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UNCLAS PARIS 000906 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TRGY ENRG KNNP IAEA FR
SUBJECT: GNEP - France Hosts Successful Third Reliable 
Nuclear Fuel Services Working Group Meeting In Cherbourg 
 
REF: A) 08 STATE 037716 B) 08 STATE 109919 
 
------------------- 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT 
------------------- 
 
¶1. (U) The third meeting of the Reliable Nuclear Fuel Services 
Working Group (RNFSWG) of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership 
(GNEP) was held in Cherbourg, France on March 20.  Twenty 
participants from ten countries and two international organizations 
attended this meeting, which was dedicated to discussion of 
sub-Working Groups identified at the September 2008 RNFSWG meeting 
(ref B). 
 
¶2. (SBU) French representatives heavily promoted the use of existing 
spent fuel reprocessing techniques based on Plutonium - Uranium 
Extraction (PUREX) technology through a tour of the La Hague 
reprocessing plant, a discussion about France's spent fuel 
management policy, and tabling of a work plan for a sub-Working 
Group on "elements and criteria for closing the fuel cycle."  The 
French encouraged Working Group endorsement for this Areva process. 
In response to concerns from the Republic of Korea, Jordan, and the 
United States, the Working Group agreed to add explicit language to 
the proposed work plan to clarify that it would address both 
near-term and long-term options (consistent with the last two 
elements of the GNEP Statement of Principles) as well as 
international aspects. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In addition to discussions on the spent nuclear fuel back 
end of the fuel cycle, Poland presented a briefing on world uranium 
reserves and the IAEA presented conclusions on fuel fabrication 
diversity and updates on recent proposals for nuclear fuel supply 
assurances.  There was no interest registered in establishing a 
sub-Working Group on fuel assembly diversity, though it was agreed 
that the RNFSWG would pursue a workshop on industry views at its 
next meeting.  There was more interest in a sub-Working Group on 
assurances of nuclear fuel supply, and Jordan agreed to chair a 
sub-group on this topic. It was agreed that the United States would 
retain the Working Group chair through the next RNFSWG meeting, 
which Poland offered to host in late September or the first week of 
October. 
 
¶4. (SBU) COMMENT:  Overall the meeting was a success, though the 
conversation was dominated by the United States, France, Jordan, 
Korea, and Poland.  Very little was heard from Bulgaria, China, 
Japan, or Australia.  Usual RNFSWG participants Canada, Russia, and 
the UK were absent from this meeting, as was Slovenia.   END SUMMARY 
AND COMMENT 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶5.  (U) On September 16, 2007, GNEP was formally established at a 
ministerial meeting in Vienna, during which two Working Groups on 
Infrastructure Development and Reliable Nuclear Fuel Services were 
established.  The RNFSWG held its inaugural meeting in Wilmington, 
NC on March 31-April 1, 2008 (ref A) and its second meeting on 
September 3-4, 2008 in Vienna (ref B). GNEP presently consists of 25 
Partners:  Armenia, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Estonia, 
France, Ghana, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, the 
 
Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Morocco, Oman, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Senegal, Slovenia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the 
United States.  There are three international organizations that 
participate as GNEP Observers:  the IAEA, Euratom, and the 
Generation IV International Forum (GIF). 
 
--------------- 
MEETING SUMMARY 
--------------- 
 
¶6. (U) The Reliable Nuclear Fuel Services Working Group (RNFSWG) 
held its 3rd meeting in Cherbourg, France, on March 20, 2009.  The 
meeting was hosted by France and included a tour of the La Hague 
reprocessing plant hosted by AREVA.  The meeting was chaired by the 
United States and attended by 20 representatives from 10 partner 
states (Australia, Bulgaria, China, France, Japan, Jordan, Poland, 
the Republic of Korea, Romania, and the United States) as well as 
two international organizations (the IAEA and the Generation IV 
International Forum). 
 
¶7. (U) The U.S. representative opened the meeting by reviewing the 
results of the inaugural RNFSWG meeting held March 31-April 1, 2008 
in Wilmington, NC, USA (ref A) and the second RNFSWG held September 
3-4, 2008 in Vienna, Austria (ref B).  He commented that the first 
meeting had focused on a systematic review of the stages comprising 
the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle (from uranium mining through 
fuel assembly) while the second meeting shifted the focus to the 
back end of the nuclear fuel cycle.  At the close of the second 
meeting, five issues were identified as needing further study:  fuel 
assurances, the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, fuel 
fabrication, fact finding, and collateral issues.  The sub-Working 
Groups identified to address these issues were the focus of this 3rd 
RNFSWG meeting. 
 
