VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNJ #0287/01 1951344
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 141344Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7100
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000287 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/C AND S/USSES 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SU LY CD
SUBJECT: FOR FORMIN FAKI MTGS:  ADDITIONAL INPUT 
 
REF: NDJAMENA 283 
 
¶1.  (SBU) This message offers information and views that 
might be helpful to the Department in preparing for Chad 
FORMIN Faki's meetings in Washington, in addition to reftel. 
 
----------------------- 
CHAD-SUDAN AND CHAD/JEM 
----------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Faki told us July 9 that President Deby had 
convoked JEM chief Khalil Ibrahim to N'Djamena with the 
intention of pressuring him into accepting a cease-fire with 
the Government of Sudan and including other Darfuri movements 
in the negotiation process.  Khalil must "make his positions 
more flexible and move resolutely towards peace," Faki 
emphasized, "and cooperate with Qatari, Egyptian, and Libyan 
efforts," as well as with SE Gration's efforts.  Faki himself 
expressed frustration with JEM, characterizing its demands as 
"not realistic" and its refusal to sign a cease-fire as 
"illogical." 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Faki undoubtedly would have been present at the 
Deby-Khalil meeting, if in fact it occurred.  (Faki left for 
DC before we could get a readout from him.)  The Department 
should seek a full readout from Faki on the Deby-Khalil 
meeting, either in the course of his meeting with The 
Secretary or during one of his other meetings.  The 
Department could use Ambassador Bechir to ensure that we will 
be very interested in this readout. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) As we see it, consequential Deby pressure on Khalil 
to engage in serious negotiations with Khartoum, through 
active cooperation with SE Gration's mediation efforts and 
the mediation efforts of Libya, Qatar, and others is the 
reciprocal "confidence-building" action by Chad to respond to 
Sudanese-proposed actions to canton Chad rebels in Sudan and 
convoke Chad rebel leaders to Khartoum, actions to be 
verified multilaterally.  Chad does not exert the same kind 
of control over Sudanese rebels, especially JEM, that Sudan 
exerts over Chad rebels.  Deby has his ways of "persuading" 
Khalil that could be effective if applied effectively and 
consistently and the results with JEM that Deby can offer 
should not be dismissed. 
 
¶5.   (SBU)  We think that The Secretary should demand of Faki 
that the Government of Chad and President Deby himself 
continue to pressure Khalil Ibrahim and JEM to cooperate with 
Darfur mediation efforts -- including the addition of other 
Darfuri movements at the negotiating table -- and to pursue 
its goals peacefully as a movement and not as a militia. 
--------------------------------- 
USG COMMITMENT TO PEACE IN DARFUR 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  In his meeting with The Secretary, Chad FORMIN 
Faki may make a bid for greater USG involvement in 
normalizing Chad-Sudan relations.  Faki may use the analogy 
of the USG role in the Navaisha talks that led to the CPA as 
a model for USG involvement in the search for peace in 
Darfur, to which normalization of Chad-Sudan relations would 
be a pre-condition.  He may argue that only the USG is in a 
position to press all the parties to reach and accord and 
that only the USG has the clout to "guarantee" that the sides 
live up to their commitments. 
 
¶7. (SBU)  We think that Faki's possible demarche can quite 
logically be met with the response that SE Gration's 
nomination as Presidential Envoy for Sudan and his very 
active personal diplomacy exemplify the USG's commitment to 
peace in Darfur. 
 
------------------------------ 
THINGS ARE LOOKING UP FOR CHAD 
------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  The GOC has been enjoying a pretty good run the 
past few months.  Besides decisively defeating attacking 
rebels in early May, Chad claims to have welcomed over 1,500 
ex-rebels back to the country, reflecting disenchantment 
among the rank and file.  Faki updated us July 9 on serious 
GOC negotiations with two significant rebel leaders, Ahmat 
Soubiane of the FSR and Mahamat Idriss of the UFDD, and 
expressed confidence that these talks could end with both men 
returning to Chad.  The possibilities for proper legislative 
and local elections in early 2010 improved with the 
successful June completion of the census, the parliamentary 
passage of enabling legislation, and the nomination of 
government and opposition party leaders to the Independent 
Electoral Commission's membership. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Chad seemed poised to put its public-financial 
house in order with a budget that the IMF and World Bank 
judged credible and viable, and that formed the basis for 
Chad and the IMF to agree on a staff-managed program for the 
next six months.  There is anecdotal evidence that business 
activity in Chad is set to grow through the rest of this year 
despite the international economic situation and the price of 
petroleum, Chad's prime public-revenue source.  The GOC has 
assembled an inter-ministerial team (with which we are 
cooperating closely) to act on USG recommendations to avoid 
looming TIP sanctions by us. 
 
NIGRO