VZCZCXRO5741
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0283/01 1941203
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 131203Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7092
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000283 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/C AND S/USSES 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF EAID PHUM SU LY QA CD
SUBJECT: WHAT THE USG EXPECTS FROM CHAD: PEACE IN DARFUR, 
NO ARMS TO JEM, AND RECONCILIATION WITH CHAD REBELS 
 
REF: A. NDJAMENA 264 
     ¶B. NDJAMENA 111 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (SBU) Ambassador told Chad FORMIN Faki July 10 that The 
Secretary's willingness to meet with him was primarily a 
function of the centrality of he Darfur crisis to USG policyin the region; that she would be interested to hear from him 
how Chad could best play an active and positive role in 
restoring peace to Darfur; and that she would expect him to 
outline steps Chad was taking to normalize relations with 
Sudan by ending military support to Sudanese rebels, 
especially JEM, and to reconcile with Chadian rebels. 
Ambassador told Faki that on bilateral issues, The Secretary 
would appreciate his briefing on Chad's progress on credible 
elections in 2010, in improving its human rights and TIP 
posture, and in improving its management of public revenues 
and relations with the IMF and World Bank. Faki said that 
Chad President Deby had convoked JEM head Khalil Ibrahim to 
pressure him to cooperate with SE Gration's Darfur peace 
effort; that he had been negotiating intensely and 
successfully with Chad rebel leaders; that President Deby was 
committed to credible elections, preparations for which were 
advanced; that Chad was working seriously to improve its 
human rights and TIP stances; and that Chad and the IMF had 
just agreed to a program aimed at poverty reduction and debt 
relief. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The U.S. should continue to leverage the Chadian 
desire for  U.S. political and diplomatic support to achieve 
the end of the Chad-Sudan proxy war, with Chad's key an end 
to its military support of JEM.  Deby pressure on Khalil to 
seek peace through serious negotiations and cooperation with 
mediators, including SE Gration, was good news, as was Faki's 
report of progress toward reconciliation with key Chad rebel 
leaders like Soubiane and Idriss.  The GOC continues to make 
slow but steady progress toward legislative and local 
elections now scheduled for early 2010; has strengthened laws 
related to trafficking issues and investigated claims of 
trafficking; and reached agreement with the IMF and 
normalized relations with the World Bank.  The U.S. should 
try to help NDjamena and Riyadh normalize relations with the 
return of a Saudi Ambassador to Chad, as we have suggested 
before (Ref B), because normalization of Saudi-Chadian 
relations would reinforce Chad's diplomatic standing among 
Arab League nations, as well as providing vital consular 
services to Chad citizens.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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NORMALIZE CHAD-SUDAN RELATIONS 
------------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Ambassador Nigro told Chad Foreign Minister Moussa 
Faki Mahamat July 10 that The Secretary's willingness to meet 
with him strongly reflected the centrality of the Darfur 
crisis to USG policy goals in the region.  Ambassador 
outlined SE Gration's strategy to end the proxy war between 
Chad and Sudan -- Sudanese agreement to canton Chad rebel 
groups in two locations, including one location removed from 
the Chad-Sudan border, and gather rebel chiefs in Khartoum; 
verification teams with international participation to 
confirm those actions; then Chad to take similar actions on 
Sudanese rebel groups, to be similarly verified; then both 
Chad and Sudan to move to disarm and demobilize all rebel 
groups.  Ambassador underscored that it was imperative for 
the GOC to understand that it must demonstrate a commitment 
to end its military and logistical support for the JEM. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Faki said that Deby had convoked JEM leader Khalil 
Ibrahim to NDjamena this weekend to personally pressure 
Khalil into accepting a cease-fire with the Government of 
Sudan and including other Darfuri movements in the 
negotiation process.  Khalil must "make his positions more 
flexible and move resolutely towards peace," Faki emphasized, 
"and cooperate with Qatari, Egyptian, and Libyan efforts" as 
well as with the USG.  Faki himself expressed frustration 
with JEM, characterizing its demands as "not realistic" and 
its refusal to sign a cease-fire as "illogical." 
 
