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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 001652 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
INL FOR KEVIN BLAKEMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC KJUS PGOV PHUM KE
SUBJECT: POLICE REFORM TASK FORCE FACES CHALLENGING MANDATE 
 
REF: NAIROBI 1567 AND PREVIOUS 
 
NAIROBI 00001652  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. Summary: The Police Reform Task Force (PRTF), chaired by 
retired Justice Philip Ransley, has been working since early 
June to develop a comprehesive set of recommendations on 
much-needed police reforms. The Task Force held public 
hearings in Nairobi on July 22 and 23, after first 
interviewing police stakeholders and then traveling 
throughout Kenya to hear public and civil society views on 
reforms. While a clear consensus has emerged among Task Force 
members and stakeholders on a number of key reforms, some 
proposals, notably the proposed merger of the Administration 
Police (AP) and the Kenya Police Service (KPS), remain highly 
controversial. There is also a great deal of public 
skepticism about the likelihood of this Task Force's 
proposals actually being implemented, given that the work of 
other similar commissions has to date failed to result in any 
significant reforms. At the PRTF's public hearings in 
Nairobi, Attorney General Amos Wako put forward his six point 
plan for police reform and, in an apparent jibe at the agency 
and its commissioner, proposed taking the criminal 
investigation mandate away from the Kenya Police Service. End 
summary. 
 
 
¶2. The Police Reform Task Force (PRTF) began work in early 
June to develop a comprehensive set of suggestions on police 
reforms. Following consultations with stakeholders in Nairobi 
and the provinces, its final report is due on July 31. The 
public and some stakeholders remain skeptical about the 
probability that the PRTF's recommendations will be 
implemented. Poloff met with Task Force member Kathurima 
M'Inoti, Chairman of the Kenya Law Reform Commission, for 
some insight into the Task Force's deliberations to date. 
M'Inoti said that consensus had emerged early among the Task 
Forces members on two key issues, namely the need for 
independent oversight authorities, both internal and 
external; and the need to establish a Police Service 
Commission (PSC). An independent oversight mechanism is 
currently included in the police Standing Orders (which are 
not a public document), but it dates from the time of 
independence and needs to be modernized, said M'Inoti. An 
independent external oversight board with civilian members 
that could investigate citizen complaints is also necessary, 
he added. The purpose of the PSC would be to regulate 
recruitment, promotions, assignments, and pensions, as well 
as to provide advocacy for police officers since they are 
prohibited by law from unionizing. M'Inoti cited as an 
example of the need for advocacy the case of an officer who 
facilitated access to detainees in North Eastern Province by 
the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, as required by 
law, and was subsequently demoted and transferred four times. 
 
TASK FORCE MEMBERS NOT IMPRESSED WITH CASE FOR MERGER 
 
¶3. The Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence 
(CIPEV), better known as the Waki Commission after its 
chairman Justice Philip Waki, made extensive recommendations 
regarding reform of Kenya's police services and national 
security architecture as part of its 500-page report released 
in October 2008. One of the Waki Commission's controversial 
recommendations in the area of police reform was to merge the 
politicized Administration Police (AP) into the more 
independent Kenya Police Service (KPS). M'Inoti described the 
merger issue as "very difficult," noting that if a merger did 
not take place, steps would have to be taken to address the 
issue of the political control of the AP by the Provincial 
Administration hierarchy, which reports directly to the 
President. M'Inoti said that the AP are the only law 
enforcement officers on the ground in remote areas plagued by 
tribal conflict, and there was fear of creating a security 
vacuum if AP officers were removed from their grassroots 
positions following a merger. On the other hand, he said, 
many politicians arguing against the merger were motivated by 
the desire to retain control of the AP in the field. He 
described the KPS as "more indisciplined and corrupt" than 
the AP, a perception that is likely shared by other Task 
Force members and would not lead them to support the merger 
proposal. M'Inoti added that the Task Force members were 
struck by the differing presentations of AP Commandant Mbugua 
and KPS Commissioner Ali. Mbugua came with a team of senior 
officials, all of whom participated in answering questions; 
 
NAIROBI 00001652  002 OF 003 
 
 
Ali also came with a team, all of whom remained silent while 
he answered the Task Force's questions. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL CALLS FOR NEW CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY 
 
¶4. The first speaker at the Task Force's public hearings on 
July 22 was Attorney General Amos Wako, who laid out his 
vision for police reform and improvements to the criminal 
justice system overall. (Comment: Not surprisingly, AG Wako 
did not include his own resignation as a first step toward 
improved functioning of the Kenyan judicial system, although 
it has been proposed by many in civil society and government 
as a helpful or even necessary prerequisite for meaningful 
change. End comment.) Wako laid out a six point plan, 
including capacity building; increased accountability; an 
update code of conduct and police standing orders; 
establishment of a Police Service Commission; abolition of 
police prosecutors; and, controversially, the creation of a 
new national criminal investigation agency. 
 