REPORT BY THE SUB-WORKING GROUP FOR COMPILING LESSONS 
LEARNED AND PERSPECTIVES FOR RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS 
 
¶8. (U) BEGIN POLAND/FRANCE PRESENTATION:  The representative from 
Poland presented a draft paper entitled "Nuclear Fissile Fuels 
Worldwide Resources," co-written by Poland and France.  He commented 
that the Polish government recently announced its intention to build 
one or two nuclear power plants.  Elsewhere, many other countries, 
including the UK and Italy were also considering the development of 
new nuclear power plants.  Since it seemed likely that the demand 
for uranium would increase by this renewed interest, it was 
important to gain an understanding of the world's uranium (and other 
fissile fuel) reserves.  The Polish representative noted that the 
2007 OECD "Red Book" estimated the identified amount of conventional 
uranium resources that can be mined for less the USD 130/kg to be 
about 5.5 million tons U. Based on the global 2006 uranium 
consumption level (66,500 tons of Uranium or "tU"), this would be 
sufficient for about 85 years of uranium supply.  If undiscovered 
conventional uranium resources are included (prognosticated and 
speculative), the estimate would rise to about 16 million tU, 
sufficient for about 270 years of operation at present consumption 
rates. 
 
¶9. (U) The Polish representative concluded that sufficient 
conventional uranium resources will be available to allow for an 
expansion of nuclear capacities by a factor of 2-3 while maintaining 
electricity prices competitive with fossil fuels.  The exploitation 
 
of unconventional resources (low grade ore, phosphate rock, copper 
leaching solution, phosphoric acid, or sea water) requires 
additional research and development but has a potential to increase 
uranium production capacities by a factor of 2 or more in the medium 
term. 
 
¶10. (U) According to this draft paper, total uranium resources could 
be extended relative to the once-through fuel cycle by recycling of 
fissile material (by 20%-30%), reactor improvements (5%-10%), and 
uranium recovery methods (about 20%) for a total potential gain of 
40%-50%.  The implementation of fast breeder reactors could increase 
the energy potential of today's known uranium resources by up to 70 
times, enough for more than 3,000 years at today's level of 
consumption (though this figure was met with some skepticism by the 
Working Group, which called for further study).  Finally, the Polish 
representative commented that fertile thorium can also be used as a 
nuclear fuel through breeding to uranium-233, though the requisite 
technology needs further development. 
 
¶11. (U) The Jordanian representative commented that his country had 
looked into the feasibility of extracting uranium from phosphate, 
and preliminary results indicate that this process looks viable. 
 
¶12. (U) A French representative noted that the Phenix fast reactor 
had just ceased operation in France.  France has a plan for a new 
prototype fast reactor by the end of 2020.  Since there are 
sufficient uranium resources available for about 200 years of 
operation with light water reactors (LWRs), he added, there is 
little pressure to develop industrial-scale fast reactors, though 
this should be achievable in principle.  The Generation IV 
International Forum (GIF) representative reminded the working group 
that "sustainability" involved not only available resources, but 
also waste management and nonproliferation considerations. END 
POLAND/FRANCE PRESENTATION. 
 
¶13. (U) BEGIN FRANCE PRESENTATION:  The French Ministry of Energy 
representative gave a presentation on the "Legal and Organizational 
Framework of the Back End of the Fuel Cycle in France."  She 
explained that France had decided to operate a closed fuel cycle, 
where spent nuclear fuel was reprocessed and civil plutonium 
extracted for use in mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, while ultimate waste 
(fission products and minor actinides) is isolated and conditioned 
for long-term disposal.  This results in a savings of raw material 
(3,000 tU per year), a reduced spending for enrichment, reduced 
interim storage requirements, and reduced volume of spent fuel and 
high-level waste to be disposed of.  She noted that in Europe, 35 
nuclear power plants (NPPs) are capable of burning MOX fuel (20 in 
France), while Japan has 15-18 MOX-capable plants. 
 
¶14. (U) The French Ministry of Energy representative described four 
pillars upon which France's radioactive materials and waste (RMW) 
management is based:  (1) a sound legal and regulatory framework, 
(2) a solid research policy, (3) transparency and democracy, and (4) 
secure financing. 
 
-- The legal/regulatory framework is based on the 1991 Bataille Act 
that defined principles for high level waste (HLW) and a 28 June 
2006 Act on sustainable RMW management.  In addition, a 13 June 2006 
Act on nuclear transparency and security established the Nuclear 
Safety Authority (ASN) as an independent administrative body. 
According to these laws, disposal of radioactive waste originating 
 
from foreign countries is forbidden in France, and may be imported 
only for reprocessing, research, or transfer. 
 
