VZCZCXYZ0015
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNR #1547/01 2011348
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201348Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0419

UNCLAS NAIROBI 001547 
 
AIDAC 
 
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7537 
RUEHSUN/USMISSION USUN ROME IT 
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 4645 
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 2166 
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA 
RHMCSUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL BT 
USAID/DCHA 
DCHA/OFDA FOR ACONVERY, KCHANNELL, CCHRISTIE 
DCHA/FFP FOR JBORNS, JDWORKEN, SANTHONY, CMUTAMBA, 
DNELSON 
AFR/EA 
STATE FOR AF/E, AF/F AND PRM 
USUN FOR DMERCADO 
USMISSION UN ROME FOR HSPANOS 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
BRUSSELS FOR PBROWN 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID ECON EAGR TBIO SOCI PHUM PREL KE
SUBJECT:  HUMANITARIAN IMPLICATIONS OF DELAYED USG 
FUNDING TO SOMALIA 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  USG humanitarian funds for assistance to Somalia 
are frozen at a critical time when humanitarian 
conditions are deteriorating, humanitarian funding is 
not keeping pace with rising needs, and donors forecast 
decreased funding on the horizon.  Lack of resolution 
within the USG regarding funding to Somalia due to US 
Department of Treasury Office of Foreign Asset Control 
(OFAC) licensing restrictions, threatens the ability of 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and 
Office of Food for Peace (FFP) partners to continue to 
implement life-saving programs.  A cessation of USAID- 
funded humanitarian programs will not only adversely 
affect the broader humanitarian system in Somalia but 
may increase insecurity and threaten relations between 
partners and community members as well as endanger 
relations between the USG and the Somali people.  The 
continued delay of humanitarian assistance will have a 
devastating impact on the 3.2 million Somalis in need 
of life-saving assistance. End summary. 
 
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A CRITICAL HUMANITARIAN SITUATION 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  As of July 2009, international humanitarian 
agencies estimated that 3.2 million Somalis, or 
approximately 43 percent of the population, require 
emergency humanitarian assistance.  According to the 
U.N., recent escalation in fighting between Somalia?s 
Transitional Federal Government forces and armed 
militia groups in Mogadishu has resulted in the 
displacement of more than 200,000 people from Mogadishu 
since May 7, most of whom have moved to the Afgooye 
corridor joining more than 400,000 others displaced 
since 2007.  The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) has reported that recently displaced people are 
in urgent need of shelter and other emergency relief 
supplies.  In addition, violence, increasingly 
targeting women, has disrupted trade and market 
activities, further exacerbating food insecurity and 
widespread malnutrition. 
 
¶3.  According to a June 12 Somalia Food Security and 
Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) report, the northern 
regions are experiencing emerging drought due to recent 
rain failure and the central regions are experiencing 
prolonged drought following five consecutive seasons of 
rain failure.  FSNAU estimates that in the central 
regions, 60 percent of the population is classified 
either in acute food and livelihood crisis or 
humanitarian emergency due to drought, hyperinflation, 
and conflict, which have affected internally displaced 
people (IDP), as well as rural and urban populations. 
May nutrition surveys confirm that the nutrition 
situation is classified as critical and remains above 
the emergency threshold with global acute malnutrition 
(GAM) rates between 15.3 and 18.0 percent and in some 
areas as high as 25 percent.  Humanitarian partners 
warn that based on current trends, malnutrition is 
likely to worsen in the near future. 
 
¶4.   Recent U.N. assessments indicate the continuation 
of widespread food insecurity in many parts of the 
country through November 2009 and estimate that nearly 
1.3 million IDPs throughout Somalia could be affected 
by deteriorating humanitarian conditions through the 
next six months. 
 
 
----------------------- 
HUMANITARIAN SHORTFALL 
----------------------- 
 
¶5.  U.N. and non-governmental organization (NGO) 
officials have noted that humanitarian funding is not 
keeping pace with rising needs in Somalia.  Despite 
increased needs, donors forecast lower funding levels 
this year, due in part to currency depreciation, 
especially for European donors.  In addition, many 
donors that received supplemental funding in 2008 to 
support humanitarian response to global food and fuel 
price increases are not expecting to receive the same 
level of funding this year. 
 
