODIA, WHY, AND WHAT SHOULD WE DO ABOUT IT? 
 
REF: A. PHNOM PENH 469 
     ¶B. PHNOM PENH 413 
     ¶C. PHNOM PENH 410 
     ¶D. PHNOM PENH 394 
     ¶E. PHNOM PENH 387 
     ¶F. PHNOM PENH 273 
     ¶G. 05 PHNOM PENH 1892 
     ¶H. 05 PHNOM PENH 210 
     ¶I. 05 PHNOM PENH 204 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CAROL A. RODLEY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The wider political space seen in Cambodia 
during the run-up to the 2008 National Assembly elections 
last July is undergoing an autocratic nip-and-tuck as the 
ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) exerts one of its 
periodic reining-in exercises in the name of greater social 
order and security.  The last three months have seen at least 
ten defamation and disinformation suits against opposition 
party members, journalists and private citizens.  The jailing 
of an opposition editor and the shuttering of an opposition 
newspaper have many human rights activists commenting on 
threats to fundamental freedoms of expression.  The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs took a broad interpretation of 
international legal norms on interference in internal affairs 
when, in response to the Ambassador's comments on endemic 
corruption (Ref D), it issued a diplomatic note to all 
diplomatic missions in early June.  While threats of violence 
or physical intimidation remain significantly lower than just 
five years ago, the CPP is mounting a sophisticated 
rules-based campaign to chip away at free speech.  Civil 
society and human rights monitors worry that more of these 
"rule of law" tactics will be used in pending legislation to 
curb the activities of NGOs (NGO Law) and restrict freedom of 
assembly (Peaceful Demonstrations Law). 
 
¶2.  (C) The CPP's roots as a hegemonic power structure and 
the approved use of UNTAC-era laws that had always emphasized 
peace and security at the expense of political and civil 
rights are among the causes for this new wave of defamation 
cases.  When CPP leaders perceive a choice between 
pluralistic liberal democracy and order, stability and 
economic development, they will exploit that conflict to 
maximize their own power and preempt opposition challenges to 
their political authority.  A familiar pattern of 
post-election crackdowns seen in 1995, 1998, and 2005 (often 
using defamation as the muzzle of choice), is playing out 
once again and CPP is following the same playbook that 
FUNCINPEC First Prime Minister Ranariddh used in the past. 
The biggest difference now is the much reduced violence, the 
more sophisticated curtailment of wide-open freedoms, and the 
appearance that CPP is making a bid to be the last party 
standing with no viable alternative in sight.  Embassy will 
continue to speak out on these threats to democracy and human 
rights and is already engaged in a long-term campaign to 
engage the government, reach out to NGOs and civil society, 
and stand up for basic freedoms while being cognizant of 
underlying fears by leaders of threats to order (that may be 
fueled by legitimate fears over the poor economy, joblessness 
among a huge youth population, and high crime rates). 
Continuing to build trust and understanding with the 
government, even when we disagree, is an important part of 
our ability to influence the outcome here;  in order to do 
this, some messages need to be delivered privately.  While 
many in the mainstream human rights and democracy NGO's 
support this approach, and indeed follow it themselves, 
others and some members of the political opposition will 
criticize it.  Finally it is important to note the current 
constriction of political space is a phenomenon almost 
entirely confined to Phnom Penh;  recent visits to a number 
of provinces reveal no significant impact or increased 
tension.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Freedoms Won 
------------ 
 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000489  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
¶3.  (C) While Freedom House still lists Cambodia as "not 
free", some of the sub-scores under political and civil 
liberties have improved modestly over recent years.  In the 
year-long run up to national elections in 2007-2008, 
Cambodia's political space opened up perceptibly.  Opposition 
members of parliament generally were more candid in their 
assessments of government failings, relatively crude rhetoric 
was a daily occurrence in an expanded set of newspapers (some 
of which were established solely to play obvious partisan 
roles),  and leading opposition newspaper Moneasekar Khmer 
increased its circulation five-fold to 5000 copies a day. 
More radio stations aired more opposition broadcasts daily in 
the first half of 2008 than in all of 2007.  While the CPP 
still dominated the media, the official 30-day campaign 
period saw the most balanced coverage of the 10 other 
contesting opposition parties than ever before.  The 
opposition Sam Rainsy Party was a big winner in this effort 
at greater equity during the campaign, and emerged from the 
elections as the strongest party after the CPP, despite 
generally a mediocre campaigning strategy and a failure to 
overcome the nationalist sentiment generated by the 
government's success in obtaining World Heritage inscription 
for Preah Vihear.  It is true that Sam Rainsy faced a 
defamation suit lodged by Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister Hor Namhong, but that appeared never to be more than 
an issue of personal honor, and was allowed to be continued 
until after the election.  One ham-fisted effort to detain 
opposition editor Dam Sith ended in his release and the 
dismissal of the case after Dam Sith offered a simple 
apology. 
 
