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Viewing cable 09MOSCOW1847, RUSSIAN ANALYSTS: OBAMA'S VISIT FIRST STEP ON LONG

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1847 2009-07-17 13:12 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO0165
PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #1847/01 1981312
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 171312Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4289
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001847 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL RS US XH MARR MCAP PARM PHUM KMDR
SUBJECT:  RUSSIAN ANALYSTS: OBAMA'S VISIT FIRST STEP ON LONG 
JOURNEY 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Reactions to President Obama's July 6-8 trip to 
Moscow have been largely positive among Russia's analytic community 
and political activists, most of whom saw the summit as setting the 
stage for a further improvement in the bilateral relationship.  The 
President's approach, particularly his message of respect for Russia 
as a "great power," resonated with the elite's own perception that 
their country has returned to international prominence.  Those 
focused on strategic issues tended to see the summit as successful, 
noting the time spent discussing missile defense systems and their 
link to offensive weapons, and they praised the agreements on 
transit to Afghanistan and the Joint Understanding on a START 
follow-on treaty.  There was some grumbling from the fringes of the 
political establishment, both from the nationalist camp and from 
liberal circles.  The human rights community and the more vocal 
political opposition criticized the visit for not addressing Russian 
internal issues, such as Moscow's handing of political dissent -- 
reflecting their hope that the U.S. would publicly challenge the 
tandem on those issues.  The visit also contributed to an 
incremental shift in public opinion toward a more positive 
assessment of the U.S. and its approach to Russia. 
End summary. 
 
Getting the Message Out 
----------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) President Obama's visit to Moscow was literally front page 
news for all the major newspapers and on the nightly television 
broadcasts.  As always, the tandem leadership sought to control the 
message, however, and used its influence over the television media 
to limit the general public's exposure to the full range of 
President Obama's message.  For example, his speech at the New 
Economic School (NES) graduation was carried live solely on the 24 
hour news channel (and then only after a direct high-level appeal to 
do so); the channels broadcasted excerpts only.  President Obama's 
meeting with opposition figures and civil society was largely pushed 
to the side in the media space -- garnering a passing reference in 
the daily news programs, if at all, and relegated to the less 
watched weekend analytic shows.  Some media sources played up the 
participation of Garry Kasparov in the opposition meeting and 
ignored the role of the more established Communist leader Gennady 
Zyuganov. 
 
3. (SBU) In general, though, the official media termed President 
Obama's trip to Moscow a definite success and a good start towards 
restoring the U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship.  Typical of that 
line, RIA Novosti's Dmitry Babich labeled the Obama-Medvedev summit 
a success, even as he complained that the leaders "did not resolve 
all the issues that burden the Russia-U.S. relationship."  Indeed, 
Babich admitted that a quick, full breakthrough in Russian-U.S. 
relations "would have been viewed with suspicion by public opinion 
in both the United States and Russia." 
 
4. (SBU) Obama's visit also topped the charts on the Russian 
blogosphere, with near 4,000 entries on a range of sites.  Chatter 
peaked at 1,700 postings between 7 and 8 July, carrying discussion 
about the key issues of the summit.  The meeting generated 
considerable buzz on both the liberal sites (such as those hosted by 
Solidarity leader Boris Nemtsov and leftist youth movement leader 
Ilya Ponamarev) as well as extremely critical assessments from the 
nationalist fringe.  The Russian television station Vesti posted the 
President's NES speech prominently on its website (as did the 
Embassy on the Russian video server RuTube) -- giving his message 
continuous accessibility to a broader, technically savvy audience. 
 
Punditry Mixed on Summit Assessments 
------------------------------------ 
 
5. (SBU) Russia's commentariat saw the summit as mixed bag, 
providing an important first step in re-orienting the relationship, 
but with an honest assessment of the differences that continue to 
divide us.  Boris Makarenko from the Center for Political 
Technologies called the departure from "zero sum" thinking the main 
success of the visit.  As examples for this he cited the agreement 
on Afghanistan, the downplaying of Ukraine and Georgia, the expected 
resubmission to Congress of the 123 Agreement, the "Medvedev-Obama" 
commission, the START follow-on talks, and U.S. "appreciation" of 
Russia's missile defense position.  Aleksey Malashenko of Moscow's 
Carnegie Center agreed the summit was successful, especially 
considering the agreements on Afghan transit and the Joint 
Understanding.  However, he did not yet see a full reset of 
relations because there remain contentious issues between the 
countries beyond these two agreements.  His colleague at Carnegie, 
political analyst Andrey Ryabov, called the agreement on Afghan 
transit the main result of the summit, but told Ekho Moskviy radio 
July 10 that the resetting of relations had not happened because the 
sides had "absolutely different approaches to strategic directions 
in world politics and international relations." 
 
R-E-S-P-E-C-T 
 
MOSCOW 00001847  002 OF 003 
 
 
------------- 
 
6. (SBU) The President's emphasis on his respect for Russia as a 
great power and a necessary partner for the U.S. in resolving a 
range of difficult international issues was widely and favorably 
noted, even among opinion shapers usually critical of Washington's 
policies.  Notably, the head of the Effective Policy Foundation, 
Gleb Pavlovskiy, considered the personal contact between Medvedev 
and Obama a good foundation for further dialogue and cooperation. 
Fellow conservative/nationalist spin-meister Vyacheslav Nikonov, 
President of Politika Foundation, told Ivestiya that Obama surprised 
many by speaking so respectfully of Russia.  Nikonov said, "Obama is 
the first U.S. president to recognize this country's contribution to 
the world and American civilization.  He has impressed by being free 
of the Cold War thinking - there are few people like him among 
Western political elites." 
 