¶6.  As of July 8, 2009, contributions to the U.N.-led 
Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) stood at 49 percent 
of the estimated USD 918 million necessary for 
humanitarian operations in Somalia.  Critical sectors, 
including health, and water, sanitation, and hygiene 
(WASH), are funded at 35 percent and 18 percent 
respectively.  The U.S. government is the largest donor 
to the CAP providing nearly 21 percent of current CAP 
contributions for Somalia, mostly in the form of food 
aid. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
CONTEXT OF USG HUMANITARIAN FUNDING TO SOMALIA 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶7.  USAID supports humanitarian services targeting 3.2 
million vulnerable Somalis.  To date in FY 2009 the USG 
has provided more than USD 149 million for humanitarian 
assistance programs in Somalia, including more than USD 
9 million through USAID/OFDA to support agriculture and 
food security, economy and market systems, refugee 
assistance, health, nutrition, protection, and WASH 
interventions.  To date in FY 2009 USAID/FFP has 
contributed nearly 160,000 metric tons (MT) of P.L. 480 
Title II emergency food assistance, valued at USD 124 
million in food aid for Somalia; reaching more than 2.7 
million people and accounting for half the total food 
aid donations for the country. 
 
¶8.  Since 1991, USAID has provided more than one 
billion USD in humanitarian assistance to Somalia, 
including more than USD 247 million in life-saving 
water, sanitation, nutrition, protection, and health 
care interventions, and more than USD 752 million in 
food aid, 40 percent of which has been in the last two 
fiscal years. 
 
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OFAC LISCENSE AND CONTINUED FUNDING DELAYS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶9.  The USG has frozen humanitarian funding to Somalia, 
pending discussions between USAID, the U.S Department 
of State, and the Department of Treasury regarding the 
need for an OFAC waiver due to Al-Shabaab?s designation 
as a terrorist organization.  The continued delay of 
humanitarian assistance funds is likely to have a 
devastating and long-lasting impact on humanitarian 
operations in Somalia and on the 3.2 million Somalis in 
need of life-saving assistance. 
 
------------------------------------ 
HEAVY COST TO HUMANITARIAN CAPACITY 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶10.  In early July, USAID/OFDA queried humanitarian 
partners working in southern Somalia regarding the 
expected impact of a prolonged funding delay.  The 
 
partners indicated that a continued delay in funding 
would likely result in the rapid scaling down of 
critical humanitarian activities.  Many partners 
indicated that programs are at risk in the coming weeks 
pending approval of no-cost extensions and, in the 
absence of approval, organizations may need to halt 
planned program activities. A few partners suggested 
that through internal emergency funding mechanisms such 
as pre-financing, organizations may be able to retain 
key staff for up to one month beyond the fourth quarter 
of the fiscal year.  However, funding delays beyond 
this point will most likely require partners to lay-off 
local and international project staff and totally 
suspend USAID/OFDA-funded activities. 
 
¶11.   Humanitarian partners caution that closing down 
USAID/OFDA-funded programs may nullify achievements 
made, successes gained, and relationships developed 
with beneficiary communities.  In addition, 
humanitarian partners warned that if most or all 
USAID/OFDA partners experiencing delayed funding resort 
to closing down programs then a large number of local 
staff may be laid off not only decreasing overall 
partner capacity but possibly contributing to a 
favorable environment for recruitment of unemployed 
youth by violent and terrorist elements and resulting 
in a degradation of the operating environment for other 
humanitarian actors in the field. 
 