A "Perfect Storm" of Litigation 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) All of that changed when, in an April 23 press 
conference Sam Rainsy Parliamentarian Mu Sochua expressed 
great offense at an off-the-cuff statement by Prime Minister 
Hun Sen on April 4 and announced her intent to sue the Prime 
Minister for defamation.  This openly hostile (and obviously 
personal) attack set off a war of words between the main 
protagonists and in the early stages the leading civil 
society advocates urged the parties to take the matter out of 
the courts.  But reported overtures to Mu Sochua to apologize 
and be done with it (many thought she could not build a case 
when, in fact, PM Hun Sen never mentioned her name) were met 
with principled statements about obtaining justice in 
Cambodia.  In the end, the government did what it has done so 
many times before and unleashed an unprecedented wave of 
defamation and disinformation suits (Refs A-F).  SRP leader 
Tioulong Saumura likened these suits, some of which carried 
jail time, to being dropped into the middle of a typhoon (Ref 
A) and told us recently that the Sam Rainsy Party would seek 
not to confront the CPP where it is strongest: in the courts 
controlled by the executive.  (COMMENT:  Saumura's analysis 
was essentially that an SRP member taunted Hun Sen into 
playing his game on his field and now the rest of SRP, upon 
consideration, realizes that they are no match, and that 
there is nothing to be gained from this folly.  END COMMENT.) 
 
Why Did it Happen? 
------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) CPP confrontation with those who challenge its 
authority is not new, although the continued decline in 
violence and physical threats and intimidation are welcome 
improvements.  Usually these conflicts occur in the period 
after elections, when parties are consolidating their 
positions.  Soon after the signing of the Paris Peace 
Agreement, before Cambodia's first election in 1993, the CPP 
response -- whether sanctioned by the leadership or not -- to 
the creation of a new party was to attack violently the 
political players.  UNTAC reinforced the peace and security 
message and the UNTAC law criminalized defamation in order to 
keep the Khmer Rouge propaganda machine at bay.  In 1995 
internal purges in the FUNCINPEC party was part of a 
CPP-FUNCINPEC leadership agreement to get rid of critics and 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000489  003 OF 005 
 
 
reflected the hard-ball politics that Cambodia has just 
emerged from:  Sam Rainsy, Son Sann, and Prince Norodom 
Sirivudh were all purged that year.  First Prime Minister 
Ranariddh, who was not unfamiliar with the uses of 
defamation, said that only "constructive" criticism was 
allowed.   After the 1998 elections, violence against 
opponents remained a dominant theme until a new government 
was formed.  The 2003 elections resulted in a political 
standoff for almost a year.  After the new coalition 
government was formed in 2004, the CPP again turned its 
attention to its opponents.  Throughout 2005 at least six 
defamation suits were brought against Sam Rainsy, Mam 
Sonando, Rong Chhun, Kem Sokha, Yeng Virak, and Pa Nguon 
Teang.  The parliamentary immunity of Rainsy was lifted in 
February 2005 along with that of SRP MP Cheam Channy (Refs H, 
I).  Late in 2005, Hun Sen said that freedom of speech must 
be balanced against the interests of social order and 
stability -- he was reacting especially to those critics of 
his policy regarding Cambodian-Vietnam border negotiations 
(Ref G). 
 
¶6.  (C) It was also Hun Sen who led the effort to 
de-criminalize defamation in early 2006.  By that time, 
Rainsy had been pardoned, Cheam Channy's sentence was reduced 
and the other critics were released.  However, the pattern of 
CPP tactics to exert control is clear: silence critics 
through the threat of the law.  With the defamation charge no 
longer carrying jail time, the government now turns to 
disinformation or incitement charges when it wants to make a 
point. 
 