Perceived Link between MD and START 
----------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) On the security side, the main issue for the Russia side 
was their perception of a U.S. policy shift to acknowledge the 
relationship between offensive and defensive weapon systems -- 
linking Missile Defense with reduction in strategic arsenals. 
Federation Council Foreign Relations Committee Chair Mikhail 
Margelov termed this a "significant step;" Babich called the U.S. 
offer to cooperate with Russia on anti-ballistic missiles a welcome 
departure from the previous U.S. administration's position.  Nikonov 
expressed hope that the Obama administration would be willing to 
compromise on the subject of missile defense. 
 
8. (SBU) Some saw U.S. flexibility on strategic weapons as part of a 
quid pro quo for Russian compromises on other security issues.  The 
Director of the Institute for Political Expertise Yevgeniy Minchenko 
stated that the U.S. finally acknowledged Russia's linkage between a 
missile defense (MD) system and cooperation on the reduction of 
strategic nuclear armaments in exchange for Russian cooperation on 
Afghanistan and Iran. 
 
9. (SBU) Not all assessments were so even-handed.  Chairman of the 
Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Konstantin Kosachev criticized U.S. 
plans to unilaterally deploy missile defense systems even as he 
lauded the Obama Administration's decision to "at the most stop and 
at the least re-examine the U.S. MD system in Central and Eastern 
Europe."  Representing the troglodyte tendencies in the military 
elite, the President of the Geopolitical Academy, Colonel General 
(retired) Leonid Ivashov threatened that if the U.S. did not freeze 
its MD plans, Russia would be compelled to increase its strategic 
nuclear weapons stockpile and develop its own MD system. 
 
Criticism from the Liberal Camp 
------------------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) Among the human rights community and liberal political 
circles, Obama's visit drew some criticism and disappointment for 
what they saw as the President's pulled punches on Russia's internal 
issues.  Representing the most vocal (and extreme) critics, Valeriya 
Novodvorskaya, an independent journalist and long-time opponent of 
the Kremlin, called the visit a failure, placing blame not only on 
Obama, but also on members of the Russian opposition and the human 
rights community for not being tougher on Russian internal failings. 
 Novodvorskaya mainly argued that the real problems in Russian 
politics, such as "Putin's dictatorship," Russia's repressive 
government system, and the quelling of political dissent went 
unnoticed in the recent summit.  Others took a more even-handed 
approach.  Prominent liberal and participant in the President's 
meeting with opposition, Vladimir Ryzhkov, noted on Radio Svoboda 
that unlike President Bush who met with only Kremlin officials, 
President Obama met with NGO representatives and opposition 
leaders. 
 
11. (SBU) For some, the issues that were not publicly addressed at 
the summit were as significant as those that were discussed.  Noting 
an apparent effort to avoid previous areas of major dispute, they 
pointed out that Obama did not publicly mention last year's war in 
Georgia, while Medvedev made no mention of American military bases 
in Central Asia.  Stanislav Petrov, writing for Vremya Novostey, 
also noted that the topic of intellectual property was not included 
in the summit's agenda. 
 
Visit Creates Bump in Popular Assessments 
----------------------------------------- 
 
12. (SBU) Looking beyond the elite, President Obama's visit marked a 
first step toward changing negative public opinion about the U.S., 
its policies, and priorities.  Preliminary polling data from the 
Fund for Public Opinion (FOM) showed that the visit, particularly 
the positive coverage provided by the state-controlled television, 
contributed to a rise in the number of average Russians who viewed 
 
MOSCOW 00001847  003 OF 003 
 
 
the U.S. as a state with a friendly relationship toward their 
country.  From a nadir of 10 percent in the aftermath of the 
conflict in Georgia last summer, a third of respondents (2,000 
respondents from 100 population centers across 44 Russian regions 
from 11-12 July) said that they considered the U.S. to have a 
friendly approach to Russia -- the highest rating since March 2004. 
The number of respondents who saw the U.S. as hostile to Russia 
declined to about half -- down from three-quarters last August. 
Forty percent of respondents expected relations to improve in the 
near term, whereas only 3 percent saw a downturn as likely. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
13. (SBU) The normally fractious opinion-shaping and analytic 
community appear to agree that President Obama's trip helped to 
crack the ice that had frozen around Russian elite and popular views 
of the U.S., setting a cornerstone to put the bilateral relationship 
on a more cooperative footing.  Expectations were high and in some 
cases unrealistic, particularly among those outside the political 
establishment, and contributed to some measure of disappointment in 
those circles.  The President's demonstration of support for 
Russia's nascent civil society and opposition figures provided a 
clear message to Russia's political establishment of our continued 
interest in human rights and political freedom.  Certainly, a more 
assertive public criticism of the regime would have been airbrushed 
out of the picture by the Kremlin in its presentation of the summit, 
thereby limiting its impact on the broader public.  As our most 
objective Russian analyst contacts have told us, by showing a 
sincere willingness to work with Medvedev, President Obama took a 
first step in alleviating Russian perceptions of U.S. disregard for 
Moscow's interests and visibly extended an invitation for Medvedev 
to join the world's responsible leadership -- with an understanding 
that participation in that membership entails adherence to 
international norms and expectations. 
 
BEYRLE