¶12.   Humanitarian partners expect that suspension of 
USAID/OFDA funded activities could result in grievances 
towards USAID and USAID partners from community members 
affected either by lack of services at a critical time 
or by unemployment of family members laid-off by USAID 
partners.  Community grievances are expected to 
increase insecurity for remaining humanitarian staff 
and would likely obstruct resumption of programs 
following resolution of the funding freeze.  In 
addition, partners warn that closing programs may also 
result in looting of program assets. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
IMPACT OF DELAYED FUNDING ON SOMALI PEOPLE 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶13.  In many locations USAID/OFDA-funded partners are 
the only humanitarian organizations operating or 
providing particular services.  For example, since the 
recent security related exit of a humanitarian partner 
from the Lower Juba Region, one USAID/OFDA-funded 
humanitarian partner remains the only NGO operating in 
the region.  If USAID/OFDA support is suspended, people 
in the region will be forced to face chronic food and 
livelihood insecurity without external support and may 
be forced to move in search of food, water, pasture, 
and security.  Partners caution that people moving in 
search of humanitarian support may result in increased 
population movements toward the Kenyan border and 
already congested refugee camps. In addition, any 
reduction in humanitarian assistance increases the risk 
of local community intolerance toward displaced people 
from the south and increases IDPs susceptibility to 
extremism. 
 
¶14.  WASH remains a critical sector in Somalia.  All 
partners queried provide WASH services in key locations 
throughout Somalia.  Partners warned program closure 
could result in increased incidence of communicable 
disease, morbidity, and mortality due to limited WASH 
services; especially considering recent U.N. World 
Health Organization reports of increasing cholera 
outbreaks.  One organization estimated that without 
USAID/OFDA support 280,000 displaced or emergency 
 
affected people will lack access to safe water through 
USAID/OFDA-funded program activities.  In addition, 
USAID/OFDA WASH partners caution that when boreholes 
stop working, pastoralists move to other boreholes that 
remain operational resulting in a greater number of 
animals moving to bordering regional areas and 
increasing the burden on grazing.  Conflict may arise 
between different groups and clans as they seek access 
to grazing and water in areas where there are no cross- 
group or clan grazing rights.  WASH partners warn that 
delayed funding may result in increasing rural-urban 
migration as pastoralists cannot maintain their herds 
without water supplies.  Population movements may also 
result in growing population density in towns causing 
increased levels of sanitation related diseases. 
 
¶15.  USAID/OFDA funding plays a vital role in 
addressing the worsening nutritional status of children 
under five years of age.  Three partners reported that 
continued funding delays would severely affect at least 
25,600 malnourished children currently being treated 
through USAID/OFDA-funded programs. 
 
¶16.  All USAID/OFDA humanitarian partners queried 
reported that long-term funding delays would result in 
the need to lay-off more than 210 local staff members 
affecting support to approximately 1550 immediate 
family members.  [Note: This number represents of a 
small pool of seven partners.  USAID/OFDA supports at 
least 20 partners in Somalia, therefore the real impact 
of program closure on local staff and immediate family 
members is expected to be as much as three times as 
great as the impact estimated by the seven partners 
operating in southern Somalia. End Note.] The resulting 
unemployment will increase the probability of relapse 
into harmful activities by youth through recruitment 
into piracy, Al-Shabaab, and other groups due to lack 
of meaningful ventures to apply their skills.  Partners 
warn that staff layoffs may cause small household 
economies that are now sprouting to fall into recession 
and possibly destitution.  In addition, resource-based 
conflict may increase resulting in further displacement 
of communities. 
 
¶17.  Food aid provided through USAID/FFP is a major 
component of USG humanitarian assistance to Somalia. 
The U.N. World Food Program (WFP), FFP?s primary food 
partner, recently reported that continued effectiveness 
of the Somalia country program relies heavily on USG 
contributions.  For example, USG contributions to WFP 
amount to 54 percent of total WFPcontributions in 2009 
and more than 56 percent in 2008.  Delayed funding to 
USAID food aid partners would have a devastating impact 
on the 2.7 million people currently benefiting from 
food distributions leaving them susceptible not only to 
hunger, malnutrition, and further displacement, but 
also to manipulation and recruitment by extremist 
groups. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
LONG-TERM IMPACT TO HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMS 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶18.  Humanitarian partners note that when USG 
humanitarian funding resumes, partners will face 
serious financial burdens as well as poor relations 
with the local community that may prevent partners from 
restarting programs.  Laid-off local staff members that 
represent a great financial investment in training, may 
have moved on to other positions requiring partners to 
re-invest in training new staff members.  The financial 
burden to replace looted assets and to rehire and 
retrain staff may be cost prohibitive.  In addition, 
 
 
 
 
hostilities created between staff and local communities 
during close-out may make it difficult to restart 
program activities at a later date. 
 