¶7.  (C) In the new multi-party pluralistic democracy of 
Cambodia, the government has still not developed a thick 
skin, the sensitivity to criticism is high, and the desire to 
bring opponents down a notch still remains with the CPP as 
part of its nature, history and ideology.  With the 2008 
elections well behind it, the government can now turn its 
attention to its critics.  Hun Sen, perceiving the need to 
deal with his own "blue" conservative faction in the CPP (old 
warriors Chea Sim and Hang Samrin), must show that he has the 
power to enforce strict measures to uphold social order. 
(COMMENT: At least Hun Sen appears pragmatic enough to make 
deals with those about to be jailed (Ref A); however, Sok An 
lately appears to be more dogmatic as evidenced by his June 
19 speech to the National Assembly on the responsibilities of 
the free press and his reported obstinate refusal to accept 
an apology from journalist Hang Chakra, who was jailed on 
disinformation charges for articles on the corrupt circles 
surrounding Sok An. END COMMENT.) 
 
Other Potential Threats: It's All About Implementation 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Further threats to a more open political atmosphere 
are seen in two new proposed draft laws on demonstrations and 
on NGO's.  The NGO Law first surfaced in draft in 2006 but 
was then shelved when a number of donors joined NGO groups in 
opposing its strict reporting requirements.  The draft 
illustrated clearly that the government's concern was 
primarily with NGOs engaged in partisan politics.  Since 
then, the Ministry of Interior has revisited the law and 
reportedly is considering consulting with civil society on a 
new proposed draft NGO Law that, among other things, requires 
annual reports made to the Ministry of Interior.  In the 
meantime, CPP party leaders have noticeably increased their 
rhetoric against NGOs that the CPP claims criticize the 
government but which are themselves corrupt, non-transparent, 
and not accountable to anyone.  This past week, allegations 
of corruption against the former Cambodian Human Rights 
Center surfaced just as its former head, Kem Sokha, was 
preparing for his Human Rights Party annual conference. 
 
¶9.  (C) Similarly, a draft Law on Peaceful Demonstrations -- 
which went through earlier public consultations -- is wending 
its way through the  draft law review process.  Although 
critics say that the law's provisions are vague on limiting 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000489  004.3 OF 005 
 
 
demonstrations that might affect "public order" (because the 
term is not defined), SRP parliamentarian Son Chhay makes a 
point that applies to many of Cambodia's laws in the current 
context:  the law itself is probably better than the 
UNTAC-era law, he said, but it is the implementing decrees 
and the implementation itself that counts.  Only when the 
details of implementation are considered will we know how 
onerous, or how good, a law will be.  The implementation of 
the disinformation article of the UNTAC Law is an example of 
restrictive interpretation.  And while there are reports that 
the new penal code will repeal the UNTAC articles and will 
not apply disinformation measures to journalists, the one 
exception is if national security is involved. 
 
¶10.  (C) According to Sok An, national security is virtually 
always affected in defamation cases, because the critical 
articles rely on "lying sources" and the "lies are prepared 
in advance with bad intentions and are against the 
government."  As Sok An told the Ambassador (Ref C), whole 
subject areas such as Angkor Wat or the borders are off 
limits as any criticism can lead to instability and 
"anarchy."  Just as the U.S. imposed new legislative 
restrictions in response to the 9/11 attacks, so too the RGC 
would have to impose restrictions on criticisms of the 
government, Sok An said. 
 