-- France's waste management research program is based on three 
complementary axes:  (1) partitioning and transmutation, calling for 
an assessment of viable technologies by 2012 and potential pilot 
facilities by 2020, (2) deep geological disposal, calling for site 
authorization by 2015 and potential operation by 2025, and (3) 
conditioning and storage, calling for creation of new or 
modification of existing facilities by 2015. 
 
-- Decisions about RMW management in France are taken with 
consultation with the local population (on a continuous basis), the 
general population (including national debates), and Parliament 
(whose views must be sought prior to any governmental decision). 
 
-- RMW management authorities in France are provided secure and 
sufficient funds for research and development purposes and for waste 
management activities. 
 
¶15. (U) Radioactive waste management in France is the responsibility 
of the National Radioactive Waste Management Agency (ANDRA), which 
will operate a disposal facility once operational.  A second 
relevant body is the National Review Board (CNE), who is responsible 
for assessing the progress of studies related to RMW management. 
 
¶16. (U) The working group discussed the disposal benefits of 
reprocessing, and France noted that 7 spent LWR fuel assemblies were 
used to produce one MOX assembly.  As a result, the ultimate amount 
of waste to be disposed of is much lower.  The United States 
representative pointed out since the spent MOX fuel must also be 
stored, the full disposal benefits of reprocessing would not be 
achieved until industrial fast burner reactors are available.  The 
GIF representative added that fast reactors would also lower the 
radiotoxicity of the ultimate waste. 
 
¶17. (U) The Romanian representative noted that reprocessing of spend 
CANDU reactor fuel was discussed during the (March 19) La Hague 
tour, during which AREVA noted that this would not be economical. 
When asked why, the French side explained that the total amount of 
spent CANDU fuel would be insufficient to justify the plant 
modifications that would be needed. END FRANCE PRESENTATION. 
 
¶18. (U) The United States representative tabled a paper, entitled 
"Foreign Research Reactor Spent Fuel Return Program - U.S. 
Department of Energy Experience in Planning, Receipt and 
Transportation," which provided a review of this program and 
compiled lessons learned from its implementation.  In the interest 
of time, there was no working group discussion on this paper. 
 
¶19. (U) The Bulgarian representatives tabled a paper entitled 
"Preparation of the Activities to Ensure Nuclear Fuel Cycle at Units 
5&6, WWER 1000 Type Reactors of Kozloduy NPP."   In the interest of 
time, there was no working group discussion on this paper. 
 
¶20. (U) The Working Group agreed to post all draft papers on 
"Lessons Learned and Perspectives for Resource Requirements" on the 
GNEP Portal for continued comment by Working Group members.  A 
summary of the papers would then be prepared for presentation at the 
next GNEP Steering Group meeting in September/October 2009. 
 
REPORT BY THE SUB-WORKING GROUP ON ELEMENTS 
AND CRITERIA FOR CLOSING THE FUEL CYCLE 
 
¶21. (U) The French representatives tabled a draft terms of reference 
and work plan for a sub-Working Group on "Closing the Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle."  They commented that the objectives of this sub-group would 
be: (1) to identify factors and limitations relevant to the back end 
of the fuel cycle, (2) to compile a list of current practices and 
frameworks, and (3) to recommend measures for moving towards fuel 
services arrangements achieving the management of spent fuel and 
closing the fuel cycle. 
 
¶22. (U) Due to the complexities of this issue, the French 
representatives recommended proceeding over three stages to meet 
these objectives.  First, a set of documents would be developed that 
identify the principal elements in need of discussion (including 
technical, legal, safety, security, policy, proliferation, and 
public acceptance considerations).  The sub-group chairs would 
prepare a first draft by June 2009 with the aim of finalizing a 
draft for review at the next RNFSWG meeting in fall 2009.  Second, a 
compilation of current approaches to back-end management would be 
prepared with an aim of finalizing by the spring 2010 RNFSWG 
meeting.  Finally, a document would be drafted that describes short- 
and long-term options for spent fuel management and closing of the 
nuclear fuel cycle.  The United States representative informed the 
Working Group that the UK representative, who was unable to attend 
the Cherbourg meeting, had expressed interest in sharing leadership 
of this sub-group. 
 