¶5. On capacity building, Wako noted the need for increased 
funding to the police services to pay for modern equipment 
(including protective clothing/body armor, as a number of 
officers have been killed recently in the line of duty), 
improved infrastructure and training, and better salaries and 
benefits. (Note: Some junior officers make as little as $150 
a month and live in very poor housing conditions. End note.) 
He also advocated for raising the minimum academic 
qualifications for entering the police forces from a D plus 
to C plus average, as well as lowering the retirement age 
from 60 to 55 in order to allow more opportunities for 
advancement to the senior ranks. Wako urged greater 
accountability "to restore public trust and confidence in the 
police" and suggested that an independent oversight authority 
be established with a wide mandate covering all Kenyan law 
enforcement agencies. He added that the oversight body needed 
to have its own investigators with full police powers and 
could, when applicable, refer criminal cases to the AG for 
prosecution. (Note: Civil society groups allege that the AG's 
office frequently refuses to act on politically sensitive 
cases, and referral to the AG is by no means a guarantee that 
prosecution will follow. End note.) Wako described the police 
standing orders as "outdated and inadequate," and stressed 
that Kenya needs a modern police code of conduct which 
respects human rights and is aligned with international best 
practices, including the UN Code for Police Officers. He also 
noted the urgent need to set up a Police Service Commission, 
which would bring transparency and fairness to police hiring, 
promotion, assignments and benefits policies. 
 
¶6. Wako then made his first controversial suggestion: he 
recommended the creation of an independent national criminal 
investigation agency, modeled structurally on the National 
Security and Intelligence Service (NSIS). The justice system 
"depends on the effectiveness of the criminal investigation 
arm and the quality of investigations," Wako said, and noted 
that the creation of a national criminal agency would free up 
the KPS to return to its "core function" of maintaining law 
and order. Wako recommended that a Director General (DG) for 
the new agency be appointed by the President in consultation 
with the Prime Minister and with approval of Parliament, and 
that the DG have security of tenure (as does Wako himself). 
He also advocated for removing the Department of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP) from under the AG's office. Kenya uses 
minimally trained police prosecutors to handle most crimes, 
including some serious felonies. Wako said that the AG's 
Office and DPP strategic plan calls for hiring 497 additional 
state counsels between now and 2012 to allow the phasing out 
of police prosecutors. He also outlined the proposed use of 
"lay prosecutors" (roughly the equivalent of paralegals) to 
handle misdemeanors, especially the large volume of minor 
traffic offenses that clog the Kenyan court system. (Note: 
Most of Wako's suggestions were positive if disingenuous 
where they rely on efficient action by his office. We have 
long supported removal of the DPP from under the AG's 
supervision, as well as the elimination of police 
prosecutors. End note.) 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶7. Clearly aware of widespread skepticism over the 
effectiveness of the Task Force, the chairman told the 
 
NAIROBI 00001652  003 OF 003 
 
 
audience at the public hearing that "we are conscious of past 
recommendations (by other commissions) and that the net 
result has been very little," but said that he believed the 
government has the political will to make fundamental changes 
and that the Task Force would "insist" that the government 
act on its recommendations. The problem is that this Task 
Force, like others of its type, does not have the ability to 
compel implementation. The problems in Kenya's law 
enforcement agencies are systemic, and public perception of 
the near-complete lack of accountability and a culture of 
impunity within the police have eroded confidence in the 
police and exacerbated crime, instability, and vigilantism. 
As one of the speakers at the public hearing said, "How can 
the police enforce the law when they feel they are above it?" 
Emergence of consensus on some core reforms (establishing a 
PSC and oversight mechanism, for example) is a positive sign, 
but it will be a much greater challenge to convince the 
government to tackle accountability and impunity in a 
meaningful way. The Ambassador and mission team will continue 
to press hard for real reform, especially on accountability 
and establishment of a functional rather than merely 
ornamental oversight mechanism. The continued presence of AG 
Wako on the judicial side and Commissioner Ali at the helm of 
the KPS would also likely act as major barriers to 
fundamental reform. 
SLUTZ