A Concerted Response 
-------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) In response to the degradation of human rights 
over the past months, the Embassy is engaging the government 
directly to encourage senior leaders to demonstrate 
commitment to democracy and human rights.  In part, we are 
assuming that the message of political dominance has been 
sent, the game of defamation has grown tiresome and that the 
government will want to be seen in a better light by the 
international community.  In our message, the Embassy is 
focusing on a number of themes to re-direct the government's 
thinking.  First, that potential investors will be disturbed 
by the underlying political instability that the defamation 
cases bring.  Cambodia is desperate for more foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and will listen intently to this argument to 
focus on the positive to attract more FDI.  In fact, we will 
argue, the government appears more confident if it allows 
critics to speak, presents its own best case, and adapts 
accordingly.  These defamation cases are seen by the outside 
world as a sign of weakness and not -- as the government 
clearly believes -- as a sign of strength.  The Cambodian 
leadership is deeply concerned for its international 
legitimacy and we will appeal to the government to pay 
attention to the negative publicity it has drawn to itself. 
Finally, embracing democratic values will secure greater 
stability for the country in which the people have a say, 
there is a means to vent concerns and release political 
pressures that otherwise may build up over time. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Either alone or with other missions, the Ambassador 
will publicly pay a visit to imprisoned newspaper editor Hang 
Chakra.  The Ambassador has held a series of meetings with 
ministers and Hun Sen's close advisors, including DPM Sok An 
(Refs C, D) and DPM Sar Kheng, Om Yentieng, and Minister of 
Justice Ang Vong Vathana, to review the RGC's recent 
back-sliding, to question the perceived threats to freedom, 
and to propose a different way forward to win legitimacy 
among the international community.  A number of Embassy 
officers are conducting similar meetings at the working level 
in key ministries.  As we listen to government concerns and 
build confidence in our relationship and in our intentions, 
we hope to counter some RGC officials' perceptions that U.S. 
support for pluralistic democracy is a vote against the 
current government.  We need to de-personalize this 
confrontation in order to make progress.  Although the Sam 
Rainsy Party thinks it has found a way out (Ref A), we  will 
engage with the political parties to see where a more 
meaningful role can be found for them to work with the 
government, which in turn may require a more responsible and 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000489  005 OF 005 
 
 
less confrontational posture by the opposition.  Embassy 
officers will also spend the next months engaging regularly 
with the NGO community and civil society to review with them 
our public position and to build confidence that a firm 
resolve can help see us through this difficult period, while 
aiming for more progress on democracy and human rights. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) The Embassy will reinforce some of the same 
pro-democracy messages to preserve political freedoms that we 
have made since the parliamentary immunity of Mu Sochua and 
Ho Vann was lifted June 22 at which time A/DCM joined the 
U.K., German, and French mission deputy heads in front of the 
National Assembly to express concern about the surprise 
inclusion of Ho Vann's case, the closed parliamentary session 
to remove MPs' immunity and the threat posed by this action 
to freedom of expression.  We expect to work more closely 
with like-minded diplomatic missions in next few weeks, and 
to include missions based in Bangkok such as the Netherlands 
and Sweden, which take an interest.  The ASEAN Human Rights 
Body now being established may prove to be another venue to 
carry our message, although this is a new entity in Cambodia 
and may take time to develop. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) The Embassy has a public diplomacy component woven 
into our strategy.  Up to the present, we have responded to 
local press inquiries with expressions of concern for press 
freedoms and free speech and to reiterate our strong support 
for democratic freedoms,  In our public remarks, we will 
adapt some of the same themes raised by President Obama in 
Russia and again in Africa: that America's interest is in 
democratic governments that protect the rights of their 
people, adding in our context that the rule of law must be 
consistent with Cambodia's own constitution which enshrines 
freedoms of expression and assembly. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) As embassy engages with the government, NGOs and 
civil society and projects our public diplomacy message to 
the public, we will report regularly on developments. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Although Cambodia's ruling party has 
conducted its cyclical reining-in exercises before, we view 
with real concern the recent closing of opposition newspaper 
Moneaksekar Khmer, the legal threats to its publisher Dam 
Sith, and the jailing of opposition journalist Hang Chakra. 
Legal attacks against MP's for their outspoken criticism 
sends a signal to Cambodian society that the lines are being 
re-drawn on what is permissible to say and these new lines 
are far from where they should be in an environment of 
genuine free speech. 
 
¶17.  (SBU) COMMENT CONT.:  Aside from the threat to stability 
that a few might feel by public remarks on corruption, there 
is genuine fear among Cambodia's ruling party about the 
increasing joblessness among a large, youthful population and 
increased criminal activity because of the lack of other 
opportunities.  We need to understand and be responsive to 
Cambodia's new reality, to listen intently to what the 
leadership is worrying about and to show that we have a 
relationship of trust.  This will help to reopen the 
political space lost over the last few months, a loss that is 
by no means irreparable.  Should the proposed campaign result 
in no movement by the government within the next few months, 
we shall have to re-evaluate and consider a more outspoken 
posture and joint action with the larger donor community. 
For the time being, measured diplomacy combined with 
reassurance of support to civil society and a public 
diplomacy campaign may gain a beachhead for broader 
democratic trends and a renewed commitment to human rights. 
RODLEY