¶19.  Partners report that long-term funding delays may 
result in a lack of capacity for the organization as a 
whole.  Recently, a USAID/OFDA humanitarian partner 
closed programs in the South and Central regions 
following credible Al-Shabaab threats.  Since program 
closure in the two regions, the organization has 
experienced reduced emergency response capacity 
particularly in food programming and disruptions in 
service delivery resulting and widening humanitarian 
gaps throughout the humanitarian community in Somalia. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
IMPACT OF DELAYED FUNDING ON HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶20.  The USG has been an active participant in 
improving humanitarian coordination. Long-term delay of 
USG humanitarian funding may damage investments in 
coordination, partnerships, and linkages between 
programs and activities in various sectors.  For 
example, one partner noted that USAID/OFDA-funded WASH, 
nutrition, and agriculture and livelihoods activities 
are designed to complement U.K Department for 
International Development (DFID)-funded health 
interventions.  In addition the connection between 
access to WASH services and improved nutrition levels 
in children has long been recognized as an issue of 
coordination.  Health partners coordinate and connect 
USAID/OFDA-supported WASH programs with WFP-targeted 
feeding programs reaching severely and moderately 
malnourished children.  Postponement of the USAID/OFDA 
funded water programs will undermine efforts to improve 
nutrition levels of affected children. 
 
¶21.  Delay in USAID/OFDA funding to U.N. agencies may 
slow or stop the pipeline of emergency relief supplies 
to many NGOs including those that may not be 
USAID/OFDA-funded but are a part of the broader 
humanitarian system.  For example, a U.N. partner uses 
USAID/OFDA funds to provide nutrition supplies to 
several international NGOs.  Delayed funding to U.N. 
agencies would have a serious impact on many 
humanitarian partners operating in Somalia, including 
those not funded by USAID/OFDA. 
 
¶22.  An essential component to humanitarian 
coordination is access and availability of information 
regarding the situation in the field and information 
sharing.  Withdrawal of USAID humanitarian partners due 
to long-term funding delays will result in significant 
difficulties in obtaining first-hand information, data, 
and statistics on the humanitarian situation in various 
locations throughout Somalia including some difficult 
to reach districts where very few NGOs operate. 
 
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COMMENTS 
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¶23.  Since there is no fully functioning government or 
system of governance that is capable of delivering 
services currently provided by humanitarian actors, 
anytime a donor or NGO exits, the burden of 
responsibility for services is directly transferred to 
the local communities.  The local communities not only 
lack capacity but are preyed upon by Al-Shabaab, and 
other groups that leverage poverty to garner support. 
 
¶24.  Maintaining consistent levels of funding for 
 
international organizations, U.N. agencies, and NGOs 
providing frontline assistance to IDPs and vulnerable 
host communities is critical.  USAID/OFDA implementing 
partners must be able to maintain and expand capacity- 
building and supportive relationships with groups that 
are better able to rapidly respond to emergencies in 
insecure environments including local NGOs, community 
based organizations, and district and regional 
authorities. 
 
¶25.  Despite the difficult operating environment, the 
USG has continuously provided humanitarian assistance 
to Somalia since 1991. There is no known precedent for 
halting humanitarian assistance, even in countries 
known to host terrorist groups.  The current 
humanitarian crisis in Somalia is the worst since the 
early 1990s and a delay or cessation in USG 
humanitarian assistance will further compound the 
crisis. 
 
ABELL