NDJAMENA 00000283  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
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RECONCILE WITH CHA REBELS 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Ambassador stated that Chad must continue to reach 
out to Chad rebels to negotiate their return to Chad 
peacefully; must not reject serious overtures from the 
rebels; and should consult with EU on its initiative to 
reconcile the GOC and the rebel groups.  Faki stated that the 
GOC had been reaching out to major rebel leaders and was in 
negotiations with several, including Ahmat Soubiane and 
Mahamt Idriss, a chief lieutenant of Mahamat Nouri.  Faki 
noted that Soubiane's and Nouri's were two of the most 
politically consequential rebel groups.  Faki said that 
Soubiane had traveled to Tripoli to negotiate his return with 
GOC officials on the sidelines of the AU summit.  Faki said 
that Idriss had just called him to discuss the return of 
elements of Nouri's group, as well.  Faki underscored that 
all efforts, whether involving JEM, Sudan, or Chadian rebels, 
will require international pressure to keep the parties 
committed. 
 
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CONTINUING USG ASSISTANCE 
------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Ambassador made clear that Chad would need to make 
progress on several fronts to ensure continued USG support. 
The USG wanted to see the GOC continue political reform that 
would enable credible local and national elections in 2010. 
We also wanted to see the GOC responsibly managing public 
revenues, especially in support of social and economic 
development, in concert with the IFIs.  The USG also expected 
Chad to demonstrate substantive progress on human rights and 
trafficking in persons issues.  Faki highlighted that the 
nearly completed census and the upcoming elections were among 
the GOC's top priorities, along with passing the revised 
budget and other laws.  The FORMIN stated that USG 
cooperation outside of Chad's oil sector was not as robust as 
the GOC wished, counting that Chad's strategic location, 
concern about terrorism, myriad of development challenges, 
and impending parliamentary and presidential elections 
augured for increased USG assistance.  More than dollars, 
however, Faki emphasized that the GOC looked to the USG for 
sustained political and diplomatic support, internally and 
internationally.  Faki noted that he was also seeking 
meetings with Senator Kerry and NSC Michelle Gavin while in 
Washington. 
 
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PLANS TO VISIT RIYADH 
--------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  The FORMIN added that he would go directly to 
Riyadh following with Washington trip, with the main goal of 
convincing the SARG to reopen its embassy in NDjamena  He 
regretted that following the death of embassy family members 
during the February 2008 rebel attack, the SARG withdrew its 
personnel and shuttered the mission here.  Faki stated that 
over 6,000 Chadian annually travel to Saudi for business or 
the Hajj and Saudi diplomatic and consular services in 
NDjamena were vital. 
 
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FAKI BIO INFO 
------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  FORMIN Faki, like President Deby, is an ethnic 
Zaghawa born in the Zaghawa heartland of Biltine in eastern 
Chad.  He has been in government service, with increasingly 
responsible positions, almost continuously since Deby took 
power in 1990.  He was Deby's Cabinet Chief of Staff from 
1999-2002; managed Deby's 2001 presidential campaign; served 
as  Minister of Public Works and Transportation; and was 
Prime Minister from 2004-2006.  He has been Foreign Minister 
since April 2008.  Faki is an experienced political figure 
with ambitions to match his abilities.  His tenure as FORMIN 
has been an active one, which much travel and intense 
diplomatic efforts, both bilateral and regional. 
 
 
NDJAMENA 00000283  003 OF 003 
 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶9.  (SBU)  The GOC continues to seek as its priority U.S. 
political and diplomatic support, rather than financial or 
military support, although the Chadians would like those 
latter forms of assistance as well. The U.S. should continue 
to leverage that Chadian goal to achieve the end of the 
Chad-Sudan proxy war with Chad's contribution being an end to 
its military support of JEM.  That Deby was convoking Khalil 
to pressure him to seek peace through serious negotiations 
and cooperation with mediators, including SE Gration, was 
good news, as was Faki's reporting on continuing progress 
toward reconciliation with key Chad rebel leaders like 
Soubiane and Idriss.  The GOC continues to make slow but 
steady progress toward legislative and local elections now 
scheduled for early 2010: if credible, they would be the 
first such elections in Chad's history.  The GOC has taken 
action to strengthen laws related to trafficking issues and 
to investigate claims of trafficking.  The agreement with the 
IMF and normalized relations with the World Bank create an 
opportunity for the GOC to benefit from international 
assistance.  The U.S. should try to help NDjamena and Riyadh 
normalize relations with the return of a Saudi Ambassador to 
Chad, as we have suggested before (Ref B), because 
normalization of Saudi-Chadian relations would reinforce 
Chad's diplomatic standing among Arab League nations, as well 
as providing vital consular services to Chad citizens. 
 
¶10.  (U)  Minimize considered. 
NIGRO