¶23. (U) The Korean representative commented on the need to clarify 
what the work plan means by "closing" the fuel cycle and whether 
this implied a closed fuel cycle based on existing techniques or 
advanced technologies still under development. The latter, he noted, 
would require significant research and development.  The French 
representatives responded that this should be done progressively, in 
light of the last two elements of the GNEP Statement of Principles, 
which call for steps to "develop, and demonstrate, inter alia, 
advanced technologies for recycling spent nuclear fuel" as well as 
to "take advantage of the best available fuel cycle approaches." 
The United States representative seconded the notion that while 
"best available" approaches should be considered, the emphasis 
should be placed on advanced technologies designed that would be 
necessary for greater waste management and nonproliferation 
benefits.  The Jordanian representative stressed the importance of 
the sub-group focusing also on international mechanisms and 
multilateral arrangements. 
 
¶24. (U) The Working Group agreed it was necessary to add language to 
the work plan to address all of these concerns.  The French 
representatives agreed to modify the draft work plan and circulate 
the revisions with an aim of reaching consensus by the April 7-8 
GNEP Steering Group meeting. 
 
DISCUSSION OF NEW SUB-WORKING GROUP ON MECHANISMS 
NEEDED TO INCREASE DIVERSITY OF FABRICATED FUEL 
 
¶25. (U) The discussion on fuel assembly diversity began with a 
presentation by the IAEA representative.  He summarized a recent 
Agency consultants meeting on this issue, the objectives of which 
were to identify and analyze possible mechanisms to increase the 
assurance of supply of fabricated fuel assemblies.  It was stressed 
 
that whereas LEU is a fungible commodity (essentially the same 
irrespective of producer), fuel assemblies are products with a high 
technological content, protected by intellectual property rights and 
proprietary components. 
 
¶26. (U) The IAEA representative noted that the market is quite 
competitive and satisfactory, and for most reactor types at least 
two suppliers exist.  Although it is possible for a reactor to 
change from one fuel assembly design to another, doing so requires 
extensive analysis and regulatory licensing work.  Each new fuel 
type normally requires a new license and might require testing of 
lead assemblies.  In certain cases, it is estimated that changeover 
from one fuel type to another can be accomplished in as few as two 
years, however the process typically takes about five years. 
 
¶27. (U) According to the conclusions of the consultants meeting, the 
following approaches are suggested to reduce the time needed to 
switch fuel assembly suppliers:  (1) the customer could have two 
fuel suppliers qualified to provide fuel, (2) the customer's 
government could establish well in advance specific agreements 
allowing a switch of supplier, or (3) the customer could make 
efforts in advance to obtain regulatory authorization for suppliers 
that are not yet certified.  More generally, the risk of fuel 
assembly disruption could be reduced by establishing a local source 
of fabrication or by holding reserves of finished fuel assemblies. 
 
 
¶28. (U) The Jordanian representative advised states to pursue 
multiple contracts for fuel assembly supply to minimize disruption 
risk.  A French representative noted that there is no single measure 
that can be taken to offer 100% assurance, advising instead to take 
a combination of measures to reduce the risk of disruption.  The 
Japanese representative announced that his Mission to the IAEA had 
hosted a January 2009 "Seminar on Global Nuclear Fuel Supply" during 
which fuel assembly supply was discussed.  Papers from this seminar 
are available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/ 
energy/iaea/seminar0902/index.html. 
 
¶29. (U) During the meeting, no Working Group members were prepared 
to offer a detailed report of the steps they have taken to offer 
assurance of fuel assembly supply.  It was therefore decided that 
members could submit voluntary reports to the group prior to the 
next Working Group meeting.  There was no great interest from 
Working Group members to take the leadership role on a sub-Working 
Group on fuel assembly supply.  Instead, it was decided that a 
workshop on industry perspectives in this issue should be organized 
during the fall 2009 Working Group meeting.  Following this 
workshop, the Working Group will determine whether there is a need 
for a further work in this area. 
 
DISCUSSION OF NEW SUB-WORKING GROUP ON ASSURANCES A 
COUNTRY SHOULD SEEK AS SUFFICIENT FOR NUCLEAR SUPPLY 
 
¶30. (U) The discussion on fuel assurances began with a presentation 
by the IAEA representative.  He identified two "co-equal" problems 
that were motivating recent work in this area:  the risk of 
political interruptions of LEU fuel as a non-market disincentive 
discouraging investment in nuclear power, and the resulting 
incentive for building new national "proliferation-sensitive" 
enrichment facilities.  Beginning in 2003, the IAEA has attempted to 
address these through the development of multilateral mechanisms 
 
designed to provide reliable access to nuclear fuel.  He identified 
10 proposed fuel assurance mechanisms from various Member States, 
three of which were identified as relatively advanced: 
 
-- a Russian-funded LEU reserve of 120 tons LEU to be stored at 
Angarsk, regulated by two agreements (Russia-IAEA and IAEA-Consumer 
State) to be approved by the IAEA Board of Governors.  This may be 
presented to the Board for consideration at the June 2009 meeting; 
 
-- a low enriched uranium "fuel bank," under IAEA auspices, funded 
by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, an American nongovernmental 
organization and the governments of the United States, the UAE, 
Kuwait, Norway, and the European Union.  An institutional framework 
for this mechanism is under development and will possibly be 
presented to the Board of Governors prior to their June 2009 
meeting; and 
 
-- a German proposal for a "multilateral enrichment sanctuary 
project" whereby a group of interested states would jointly operate 
an enrichment facility in an "international territory" administered 
by the IAEA. 
 
