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Viewing cable 09NAIROBI1627, SOMALIA - Shabelle Details Intimidation, Problems

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09NAIROBI1627 2009-07-28 12:39 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Nairobi
VZCZCXRO8190
OO RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNR #1627/01 2091239
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 281239Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0529
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
RUZEFAA/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMCSUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 001627 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S CARSON 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI KDEM KPAO SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - Shabelle Details Intimidation, Problems 
 
REF: NAIROBI 1133 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Shabelle Media Network's CEO and his Deputy on July 23 
claimed their station was more actively targeted than others, but 
noted that all media in Somalia have experienced difficulties. 
Citing the deaths of two of their directors in the past two years 
(reftel) and the shrinking space for independent media outlets in 
Mogadishu, they appealed for assistance in moving Shabelle's 
operations out of Somalia.  End Summary. 
 
----------------- 
Shabelle Targeted 
----------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Shabelle Media Network (SMN) CEO Abdimaalik Yusuf Mohamud 
and his deputy, Mohamed Amiin Adow, briefed us on July 23 about the 
ongoing threats faced by SMN and detailed how they believed Shabelle 
had been targeted particularly intensively.  The two pointed to the 
murders of two directors - Mukhtar Hirabe on June 7 (reftel) and 
Bashir Nur Gedi in October 2007 - as evidence of specific targeting 
of SMN by al-Shabaab.  Reftel noted that Hirabe's assassination may 
have resulted from his coverage of the rumored death of Hassan Dahir 
Aweys and his conversation with Post about Aweys.  However, Adow 
told us that Hirabe had received a threat from al-Shabaab on June 2 
after refusing to "donate" several drums of fuel for the "jihad." 
He was assassinated five days later. 
 
3. (SBU) Adow also described the closure of Shabelle's Merka FM 
station after al-Shabaab demanded a list of radio programs.  Rather 
than air extremist-directed programming, particularly re-broadcasts 
of programming from Shabaab's Andulus Radio, or have their equipment 
confiscated, the managers decided to tell the Shabaab authorities in 
Merka that the equipment had technical problems and needed to be 
taken to Mogadishu for repairs, after which the staff closed the 
station.  In Mogadishu, the owner of the building in which SMN rents 
its office space had been threatened if he did not evict Radio 
Shabelle.  Adow said masked men were stationed near the Shabelle 
headquarters daily, monitoring who entered and who left.  Adow 
claimed that several SMN staffers have been holed up in the building 
for several weeks, fearing assassination if they left the location. 
Adow also stated that Shabaab was monitoring the SMN website.  While 
the website has a U.S. Embassy logo from a program several years 
ago, they are reluctant to post any new Embasy material, such as 
Embassy press releases. 
 
4. (SBU) More broadly, Yusuf and Amiin repeated the oft-heard 
statements that any station that refused to carry pro-Shabaab 
programs would have its personnel targeted.  Owing to Somalia's 
often-intertwined relationships among reporters and outlets, a 
number of the reporters injured or harassed in the recent past have 
been associated with SMN. 
 
------------ 
Relocate, or 
Close 
------------ 
 
5. (SBU) Yusuf and Adow, who reside in the UK and Sweden 
respectively, told us that their fifty Mogadishu-based employees 
have told SMN management that they will tender their resignations 
within a week unless something is done to mitigate the obvious risks 
involved in their work.  Yusuf and Adow appealed for assistance in 
relocating the operations to Nairobi.  They had plans to build 
studios in Minnesota and London, as well.  According to their USD 
700,000 proposal, they would transmit programs to Mogadishu via 
satellite, where a skeleton staff would transfer the signal to FM 
transmitters in the capital.  The two appeared resigned to the fact 
that the deteriorating situation would not allow their station to 
survive in Mogadishu. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
6. (SBU) Independent media in Somalia are clearly operating in a 
climate of fear and intimidation, although SMN's circumstances 
appear bleaker than most.  We cannot corroborate Yusuf's and Adow's 
account, but the assassination of Hirabe on June 7 serves as a 
chilling reminder of the hazards that Somali journalists face.  Our 
 
NAIROBI 00001627  002 OF 002 
 
 
requests to have U.S. officials conduct interviews on Somalia-based 
stations are almost uniformly turned down because of the 
intimidation detailed by Yusuf and Adow.  Our offers to advocate on 
behalf of the threatened stations are also refused, often with 
specific requests not to associate the stations with the USG in any 
manner. 
 
SLUTZ