¶31. (U) The IAEA representative reported that at the March 2009 
Board of Governors meeting, Director General ElBaradei stated that 
fuel assurance mechanisms should be based on three principles:  (1) 
non-political, non-discriminatory, and available to all States 
meeting safeguards obligations, (2) release of fuel be determined by 
non-political criteria established in advance, and (3) no State to 
give up any Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) rights regarding 
any parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. 
 
¶32. (U) Following the presentation, the Jordanian representative 
commented that the IAEA is by definition a strictly multilateral 
organization, so that any mechanisms under its auspices would have 
an added level of assurance.  The French representative noted that 
France supports these projects (commenting that as EU president it 
played a big role in the EU fuel bank contribution) and was pleased 
to see movement towards discussion within the Board of Governors. 
The French representative also noted that the proposals as they 
stand do not impact any states' NPT rights.  The Japanese 
representative noted that this issue was also considered at the 
January 2009 seminar Japan hosted in Vienna (see link above). 
 
¶33. (U) During the September 2008 RNFSWG meeting, the possibility 
was raised of a sub-Working Group on "assurances a country should 
seek as sufficient for nuclear supply."  The United State 
representative queried the group for interest in leading this 
sub-Working Group, and the representative from Jordan stated that 
Jordan would be willing to serve as chair.  It will therefore 
prepare a draft work plan to present to the Working Group at the 
fall 2009 meeting. 
 
LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION AND NEXT MEETING 
 
¶34. (U) The United States representative asked the Working Group if 
any nations were interested in taking over leadership of the group 
upon closure of the present meeting.  In the absence of any explicit 
interest, it was agreed that the United States would hold the chair 
for one more meeting in fall 2009.  At this meeting, the Working 
Group would select a new chair to lead the group in 2010. 
 
¶35. (U) The Working Group was asked for expressions of interest for 
hosting the fall 2009 meeting.  The Polish representative voiced 
interest.  This meeting could possibly be arranged for Gdansk, 
Warsaw, or Krakow, but three months advance notice was requested. 
 
¶36. (U) Regarding dates for the next meeting, the U.S. 
representative reminded the group that the IAEA Board of Governors 
meeting was to take place the week of September 7 and the General 
Conference would be held the week of September 14, 2009.  To allow 
sufficient time to finalize meeting results for presentation at the 
next (late October) GNEP Steering Group meeting in China, the weeks 
of September 28 or October 5 were proposed.  As chair of the Working 
Group, the United States will follow-up with a firm proposal for the 
fall 2009 meeting. 
 
VISIT OF AREVA'S LA HAGUE RECYLCING FACILITY 
 
¶37. (U) On March 19, the Working Group was invited by AREVA to tour 
its recycling facility at La Hague.  Following a general 
presentation on the facility and AREVA's role in today's nuclear 
industry, Working Group participants toured the dry unloading 
facility T0, spent fuel storage pool D, a vitrification facility T7, 
and the control room of the UP3 plant.  The tour provided Working 
Group members a close look at the elaborate design and immense scale 
of an industrial spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plant. 
 
¶38. (U) FURTHER INFORMATION:  Overseas posts requesting further 
information may contact the following US Department of Energy (DOE) 
officials: 
 
Ed McGinnis 
GNEP Steering Group Chair and 
Deputy Assistant Secretary 
Office of Nuclear Energy 
U.S. Department of Energy 
202 586-5253 (office) 
202 425-2973 (mobile) 
Edward.McGinnis@Nuclear.Energy.Gov 
 
Beth Lisann 
U.S. Steering Group Plus 1 Representative 
202 586-0136 (office) 
Elizabeth.lisann@doe.hq.gov 
 
Andrea Duskas 
202 586-6130 (office) 
202 276-4199 (mobile) 
Andrea.duskas@hq.doe.gov 
 
Bernard Bluhm 
202 586-8317 (office) 
bernard.bluhm@nuclear.energy.gov 
 
 
 
Pekala